Moore et al v. Denbury Onshore L L C

Filing 79

RULING re 60 MOTION for Reconsideration re 56 Memorandum Ruling filed by Melissa Moore Hutchinson, Charles Dane Moore, Martha Zoe Moore. Signed by Judge Robert G James on 3/1/16. (crt,DickersonSld, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
MARTHA ZOE MOORE, CHARLES
DANE MOORE & MELISSA MOORE
HUTCHINSON

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14CV913

VERSUS

JUDGE ROBERT G. JAMES

DENBURY ONSHORE, LLC

MAG. JUDGE KAREN L. HAYES
RULING

This is an oilfield remediation case brought by Plaintiffs Martha Zoe Moore, Charles Dane
Moore, and Melissa Moore Hutchinson (“the Moores”) against Defendant Denbury Onshore, LLC
(“Denbury”), pursuant to LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29 (“Act 312"). Pending before the Court is the
Moores’ Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. No. 60] of the Court’s Ruling and Judgment on
Denbury’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. [Doc. Nos. 56, 57]. For the reasons set forth
below, the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I.

RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The underlying facts are discussed in the Court’s Ruling on Denbury’s Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment. [Doc. No. 56]. That portion of the Ruling is incorporated herein. Essentially,
the Moores allege that Denbury contaminated their property through oil and gas operations. The
Moores now seek damages under Act 312. Act 312 provides a mechanism for ensuring contaminated
property is remediated to state regulatory standards. Specifically, it compels liable defendants to fund
the “most feasible plan” to return the property to state regulatory standards. Defendants deposit the
money to fund the plan into the Court’s registry to ensure it is actually used for remediation. In their
Petition [Doc. No. 1], the Moores also ask for damages above those needed to fund the most feasible

plan.
Denbury filed a motion for partial summary judgment and asserted the following: (1)
Denbury had no obligation to remediate the property to its original condition, and (2) Denbury’s
liability was limited to funding the most feasible plan. [Doc. No. 31].
The Court granted Denbury’s motion in part and denied the motion in part. [Doc. Nos. 56,
57]. With respect to Denbury’s claim that it was not obligated to remediate the Moores’ property to
original condition, the Court granted the motion. However, the Court denied the motion to the extent
Denbury contended it had no remedial obligation besides funding the most feasible plan. The Court
found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Denbury operated unreasonably or excessively.
Nevertheless, the Court found that Denbury would deposit damages awarded for unreasonable or
excessive operations, if any, into the Court’s registry.
Armed with legislative history and canon-based arguments, the Moores now move the Court
to revisit its judgment and deny Denbury’s motion in its entirety. [Doc. No. 60]. Denbury filed an
opposition. [Doc. No. 72]. The matter is ripe.
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
A.

Standard of Review on Motions for Reconsideration

The Federal Rules do not allow for a motion for reconsideration in haec verba. But the Fifth
Circuit has “consistently recognized that such a motion may challenge a judgment or order under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b), 59(e), or 60(b).” Southern Snow Mfg. Co., Inc. v.
SnowWizard Holdings, Inc., 921 F.Supp.2d 548, 564 (E.D. La. 2013). “ Rules 59 and 60, however,
apply only to final judgments. An order on a motion for partial summary judgment is interlocutory
and the trial court has discretion to reconsider or reverse its decision.” Id. (citing Lavespere v. Niagra
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Mach & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 185 (5th Cir. 1990).
Here, the Court’s original ruling and judgment addressed Denbury’s motion for partial
summary judgment. Accordingly, Rule 54(b) applies. Under Rule 54(b), the district court “possesses
the inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen
by it to be sufficient.” Stoffels ex rel. SBC Telephone Concession plan v. SBC Comm., Inc., 677 F.3d
720, 726 (5th Cir. 2012); Melancon v. Texaco, Inc., 659 F.2d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 1981). “The exact
standard applicable to the granting of a motion under Rule 54(b) is not clear, though it is typically
held to be less exacting than would be a motion under Rule 59(e).” Livingston Downs Racing Ass’n
v. Jefferson Downs Corp., 259 F.Supp.2d 471, 474-75 (M.D. La. 2002). However, courts in this
district “look to the kinds of consideration under [Rules 59 and 60] for guidance.” SGC Land, LLC
v. La. Midstream Gas Serv., 939 F.Supp.2d 612, 624 (W.D. La. 2013). Under Rule 59(e), a motion
to alter or amend a judgment may be granted: “(1) to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon
which the judgment is based; (2) the availability of new evidence; (3) the need to prevent manifest
injustice; or (4) an intervening change in controlling law.” In the Matter of Self, 172 F.Supp.2d 813,
815-16 (W.D. La. 2001) (citing 11 WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2810.1). Finally, motions for reconsideration are not proper vehicles to recycle arguments that the
parties have already made.
B.

