Williams v. Town of Delhi et al

Filing 32

MEMORANDUM RULING re 20 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Steve Harrell, Town of Delhi, Tim Crum. Signed by Judge Robert G James on 2/27/15. (crt,Crawford, A)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
BILLY WILLIAMS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-00043

VERSUS

JUDGE ROBERT G. JAMES

TOWN OF DELHI, ET AL

MAG. JUDGE KAREN L. HAYES

RULING
This is a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on claims of false
arrest and excessive force asserted by Plaintiff Billy Ray Williams, Jr. (“Williams”) against the Town
of Delhi, Delhi Police Officer Tim Crum (“Officer Crum”) in his individual and official capacities,
and Delhi Chief of Police Steve Harrell (“Chief Harrell”) in his official capacity. Plaintiff also asserts
related state law claims.
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 20]. For
the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED, and Williams’ claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 15, 2013, Officer Crum received a cell phone call from Ryan Baker, an off-duty

State Trooper (“Trooper Baker”), reporting that three African-American males had approached him
in the parking lot of the M & M Package store in Delhi, Louisiana, and had attempted to sell him
narcotics. [Doc. No. 20, Exh. A, Delhi Municipal Court Trial Transcript (“Trial Transcript”), p. 1].
Trooper Baker described the suspects and the car they were driving, a late model, maroon Ford
Explorer. Officer Crum testified that, minutes after this call, a vehicle matching Trooper Baker’s

description changed lanes in front of his police cruiser into oncoming traffic. [Doc. No. 20, Exh. A,
Trial Transcript, p. 2]. Officer Crum activated his lights, the Explorer pulled over, and two passenger
doors opened. Id. One of the passengers, later identified as Dalvin Polly, escaped on foot, but was
captured by a Richland Parish Deputy Sheriff soon after. Id. Officer Crum rushed to the front of the
Explorer, saw the other passenger, Williams, outside the vehicle and commanded him to stop. Id.
Officer Crum claims that Williams fled.

Id.

He shot Williams with his Taser gun from

approximately 20 feet away, and Williams fell, apparently smashing his face against the ground. Id.
After Williams was Tasered the first time, Officer Crum testified that Williams was holding
his shirt in the front, which appeared to Officer Crum as though Williams was concealing a weapon
or contraband under his shirt. Id. Officer Crum yelled at Williams to “stay down!” but Williams
attempted to stand back up. Id. at p. 2. Officer Crum Tased Williams again. Id. Williams fell to the
ground for the second time, but, according to Officer Crum, continued to resist arrest, holding his
hands underneath his chest and preventing Officer Crum from handcuffing him. Id. Williams again
attempted to stand up, and Officer Crum hit “him with another cycle” from the Taser. Id.
Soon after Williams was Tasered for the third time, Deputy Matthew Henderson of the
Richland Parish Sheriff’s Office (“Deputy Henderson”) arrived and observed a “large amount of
blood” on Williams’ face and arms. [Doc. No. 28, Exh. P2, Deputy Henderson Complaint, p. 2].
Deputy Henderson handcuffed Williams’ left wrist, but was unable to handcuff Williams’ right wrist
because Williams was holding it under his chest. Id. Officer Crum Tasered Williams for the fourth
time. Id. Williams was finally restrained, and Deputy Henderson called an ambulance. Id. A mob
of “irate citizens” gathered at the scene, yelling and screaming at the officers. Id. No weapon or
contraband was found on Williams.
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In contrast to Officer Crum’s version of the events, Williams claims that he at no time resisted
arrest or fled. [Doc. No. 20, Exh. A, Trial Transcript, p. 41]. Williams also testified that, after he
was Tasered the fist time, he was knocked unconscious and remembers nothing until he woke up in
the hospital. Id. at p. 41.
Crum’s cruiser was not equipped with a camera. Id. at p. 5. However, it is undisputed that
the arrest took place in Mrs. Mary Henson’s front yard. Id. at 25. Mrs. Henson witnessed the
majority of the incident, and her testimony echoes Officer Crum’s and Deputy Henderson’s version
of the arrest. See id. at pp. 24-40. Specifically, Mrs. Henson testified that Officer Crum continually
told Williams to “stay down” but that Williams repeatedly attempted to get up. Id. at p. 24.
After Williams was restrained, an ambulance arrived and Officer Crum accompanied Williams
to the Richland Parish Medical Center in Rayville, Louisiana. Williams suffered multiple facial
fractures, trauma to the chest, a bilateral pulmonary contusion, and lower neck injuries. [Doc. No.
28, Exh. P5, LSU Shreveport Medical Report, p. 3].

