Luv N Care Ltd v. Groupo Rimar
Filing
127
MEMORANDUM RULING re 64 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Groupo Rimar. Signed by Judge Robert G James on 9/30/15. (crt,Crawford, A)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
LUV N’ CARE, LTD.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-02491
VERSUS
JUDGE ROBERT G. JAMES
GROUPO RIMAR, AKA
SUAVINEX, SA
MAG. JUDGE KAREN L. HAYES
RULING
This is a breach of contract case. Plaintiff Luv n’ Care, Ltd. (“LNC”) filed suit against
Groupo Rimar, Suavinex, SA (“Suavinex”) over an alleged breach of the parties’ 2012 Termination
Agreement and Mutual Release (“2012 Termination Agreement”).
Before the Court is Suavinex’s “Motion for Partial Summary Judgment” [Doc. No. 64]. For
the following reasons, Suavinex’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
LNC is a Louisiana corporation; Suavinex is a Spanish corporation. [Doc. No. 20, p. 1]. Both
companies sell and design baby products. In 2009 the parties entered into a distribution agreement
whereby Suavinex would have the right to distribute certain products in Mainland Spain and Spain’s
national territory.1 [Doc. No. 82-1, p. 3]. The products LNC authorized Suavinex to distribute
included the orthodontic pacifier and soft top spout products at issue in this case. [Doc. No. 82-2,
p. 11].
1
In its briefing, LNC points out that the history of the parties goes back further than the 2009
Agreement. This is confirmed by Suavinex’s admission that LNC sold the disputed products to
Suavinex as early as 2001. [Doc. No. 82-2, p. 7]. However, the Court finds much of LNC’s recap
of the parties’ history to be irrelevant as neither the 2009 Agreement nor 2012 Termination
Agreement references or incorporates any prior conduct or relationship between the parties.
The 2009 Agreement had a term of three years. [Doc. No. 64, Exh. G, p. 8]. At some point
before the agreement terminated, a dispute arose between the parties. In settlement of the dispute,
the parties entered into a Termination Agreement on April 12, 2012. The 2012 Termination
Agreement served to terminate the 2009 Agreement, subject to the survivability of Paragraphs 15,
16, and 19. [Doc. No. 64, Exh. H, p. 2]. Surviving Paragraphs 15, specifically 15B, and 19 of the
2009 Agreement are at issue in this case.
Paragraph 15B concerns “Intellectual Property Rights and LNC’s Product Design and
Packaging.” In that provision, Suavinex agrees “not to copy or utilize any of LNC’s formulae,
trade secrets, product design, patents, drawings, business plans, prototypes, packaging,
procedures and methods [and] any other proprietary designs or information without LNC’s
written permission.” [Doc. No. 64, Exh. G, p. 8 (emphasis added)].
Paragraph 19 concerns “Use of Confidential Information” and provides:
During the term of this Agreement and continuing after the expiration or
termination hereof, either party shall not disclose or make accessible to anyone,
or make use of the knowledge or information which either party obtains or
obtained during the term of this Agreement with respect to formulae, trade
secrets, product design, patents, business plans, prototypes, procedures and
methods [and] any other proprietary designs or information of the other party
without the written consent of the other party. Either party acknowledges
receipt of confidential and non-confidential proprietary information from the
other party. During the term of this Agreement and continuing after the
expiration or termination hereof, Distributor agrees not to use in any fashion
said information or designs, or any colorable imitations thereof...2
[Doc. No. 64, Exh. G, p. 10 (emphasis added)].
LNC asserts that, in 2013, it learned that Suavinex had been selling child and baby products
2
In their pleadings and briefings, both parties, when providing the contract terms, insert an
[and] into the disputed paragraphs so that they read: “procedures and methods [and] any other
proprietary designs or information.” See [Doc. No. 20, p. 3-4]; [Doc. No. 64-1, p. 9].
2
that closely resembled its own, in violation of Paragraphs 15 and 19. [Doc. No. 20, p. 4].
