Harris v. Monroe

Filing 6

RULING re 2 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Kathleen J Harris. For the reasons stated, the Motion for TRO is DENIED. Signed by Chief Judge Robert G James on 8/16/12. (crt,DickersonSld, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION

DR. KATHLEEN J. HARRIS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-2180

VERSUS

JUDGE ROBERT G. JAMES

MONROE CITY SCHOOL BOARD

MAG. JUDGE KAREN L. HAYES
RULING

Pending before the Court is a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“Motion for TRO”)
[Doc. No. 2] filed by Plaintiff Dr. Kathleen J. Harris (“Harris”) against Defendant Monroe City
School Board (“the Board”). Harris requests a temporary restraining order (1) enjoining the Board
from conducting her termination hearing on August 16, 2012, (2) enjoining the Board from
conducting a hearing on any date unless three of the Board members are recused, and (3) enjoining
the Board from conducting the hearing until her request for preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief can be heard. For the following reasons, the Motion for TRO is DENIED.
I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Harris is currently the Superintendent of the Board and has served in that capacity since July

15, 2010. Under her employment contract, Harris’ term does not expire until December 31, 2012.
However, on June 26, 2012, the Board adopted a resolution, which identified seven areas of
concern with Harris’ operation of the school system. The Board retained Dennis Blunt (“Blunt”),
an outside attorney, to investigate these concerns. The Board placed Harris on paid administrative
leave pending the outcome of the investigation.
At the conclusion of his investigation, Blunt prepared formal charges against Harris, which

were adopted by the Board by a 5-2 vote at a specially called meeting on July 26, 2012. The Board
continued Harris’ paid administrative leave.
The Board has now notified Harris and her attorney that it intends to conduct a hearing on
August 16, 2012, at 1:00 p.m., to take evidence on the charges and to determine whether she should
be terminated.
Prior to bringing the action in this Court, Harris filed a Petition for Temporary Restraining
Order, Preliminary Injunction, Permanent Injunction and Other Relief in the Fourth Judicial District
Court, Parish of Ouachita, State of Louisiana. On August 13, 2012, the Honorable Benjamin Jones
issued a Ruling, denying Harris’ request for a TRO and stating that “[t]here is not time to schedule
a preliminary injunction hearing before Thursday, August 16th. Nor is there time in the Court’s . .
. docket to conduct a hearing.” Harris v. Monroe City School Board, Docket No. 12-2502, Fourth
Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita, State of Louisiana, August 13, 2012 Ruling.
On August 14, 2012, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Harris filed a Complaint for Temporary
Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, Permanent Injunction and Other Relief [Doc. No. 1] and
the instant Motion for TRO [Doc. No. 2].
The Court conducted a telephone status conference with counsel for both parties on August
15, 2012, at 1:30 p.m. At that time, counsel presented their arguments to the Court.
Having reviewed the case law and the facts in the Complaint and Motion for TRO, the Court
now issues this ruling on the Motion for TRO.
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
A.

Colorado River Abstention

As an initial matter, under Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424
2

U.S. 800 (1976), the Court has considered whether it should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction
in light of the pending state court litigation.
It is the “virtual unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given
them,” and “‘the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the
same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction.’” Id. at 817 (quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217
U.S. 268, 282 (1910)). Nevertheless, there are “extraordinary and narrow” circumstances under
which a district court may abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a case when there is a concurrent
state proceeding, based on considerations of “‘[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to
conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.’” Id. at 813, 816
(quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)).
“While declining to prescribe a ‘hard and fast rule,’” the Supreme Court has identified six
factors the Court may consider and weigh “ in determining whether exceptional circumstances exist
that would permit” it to decline to exercise jurisdiction:
(1)

assumption by either court of jurisdiction over a res;

(2)

the relative inconvenience of the forums;

(3)

the avoidance of piecemeal litigation;

(4)

the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums;

(5)

whether and to what extent federal law provides the rules of decision on the
merits; and

(6)

the adequacy of the state proceedings in protecting the rights of the party
invoking federal jurisdiction.

Murphy v. Uncle Ben’s, Inc., 168 F.3d 734, 738 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).

3

1.

Assumption by Either Court of Jurisdiction Over a Res

This case does not involve any res or property over which any either the state court or this
Court has taken control. The absence of this factor weighs against abstention.
2.

The Relative Inconvenience of the Forums

Since both courts are located in Monroe, Louisiana, this factor is inapplicable, and its absence
weighs against abstention.
3.

