Poullard v. Sharp et al

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 14 Motion to Vacate re 10 Ruling, and 11 Judgment. Signed by Judge Robert G James on 6/23/14. (crt,DickersonSld, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
JOHN POULLARD

CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-0965

VERSUS

JUDGE ROBERT G. JAMES

JUDGE ALVIN SHARP

MAG. JUDGE KAREN L. HAYES
MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff John Poullard’s (“Poullard”) pro se Motion to Vacate [Doc Nos.
14 &15] the Court’s May 28, 2014 Ruling and Judgment. [Doc Nos. 10 & 11]. Poullard claims that
the Ruling and Judgment are contrary to the law because this Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate his
mandamus action. [Doc. No. 15, p. 2].
Title 28, United States Code Section 1361, cited by Plaintiff as authority to pursue this
action, states: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of
mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform
a duty owed to the plaintiff.” Poullard has, from the outset, made it clear that he seeks an order of
this Court “. . . ordering the State District court Judge to act and allow petitioner his United States
Constitutional Rights 1st and 14th [Amendment] access to court to prosecute his supplement petition
for damages claims and to stop the violation of access to court and due process of law and arbitrarily
contrary action to that of the judiciary.” [Doc. No. 1, pp. 19-20]. As previously noted, the federal
mandamus statute is clear, as is the jurisprudence interpreting the statue – “. . . a federal district
court is not authorized to grant relief in the nature of mandamus relief to direct state officials in the
performance of their duties and functions.” See Emerson v. Owens, 472 Fed. App’x 308 (5th Cir.
2012) (citing Moye v. Clerk, DeKalb County Superior Court, 474 F.2d 1275, 1275–76 (5th Cir.

1973)); see also Nabelek v. Collins, 48 Fed. App’x 104 (5th Cir. 2002).
Further, to the extent that Poullard relies upon the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §1651, such
reliance is also misplaced. Section 1651does not provide an independent basis for the exercise of
jurisdiction by the federal district courts. Indeed, the statute merely authorizes those courts to issue
commands in the form of writs, “in aid of their respective jurisdictions,” and which are necessary
to effectuate orders previously issued where jurisdiction has otherwise been obtained. Texas v. Real
Parties in Interest, 259 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1115, 122 S.Ct. 924, 151
L.Ed.2d 887 (2002); see also Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 119 S. Ct. 1538, 143 L.Ed.2d 720
(1999). Therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that Poullard’s Motion to Vacate [Doc. Nos. 14 & 15] is DENIED.
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 23rd day of June, 2014.

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