Union Pacific Railroad Co v. Taylor Truck Line Inc et al

Filing 440

MEMORANDUM RULING re 426 MOTION to Refer ICCTA Preemption Issue to the Surface Transportation Board and to Stay this Lawsuit Pending the Surface Transportation Boards Ruling filed by Taylor Consolidated Inc, Taylor Logistics Inc, Daniel Shackleford, Taylor Truck Line Inc, College City Leasing L L C. Signed by Judge Terry A Doughty on 9/24/2018. (crt,Crawford, A)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY

CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-0074

VERSUS

JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

TAYLOR TRUCK LINE, INC., ET AL.

MAG. JUDGE KAREN L. HAYES

--(consolidated with)-R & L BUILDERS SUPPLY, INC., ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-2460

VERSUS

JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
ET AL.

MAG. JUDGE KAREN L. HAYES

RULING
Pending before the Court is a Motion to Refer Preemption Issue to the Surface
Transportation Board and to Stay this Lawsuit Pending the Surface Transportation Board’s Ruling
(“Motion to Refer”) [Doc. No. 426] filed by Defendants Daniel Shackleford (“Shackleford”),
College City Leasing, LLC (“College City”), Taylor Truck Lines, Inc. (“Taylor Truck”), Taylor
Logistics, Inc. (“Taylor Logistics”), and Taylor Consolidated, Inc. (collectively, “the Taylor
Entities”). Consolidated Plaintiffs R & L Properties of Oak Grove, LLC and R & L Builders
Supply, Inc. have joined the Taylor Entities’ motion. [Doc. No. 433]. Plaintiff Union Pacific
Railroad Co. (AUnion Pacific@) has filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion. [Doc. No.
436]. The Taylor Entities have filed a reply in support of their motion. [Doc. No. 437].
For the following reasons, the Motion to Refer is DENIED.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Court has set forth the facts and procedural history of this case numerous times in

rulings on multiple substantive motions.

The Court incorporates its recitation of facts and

procedural history by reference.
With specific regard to this motion, on April 10, 2018, the Court issued a Ruling [Doc. No.
404] and Judgment [Doc. No. 405] on Union Pacific’s Second Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment [Doc. No. 380], granting the motion and finding that the Taylor Entities’ comparative
negligence defense based on Union Pacific’s construction, repair, or maintenance of the Crossing
is preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”), 49 USCS
§10101, et. seq.
On April 20, 2018, the Taylor Entities filed a Motion to Alter Judgment [Doc. No. 407].
They moved the Court to amend its Judgment for interlocutory certification to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Union Pacific opposed
interlocutory certification [Doc. No. 410]. After review, the Court granted the Taylor Entities’
motion and certified its Ruling and Judgment on ICCTA preemption to the Fifth Circuit. [Doc.
No. 411]. While the request for interlocutory review was pending, on May 30, 2018, the Taylor
Entities filed a letter with the Fifth Circuit, arguing that their affirmative defense was saved by the
FRSA and citing to the STB’s May 25, 2018 decision in Jimmy Lee Waneck and Starr Sweringen
Waneck, et al.—Petition for Declaratory Order, Docket No. FD 36167 (May 25, 2018), as well as
attaching copy of that decision. However, on June 1, 2018, the Fifth Circuit denied leave on the
interlocutory appeal [Doc. No. 413], and the case was returned to this Court.
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On August 16, 2018, the Taylor Entities filed the instant motion, moving the Court to
reconsider its previous Ruling and Judgment, to refer the ICCTA preemption issue to the Surface
Transportation Board (“STB”) and to stay this lawsuit pending a decision of the STB. The motion
is fully briefed, and the Court is prepared to rule.
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
The ICCTA establishes that the STB has exclusive jurisdiction over the following:
(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies provided in this part with respect
to rates, classifications, rules (including car service, interchange, and other
operating rules), practices, routes, services, and facilities of such carriers; and
(2) the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of
spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, or facilities, even if the tracks are
located, or intended to be located, entirely in one State, is exclusive. Except as
otherwise provided in this part, the remedies provided under this part with respect
to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided
under Federal or State law.

49 U.S.C. § 10501(b). State law claims or defenses may be expressly or impliedly preempted.
In its previous Ruling, the Court found that the Taylor Entities’ defense based on state negligence
law is preempted under the ICCTA where they contend that Union Pacific was negligent in
constructing, repairing, or maintaining the Crossing and, if the Taylor Entities are correct, then
Union Pacific would be required to make changes to the Crossing that would require considerable
reconstruction. The Court concluded that “the Taylor Entities ‘seek to manage or govern railroad
operations’ and ‘allowing them to go forward’ with their comparative negligence defense ‘would
unreasonably interfere with rail transportation.’” [Doc. No. 404, p. 17 (quoting Thomas Tubbs—
Petition for Declaratory Order, Docket No. FD 35792, 2014 WL 5508153, at *5 (Oct. 31, 2014))].
The Taylor Entities now move the Court to refer the issue of preemption to the STB based
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on a recent decision, arguing that the Court should (1) reconsider its judgment; (2) “refer to the
[STB] the critical issue of whether the [ICCTA] or the Federal Rail Safety Act [“FRSA”] governs
the question of whether the affirmative defense of comparative negligence raised by the Taylor
Entities is preempted by federal law”; and (3) stay further action until STB rules.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a motion for reconsideration per se.
Instead, a motion challenging a judgment or order may be filed under Rules 54, 59, or 60. Rules
59 and 60 apply only to final judgments. Rule 54(b) provides that any order Athat adjudicates
fewer than all the claims... [among] all the parties... may be revised at any time before the entry of
a [final] judgment.@ FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). AUnder Rule 54[(b)], a district court has the inherent
procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to
be sufficient.@ Iturralde v. Shaw Grp., Inc., 512 F. App=x 430, 432 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Melancon v. Texaco, Inc., 659 F2.d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 1981)) (citations omitted); see generally
Moses H. Cone Mem=l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 n. 14 (1983) (holding that
Avirtually all interlocutory orders may be altered or amended before final judgment if sufficient
cause is shown@).