The Avoidance of Piecemeal Litigation

The federal and state cases involve the same plaintiff, the same defendant, and some
overlapping issues, namely the contractual disputes between the parties. To the extent that this
parallel litigation is duplicative, not piecemeal, the Fifth Circuit is clear that “[t]he prevention of
duplicative litigation is not a factor to be considered in an abstention determination.”Evanston v. Ins.
Co. v. Jimco, Inc., 844 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817).
In the Complaint before this Court, Harris raises only federal constitutional Due Process
claims, which are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While Harris’ § 1983 claims could have been
brought in state court, they were not, resulting in some piecemeal litigation. However, the Fifth
Circuit has explained that the real concern with this factor is whether there would be the “danger of
inconsistent rulings affecting property ownership.” Evanston, 844 F.2d at 1192. There is no such
danger here, and, thus, this factor, too, weighs against abstention.
4.

The Order in Which Jurisdiction Was Obtained By the Concurrent
Forums

It is clear that Harris first filed in state court before coming to this Court. Nevertheless, the
Court is required to look both at the date of filing and the progress made in the two cases. Id. at

4

1190 (citation omitted). In the state case, Judge Jones’ denial of her request for a TRO is the only
action which has taken place. The two cases are at approximately the same stage of litigation.
Therefore, this factor weighs against abstention.
5.

Whether and to What Extent Federal Law Provides the Rules of
Decision on the Merits

“‘The presence of a federal law issue ‘must always be a major consideration weighing against
surrender [of jurisdiction],’ but the presence of state law issues weighs in favor of surrender only in
rare circumstances.” Murphy, 168 F.3d at 739 (quoting Evanston, 844 F.2d at 1193 ) (other citation
omitted). It is clear that federal law under § 1983 provides the rule of decision on Harris’ Due
Process claims. While Harris has also raised related state law contractual issues which will certainly
provide a backdrop for consideration of her § 1983 claims, the primary thrust of her case is federal.
Thus, this factor, too, weighs against abstention.
6.

The Adequacy of State Proceedings in Protecting the Rights of the Party
Invoking Federal Jurisdiction

“‘If there is any substantial doubt’” as to whether a state court provides an adequate forum,
“‘it would be a serious abuse of discretion to grant the stay or dismissal at all.’” Murphy, 168 F.3d
at 739 (quoting Moses H. Cone Moses Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 28 (1983) (other citations omitted)). Though the Court has no doubt that the state court is an
otherwise adequate forum to protect Harris’ rights, Judge Jones stated in his ruling denying the TRO
that docket constraints prevent him from considering Harris’ preliminary injunction prior to the
August 16, 2012 hearing. Further, Judge Jones was not even presented with the Due Process
arguments set forth in the instant Motion for TRO. Under these circumstances, the final factor must
also weigh against abstention.
5

Because the balancing of these factors clearly weighs in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction,
the Court will now proceed to the merits of the Motion for TRO.
B.

TRO

Harris requests a TRO enjoining the Board from conducting the termination hearing
scheduled for August 16, 2012, at 1:00 p.m. She further requests that the Court enjoin the Board
from conducting the hearing on August 16 or any other date unless Board members Victoria Dayton
(“Dayton”), Clarence Sharp (“Sharp”), and James Traweek (“Traweek”) are recused from
participating. Finally, she requests that the Court enjoin the Board from conducting the termination
hearing until such time as her request for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief can be heard.
To obtain a temporary restraining order, “the moving party must establish four factors: (1)
a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that failure to grant the
injunction will result in irreparable injury, (3) the threatened injury outweighs any damage that the
injunction may cause the opposing party, and (4) the injunction will not disserve the public interest.”
Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103, 1107 (5th Cir. 1991). Injunctive relief “is an extraordinary
remedy and should be granted only if the movant has clearly carried the burden of persuasion with
respect to all four factors.” Allied Marketing Group, Inc. v. CDL Marketing, Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 809
(5th Cir. 1989).
Harris contends that without a TRO she “will be removed from office and her Superintendent
pay will be terminated in violation of her Due Process and contractual rights.” [Doc. No. 2, p. 4].
Relying on Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 118 F.3d 1047 (5th Cir. 1997), Harris argues that the
Board, “as presently constituted, cannot and will not give her a fair hearing that complies with Due
Process and her contractual rights” because “Dayton, Sharp, and Traweek[] have demonstrated a bias
6

against . . . Harris that is irrevocable.” [Doc. No. 2, p. 4].
In Valley, the Fifth Circuit addressed the potential effects on a superintendent’s Due Process
rights when a school board serves as both investigator and adjudicator. In that case, Dr. Betty Cox
(“Cox”) brought suit against the Rapides Parish School Board after she was suspended from her
position as Superintendent. During the pendency of the lawsuit, the School Board held a hearing and
voted to terminate Cox. Cox then amended her complaint to add a claim that her termination hearing
failed to comport with the Due Process requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. She sought a TRO and a preliminary injunction restoring her to the
superintendent position. The district court denied Cox’s request for a TRO, but, after a hearing,
granted the preliminary injunction. The School Board appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed
the district court’s decision.
At issue before the Fifth Circuit was whether Cox’s Due Process rights were violated because
four members of the School Board who voted to terminate her were irreversibly biased. At its base,
“constitutional due process” requires a “fair and impartial tribunal.” Id. at 1052. The Supreme Court
has found that “decision makers are constitutionally unacceptable” in three specific circumstances:
“(1) where the decision maker has a direct personal, substantial, and pecuniary interest in the
outcome of the case; (2) where an adjudicator has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from
the party before him; and (3) when a judicial or quasi-judicial decision maker has the dual role of
investigating and adjudicating disputes and complaints.” Id. (citing Baran v. Port of Beaumont
Navigation Dist. of Jefferson Cty., 57 F.3d 436, 444–46 (5th Cir. 1995)). Considering only the third
circumstance, the Fifth Circuit explained that “[t]he problem of a procedural defect arises when the
decision makers have prejudged the facts to such an extent that their minds are ‘irrevocably closed’
7