On June 6, 2013, alleging Suavinex’s sale of these products violated Paragraphs 15 and 19
of the 2009 Agreement, LNC filed a petition for breach of contract in the Fourth Judicial District
Court, Parish of Ouachita, State of Louisiana. (“Fourth Judicial District Court”) [Doc. No. 64, Exh.
L]. However, that suit was voluntarily dismissed because the 2012 Termination mandated any suit
related to its terms be brought in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana.
On June 14, 2014, LNC filed a Complaint against Suavinex in this Court. [Doc. No. 1]. An
Amended Complaint was filed on December 8, 2014. [Doc. No. 20]. The Amended Complaint
alleged that certain Suavinex products so closely resembled the silicone soft top spout products and
orthodontic pacifier as to violate the terms of paragraphs 15 and 19 of the 2009 Distribution
Agreement. Id at 4.3 Suavinex filed an Answer denying a breach of the 2009 Agreement or 2012
Termination Agreement. [Doc. No. 26]. In its Answer, Suavinex brought a Counterclaim for Breach
of Contract, alleging LNC had violated the terms of the 2012 Termination Agreement by initially
bringing suit in the Fourth Judicial District Court, and a Counterclaim for a Declaratory Judgment
that it had not breached the terms of the 2009 Agreement or 2012 Termination Agreement. [Doc. No.
26, p. 14-15].
Suavinex filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on July 6, 2015, seeking summary
judgment on the following: (1) Suavinex’s Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment that Suavinex
did not breach the parties’ 2009 Agreement or 2012 Termination Agreement and Mutual Release,
3
There was also an allegation based on the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law, LA. Rev. Stat. 51: 1407, et seq., but this claim was subsequently dismissed. [Doc.
No. 60].
3
as alleged in LNC’s Amended Complaint; (2) that LNC had not been irreparably harmed and
therefore was not entitled to a permanent injunction prohibiting Suavinex’s sales outside of the
United States of the orthodontic pacifier and silicone soft top spout products at issue in this action;
and (3) Suavinex’s Counterclaim for Breach of Contract that LNC breached the 2012 Termination
Agreement by willfully filing a breach of contract action in state court, knowing that the 2012
Termination Agreement mandated such action be brought only in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana. [Doc. No. 64, p. 1]. On August 3, 2015, LNC filed an
opposition memorandum. [Doc. No. 77]. On August 27, 2015, Suavinex filed a reply. [Doc. No. 82].
On September 3, 2015, LNC filed a sur-reply. [Doc. No. 87].
II.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A.
Legal Standards
1.
Summary Judgment
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment “should be rendered if the
pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the
basis for its motion by identifying portions of the record which highlight the absence of genuine
issues of material fact. Topalian v. Ehrmann, 954 F.2d 1125, 1132 (5th Cir. 1992). A fact is
“material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the lawsuit under
applicable law in the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute
about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could render
a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
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If the moving party can meet the initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party
to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Norman v. Apache Corp., 19
F.3d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1994). In evaluating the evidence tendered by the parties, the Court must
accept the evidence of the nonmovant as credible and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory
allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37
F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). Thus, summary judgment is appropriate if a reasonable jury could
not return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337,
343 (5th Cir. 2007)(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248(1986)).
With respect to Suavinex’s Counterclaim that LNC breached the parties’ 2012 Termination
Agreement, Suavinex bears the burden of proof, and, therefore, must support its motion with
“credible evidence...that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986). Suavinex, as the moving party must “establish beyond
peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or defense to warrant judgment in his favor.”
Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1192 (5th Cir. 1986).
However, with respect to LNC’s claims that Suavinex breached the parties’ Agreements and
LNC’s request for a permanent injunction, LNC bears the burden of proof. Accordingly, Suavinex
need not negate all the essential elements of LNC’s claim. Suavinex’s burden is to demonstrate an
absence of factual support for one or more of those elements. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322323.
2.