Because of the severity and extent of his

injuries, Williams was transported to the LSU Medical Center in Shreveport, where he spent three
days in the intensive care unit.
Following the incident, Officer Crum was placed on administrative leave with pay pending
an investigation of the incident. On November 18, 2013, Officer Crum was re-instated, not as a
patrolman, but as a dispatcher. [Doc. No. 28, Exh. P4, Minutes of Town of Delhi Board Meeting, ¶
5]. Williams claims that there were eleven citizen complaints lodged against Officer Crum in the three
years preceding this incident, but does not provide competent summary judgment evidence to this
effect. [Doc. No. 27, Plaintiff’s Undisputed Material Facts, ¶ 9]. Officer Crum resigned from the City
of Delhi Police Department in January 2014. [Doc. No. 20, Exh. A, Trial Transcript, p. 21].
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Williams was charged with and convicted of resisting arrest by flight in the Delhi Municipal
Court on May 12, 2014. [Doc. No. 20, Exh. A, Trial Transcript, p. 47].
On January 9, 2014, Williams initiated this action. [Doc. No. 1]. On December 19, 2014,
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. [Doc. No. 20]. Plaintiff filed an opposition
memorandum [Doc. No. 27], to which Defendants replied [Doc. No. 31].
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
A.

Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment “should be rendered if the
pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis
for its motion by identifying portions of the record which highlight the absence of genuine issues of
material fact. Topalian v. Ehrmann, 954 F.2d 1125, 1132 (5th Cir. 1992). A fact is “material” if proof
of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the lawsuit under applicable law in the
case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is
“genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could render a verdict for the
nonmoving party. Id.
If the moving party can meet the initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party
to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Norman v. Apache Corp., 19
F.3d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1994). In evaluating the evidence tendered by the parties, the Court must
accept the evidence of the nonmovant as credible and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, “a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory
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allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence. Thus, Summary Judgment is
appropriate if a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Turner v. Baylor
Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007)(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248(1986)).
B.

§ 1983 Claims Against Officer Crum
1.

Official Capacity Claims

Williams sues Officer Crum “individually and in his capacity as a Police Officer of the Town
of Delhi.” [Doc. No. 1, Plaintiff’s Complaint,¶ 1]. “State officers sued for damages in their official
capacity are not ‘persons’ for purposes of the suit because they assume the identity of the government
that employs them.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The real party in interest in an official-capacity suit is the governmental entity, not the named official.
Id. at 25 (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S 159, 166 (1985)); see also Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire
and Police Civil Serv. Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 483 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that official-capacity suits are
generally “another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”).
Here, Williams’ claims against Officer Crum in his official capacity are duplicative of the claims
against the Town of Delhi. In other words, Williams’ allegations against Officer Crum in his official
capacity are, in effect, claims against the Town of Delhi, the entity of which he is an agent.
Consequently, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Williams’ §1983 claims against
Officer Crum in his official capacity is GRANTED and those claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.

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2.