An Aorder granting partial summary judgment [is] interlocutory,@ and,

therefore, the Court must Aanalyze[] the motion for reconsideration under Rule 54(b) . . . instead
of Rule 59(e), which applies to final judgments.@ Cabral v. Brennan, 853 F.3d 763, 766 (5th Cir.
2017).

Courts evaluate motions to reconsider interlocutory orders under a Aless exacting@

standard than Rule 59(e), but, nevertheless, look to similar considerations for guidance. See HBM
Interests, LLC v. Chesapeake Louisiana, LP, No. 12-1048, 2013 WL 3893989 (W.D. La. July 26,
2013) (quoting Livingston Downs Racing Ass=n, Inc. v. Jefferson Downs Corp., 259 F. Supp. 2d
471, 475 (M.D. La. 2002)); Sw. Louisiana Hosp. Ass=n v. BASF Const. Chemicals, LLC, No.
5

2:10-CV-902, 2013 WL 1858610 (W.D. La. Apr. 29, 2013) (quoting Livingston Downs, 259 F.
Supp. 2d at 475). Therefore, in determining whether to grant the motion, the Court evaluates
whether there are Amanifest errors of law or fact upon which judgment is based[,]@ whether Anew
evidence@ is available, whether there is a need Ato prevent manifest injustice,@ or whether there has
been Aan intervening change in controlling law.@ HBM Interests, 2013 WL 3893989, at *1
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In this case, the Court finds no manifest errors of fact or law upon which to reconsider its
judgment and that a stay for a referral to the STB would not promote judicial economy or the
efficient administration of justice.
The Taylor Entities rely on the STB’s Waneck decision, which they characterize as
“groundbreaking.” [Doc. No. 426, pp. 2-3]. However, as the Taylor Entities point out, the STB
actually “declined to institute a proceeding on the questions raised, and instead provided guidance
on the preemption issue.” Id. at p. 7. As the STB stated in Waneck:
[I]ssues involving federal preemption under § 10501(b) [of the ICCTA] can be decided either by
the Board or the courts in the first instance as “both the Board and the courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to determine preemption.” Brookhaven Rail Terminal—Pet. For Declaratory Order,
FD 35819, slip op. at 4 (STB served Aug. 28, 2014). Moreover, the district court has not referred
any issues to the Board, and it can address the preemption issues presented. See City of
Sammamish, Wash. — Pet. for Declaratory Order, FD 36161, slip op. at 4 (STB served Mar. 29,
2018). Further, with respect to Petitioners' FRSA-related arguments, it would be beyond the
Board’s purview to interpret FRSA or to opine on how § 20106(b) might apply to the claims at
issue in the district court. However, the Board offers the following guidance to the court and the
parties to assist in the resolution of this dispute.
Waneck, 1999 WL at *3.
Moreover, as Union Pacific points out, the STB, which is authorized to have five members,
had only two members at the time of the Waneck advice because of the delays in the political

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appointment process. Neither of those two members is a lawyer or trained in the law. [Doc. No.
436, p. 3 (citing to https://www.stb.gov/stb/about/board.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2018))]. The
STB does not (and could not) claim exclusive jurisdiction or competence to analyze preemption
issues. Rather, as often is the case, this Court has analyzed the preemption issue and stands by its
analysis of this issue of law. The Court allowed the Taylor Entities leave to obtain review of the
Fifth Circuit, but the Fifth Circuit declined, even after having been made aware of the Waneck
decision. Waneck does not, in this Court’s view, create a manifest error of law necessitating the
Court’s reconsideration of its Ruling and Judgment.1
Finally, in considering whether to refer this issue to the STB, the Court cannot ignore the
fact that this case has been pending more than three and one-half years and will have been pending
four years by the time of trial, if no other delays are permitted. The parties have had the
opportunity to engage in extensive motion practice, have fully briefed all of those motions, and
have sought reconsideration on a large number of motions. At this point, it is the Court’s view
that the efficient administration of justice requires that the parties proceed to trial as set on January
21, 2019, and they can appeal any or all of the Court’s decisions after the entry of final judgment.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Taylor Entities’ Motion to Refer [Doc. No. 426] is

1

The parties have had the opportunity to argue the applicability of the FRSA and its
provisions in other motions for partial summary judgment in this case. See [Doc. Nos. 289, 290,
343, 344, 358, and 359].
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DENIED.
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 24th day of September, 2018.

TERRY A. DOUGHTY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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