Interpretation of Contracts
To prove a breach of contract under Louisiana law, a party must show that: (1) the obligor
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had an obligation to perform; (2) the obligor failed to perform; and (3) the obligee sustained injury
as a result of the obligor’s failure to perform. Favrot v. Favrot, No. 1108-09 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2011),
68 So. 3d 1099, 1109. Interpretation of the contract will often be necessary to determine whether
there has been a breach.
The goal of contract interpretation is to discover the common intent of the parties. LA. CIV.
CODE art. 2045. The contract language is the starting point for determining that common intent. Six
Flags, Inc. v.Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 565 F.3d 948, 954 (5th Cir. 2009). “The words of
a contract must be given their generally prevailing meaning.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 2047. When the
words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further
interpretation may be made in search of the parties intent. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2048. Extrinsic
evidence is proper only where a contract is ambiguous after examination of the four corners of the
agreement. Amoco Production Co. v. Fina Oil & Chemical Co., No. 95-1185 (La. App. 1 Cir.
2/23/1996); 670 So.2d 502, 511.
The interpretation of a contract typically presents a question of law that may be resolved by
summary judgment. Caddo Gas Gathering L.L.C. v. Regency Intrastate LLC, 44-851 (La. App. 2
Cir. 11/12/2009); 26 So.3d 233, 235. However, if a court determines as a matter of law that a
contract is ambiguous, then discerning the parties’ intent becomes, in part, a question of fact, and
summary judgment will rarely be appropriate. See Carter v. BRMAP, 90-1153 (La. App. 1 Cir.
11/22/1991); 591 So.2d 1184, 1188.
B.
LNC’s Breach of Contract Claim
In its Amended Complaint, LNC alleged that Suavinex breached surviving paragraphs 15,
specifically 15B, and 19 of the 2009 Agreement by selling child and baby products that “closely
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resembled” LNC products. Paragraph 15B provides:
15.
Intellectual Property Rights and LNC’s Product Design and Packaging
B.
Distributor hereby acknowledges and agrees not to copy or utilize any of
LNC’s formulae, trade secrets, product design, patents, drawings, business
plans, prototypes, packaging, procedures and methods [and] any other
proprietary designs or information without LNC’s written permission.
Paragraph 19 of the 2009 Agreement provides, in pertinent part:
19.
Use of Confidential Information
During the term of this Agreement and continuing after the expiration or termination
hereof, either party shall not disclose or make accessible to anyone, or make use of
the knowledge or information which either party obtains or obtained during the term
of this Agreement with respect to formulae, trade secrets, product design, patents,
drawings, business plans, prototypes, procedures and methods [and] any other
proprietary designs or information of the other party without the written consent of
the other party. Either party acknowledges receipt of confidential and nonconfidential proprietary information from the other party. During the term of this
Agreement and continuing after the expiration or termination hereof, Distributor
agrees not to use in any fashion said information or designs, or any colorable
imitation thereof...
The plain language of the contract is the starting point. Suavinex argues that the disputed
paragraphs are unambiguous and protect only LNC’s proprietary information. Because the LNC
products Suavinex allegedly copied were within the public arena at the time the parties entered the
2009 Distribution Agreement and not proprietary as that term is generally defined, they have not
breached Paragraphs 15B and 19.4
LNC contends that the disputed provisions were meant to provide patent-like protection in
areas of the world where the company cannot afford to procure patents. By LNC’s interpretation,
4
There is no dispute that the products at issue in this case were publicly available prior to the
execution of the 2009 Distribution Agreement. LNC only contends that the products were
confidential before being sold to the public. However, even if true, this assertion is irrelevant.
7
making and then selling any products resembling or possessing similar features as one of its own
breaches the provisions. Indeed, LNC contends that Suavinex was aware of its interpretation of the
contract. [Doc. No. 77, p. 4].
Bed-rock principles of contract interpretation command that the words of a contract must
be given their generally prevailing meaning. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2047. Proprietary information is
“information in which the owner has a protectable interest.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).