Louisiana Principles of Statutory Interpretation

Sitting in diversity, the Court is bound by Louisiana rules of statutory construction. Engines
Southwest, Inc v. Kohler Co., 371 F.Supp.2d 830, 835 (W.D. La. 2005). Under Louisiana law,
statutes are interpreted as follows:
when a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to
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absurd consequences, it shall be applied as written, with no further inquiry
made in search of the legislative intent. However, when a law is susceptible
of different meanings, ‘it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best
conforms to the purpose of the law. The meaning and intent of a law is
determined by considering the law in its entirety and all other laws
concerning the same subject matter and construing the provision in a manner
that is consistent with the express terms of the statute and with the obvious
intent of the lawmaker in enacting it. The statute must therefore be applied
and interpreted in a manner that is logical and consistent with the presumed
fair purpose and intention the legislature had in enacting it. Courts should
give effect to all parts of a statute and should not adopt a statutory
construction that makes any part superfluous or meaningless, if that result can
be avoided.
Palmer v. La. Bd. of Elementary and Secondary Educ., No. 2002-C-2043 (La. 4/9/03); 842 So.2d
363, 367.
Louisiana courts routinely inspect relevant legislative history to resolve ambiguities in
statutes. See Detillier v. Kenner Reg. Med. Ctr., No. 2003-CC-3259 (La. 7/6/04); 877 So.2d 100, 106
(quoting Lockett v. State, Dep’t. of Transp. and Dev., 2003-1767 (La. 2/25/04), 869 So.2d 87) (“One
particularly helpful guide in ascertaining the intent of the Legislature is the legislative history of the
statute in question and related legislation.”).
For example, “[c]ommentary at legislative committee meetings and journals of the houses
of the state legislature are helpful to courts in determining the purpose and true legislative intent
behind the law.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co v. U.S. Agencies, L.L.C., 2005-0728 (La. App. 1 Cir.
3/24/06); 934 So.2d 745, 748; see also Bridges v. Smith, 2001-2166 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/27/02); 832
So.2d 307, 311 (“Intent expressed at the appropriate legislative committee meetings is an aid to the
courts in determining the true legislative intent and purpose behind the law.”); Bourque v. Bailey,
93-1657 (La. App. 3 Cir. 9/21/94); 643 So.2d 236, 238 (reviewing transcripts from the legislative
hearings leading to the provision’s enactment).
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In this case, the Court first looks to the statute’s plain language. The Moores, in their Motion
for Reconsideration, claim that the language unambiguously allows a plaintiff to pocket a damage
award for excessive or unreasonable lease operations. They also argue that the legislative history
allows them to recover remediation to original condition under Subsection M(1)(c).
C.

Text of the 2014 Amendments

In 2014, the legislature amended the private damage provisions of Act 312. Subsection H
now reads:
(1)

This Section shall not preclude an owner of land from pursuing a judicial
remedy or receiving a judicial award for private claims suffered as a result of
environmental damage, except as otherwise provided in this Section. Any
a adga tdi c n eto wt t ej d mnf ra dto armdai ni e cs o t erq ie e t o t efai l pa a o tdb t ec uti n trq ie
wr rne n o nci n ihh u g e t o d ii n l e e i to n xes fh e urmns fh esbe ln d pe yh o r s o e urd
to be paid into the registry of the court.
(2)

Damages that may be awarded in an action under this Section shall be
governed by the provisions of Subsection M of this Section. This Section
shall not be interpreted to create any cause of action or to impose additional
implied obligations under the mineral code or arising out of a mineral lease.

§ (H)(1)(2) (emphasis added).
Subsection M, which defines the damages available under Subsection H, provides:
(1)

In an action governed by the provisions of this section, damages may be
awarded only for the following:
(a)

The cost of funding the feasible plan adopted by the court.

(b)

The cost of additional remediation only if required by an express
contractual provision providing for remediation to original
condition or to some other specific remediation standard.

(c)

The cost of evaluating, correcting or repairing environmental damage
upon a showing that such damage was caused by unreasonable or
excessive operations based on rules, regulations, lease terms and
implied lease obligations arising by operation of law, or standards
applicable at the time of the activity complained of, provided that
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such damage is not duplicative of damages awarded under Paragraphs
(1) and (2) of this section.
(d)

The cost of nonremediation damages.

