Koon v. Louisiana State Penitentiary

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 19 Motion for Reconsideration re 12 Judgment Adopting Report and Recommendation. Signed by Judge Robert G James on 11/13/15. (crt,DickersonSld, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
JAMES KOON
LA. DOC #305523

CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-2538

VERSUS

SECTION P
JUDGE ROBERT G. JAMES

WARDEN BURL CAIN

MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAREN L. HAYES
MEMORANDUM ORDER

Petitioner James Koon (“Koon”) is serving a life sentence after his 1996 conviction for
second degree murder. He previously filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §2254. On November 26, 2013, Magistrate Judge Karen L. Hayes issued a Report and
Recommendation, recommending that the Court dismiss Koon’s Petition as time-barred under 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d). As part of the basis for his Petition, Koon argued that Dr. Steven Hayne was
not qualified to testify as an expert witness, but claimed that he did not learn of this evidence
until after September 15, 2011. Magistrate Judge Hayes rejected his argument, pointing to 2010
correspondence between Koon and his attorney which appears to demonstrate Koon’s actual
knowledge of issues with Dr. Haynes’ testimony. She also points to the facts that Dr. Hayne’s
expertise was questioned in an Mississippi Supreme Court opinion in May 2007 and this same
issue was raised in a 2006 magazine article. All in all, she recommended that the Court find that
Koon should have discovered the issues with Dr. Hayne’s testimony well before the fall of 2011.
On January 13, 2014, the Court adopted the Report and Recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge and dismissed Koon’s Petition with prejudice as time-barred by the provisions

of 28 U.S.C. §2244(d). The Court granted a certificate of appealability, finding that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether it was correct in its procedural ruling that Koon was not
entitled to statutory tolling.
On appeal, in its opinion [Doc. No. 18], the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the Court, finding that Koon “discovered, or should have discovered, the factual
predicate of his claim about Dr. Hayne more than a year before he filed the state habeas petition
that would have tolled the limitation period. Because the limitation period expired before it was
tolled, Koon’s petition was untimely.” Id. at p. 3. The Fifth Circuit’s mandate issued on
December 4, 2014.
Now, Koon has filed a “Motion under F.R. Civ. P. 60(b) 1-6" [Doc. No. 19]. Under Rule
60(b)(1)-(6),
the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1)

mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2)

newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3)

fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or misconduct by an opposing party;

(4)

the judgment is void;

(5)

the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or

(6)

any other reason that justifies relief.

A motion under Rule 60(b)(1)-(3) must be made no later than one year after entry of the
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judgment or order contested. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c). A motion under Rule 60(b)(4)-(6) must be
made within a reasonable time. Id.
However, a Rule 60(b) motion may be construed as a second and successive habeas
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A Rule 60(b) motion actually asserts a habeas claim “when it
presents a new claim for relief, or when it presents new evidence in support of a claim already
litigated, . . . or when it asserts a change in the substantive law governing the claim, or when it
attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim on the merits.” Ruiz v. Quarterman,
504 F.3d 523, 526 (5th Cir. 2007). “Significantly, . . . there is no new habeas claim ‘when [a
petitioner] merely asserts that a previous ruling which precluded a merits determination was in
error--for example, a denial for such reasons as failure to exhaust, procedural default, or
statute-of-limitations bar.’” Id. (quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 523 n.4 (2005)).
The timeliness of Koon’s original Petition has been fully litigated. This Court found his §
2254 Petition to be time-barred, and that decision was affirmed on appeal to the Fifth Circuit.
Koon did not seek further review in the United States Supreme Court. Instead, Koon now argues
that this Court was wrong under Supreme Court precedent. Given these parameters, the Court’s
previous judgment was not “on the merits,”and, thus, the Court has jurisdiction to consider
Koon’s claims. Id.; Turner v. Howerton, 2007 WL 3082138, *3–4 (11th Cir.2007) (“Under
Gonzalez, a legal error may be a ‘mistake’ within Rule 60(b) when the purported error occurred
in a ‘previous ruling which precluded a merits determination,’ such as a denial based on
procedurally barred or unexhausted claims.”) (citing Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532).
Nevertheless, having reviewed Koon’s arguments and the case law, the Court finds no
basis for relief under Rule 60(b) and no evidence that there was a legal error or mistake in this
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case. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Koon’s motion [Doc. No. 19] is DENIED.
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 13th day of November, 2015.

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