Holman et al v. W-Industries of Louisiana, LLC

Filing 142

RULING re 120 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Nabors Drilling U S A L P. Signed by Judge Robert G James on 12/15/14. (crt,DickersonSld, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION

DENNIS E. HOLMAN AND
YOLANDA HOLMAN

CIVIL ACTION 11-1864

VERSUS

JUDGE ROBERT G. JAMES

W-INDUSTRIES OF LOUISIANA, LLC,
ET AL.

MAG. JUDGE KAREN L. HAYES

RULING
Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 120] filed by
Defendant Nabors Drilling USA, LP (“Nabors”). Plaintiffs Dennis and Yolanda Holman (“the
Holmans”) have filed an opposition memorandum [Doc. No. 125], and Nabors has filed a reply
memorandum [Doc. No. 129].
I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Dennis Holman (“Holman”) worked as a production operator for Greystar Corporation

(“Greystar) aboard the ATP TITAN, a complex structure serving as both a drilling platform and
production facility in the Telemark Field in the Gulf of Mexico.
On November 3, 2010, Holman was in the galley eating cereal. He heard a loud “boom” and
felt the platform sway. [Doc. No. 120, Exhibit A, Holman Depo., pp. 89-90]. After that, the
Emergency Shut Down and Deluge System (“ESDDS”) was activated. The lights went out, and the
abandon platform alarm began sounding.

There were reports of a gas release from the process area. Therefore, Holman’s supervisor,
Deral Cox (“Cox”), sent him below the platform to “kill the electrical pump” and stop any release.
Id.
Because the water deluge system had begun to operate, spraying the platform with tens of
thousands of gallons of water in order to suppress a potential fire, the piping and deck were wet and
slippery. As Holman ascended a stairwell, his grip slipped, he stumbled backwards, and injured his
back.
After the accident, Holman returned to the control room. By that time, the lights were back
on, and the emergency generator was operating. Holman took off the remainder of his shift and was
returned to shore by helicopter the next day. He did not return to work.
It was later determined that the entire event was a false alarm. However, Holman did not
know what activated the ESDDS, the abandon platform warning, and the deluge system. He was told
that the noise he heard was the sound of a grocery box hitting the living quarters on the ATP Titan
when the Nabors crane operator was trying to lift the box, but Holman has no personal knowledge
of what caused the ESDDS activation and resulting issues.
Cody Dupre (“Dupre”), who was employed by Greystar as the Lead I & E Technician1 on the
ATP Titan, was the “go-to person on the investigation” of the ESDDS activation and prepared the
official Incident Report. [Doc. No. 120, Exh. D, Dupre Depo., p. 116]; [Doc. No. 125, Exh. 1]. Dupre
did not find any connection between the impact of the grocery box on the handrail and the activation
of the ESDDS, the abandon platform warning, and the deluge system.

1

“I & E” presumably refers to instrumentation and electrical technician.
2

On October 21, 2011, the Holmans brought suit against W-Industries of Louisiana, LLC (“WIndustries”), asserting claims under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”).2 The
Holmans allege that W-Industries, which performed repair and maintenance services on the ATP
Titan, are liable because its technicians negligently set the low voltage “trip level” for the ESDDS at
23 volts, rather than 21 volts, which, in turn, caused the circuit breakers to trip unnecessarily. The
battery supplying power was drained and allegedly caused the scenario resulting in Holman’s
incident. Mrs. Holman also asserted a loss of consortium claim under Louisiana law.
On June 1, 2012, with leave of Court, the Holmans amended their Complaint. [Doc. No. 13].
As it was unclear whether the ATP Titan might be considered a vessel, rather than a platform, the
Holmans amended to assert a maritime claim. The Holmans also added Emerson Network Power,
Liebert Services, Inc. (“Emerson”), because it was alleged that an Emerson employee was responsible
for setting the low trip level.
On August 10, 2012, W-Industries filed a Third Party Demand against Nabors, among others.
[Doc. No. 23].
On June 23, 2014, the Holmans filed a Third Supplemental and Amended Complaint adding
Nabors as a Defendant. [Doc. No. 104].
On October 10, 2014, Nabors filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No.
120].3 The Holmans timely filed an opposition memorandum [Doc. No. 125]. Nabors filed a reply
memorandum. [Doc. No. 129]. The Court is now prepared to rule.

2

The incident occurred on the Outer Continental Shelf in the Gulf of Mexico.

3

Nabors also filed a Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. No. 119], but
the Court has first considered the summary judgment motion.
3

II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
A.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment “should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED . R. CIV . P. 56(c)(2). The moving party
bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion by identifying portions of
the record which highlight the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Topalian v. Ehrmann, 954
F.2d 1125, 1132 (5th Cir. 1992). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would
affect the outcome of the lawsuit under applicable law in the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that
a reasonable fact finder could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
If the moving party can meet the initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party
to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Norman v. Apache Corp., 19
F.3d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1994). The nonmoving party must show more than “some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). In evaluating the evidence tendered by the parties, the Court must accept the evidence
of the nonmovant as credible and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
255.
B.

