Maxwell v. Iasis Glenwood Reginal Medical Center et al

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM RULING re 26 APPEAL OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE DECISION to District Judge filed by Sheila Maxwell. Signed by Judge Robert G James on 9/1/15. (crt,DickersonSld, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
SHEILA MAXWELL

CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-0309

VERSUS

JUDGE ROBERT G. JAMES

IASIS GLENWOOD REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER, et al

MAG. JUDGE JAMES D. KIRK

MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is Plaintiff Sheila Maxwell’s (“Maxwell”) appeal [Doc. No. 26] of
Magistrate Judge James D. Kirk’s Memorandum Order [Doc. No. 25] denying Maxwell’s motion
to amend complaint [Doc. No. 20].
For the following reasons, Magistrate Judge Kirk’s Memorandum Ruling is AFFIRMED,
and Maxwell’s appeal is DISMISSED.
I.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
A.

Standard of Review

A party may file objections to a non-dispositive order of the Magistrate Judge within
fourteen (14) days. Fed. R. Civ. P 72(a). The District Judge shall modify or set aside the
Magistrate Judge’s order only where it is shown to be “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Id.
Maxwell timely filed an appeal of Magistrate Judge Kirk’s Order. Accordingly, this appeal is
governed by Rule 72(a).
B.

Motion to Amend Complaint

Maxwell appeals Magistrate Judge Kirk’s Memorandum Order denying her motion to
amend complaint. Maxwell’s negligence case was originally filed in Louisiana state court. There

she sued Iasis Glenwood Regional Hospital (“Glenwood”); Glenwood’s security company,
Criterion Healthcare Security, Inc. (“Criterion”); and “John Doe,” a placeholder for the unknown
security guard or guards. [Doc. No. 25]. Maxwell is a resident of Louisiana, and Defendants
Glenwood and Criterion are residents of Delaware and Tennessee respectively. Id. Maxwell
alleged that “John Doe” was a resident of Louisiana, even though his identity was unknown, but,
because this placeholder has no legal effect, Criterion and Glenwood removed the case to this
Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Id.
After removal, the parties conducted discovery, and Maxwell learned that Bonita HerringHoneycutt (“Herring-Honeycutt”), a citizen of Louisiana, was the unknown security guard. Id.
Maxwell moved to remand the case to state court, but this Court adopted the Report and
Recommendations of Magistrate Judge Kirk [ Doc. No. 14] and denied the motion [Doc. No. 18].
Maxwell then moved for leave to amend her Complaint to add Herring-Honeycutt as a defendant.
[Doc. No. 20].
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) governs amendments to federal pleadings. The
rule dictates that “a party may amend its pleadings only with the opposing party’s consent or the
court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. When the plaintiff,
by amendment, “seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter
jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to state court.”
See Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1179, 1182. (5th Cir. 1987). In such situations, “Justice
requires that the district court consider [the so-called Hensgens]...factors to balance the
defendant’s interests in maintaining the federal forum with the competing interest of not having
parallel lawsuits. Tillman v. CSX Transp. Inc., 29 F.2d 1023, 1029 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing
Hensgens, 833 F.2d at 1182). These factors include: (1) the extent to which the purpose of the

amendment is to defeat federal jurisdiction; (2) whether the plaintiff has been dilatory in asking
for amendment; (3) whether plaintiff will be significantly injured if amendment is not allowed;
and (4) any other factors bearing on the equities. Hensgens, 833 F.2d at 1182.
In the instant case, the Magistrate Judge applied the Hensgens factors and determined that
Maxwell should not be allowed leave to amend and add the non-diverse defendant, HerringHoneycutt. The decision to apply the Hensgens factors is not contrary to law, and the Magistrate
Judge’s application of the factors is not clearly erroneous.
Maxwell argues this Court should overturn Magistrate Judge Kirk’s Order because it is
based, at least in part, on the Magistrate Judge’s assertion that “the claim against the guard is
prescribed.” [Doc. No. 25]. She correctly notes that suit against one solidary obligor serves to
interrupt prescription as to the other solidary obligors. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1799. Therefore, suit
against Herring-Honeycutt’s employer, Criterion, served to interrupt prescription as to HerringHoneycutt for any negligent actions in the course and scope of her employment. The Magistrate
Judge’s point, however, is that any suit against Herring-Honeycutt at this point would be
untimely but for the Louisiana rule that prescription interrupted against one solidary obligor is
interrupted for all. So, any claims Maxwell had solely against Herring-Honeycutt are prescribed.
Accordingly, Herring-Honeycutt’s presence in the suit is unnecessary because Maxwell can
recover all damages for the only viable claims from Criterion, Herring-Honeycutt’s employer.
[Doc. No. 29]. And, although the necessity of a party is not an explicit factor in the Hensgens
analysis, it can surely be relevant when determining the purpose of the amendment and the
potential prejudice to the plaintiff should the court deny leave to amend. See Williams v. New
Orleans Terminals, LLC, No. 12-2913, 2013 WL 160429 at *5 (E.D. La. Jan. 15, 2013) (noting a
low risk of prejudice to plaintiffs in situations where motion to amend and add a non-diverse

employee is denied but recovery against the employer is still available under respondeat
superior.) Moreover, even if the Magistrate Judge’s order is read to assume that all claims
against Herring-Honeycutt are prescribed, the rest of his reasoning adequately supports the order
under the standard of review.
Maxwell also asserts that the Magistrate Judge’s decision to deny the proposed
amendment is incorrect because Maxwell was not dilatory in her attempts to add HerringHoneycutt. However, whether the plaintiff has been dilatory in asking for the amendment is not
dispostive under the Hensgens analysis; no one factor is conclusive. Id. at *4.
Finally, Maxwell argues the amendment’s purpose is not to defeat federal jurisdiction.
Under the theory of respondeat superior, any claims Maxwell has against Herring-Honeycutt can
be asserted against the employer. Indeed, Criterion does not contest that Herring-Honeycutt was
within the course and scope of her employment at the time of her accident, nor does Maxwell
argue that Criterion is insolvent or uninsured. [Doc. No. 25]. Thus, Maxwell will likely turn to
Criterion for relief, not Herring-Honeycutt. As a result, the Magistrate Judge concludes the
proposed amendment’s purpose is to defeat jurisdiction. [Doc. No. 25]. This conclusion is not
clearly erroneous. Maxwell’s alternative explanation for the amendment, that she seeks it in order
to enhance discovery against Herring-Honeycutt, is not persuasive enough to carry the day under
the standard of review. As Criterion notes in its Memorandum in Opposition [Doc. No. 29], if
Maxwell needs to depose Herring-Honeycutt, she will have the full subpoena authority of this
Court to ensure Herring-Honeycutt’s presence.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Magistrate Judge Kirk’s Memorandum Order [Doc. No. 25] is

AFFIRMED, and Maxwell’s appeal [Doc. No. 26] is DISMISSED.

MONROE, LOUISIANA this 1st day of September, 2015.