before actual adjudication.” Id. (citing Baran, 57 F.3d at 446).
“Nevertheless, bias by an adjudicator is not lightly established. The movant must overcome
two strong presumptions: (1) the presumption of honesty and integrity of the adjudicators; and (2)
the presumption that those making decisions affecting the public are doing so in the public interest.”
Id. at 1052-53. A plaintiff can overcome the presumptions if she convinces the court that “‘under
a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weaknesses, conferring investigative and
adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the
practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.’” Id.
at 1053 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
In the Valley case, the Fifth Circuit found that Cox met her burden and overcame the
presumptions by presenting facts that unfolded “like a soap opera.” Id. at 1055. Two board
members were publicly embarrassed by her investigation of their abusive use of a Board telephone
line, and they stated that their opinion of Cox changed after the investigation. A third board member
made prehearing statements in public and to the media promising that Cox would be fired. Finally,
Cox investigated the fourth board member’s practice of self dealing prior to his election to the Board.
The fourth board member also made statements in public indicating his intent to fire Cox. These
facts, among others, provided a “clear impression of the rancor and deeply held views of the
aforementioned school board members prior to the discharge hearing.” Id.
The Court begins its analysis with the circumstance at issue in Valley: the potential bias that
may result when a school board acts as both investigator and adjudicator. In this case, the Board,
like the Rapides Parish School Board, serves both investigative and adjudicative roles. Unlike the
Rapides Parish School Board, however, the Board did not conduct its investigation alone. Rather,
8

the Board retained an outside attorney, Blunt, to investigate its concerns. The Board only set a
termination hearing after Blunt completed his investigation and prepared formal charges against
Harris. This fact alone distinguishes the Board’s actions. Nevertheless, given the Board’s dual roles,
the Court must also consider the allegations of bias against Dayton, Sharp, and Traweek.
For the purposes of this Ruling, the Court has accepted Harris’ factual allegations in her
Complaint and the Memorandum in Support of the Motion for TRO as true. Those facts are
straightforward: Dayton, Sharp, and Traweek voted against hiring her initially, voted not to renew
her contract at the end of her term, voted to investigate and suspend her, and gave her the lowest
possible evaluation score. To be clear, Harris’ only allegations are that these three Board members
are biased and have irrevocably closed their minds because they have consistently voted against her
and given her a poor professional evaluation. Given the “strong” presumptions that Board members
act with honesty and integrity and in the public interest, these undisputed facts are insufficient to
meet Harris’ burden of showing that Dayton, Sharp, and Traweek have reached “prehearing
commitments on questions of adjudicative fact.” Id. at 1053.
In contrast to the Rapides Parish School Board members in Valley, Harris has presented no
facts or even allegations that show that Dayton, Sharp, or Traweek have any reason to have
developed personal rancor towards her. Harris does not allege that she conducted any investigations
of these Board members, that she had any personal interactions with them to support her allegations,
or even that they have made statements publicly or privately to suggest that their minds are
irrevocably closed. In short, she has made no effort to provide the Court with any facts against
Dayton, Sharp, or Traweek individually, but has focused solely on their official actions. The Court
finds that the facts presented by Harris do not establish a substantial likelihood of success on the
9

merits on her Complaint.
Based on the Court’s finding that Harris is unlikely to prevail on the merits of her claim that
the hearing violates her Due Process rights, the Court need not reach the additional requirements for
injunctive relief.
C.

Preliminary Injunctive Relief

Finally, the Court has considered whether a hearing on Harris’ request for a preliminary
injunction should be held this morning prior to the termination hearing. However, the Court
considered the facts presented in Harris’ Complaint and Memorandum in Support of the Motion for
TRO as true, and the undisputed votes and evaluations of Dayton, Sharp, and Traweek are a matter
of public record. Thus, no purpose would be served by holding a preliminary injunction hearing.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Harris’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order [Doc. No. 2]

is DENIED. The August 16, 2012 termination hearing shall proceed with all Board members
allowed to participate.
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 16th day of August, 2012.

10