Cause-in-Fact

The Holmans have asserted a negligence action against Nabors. To determine whether a
plaintiff should recover on a negligence claim, Louisiana courts employ a duty-risk analysis. Long
v. State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. and Dev., 916 So.2d 87, 101 (La. 2005). Under the duty-risk analysis,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant had a duty to conform to a specific standard of care
4

(duty); (2) the defendant failed to conform its conduct to that standard (breach); (3) the defendant’s
substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries (cause-in-fact); (4) the defendant’s
substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (legal causation or scope of liablity);
and (5) that he suffered actual damages (damages). See Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 94-C-0952,
p. 5 (La. 11/30/94); 646 So.2d 318, 322 (citations omitted); Long v. State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. and
Dev., 04–0485, p. 21 (La. 6/29/05); 916 So.2d 87, 101 (citations omitted). A plaintiff’s failure to
prove any of the elements of the duty-risk analysis results in a determination of no liability. Lemann
v. Essen Lane Daiquiris, Inc., 05–1095 (La. 3/10/06); 923 So.2d 627.
To meet the cause-in-fact element, a plaintiff generally “must prove only that the conduct was
a necessary antecedent of the accident, that is, but for the defendant’s conduct, the incident probably
would not have occurred.” Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So.2d 1032 (La. 1991) (citing Timothy J.
McNamara, The Duties and Risks of the Duty-Risk Analysis, 44 LA . L. REV . 1227, 1231 (1984)).
Nevertheless, “[w]here there are concurrent causes of an accident, the proper inquiry is whether the
conduct in question was a substantial factor in bringing about the accident.”4 Jones v. Centerpoint
Energy Entex, 11–02 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/25/11); 66 So.3d 539, 548 (quoting Perkins v. Entergy Corp.,
00–1372, 00–1387, 00–1440, p. 8 (La. 3/23/01); 782 So.2d 606, 611). Cause-in-fact is a factual

4

In Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242
La. 471, 137 So.2d 298 (1962), we stated that “conduct is a
cause-in-fact of harm to another if it was a substantial factor in
bringing about that harm.” Id. at 302. Elaborating on that
pronouncement of law, we stated negligent conduct is a substantial
factor if the harm would not have occurred without the conduct,
i.e., but for defendant’s conduct, plaintiff would not have sustained
injury. Thereby, we equated the two concepts of substantial factor
and necessary antecedent.

Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 08–1163, p. 27 (La. 5/22/09); 16 So.3d 1065, 1086.
5

question to be determined by the factfinder, but “summary judgment may be appropriate when there
is no evidence to show that the defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s injuries.” Estate of
Robinson v. Continental Cas. Co., 44-952, p. 12 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2010); 31 So.3d 1194, 1202; Nettle
v. Frischhertz Elec. Co. Inc., 2009-1404, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2010); 40 So.3d 1144, 1147.
In this case, the Holmans contend that the “boom” Holman heard occurred when Nabors’
crane operator caused a grocery box to hit a handrail near the living quarters while attempting to lift
the box from the platform. The Holmans further contend that this impact was a substantial factor in
the activation of the ESDDS and in Holman’s injury. While it is largely undisputed that the crane
operator allowed the grocery box to hit the handrail,5 Nabors argues that it is entitled to summary
judgment because the Holmans have produced no admissible evidence this incident played a
substantial factor in the ESDDS activation, loss of lighting, or in Holman’s injury.
Since this lawsuit was filed, eleven people have been deposed. Dupre, the Greystar Lead I &
E Technician, testified that he was the person with the most knowledge about the power supply and
battery back-up system that caused the ESDDS to be activated. [Doc. No. 120, Exh. D, Dupre Depo.,
p. 116]. He was standing about 20 feet from where the crane swung the grocery box into the hand
rail. After hearing the noise, Dupre walked to the side of the platform and looked at the crane
operator. He saw a cut cable before the platform went dark.
Once power was restored, Dupre began to investigate the cause of the problem.

Dupre

opened the battery charger in the Motor Control Center (“MCC”) and saw the relay was set at 23
volts, rather than 21 volts its design called for. In Dupre’s opinion, if the relay had been set at 21

