Moore v. Louisiana et al

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM ORDER: Directing plaintiff to amend complaint/petition. Pro Se Response due by 3/20/2017. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen L Hayes on 2/16/17. (crt,Leday, A)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
WILL LEE MOORE

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-CV-1715

VS.

SECTION P
JUDGE ROBERT G. JAMES

STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAREN L. HAYES

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Will Lee Moore, proceeding in forma pauperis, filed the instant civil rights
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 on December 14, 2016. Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee
custody at the Ouachita Correctional Center, awaiting trial on unknown charges.
He makes numerous allegations against the State of Louisiana, Jay Russell, Robert Chu, Pat
Johnson, Karl Sharp and J. Kirby.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation in
accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636 and the standing orders of the Court.
Amend Order
1. Rule 8 Considerations
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require explicit detail, but it does
require a plaintiff to allege specific facts which support the conclusion that his constitutional rights
were violated by each person who is named as defendant. This conclusion must be supported by
specific factual allegations stating the following:
(1) the name(s) of each person who allegedly violated plaintiff’s constitutional
rights;
(2) a description of what actually occurred or what each defendant did to violate
plaintiff’s rights;

(3) the place and date(s)that each event occurred; and
(4) a description of the alleged injury sustained as a result of the alleged violation.
Plaintiff should amend his complaint and provide the factual allegations as set forth
above as they pertain to each individual defendant.
2. Supervisory Capacity
Plaintiff names Ouachita Parish Sheriff Jay Russell and Ouachita Correctional Center
Warden Pat Johnson in their supervisory capacities. “Supervisory officials may be held liable only
if: (i) they affirmatively participate in acts that cause constitutional deprivations; or (ii) implement
unconstitutional policies that causally result in plaintiff’s injuries.” Mouille v. City of Live Oak, Tex.,
977 F.2d 924, 929 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951, 113 S.Ct. 2443, 124 L.Ed.2d 660
(1993). “Vicarious liability does not apply to § 1983 claims.” Pierce v. Texas Dept. of Crim. Justice,
Inst. Div., 37 F.3d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1107, 115 S.Ct. 1957, 131
L.Ed.2d 849 (1995). “Personal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of action.”
Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 248, 78
L.Ed.2d 236 (1983).
To the extent that plaintiff seeks to name Sheriff Russell and/or Warden Pat Johnson as
defendants, he must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate either personal involvement or the
implementation of unconstitutional policies by each defendant.
3. Prosecutorial Immunity
Any claim for monetary damages against District Attorney Robert Chu is probably barred
by the doctrine of absolute immunity. A district attorney is absolutely immune in a civil rights suit
for any action taken pursuant to his role as prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial

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proceedings and in presenting the State’s case. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129, 118 S.Ct.
502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d
128 (1976); Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674, 676 (5th Cir.1997). Plaintiff’s claim against the District
Attorney is apparently based on his role as a prosecutor. If the conduct complained of was taken in
this defendant’s role as the State’s advocate, he is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. See
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 (absolute immunity protected prosecutor from suit even for knowingly using
perjured testimony and suppressing material evidence at plaintiff’s murder trial).
4. Judicial Immunity
Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Carl Sharp presumably arise out of the performance of his
judicial duties. Judges have absolute immunity for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction.
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). The Fifth Circuit has
delineated three elements to identify acts as being judicial in nature, and thus not in the clear absence
of all jurisdiction: “(1) normal judicial functions that (2) occurred in the judge’s court or chambers
and were (3) centered around a case pending before the judge.” Eitel v. Holland, 787 F.2d 995, 998
(5th Cir.1986). These factors are construed liberally in favor of immunity. Adams v. McIlhany, 764
F.2d 294, 297 (5th Cir.1985).
5. State of Louisiana
Plaintiff names the State of Louisiana as a defendant herein. However, the state is not a
“person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Stotter v. University of Texas at San Antonio, 508
F.3d 812, 821 (5th Cir.2007); Will v. Michigan State Dep't of Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1981).
Furthermore, any § 1983 claim against the state is also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. U.S.
Const. amend. XI; Rodriguez v. Texas Commission on the Arts, 199 F.3d 279, 280 (5th Cir.2000)

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(“Citizens may not bring suit against a state or any instrumentality thereof without the state's
consent. The Eleventh Amendment also bars lawsuits against a state agency if the agency is so
closely connected to the state that the state itself is the party in interest. See Vogt v. Board of
Comm'rs of the Orleans Levee District, 294 F.3d 684 (5th Cir.2002).
6. Heck v. Humphrey and Wallace v. Kato considerations
It appears that plaintiff makes an allegation of false imprisonment. Plaintiff should amend
his pleadings to state the charges upon which he is awaiting trial and the status of same. If plaintiff
is ultimately convicted of charges for which he is incarcerated, he may not be entitled to seek
compensatory damages for false imprisonment until such time as the conviction in question has been
declared invalid. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994),
which held:
... in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional ... imprisonment
or other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254...
Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court
must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be
dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has
already been invalidated.
Heck, at 486-487.
Heck prohibits the use of § 1983 complaints as a means of collaterally attacking outstanding
state convictions.
On the other hand, if a criminal prosecution based on the November 2016 arrest remains
pending, Heck probably does not apply. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (The Heck rule
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applies only when there has been a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated, not to
pending criminal charges.) However, federal courts have been authorized to stay civil rights claims
attacking the legality of a detainee’s arrest, prosecution, and detention until such time as the
allegedly improper state prosecution has been concluded. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94
(2007) (“If a plaintiff files a false arrest claim before he has been convicted (or files any other claim
related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial), it is within the
power of the district court ... to stay the civil action until the criminal case ... is ended.”)
Plaintiff should therefore amend his complaint to state the charges upon which he is
awaiting trial and the status of same. He should provide a detailed description of the charges that
resulted in his incarceration and provide, if available, copies of the arrest reports and affidavits of
the arresting officers. He should also provide, if available, the court minutes to establish whether
any probable cause determinations were made with respect to the November 2016 arrest of which
he complains. He should also provide any documentation in his possession regarding the dismissal
of any charges.
Conclusion and Order
Before this court determines the proper disposition of plaintiff’s complaint, plaintiff should
be given the opportunity to remedy the deficiencies identified above. Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d
179 (5th Cir. 1985).
Therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff amend his complaint within thirty (30) days of the filing of
this order to cure the deficiencies as outlined above, precisely stating what each named defendant
did to violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and alternatively, dismiss those claims or defendants

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plaintiff is unable to cure through amendment. Plaintiff should amend his complaint to state the
charges upon which he is awaiting trial and the status of same. He should provide a detailed
description of the charges that resulted in his incarceration and provide, if available, copies of the
arrest reports and affidavits of the arresting officers. He should also provide, if available, court
minutes to establish whether any probable cause determinations were made with respect to the
November 2016 arrest of which he complains. He should also provide any documentation in his
possession regarding the dismissal of any charges.
Failure to comply with this order may result in dismissal of this action as frivolous
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) or under Rule 41(b) or 16(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Plaintiff is further required to notify the Court of any change in his address under
L.R. 41.3.
In Chambers, Monroe, Louisiana, February 16, 2017.

______________________________________
KAREN L. HAYES
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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