§ (M)(1)(a-d) (emphasis added).
D.

The Interplay Between Subsections H and M

Originally, based on the text of the statute, and bolstered by certain canons of interpretation,
the Court held that all extra-contractual damages under Act 312 had to be deposited into the Court’s
registry. The Moores disagree. They argue that a successful plaintiff can pocket the costs necessary
to correct environmental damage arising from unreasonable or excessive operations. In support, the
Moores cite the statute’s plain language, canons of statutory interpretation, and legislative history.
First, the Moores argue the Court’s interpretation deviates from the statute’s plain language.1
They point to Subsection H(1) and the plain meaning of “additional.” Claiming that damages to
correct or repair unreasonable or excessive operations would constitute remediation, the Moores
posit that this remediation would be “additional” because it is in excess of that needed to fund the
most feasible plan. They further note,“[b]ased on any fair reading of Subsection(1), the phrase
‘additional remediation’ simply means an award that is in excess of the requirements of the most
feasible plan.” [Doc. No. 60].
But Subsection H cannot be read in a vacuum. The Moores’ argument ignores Subsection M,
which defines the damages available under the Act. “Additional remediation” appears in only one
of Subsection M’s listings, M(1)(b), which purports to award additional remediation “only” if

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The Moores also argue the Court’s interpretation renders certain provisions of the statute
superfluous and would result in absurd results. Given the ambiguity in the statute and
unambiguous legislative history, the Court need not reach these contentions.
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provided in a contractual provision. § (M)(1)(b). That Subsection M(1)(c) did not use the words
additional remediation to describe its damages, and that Subsection M(1)(b) purports to limit the cost
of “additional remediation” to contracts, could lead a reasonable interpreter to conclude the
Legislature intended to limit a plaintiff’s direct damages to those compelled by contract.
On the other hand, one could point to Subsection M(1)(d) which is labeled “non-remediation”
damages. If Subsection M(1)(d) encompasses all non-remediation damages, then Subsection M(1)(c)
would necessarily encompass a type of remediation which would be additional to that awarded
pursuant to the most feasible plan. Under that construction, the damages described in Subsection
M(1)(c) would be additional remediation by context.
The Court concludes the statute lacks clarity on what damages a successful plaintiff must
deposit in the Court’s registry. In Louisiana, courts routinely review legislative history to resolve
ambiguity and discern the Legislature’s intent. Accordingly, the Court will consider the 2014
Amendments’ legislative history.
E.

Legislative History of the 2014 Amendments

The Moores rely heavily on comments made by the bill’s author, Senator Robert Adley
(“Senator Adley”), during an April 9, 2014 hearing before the Senate Natural Resource Committee.2
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Denbury objects to the Court’s consideration of this evidence. First, it claims the
transcripts of the Senate Natural Resources Committee hearing are unauthenticated. Second, it
claims the video footage of the House Civil Law Committee proceedings is incomplete and
unauthenticated. The Court finds the objections unpersuasive. The circumstances serve to
authenticate the transcripts and videos. Indeed, a party satisfies the authentication requirement if
the document’s form and content, taken with other circumstances, indicate the document is
reliable. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4). Nor does the incomplete nature of the evidence justify ignoring
it. Denbury claims the tapes are edited, but “make[s] no claim of (or offer[s] any reason to
suspect) fraud or tampering, nor do[oes] [it] say that the videos do not show actual footage of the
[event] in question.” Asoiciacion De Periodistas De Puerto Rico v. Mueller, 680 F.3d 70, 79 (1st
Cir. 2012) (refusing to exclude videos where opponent failed to provide specific reasons why
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During the hearing, Senator Adley and other proponents discussed whether the 2014 Amendments
would change the law. Senator Adley repeatedly emphasized that the 2014 Amendments were not
meant to change the law in the wake of State v. La. Land & Explo. Co., 2012-0884 (La. 1/30/13);
110 So.3d 10383 (“LL&E”). Rather, the amendments attempted to codify that decision.
Indeed, in response to concern that the amendments changed the law, Senator Adley
reassured that the amendments maintained the status quo:
Senator Amedee:

Does this bill change the substantive law in any way
and does it affect, you know, 2683, Civil Code 2683
[stet] dealing with leases?

Senator Adley:

I don’t think it does.