5

The crane operator, Roderick Wafer, testified that he has no recollection of allowing a
box to strike the rig in some way. [Doc. No. 125, Exh. 4, Wafer Depo., pp. 34-46]. He does not
deny the incident, but has no recollection of it. All other deponents testified that this incident
occurred.
6

volts, the alarms would not have sounded, and the power loss would not have occurred. When the
power reaches 23 volts, an alarm sounds, but Dupre believed that the alarms had been ignored
because of a lack of communication between himself and the operator on duty.
Dupre specifically considered and excluded the impact of the grocery box on the handrail as
a cause of the ESDDS activation. Dupre saw the box against the handrail, and there was no
emergency shut down (“ESD”) button between the box and the handrail, only a lighting cable. There
was an ESD button in the general vicinity of the impact, but that button was protected by a metal
guard to prevent accidental activation. According to Dupre, even if the grocery box had hit an ESD
button, the facility would have been “shut-in” and the main turbine deactivated, but the emergency
generator would have remained intact. [Doc. No. 120, Exh. D, Dupre Depo., pp. 113-14].
However, on the night of the incident, the main turbine was off and the emergency generator
was not available. The system is not sensitive to impacts or vibrations, only to voltage and amperage.
Dupre concluded that the improper setting of the relay in the battery charger drained the batteries to
the power supply, causing the entire chain of events. Dupre concluded that the timing of the two
events–the impact of the grocery box and the later ESDDS activation–was “sheer coincidence.” [Doc.
No. 120, Exh. D, Dupre Depo., p. 115].
Other persons involved in the incident, including Holman’s supervisor, Cox, either testified
consistently with Dupre or testified that they had no knowledge of what caused the chain of events.
See [Doc. No. 120, Exh. B, Cox Depo., pp. 117-121; Exh. C, Depo. of Greystar control room
operator, Ryan Hicks, pp. 48-49; Exh. E, Depo. of W-Industries I & E Technician Ben Casey, pp.
167-69; Exh. F, Depo. of UP Systems service technician, Richard Reed, pp. 128-29; Exh. G, Depo.
of UP Systems service manager, Patrick Thomas, pp. 44 & 56].

7

Given the evidence presented by Nabors, the Holmans had to present some evidence showing
that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial that the actions of Nabors’ crane operator was
a substantial factor in Holman’s injuries. To meet this requirement, the Holmans point to the
testimony of Mark Martin (“Martin”), the lead barge supervisor for Greystar.6 Martin testified that
they “got the I & E in there” and “figured out what shut us in . . . was the inclination switches on [the]
generators and power system.” [Doc. No. 125, Exh. 7, Martin Depo., p. 40]. He explained that the
collision from the box “tripped our generators out.” Id. He testified further that this impact started
the “initial shut-in of everything, and that is -- it hit it so hard that the abandon platform enunciation
just started going off too.” [Doc. No. 125, Exh. 8, Martin Depo., p. 41]. Once everything started
shutting down, according to Martin, “the deluge system went off.” Id.
At first blush, Martin’s deposition testimony would appear to raise a genuine issue of material
fact for trial. However, a review of Martin’s testimony shows that he has no personal knowledge that
the grocery box caused the activation or the generators to go offline. [Doc. No. 120, Exh. I, Martin
Depo., p. 48 (Q: “Did you actually yourself go over . . . and look at this inclination switch . . . ?” A:
“No.”)]. He testified that he relied on hearsay statements from either “the mechanic [Burl Russell]
or the I&E [Dupre].” Id.
Dupre clearly considered the impact of the grocery box in his investigation, but concluded
within 45 minutes of beginning his investigation that the impact did not cause the ESDDS activation
and other events. As the Holmans admit, Burl Russell (“Russell”) was asleep at the time of the
incident, was not involved in the investigation, and just heard about possible causes. See [Doc. No.
125, p. 8]. Russell testified that workers were “brainstorming what could have happened” and briefly

6

The Holmans also cite to testimony of Cox and Dupre, but none of the cited testimony
addresses causation. [Doc. No. 125, pp. 8-9].
8

considered whether the impact of the grocery box could have tripped the inclinometer and caused the
ESDDS activation,7 but quickly concluded that the impact was not the cause. [Doc. No. 120, Exh. J,
Russell Depo., pp. 72-73]. Russell explained, consistently with Dupre, that an incident with the
inclination switch (or inclinometer) would not have caused all of the emergency shut-in procedures
to activate. [Doc. No. 120, Exh. J., Russell Depo., p. 92].
Having reviewed the extensive deposition testimony provided, the Court finds that the
Holmans have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial that any action by Nabors was
a substantial factor in bringing about Holman’s injuries.8
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Nabors’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 120] is

GRANTED, and all claims against Nabors are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 15th day of December, 2014.

7

Russell denies telling Martin that the impact of the grocery box was related to the
inclinometer and caused the entire event. See [Doc. No. 120, Exh. J, Russell Depo., p. 72].
However, even if the Court accepts for purposes of summary judgment that Russell did make
such a statement to Martin, that statement must be viewed in the context of his other testimony.
Namely, Russell does not deny that he, like Dupre, initially considered the impact of the grocery
box as a possible cause of the later event, but ruled out that possibility.
8

The Court has considered the Holmans’ arguments that Nabors’ “negligent loading of the
grocery box” was the “first domino in the line,” activating the chain of emergency events. [Doc.
No. 125, pp. 10, 12]. However, there was never anything but speculation that the inclinometer
may have been tripped, and the investigation ruled out the impact of the grocery box as the cause
of events. The Holmans have presented no evidence to the contrary.
9