Any protectable information is usually lost when that information is offered to the public. See Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 149 (1989) (noting that, as a general rule,
“[o]nce an inventor has decided to lift the veil of secrecy from his work, he must choose the
protection of a federal patent or the dedication of his work to the public at large.”). Courts have
continually emphasized the lack of protection for publicly-available products: “unless protected by
copyright or patent, once [a] form [or] design in an article is offered to the public, it becomes the
property of the public and, absent deceptive identification about source, may be copied at will.”
Zippo Mfg. v. Manners Jewelers, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 845, 847 (E.D. La. 1960); see also EppendorfNetheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 354 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[u]nless
protected by patent or copyright, functional product features may be copied freely by competitors
in the marketplace.”).
In this case, Paragraph 15B applies to the copying or utilization of an enumerated list of items
commonly understood to be proprietary, as well as the catch-all: “ any other proprietary designs or
information.” Paragraph 19 contains the same enumerated list and catch-all, but applies to the
disclosure of confidential and non-confidential proprietary information.
Thus, the actual terms of this contract are unambiguous and apply to proprietary information,
8
not publicly-available information as LNC contends. Because the products at issue in this matter
were publicly available before the parties entered the 2009 Agreement, Suavinex has not breached
the express terms of the 2012 Termination Agreement. Moreover, LNC’s intent, or even any alleged
mutual understanding as to the contract’s meaning, is of no moment in this case because the contract
itself is clear, and extrinsic evidence is inadmissible. See Amoco Production Co.,670 So.2d at 511.
Further, LNC’s proposed interpretation would violate Louisiana contract principles. Several
courts applying Louisiana law have held that only information that is confidential to at least one of
the parties may be protected through contract. See Johnson Controls, Inc. v . Guidry, 724 F. Supp.
2d 612, 625 (W.D. La. 2010) (dealing with non-compete agreement and Employee Intellectual
Property and Confidentiality Agreement providing the employee “shall not disclose to anyone...any
item of Intellectual Property which is confidential or proprietary to JCI...); NCH Corp. v. Broyles,
749 F.2d 247, 253 (5th Cir. 1985) (dealing with covenants not to compete, solicit customers, and not
to use or disclose confidential information). Although the cited cases deal with employment
contracts, their logic would seemingly apply across the board.
LNC’s citation to contrary authority is not persuasive. First, LNC cites to a Federal Circuit
case, Universal Gym, Inc. v. ERWA Exercise Equipment Ltd., 827 F.2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1987). In
that case, ERWA and Universal Gym entered an agreement under which ERWA could manufacture,
market, and sell Universal exercise machines in Canada under Universal trademarks in return for
paying royalties to Universal. Id. at 1545. The agreement also contained a paragraph providing that,
after the termination of the agreement, ERWA could not “manufacture, use, sell, or distribute any
products which include any of the features, designs, technical information or said know-how of
licensor...” Id.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit applied the plain language of the
agreement and affirmed the district court’s refusal to limit protection to confidential or proprietary
information. Id. at 1551. The district court had reasoned that the contract meant what it said; it was
not limited to proprietary or confidential information and did not violate public policy. See Universal
Gym Equipment, Inc. v. Atlantic Health & Fitness Products, No. B-80-446, 1985 WL 72675 at *17
(D. Md. Oct. 24, 1985).
However, the Universal Gym Court was not applying Louisiana law, which prohibits the
protection of such information. Moreover, the language of the agreement in Universal Gym does not
have the same limitation to proprietary information contained in the agreement herein.
LNC also contends that the Fourth Judicial District Court has construed an identical
agreement, finding it enforceable and applicable to publicly-available information. [Doc. No. 77, p.
20]. In Luv n’ Care, Ltd. v. Jackel International Limited, 4th Judicial District Court Docket No. 101891, LNC alleged that Jackel had breached a distribution agreement by selling products that closely
resembled those of LNC. The contractual provisions allegedly breached by Jackel were, in large part,
identical to the provisions at issue in this case. Jackel filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing
that it had not breached the provisions. The Fourth Judicial District Court denied Jackel’s Motion
for Summary Judgment in a ruling without reasons, allowing the case to go to the jury.