Senator Adley:

What we’ve done now is we’ve taken seven years of
jurisprudence, because the courts have spoken to this
issue in the Supreme Court twice. We’ve taken that
seven years of jurisprudence and we’ve created what
I think is the answer...

Senator Adley:

I’ve heard my name thrown around. I’ve heard all this
thrown around them, and I’ve heard all this about
what we’re changing, what I’m trying to change. I’m
not changing a flipping thing. These are the words
from the two court cases that he said he was so proud
of.

they were not fair depictions of the events in question).
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LL&E, discussed at length in the Court’s Ruling on Denbury’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, and rendered before the 2014 amendments, clarified the damages available
under Act 312. The case specifically held that Act 312 does not limit a successful plaintiff’s
remedy to the damages needed to fund the most feasible plan. See La. Land and Explor. 110
So.3d at 1054 (“In Subsection H, the [L]egislature specifically makes clear the statute was not
intended to change the substantive law. Subsection H states that the procedure enacted by this
Section shall not preclude a landowner from pursuing a judicial remedy or receiving a judicial
award for private claims, other than those remediation damages necessary to fund the most plan
to remediate the land to a standard that protects the public interest...”).
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[Doc. No. 60-2, Transcript of April 9, 2014 Committee Hearing, p. 25-27].
After the hearing before the Senate Natural Resources Committee, the bill was presented to
the House Civil Law Committee for hearing on May 12, 2014. The hearing was captured on video.
The Moores point to several video clips to further demonstrate the legislative intent was to capture
the state of the law after LL&E.
Mr. Jimmy Faircloth (“Faircloth”), a proponent of the amendments gave the following sworn
testimony before the committee:
Item one is the feasible plan, that’s the regulatory. Item two is express contractual clean-ups.
Item three is a codification of the way that Act 312 works on top of the Mineral Code and
Civil Law. There’s been tens of millions of dollars spent on what you see number three here.
That’s where 98% of the litigation in the legacy world has centered around that piece. ..and
the Supreme Court in those two opinions essentially said this is what happens...this is what
the Supreme Court (in Marin and LL&E) said. It said implied obligation does exist and it
exists along with 312 and along with these other remedial pieces, here’s how it exists. And
so that’s what this is, that...jurisprudential explanation is woven into this statutory language.
[Doc. No. 60-2, Video Clip of May 12, 2014 Committee Hearing].
In a later hearing before the full House for approval on May 15, 2014, Representative Neal
Abramson (“Abramson”) fielded concern that the bill was changing the law. Abramson assured that
the purpose of the amendments was to ensure that the statute’s language encompassed a landowner’s
implied mineral rights under Supreme Court precedent.
...There are express contractual rights to a heightened remediation over and above what the
state regulatory requirement is. But even if you don’t have an express provision in your
contract, the Mineral Code and the Civil Code have been interpreted to give you implied
rights. That is what’s in paragraph 3, not 2...
[Doc. No. 60-2, Video Clip of May 15, 2014 House Hearing].
The legislative history makes a compelling case for interpreting the statute to preserve the
LL&E holding. The Court also finds that the Moores’ interpretation is in line with what the LL&E
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court described as the statute’s central purpose: ensuring remediation of damaged property. See La.
Land and Explor. 110 So.3d at 1049.
Thus, the Court amends its Ruling to clarify that the 2014 Amendments do not overrule
LL&E with respect to the damages a successful plaintiff can directly recover. Accordingly, should
the jury find Denbury acted unreasonably or excessively, the Moores could pocket the resultant
damages. And to that extent, the Moores’ motion for reconsideration is GRANTED.
However, the Court reaffirms its dismissal of the Moores’ claim for a cleanup to original
condition. The statute unambiguously precludes that claim here. Remediation to “original condition”
or some other specific remediation standard is permitted only through contract. § (M)(1)(b). No such
contract exists in this case, and there is no reason to amend the Court’s Ruling or Judgment on the
issue. Thus, to the extent the Moores move the Court to reconsider dismissing the claim for
remediation to original condition, the motion is DENIED.
III.

CONCLUSION
For those reasons, To the extent the Moores seek reconsideration of the Court’s finding

that damages under LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29 M(1)(c) must be deposited into the Court’s registry,
the motion is GRANTED. Upon reconsideration, the Court finds that damages awarded under
LA. REV. STAT. § 30:29 M(1)(c) need not be deposited into the Court’s registry. The motion is
otherwise DENIED.
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 1st day of March, 2016.

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