Excessive Force Claim

Williams alleges that Officer Crum exerted excessive force when arresting and handcuffing
him. Because Williams has been convicted of resisting arrest, Defendants argue that Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), precludes Williams’ excessive force claim, and, even if it does not,
that they are shielded by qualified immunity. Consequently, the Court must resolve whether the
allegations in Williams’ Complaint are inherently inconsistent with his resisting arrest conviction.
On May 12, 2014, Williams was convicted of resisting an officer by flight under LA . REV .
STAT . ANN . 14:108. It is well settled under Heck and its Fifth Circuit progeny that a plaintiff who has
been convicted of a crime cannot recover damages for an alleged violation of his constitutional rights
unless: (1) the plaintiff demonstrates that the conviction or sentence has in some way been reversed
or invalidated; or (2) can show that the alleged violation and the underlying conviction are separable
and “conceptually distinct.” Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Heck, 512 U.S.
at 486-87; Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2006)).
Determination of whether the conviction and alleged violation are “conceptually distinct” is
an “analytical and fact intensive” undertaking that requires the examining court “to focus on whether
success on the excessive force claim requires negation of an element of the criminal offense.” Bush,
513 F.3d at 497 (citing Ballard, 444 F.3d at 396). For example, the Bush court held that an excessive
force claim was separable from the plaintiff’s resisting arrest conviction because the facts of that case
were such that the arrest could be separated into two distinct stages–the first stage consisting of the
period when the plaintiff was unrestrained and resistant and the second stage occurring when the
plaintiff was handcuffed and compliant. Bush, 513 F.3d at 499. Because the judge in the criminal
proceeding did not clearly indicate that the conviction was predicated on the plaintiff’s alleged
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resistance in the second stage, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s excessive force claim in the
second stage was separable and not barred by Heck. Id.
However, if a § 1983 excessive force plaintiff asserts absolute innocence in his complaint with
regard to the entire arrest encounter, and not merely to a divisible portion of it, the Fifth Circuit holds
that the excessive force claim is necessarily inconsistent and inseparable from a related conviction
and therefore barred by Heck. Compare DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 657 (5th
Cir. 2007) (declining to consider the plaintiff’s argument that his claims of excessive force were
separable from his aggravated assault conviction because his complaint presented the excessive force
claim as a single violent encounter throughout which the plaintiff was wholly innocent), and Daigre
v. City of Waveland, Miss., 549 F. App’x 283, 286 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished)
(holding that Heck precluded plaintiff from proceeding on her excessive force claim solely on the
basis that plaintiff alleged complete innocence in her complaint, which was necessarily inconsistent
with the validity of her subsequent resisting arrest conviction), with Bush, 513 F.3d at 497 (noting
that plaintiff’s assertion in her complaint that she did not resist arrest, when read in the context of her
entire complaint, could be interpreted as referring to a discrete portion of her arrest encounter, not
necessarily to the entire arrest, and therefore not barred by Heck). The rationale undergirding DeLeon
and Daigre is that “factual assertions in pleadings are . . . judicial admissions conclusively binding
on the party that made them.” Diagre, 549 F. App’x 283 at 286 (quoting Davis v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc., 823 F.2d 105, 108 (5th Cir. 1987) (alterations and citation omitted)).
Thus, to avoid dismissal under Heck, Williams must clear two hurdles. First, the allegations
in his Complaint must not be inherently inconsistent with his resisting arrest conviction; in other
words, he must not allege absolute innocence throughout the arrest encounter because such a position
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would necessarily contravene his subsequent conviction. Second, only after overcoming the first
hurdle, he must generate factual issues that: (1) his arrest occurred in divisible stages, and (2) Officer
Crum exerted excessive force after he was restrained and compliant.
Williams cannot clear the first hurdle because the allegations in his Complaint contradict his
conviction. His Complaint alleges simply that “he complied and obeyed all of the defendant, TIM
CRUM’s commands when he proceeded to physically assault him.” [Doc. No. 1, Plaintiff’s
Complaint, ¶ 10] (emphasis added). This is the only reference to facts surrounding the arrest in
Williams’ Complaint. The statement is absolute and can be interpreted in only one way: Williams
asserts complete innocence throughout the entire arrest episode, not merely in a discrete part of it.
Thus, this scenario is analogous to DeLeon and Daigre and is distinguishable from Bush.
Williams argues against dismissal under Heck because his conviction is “currently on appeal
to the 5th Judicial Court of Louisiana.” [Doc. No. 28, p. 5]. This argument fails, however, because
the Heck holding is clear that a plaintiff can proceed under § 1983 only if he can prove that his
conviction has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
Considering these factors, Williams’ excessive force claim is subject to dismissal under Heck
because a favorable excessive force judgment “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction.” Ballard, 444 F.3d at 396. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED to the extent it seeks dismissal of Williams’ excessive force claim. That claim is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE subject to Williams’ right to assert it again if “the Heck conditions
are met.” Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996).
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3.

