Wright v. Louisiana State Penitentiary

Filing 49

ORDER denying 45 Motion for Reconsideration re 43 Order on Motion for Reconsideration filed by Chadwick Wright. Signed by Judge Donald E Walter on 10/18/2023. (crt,Enkey, R)

Case 3:12-cv-02057-DEW-KDM Document 49 Filed 10/18/23 Page 1 of 3 PageID #: 3882

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
CHADWICK WRIGHT

CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-2057

VERSUS

JUDGE DONALD E. WALTER

WARDEN OF THE LOUISIANA
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
STATE PENETENTIARY
MCCLUSKY
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner Chadwick Wright’s (“Wright”) “Motion for Relief from This
Court’s May 8, 2023, Memorandum Ruling Denying Relief from This Court’s Judgment Denying
My Person Habeas Relief (Record Document 40).” Record Document 45. The basis of Wright’s
motion is that the Court erred in denying Wright’s February 8, 2023, “Motion for
Reconsideration,” as untimely. See Record Documents 40 and 43. Specifically, Wright argues he
was not required to explain the nearly ten-year delay1 in filing his initial motion for reconsideration
because “[n]othing within the language of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 indicates
a notice that motion submitted for activating a proceeding for obtaining relief from judgment must
retain an explanation within the pleading demonstrating relief sought from a judgment has been
initiated at a reasonable time [sic].” Record Document 45-1 at 2.
The language of Rule 60, which explicitly requires that motions for reconsideration “must
be made within a reasonable time,” puts moving parties on notice that there is an element of
timeliness to a motion under Rule 60. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Reasonableness turns on the

1

The judgment from which Wright seeks relief was entered on August 23, 2013. See Record
Document 33. Wright filed his first Rule 60(b) motion on February 8, 2023, nearly ten years
after the judgment was entered. See Record Document 40.

Case 3:12-cv-02057-DEW-KDM Document 49 Filed 10/18/23 Page 2 of 3 PageID #: 3883

“particular facts and circumstances of the case.” Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 38
F.3d 1404, 1410 (5th Cir. 1994)). Wright failed to address this requirement in his first motion for
reconsideration, and while pro se motions are liberally construed, pro se parties are not exempt
from adhering to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d
475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014).
In an attempt to cure the defect, Wright filed the instant second motion for reconsideration
and offers an explanation for the ten-year delay. See Record Document 45-1. Wright reiterates that
he was illiterate and suffered from a mental disorder. See id. at 2. Wright argues that he only had
access to state approved inmate counsel to prepare his filings and counsel did not make scheduled
rounds. See id. He further asserts that the state approved inmate counsel were not providing
adequate legal knowledge. See id. at 3. Wright alleges that he did not have “access to adequate
means for enabling [his] ability to effectively communicate with the courts[,]” and therefore, he
suspended pursuit of his habeas relief to “secure meaningful access to the courts by learning how
to identify the correct understanding of Constitutional Law and how to apply it within the Federal
Judicia[l] System.” Id. at 8. Wright further argues that ten years was not an unreasonable delay
because the time was necessary to adequately prosecute and defend his cause of action. See id.
The Court is unpersuaded by Wright’s argument that the delay was caused by state
appointed inmate counsel’s failure to make scheduled rounds and provide adequate legal
knowledge. State prisoners have no constitutional right to either an attorney or inmate counsel in
state post-conviction proceedings. See Shinn v. Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718, 1735 (2022). Therefore,
the failure of state appointed inmate counsel to assist in filing this motion cannot be the basis for
the ten-year delay. Additionally, Wright offers again his illiteracy as the impediment for his failure
to file this motion for ten years. See Record Document 45-1 at 2. While this Court appreciates

2

Case 3:12-cv-02057-DEW-KDM Document 49 Filed 10/18/23 Page 3 of 3 PageID #: 3884

Wright’s explanation of his illiteracy, this Court finds that filing the motion nearly ten years after
the district court’s judgment on his habeas petition is not within the “reasonable time”
contemplated by Rule 60(c)(1). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1); see also Gill v. Wells, 610 F. App’x
809, 813 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding that the petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion that was filed ten years
after the challenged judgment was not filed within a reasonable time); see also Jackson v.
Lumpkin, No. 9-CV-3656, 2020 WL 12969193, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2020) (a Rule 60(b)(6)
motion filed ten years after the court dismissed the movant’s petition was not made within a
reasonable time); see also West v. Champion, 363 F. App’x 660, 664 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding
that a Rule 60(b)(6) motion filed more than eight years after district court’s judgment on habeas
petition was not within a reasonable time); see also Tyler v. Anderson, 749 F.3d 499, 510 (6th Cir.
2014) (holding that the petitioner could have filed a Rule 60(b)(6) “motion pro se, as he had done
before, within the period spanning more than ten years”).
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Wright’s motion for reconsideration
(Record Document 45) is hereby DENIED.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 18th day of October, 2023.

3