It is well established that this Court is not bound by the decisions of state trial courts. See
Ladue v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 920 F.2d 272, 273 (5th Cir. 1991). Further, in that case, LNC alleged
Jackel had breached a contractual provision not at issue here. That provision may have influenced
the Fourth Judicial District Court’s denial of summary judgment. Without reasons, the decision
offers no guidance and, thus, is not persuasive.
10
Paragraphs 15(B) and 19, by their plain terms, do not prohibit use of non-proprietary
information such as the publicly-available LNC product designs alleged to have been copied.
Moreover, LNC’s proposed interpretation is untenable because Louisiana contract law only allows
for the protection of confidential information when the information is actually confidential to one
of the parties. Therefore, Suavinex’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with respect to its
Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment that it did not breach the parties’ 2012 Termination
Agreement is GRANTED. 5
C.
LNC’s Request for Permanent Injunction
This Court has found that Suavinex did not breach the parties’ 2012 Termination Agreement.
Therefore, Suavinex’s motion for summary judgment that LNC is not entitled to a permanent
injunction is also GRANTED.
D.
Suavinex’s Breach of the 2012 Termination Agreement Claim
Suavinex also moves for summary judgment on its Counterclaim alleging LNC breached the
terms of the 2012 Termination Agreement by filing a lawsuit for breach of that Agreement in a court
other than the Western District of Louisiana. [Doc. No. 64, p. 1]. Section 5.9 of the 2012
Termination Agreement provides, in pertinent part, that:
Any action, hearing, suit or proceeding arising out of or relating to this Agreement
shall be brought in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana...The prevailing party in a claim in a court of competent jurisdiction arising
under this Agreement against another Party shall be entitled to collect reasonable
attorney’s fees incurred in connection with the claim or suit or the underlying matter.
For purposes of this Section, a Party shall be considered the prevailing party if a court
of competent jurisdiction has reached a decision which is substantially closer to one
Party’s original claims or defenses, taken as a whole, than the opposing Party;
5
Given this conclusion, the Court need not reach Suavinex’s alternative argument that LNC
released any claims under the 2012 Termination Agreement.
11
provided that if the decision is not clearly substantially closer to one party’s original
claims or defenses, taken as a whole, than the opposing Party, none of the Parties
shall be entitled to collect attorney’s fees.
[Doc. No. 64, Exh. H, p. 5]. On June 6, 2013, LNC filed a breach of contract action against Suavinex
in the Fourth Judicial District Court, alleging that Suavinex breached provisions 15B and 19 of the
2009 Distribution Agreement. [Doc. No. 64 Exh. L]. Because of that filing and subsequent dismissal,
Suavinex alleges it suffered damages, including its own time and efforts, as well as the costs of
counsel in defending against the improperly filed state court lawsuit. [Doc. No. 64-1, p. 22].
Suavinex argues that these facts and allegations warrant summary judgment on this issue.
Conversely, LNC argues that three reasons preclude granting the motion. LNC first asserts
that Suavinex is only entitled to attorneys’ fees if it is the prevailing party as defined in the 2012
Termination Agreement. [Doc. No. 77, p. 6]. According to LNC, because the contract requires the
claims and defenses to “be taken as a whole” in order to determine the prevailing party, granting a
motion for summary judgment on the issue is premature because there are multiple claims at issue
in this case. Id. at 7. A prevailing party may only get attorneys’ fees after resolving all of the claims
at issue. Id. Second, LNC claims that Suavinex has provided no evidence that the attorneys’ fees it
seeks are reasonable. Id. Third, LNC argues that its filing in state court did not violate the 2012
Termination Agreement because the cause of action was not based upon a violation of the 2012
Termination Agreement, but rather the 2009 Agreement. [Doc. No. 87, p. 4].