Unlawful Arrest Claim

Williams alleges that he was stopped by Officer Crum “without probable cause,” in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. [Doc. No. 1, Plaintiff’s Complaint,¶¶ 1 & 9]. Although it is unclear,
Williams appears to assert a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim. Consequently, the Court must determine
whether Officer Crum had probable cause to arrest Williams before he resisted arrest, or, even if
Officer Crum did not, whether Officer Crum is shielded by qualified immunity.
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST . AMEND . IV.
Consistent with the rule at common law, “a warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is
being committed.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (citing United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411, 417–424 (1976)). “Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within an
officer’s knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being
committed.” Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370 (2009) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
However, an investigatory stop need only be supported by “reasonable suspicion,” not by
probable cause. United States v. Brown, 558 F. App’x 386, 390 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968)). Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is determined by a “totality of the
circumstances,” which, in the context of a tip, is determined by a consideration of the informant’s
“veracity,” “reliability,” and “basis of knowledge.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328 (1990)
(citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)). If an investigatory stop goes beyond what is necessary
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to determine whether the suspect is a threat, it is no longer valid and must be predicated on probable
cause. United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 576 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508
U.S. 366, 373 (1993)).
Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability unless (1) the
official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was (2) clearly established at the time of the
challenged conduct. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (citing Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). Once a defendant invokes qualified immunity, as Defendants have done
here, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense. McClendon
v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002). The Supreme Court has explained that the
clearly established standard incorporates an objective reasonableness inquiry. Rice v. ReliaStar Life
Ins. Co., 770 F.3d 1122, 1130 (5th Cir. 2014). The question of whether an official’s conduct was
objectively reasonable is a question of law, to be decided by the court. Evett v. DETNTFF, 330 F.3d
681, 687 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). If officers “of reasonable competence could
disagree as to whether Plaintiff’s rights were violated, the officer’s qualified immunity remains
intact.” Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 750 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 341 (1986)).
With regard to § 1983 claims for unlawful arrest, an officer’s conduct is objectively reasonable
if a reasonable person in the officer’s position could have believed he had probable cause to arrest.
Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 166 (5th Cir. 2009). On the other hand, it was clearly established
at the time of Williams’ arrest that an arrest unsupported by probable cause “is unlawful” and
therefore objectively unreasonable. See Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 402 (5th Cir. 2004).

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Other than a conclusory allegation in his Complaint, Williams does not contest that Officer
Crum had probable cause to initially stop the vehicle he rode in. A reliable source with firsthand
knowledge, Trooper Baker, informed Officer Crum that three African-American males in a maroon
Ford Explorer had attempted to sell him drugs. On these facts alone, assuming the initial traffic stop
constituted an arrest rather than a mere investigatory stop, probable cause existed to arrest Williams.
Even assuming, arguendo, that probable cause lacked, Officer Crum is entitled to qualified immunity
because an objectively reasonable person in Officer Crum’s position could have believed that there
was probable cause for the initial stop.
Morever, if the Court were to construe Williams’ Complaint to allege probable cause lacked
to arrest him for resisting arrest, such a claim is precluded by Heck. Williams has already been
convicted of resisting arrest and that conviction has not “been reversed on direct appeal, expunged
by executive order, declared invalid . . . or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
is GRANTED to the extent it seeks dismissal of Williams’ unlawful arrest claim against Officer Crum
in his individual capacity, and that claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
C.

