Rice et al v. Cornerstone Hospital of West Monroe L L C

Filing 131

RULING re 128 MOTION for Reconsideration re 126 Memorandum Ruling filed by Tommie Rice, Phyllis Rice. Signed by Judge Robert G James on 4/1/16. (crt,DickersonSld, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
TOMMIE RICE, ON BEHALF OF
THE MINORS, CIR AND GMR

CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-0362

VERSUS

JUDGE ROBERT G. JAMES

CORNERSTONE HOSPITAL OF
WEST MONROE

MAG. JUDGE KAREN L. HAYES

RULING
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Tommie Rice’s (“Rice”) Motion for Reconsideration,
Vacation, Alteration and/or Amendment of Ruling and Judgment (“Motion for Reconsideration”)
[Doc. No. 128].

Defendant Cornerstone Hospital of West Monroe (“Cornerstone”) filed a

Memorandum in Opposition [Doc. No. 130]. Rice did not file a reply.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a motion for reconsideration per se.
A motion for reconsideration is treated as a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e)
if it is filed within twenty-eight days after the original judgment. Steward v. City of New Orleans,
537 Fed. App’x 552, 554 (5th Cir. 2013).
“A Rule 59(e) motion ‘calls into question the correctness of a judgment.’” Templet v.
HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Transtexas Gas Corp., 303 F.3d
571, 581 (5th Cir. 2002)). “[S]uch a motion is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal
theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment.” Id. at
479 (citing Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990)). “Rather, Rule 59(e)
‘serve[s] the narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present
newly discovered evidence.’” Id. (quoting Waltman v. Int’l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir.
1989)) (modification in original). “Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary

remedy that should be used sparingly.” Id. (citing Clancy v. Employers Health Ins. Co., 101 F. Supp.
2d 463, 465 (E.D. La. 2000) (citing 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2810.1, at 124 (2d ed. 1995))).
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Rice contends that the Court committed manifest errors
of law and/or fact. Rice raises three issues:
(1)

the Court failed to recognize and give sufficient weight and credence to the
evidence, including but not limited to the sworn testimony of Dr. Richard
Mormino, Dr. Richard Stemm and Dr. David Mercer, regarding the fractures
suffered by Joshua Rice while in the care of Cornerstone and the impact of
those injuries on his mobility and ultimately his candidacy for the bowel
transplant which could have saved his life;

(2)

the Court failed to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and infer negligence
on the part of Cornerstone; and

(3)

the Court failed to afford Rice the presumption set forth in Housley v. Cerise,
579 So.2d 973 (La. 1991) in meeting his burden of proof on causation.

[Doc. No. 128-1, pp. 1-2].
As Cornerstone points out in its memorandum, the Court did consider the evidence
presented and arguments made with regard to the first two issues Rice raises. The Court finds no
manifest errors of law or fact and declines to alter or amend its judgment on these bases.
The Court issues this ruling only to address the third issue. In this regard, the Court did not
specifically discuss the Housley presumption in its ruling on the cross-motions for summary
judgment. The presumption recognized by the Louisiana Supreme Court may assist a plaintiff in
establishing his burden of proof on causation:
[a] claimant’s disability is presumed to have resulted from an accident, if before the
accident the injured person was in good health, but commencing with the accident
the symptoms of the disabling condition appear and continuously manifest
themselves afterwards, providing that the medical evidence shows there to be a
reasonable possibility of causal connection between the accident and the disabling
condition.
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Lukas v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 342 So.2d 591, 596 (La. 1977). This language later formed
the basis for the decision in Housley v. Cerise, 579 So.2d 973 (La. 1991) and thereafter became
known as the Hously presumption.
Although not specifically discussing Hously, the Court did discuss Joshua Rice’s condition
prior to his fractures. In discussing the inapplicability of res ipsa loquitur, the Court stated:
The Court cannot ignore the undisputed facts of the Decedent’s medical conditions
in assessing whether this injury is the type that does not occur in the absence of
negligence. Certainly, fractures of the hip and shoulder do not occur without incident
in otherwise healthy individuals. The Decedent was not a healthy individual. While
Rice denies that Decedent had osteopenia, he does not deny that Decedent had the
condition of osteomalacia, which is “a weakening of the bones in this case due to a
combination of short bowel syndrome, multiple bowel fistulas, malabsorption,
vitamin D deficiency, inactivity and renal failure.” [Doc. No. 97-29, Expert Report
of Dr. Randolph Taylor ("Taylor Report"), p. 1]. With such a condition, Cornerstone
has presented expert testimony that “fractures could occur during the normal course
of treatment or normal transfer with no negligence, or even the best medical care due
to Mr. Rice's debilitation and osteomalacia.” Id. at p. 2. Therefore, the Court cannot
conclude as a matter of law that the Decedent’s injury was the kind that does not
occur in the absence of negligence.
The Hously presumption simply does not apply when the decedent was not in good health as was the
case with Joshua Rice. Therefore, the Court did not commit a manifest error of law in failing to
afford Rice the benefit of the Hously presumption.
Accordingly, for these reasons, Rice’s Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. No. 128]
is DENIED.
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 1st day of April, 2016.

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