Williams et al v. Cobb et al

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM RULING re 15 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Kevin W Cobb and Chad Lee. Signed by Judge Terry A Doughty on 8/8/2018. (crt,Crawford, A)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
LARRY WILLIAMS, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-1010

VERSUS

JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

SHERIFF KEVN COBB, ET AL.

MAG. JUDGE KAREN L. HAYES

RULING
This is a civil rights action brought by Plaintiffs Larry Williams, Larry Henry, Laquatta
Henry, and Brandon Brealy against Defendants Kevin Cobb, individually and in his capacity as
Sheriff of Franklin Parish, and Chad Lee, individually and in his capacity as Warden of the
Franklin Parish Detention Center (“FPDC”).
I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 8, 2015, Larry Brealy (“Brealy”) was incarcerated at FPDC. On that day, he was

working in the kitchen. At about 6:40 p.m., he finished his shift and went back to his dorm.
At approximately 7:00 p.m., deputies were notified by other inmates in the dorm that
Brealy was having trouble breathing. Deputies immediately arrived and removed Brealy from
the dorm; Brealy then collapsed onto a bench in the hallway, losing consciousness. Deputies
contacted medical assistance, called for emergency medical services (“EMS”), and began
performing CPR on Brealy.
At approximately 7:13 p.m., approximately 13 minutes after deputies were first notified
of Brealy’s difficulty breathing, EMS arrived on scene and assumed control of Brealy’s medical

care. Unfortunately, Brealy subsequently passed away. Medical personnel determined that the
cause of death was a cardiac event.
At no time prior to July 8, 2015, had Brealy submitted a verbal or written request for
medical attention.1 Additionally, Brealy had made no verbal complaints to the FPDC nurse,
Sonya Smith.
On July 8, 2016, Plaintiffs, who are Brealy’s sons and daughter, filed a Complaint in this
Court, alleging that Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the “deliberate indifference
to the critical medical needs” of Brealy prior to his death, in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs further contend that Defendants are policy makers and had a
history of deliberate indifference to Brealy’s medical needs, failed to supervise FPDC personnel,
and failed to adequately train or promulgate training policies. Plaintiffs further assert wrongful
death and survival actions against Defendants, contending that they were negligent in violation
of Louisiana law.
On July 13, 2018, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. A notice
of motion setting issued on July 16, 2018, indicating that Plaintiffs had twenty-one (21) days to
file a memorandum in opposition to the motion. No opposition was filed.
The Court is now prepared to rule.

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that Brealy “spent the day once again making
numerous complaints to the Detention Center about having significant pain in his chest, and how
he couldn’t breath [sic] and his pain and condition continued to increase in severity and that he
needed serious medical attention.” [Doc. No. 1, ¶ 7]. Plaintiffs further alleged that Defendants
ignored the “cries” of Brealy’s cellmates. [Doc. No. 1, ¶ 8]. However, they have not contested
Defendants’ statement of material facts, which are supported by affidavits, and they have not
presented any admissible evidence to support these allegations.
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II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
A.

Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), “[a] party may move for summary
judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which
summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for
its motion by identifying portions of the record which highlight the absence of genuine issues of
material fact. Topalian v. Ehrmann, 954 F.2d 1125, 1132 (5th Cir. 1992); see also FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(c)(1) (“A party asserting that a fact cannot be . . . disputed must support the assertion by . .
. citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . .”).
A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of
the lawsuit under applicable law in the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact
finder could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
Unless the moving party meets its initial burden, the Court may not grant a motion for
summary judgment, even if the motion is unopposed. Hetzel v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 50 F.3d
360, 362 (5th Cir. 1995). However, pursuant to Local Rule 56.2, since Plaintiffs did not file an
opposition and statement of contested material facts, Defendants’ statement of uncontested
material facts is deemed admitted for purposes of this motion. LR 56.2 (“All material facts set
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forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed admitted, for
purposes of the motion, unless controverted as required by this rule.).
B.

Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 Claims

First, Plaintiffs assert individual and official capacity claims against Defendants under §
1983.
“The State’s exercise of its power to hold detainees and prisoners. . . brings with it a
responsibility under the U.S. Constitution to tend to the essentials of their well-being: when the
State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders
him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs . .
. it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due
Process Clause.”2 Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 638–39 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc)
(quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme Court held that “[r]egardless of
how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of
action under § 1983.” Id. at 104. That is, “[a] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment
when his/her conduct demonstrates deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs,
constituting an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. (citation and internal quotation

The medical care claims of a pretrial detainee proceed from his right to medical care and
protection from harm under the Fourteenth Amendment, while a prisoner’s rights fall under the
Eighth Amendment. See Hare, 74 F.3d at 647–48. The Fifth Circuit applies the subjective
deliberate indifference test to both types of claims. Thus, in this case, Plaintiffs’ claims are to be
considered under the Eighth Amendment, but the standard is the same, regardless.
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marks omitted). “A delay of medical care can constitute an Eighth Amendment violation” if
“there has been deliberate indifference [that] results in substantial harm.” Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
A prison official can be found liable under the Eighth Amendment only if the
official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that
a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
[Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 462 (5th Cir. 2006)]. If, however, the risk is
obvious, the prison official’s knowledge of a substantial risk of harm may be
inferred. Id. (citation omitted). A disagreement with the treatment provided is
not sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference. Id. at 464 (citation
omitted). A prison inmate may also demonstrate deliberate indifference by
showing that “a prison official ‘refused to treat him, ignored his complaints,
intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would
clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.’” Id. (citation
omitted).

Bennett v. Louisiana ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety & Corrections, No. 07-31189, 2009 WL
102080, at *4 (5th Cir. Jan. 15, 2009). “Deliberate indifference is more than mere negligence in
failing to supply medical treatment.” Gibbs v. Grimmette, 254 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir.2001).
“Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault,” requiring disregard of a known or
obvious consequence and encompassing “only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,
repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Southard v. Texas Bd. of Crim. Justice, 114 F.3d 539,
551 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Bd. of the Cnty. of Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Ok. v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 410 (1997)); McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Stewart
v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 1999).

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Further, in a § 1983 action, a supervisory official may be held liable only if he
affirmatively participated in the acts that resulted in a constitutional deprivation; or he
implemented unconstitutional policies that resulted in the plaintiff’s injury. Porter v. Epps, 659
F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011); Gates v. Texas Depot of Prot. & Reg. Serve., 537 F.3d 404, 435
(5th Cir. 2008). An unconstitutional policy or custom must be specifically identified, not
just alleged in conclusory fashion. Spiller v. City of Texas City Police Dep’t., 130 F.3d 162, 167
(5th Cir. 1997).
Here, Plaintiffs’ claims fail in all regards. Based on the facts set forth above, the Court
finds that Plaintiffs have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial whether
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Brealy’s medical needs. All admissible evidence in
this case shows that FPDC personnel responded almost immediately to a complaint that he was
having difficulty breathing, they sought medical assistance for him, they provided CPR until
EMS arrived, and they had him transported to the hospital for further care. Additionally,
Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence that Sheriff Cobb or Warden Lee either participated in
Brealy’s treatment and/or issued or implemented a specific policy or custom which could have
contributed to Brealy’s death. Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot proceed with any official or
individual capacity claims against Defendants. While the Court has the greatest sympathy for
Plaintiffs in the death of their father, there is simply no evidence that he was constitutionally
deprived of medical care or that such alleged deprivation was the result of official policy or
custom. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ civil rights
claims.
C.

State Law Claims
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Plaintiffs also assert state law negligence claims against Defendants. Under the
Louisiana duty/risk analysis, “the scope of an officer's duty to act reasonably under the
circumstances does not extend so far as to require that the officer always choose the ‘best’ or
even a ‘better’ method of approach.” Syrie v. Schilhab, 96-1027 (La. 5/20/97), 693 So. 2d 1173,
1177. The same facts fail to raise a genuine issue for trial that the officers under Defendants’
purview failed to act reasonably under the circumstances. Accordingly, Defendants are also
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ state law claims.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 15] filed by

Sheriff Cobb and Warden Lee is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 8th day of August, 2018.

TERRY A. DOUGHTY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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