§ 1983 Claims Against the Town of Delhi and Chief Harrell
1.

Excessive Force Claims

Williams also asserts an excessive force claim against the Town of Delhi and Chief Harrell
in his official capacity, alleging (1) the Town maintained a custom to “inadequately and improperly”
investigate citizen complaints against its officers and (2) that its policy to inadequately train its
officers resulted in the constitutional violation. [Doc. No. 1, Plaintiff’s Complaint,¶ ¶ 18-20].
Williams’ claims against Chief Harrell are actually claims against the Town of Delhi. See Bellard
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v. Gautreaux, 675 F.3d 454, 462 (5th Cir. 2012) (claims asserted against sheriff in his official
capacity are treated as claims against the entity he represents); see also Brown v. Strain, 663 F.3d 245,
251 (5th Cir. 2011) (same).
Vicarious liability does not apply to governmental entities for claims under § 1983. Monell
v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, liability against a
governmental entity under § 1983 requires proof of three elements: “(1) an official policy (or custom),
of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a
constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy or custom.” Valle v. City of Hous., 613
F.3d 536, 541–42 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted). However, as already
noted, Heck prohibits a plaintiff from alleging a constitutional violation under § 1983 if allowing that
claim to proceed would undermine the validity of the plaintiff’s conviction, unless the plaintiff
demonstrates that the conviction has in some way been reversed or invalidated. Bush, 513 F.3d 492,
497.
For the same reasons set forth above in the ruling on Williams’ § 1983 excessive force claim
against Officer Crum in his individual capacity, Williams’ excessive force claims against the Town
of Delhi and Chief Harrell, which are predicated on Monell liability, require dismissal under Heck.
Supervisory liability claims under Monell require an underlying constitutional violation and, where
the underlying violation is barred by Heck, it cannot form the basis for a derivative Monell claim. See
Deleon, 488 F.3d 649 (barring claims against individual officer and municipality pursuant to Heck);
Diagre, 549 Fed. App’x at 287 (same); Whatley v. Coffin, 496 Fed. App’x. 414, 417 (5th Cir.2012)
(per curiam) (unpublished) (same). Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is

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GRANTED to the extent it seeks dismissal of Williams’ excessive force claims against the Town of
Delhi and Chief Harrell, and these claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2.

Unlawful Arrest Claims

Williams apparently also asserts an unlawful arrest claim against the Town of Delhi and Chief
Harrell in his official capacity, alleging that the vehicle in which he was traveling was stopped
“without probable cause,” that the “Delhi Police Department developed and maintained policies or
customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights” of individuals residing in
Delhi, and that Chief Harrell was the “supervisor and commanding officer” of Officer Crum at the
time of the incident. [Doc. No. 1, Plaintiff’s Complaint, ¶¶9, 19, & 23].
As already stated, Monell liability can only be established against a municipality if the plaintiff
can demonstrate an official policy or custom of which a policymaker can be charged with actual or
constructive knowledge, and a constitutional violation whose “moving force” is that policy or custom.
Valle, 613 F.3d at 541–42. In order to establish a constitutional violation for unlawful arrest,
Williams must show that the initial traffic stop amounted to an arrest and that the arrest was not
supported by probable cause.
Williams cannot establish Monell liability because he presents no evidence the Town of Delhi
or Chief Harrell instituted a policy of unlawfully arresting individuals. Moreover, Williams cannot
even demonstrate an underlying constitutional violation–for the same reasons set forth above in the
ruling on Plaintiff’s § 1983 unlawful arrest claim against Officer Crum, there was probable cause to
arrest Williams. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is accordingly GRANTED to the extent
it seeks dismissal of Williams’ unlawful arrest claims against the Town of Delhi and Chief Harrell,
and these claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
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D.