The Court finds that LNC has breached the clear provision of the 2012 Termination
Agreement mandating that any lawsuit “arising out of or relating” to it must be filed in this Court
(the Western District of Louisiana) because LNC’s suit was, at the very least, related to the 2012
Termination Agreement. [Doc. No. 64, Exh. H, p. 5]. Contrary to LNC’s argument, Suavinex is not
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attempting to obtain attorneys’ fees as a “prevailing party,” but as damages for LNC’s breach. There
is no requirement that one must be a prevailing party in order to recover damages; the provision
merely states that a certain remedy–reasonable attorneys’ fees–is available for a prevailing party as
defined in the agreement. There is no indication that this was meant to be an exclusive remedy, or
that damages for the contract’s breach could only be obtained after an adjudication of all claims.
Further, LNC’s argument that it cannot be liable under the 2012 Termination Agreement
because its state suit was mistakenly based on the 2009 Agreement fails to persuade. By the time
LNC filed its state suit in 2013, any suit based on Paragraphs 15, 16, and 19 of the 2009 Agreement
was required to be brought in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.
Because LNC brought suit in the Fourth Judicial District Court, it violated the express terms of the
contract.
However, in order to prove breach of contract under Louisiana law, the claimant must show
injury or damage as a result of the obligee’s failure to perform. See Favrot, 68 So. 3d 1099, at 1109.
Here, the Court finds that Suavinex has proven breach of contract by demonstrating at least some
injury, but has not introduced sufficient proof to allow the Court to determine the amount of damages
to which it is entitled.
Suavinex asks for “at least the amount of the Banner & Witcoff invoices paid for services
defending against the improper state court action through the dismissal of the state court action on
September 3, 2014.” [Doc. No. 82, p. 3]. In support of this request, Suavinex provides an exhibit
containing the Banner & Witcoff Statement of Account, but the Statement of Account is cursory at
best. It contains only four invoice dates, four invoice numbers, amounts billed, and balance due.
[Doc. No. 64, Exh. P]. There is no description of what the Banner & Witcoff attorneys actually did.
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Indeed, there is no way to know from the Statement of Account that the money owed is actually
related to the instant case. Further, there is some dispute as to whether Suavinex failed to mitigate
its damages by not negotiating with LNC’s counsel at an earlier date concerning a voluntary
dismissal of the state court action.
If Suavinex wishes to pursue its claim for damages in the amount sought, it must provide the
Court with admissible and appropriate evidence demonstrating when the Banner & Witcoff attorneys
were retained, what they did with respect to the improperly filed state court suit, their hourly rates,
and the number of hours they worked on Suavinex’s declinatory exception for improper venue. LNC
will then be given a period of time to contest Suavinex’s evidence relating to the amount of damages.
Accordingly, Suavinex’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this Counterclaim is
GRANTED, but no damages are awarded at this time. Suavinex shall have until Wednesday, October
14, 2015, to file a supplemental memorandum in support of its request for damages with the
evidence detailed above. LNC shall have until Wednesday, October 28, 2015, to file a memorandum
in opposition to Suavinex’s request for damages along with any appropriate and admissible evidence.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Suavinex’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
The Court finds that Suavinex has not breached the 2012 Termination Agreement and that LNC is
not entitled to a permanent injunction. The Court further finds that LNC breached the 2012
Termination Agreement by filing suit in the Fourth Judicial District Court. However, no damages
are awarded at this time. Suavinex shall have until Thursday, October 15, 2015, to file a
supplemental memorandum with admissible and appropriate evidence demonstrating when the
Banner & Witcoff attorneys were retained, what they did with respect to the improperly filed state
14
court suit, their hourly rates, and the number of hours they worked on Suavinex’s declinatory
exception for improper venue. LNC will then have until Thursday, October 29, 2015, to file a
supplemental memorandum with admissible and appropriate evidence in opposition to Suavinex’s
request for damages.
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 30th day of September, 2015.
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