State Law Claims

Williams incorporates broad state law claims in his Complaint under LA . CIV . CODE ANN .
“art. 2315, et seq.,” but does not specify or brief exactly what claims to which he refers. When
generously interpreted, the Complaint can be construed to assert state law claims for: (1) false arrest;
(2) excessive force; (3) and state law vicarious liability claims against Chief Harrell. These claims
are addressed in turn.
1.

False Arrest

Under Louisiana law, the tort of false arrest occurs when one arrests and restrains another
against his will and without statutory authority. Henderson v. Bailey Bark Materials, 47,946 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 4/10/13); 116 So. 3d 30, 39. The claim requires proof of the following elements: (1)
detention of the person; and (2) the unlawfulness of the detention. Id. (citing Harris v. Eckerd Corp.,
35,135 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/26/01); 796 So. 2d 719, 722). Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article
213 provides that “a law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant when that officer
has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed an offense.” State v.
Smith, 42,089 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/20/07); 960 So. 2d 369, 375. This requires that an officer have
probable cause for the arrest. See State v. James, 42,976 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/13/08); 975 So. 2d 801,
803. Moreover, “Louisiana applies qualified immunity principles to state constitutional law claims
based on the same factors that compelled the United States Supreme Court to recognize a qualified
good faith immunity for state officers under §1983.” Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 296
(5th Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The Court has concluded that there was probable cause to initially arrest Williams, and the
arrest was therefore lawful. Even if probable cause was lacking, the Court has found that Defendants
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are entitled to qualified immunity because Officer Crum’s actions were objectively reasonable. Thus,
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED to the extent it seeks dismissal of
Williams’ state law claims against Defendants for unlawful arrest, and these claims are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
2.

Excessive Force

Louisiana’s excessive force tort mirrors its federal constitutional counterpart, see Kyle v. City
of New Orleans, 353 So.2d 969, 972 (La. 1977), and the Heck principle applies with equal force to
state law claims. See Williams v. Harding, 2012-1595 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/26/13); 117 So. 3d 187, 191.
For the reasons set forth above in the ruling on Williams’ § 1983 excessive force claims,
Williams’ state law excessive force claims are precluded by Heck. Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment is therefore GRANTED to the extent it seeks dismissal of Williams’ state law excessive
force claims, and these claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
3.

Vicarious Liability

Williams’ Complaint appears to allege that Chief Harrell is vicariously liable under Louisiana
law for Officer Crum’s actions. Under LA . CIV . CODE ANN . art. 2320, “an employer is subject to
vicarious liability for the tortious conduct of his employee, irrespective of his title, while acting within
the course and scope of employment.” Brasseaux v. Town of Mamou, 752 So.2d 815, 821 (La. 2000).
Governmental entities “do not enjoy special protection from vicarious liability under Louisiana law
and are subject to respondeat superior like every other employer.” Deville, 567 F.3d at 173 (citing
Brasseaux, 752 So.2d 815); see also Bussey v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 984 So.2d 781, 784 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 2008) (“[V]icarious liability [under article 2320] applies to law enforcement employers

15

as well.”) (citations omitted). Again, however, the Heck principle also applies to state law claims.
Williams, 117 So. 3d at 191.
Because there was probable cause to arrest Williams initially, Chief Harrell cannot be
vicariously liable for any alleged unlawful arrest. Further, Heck precludes Williams’ federal and state
law excessive force claims. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED
to the extent it seeks dismissal of Williams’ state law vicarious liability claims against Chief Harrell
for unlawful arrest and excessive force, and these claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE..
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 20]

is GRANTED. Williams’ claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, subject to Williams’ right
to assert his excessive force claims again if the conditions set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994) are met.
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 27th day of February, 2015.

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