Jenkins et al v. City of Ruston et al

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM RULING re 26 MOTION for Summary Judgment, MOTION to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim, MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Police Dept City of Ruston, City of Ruston. Signed by Chief Judge S Maurice Hicks, Jr on 9/19/2019. (crt,McDonnell, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
CHELSEA DANIELLE JENKINS, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-0963

VERSUS

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

CITY OF RUSTON, ET AL.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HAYES
MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion, Rule 12(c) Motion, and Rule 56 Motion
for Summary Judgment (Record Document 26) filed by Defendants, the City of Ruston
and the Ruston City Police Department. Plaintiffs Chelsea and Brittany Jenkins oppose
the motion. See Record Document 30. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ claims
against the Ruston City Police Department are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, as the
police department is not a legal entity capable of being sued. Additionally, Defendants’
Rule 12(b)(1) motion is GRANTED, as this Court finds that it lacks federal question
subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ claims against the City of Ruston are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
On the night of July 28, 2016, the Jenkinses – who are sisters - planned a party at
their apartment home at 3100 Courtney Avenue in Ruston, Louisiana. See Record
Document 1 at ¶ 5. The party was scheduled to begin at 10:00 p.m. See Record
Document 26-10 (Deposition of Chelsea Jenkins) at 93. Guests began arriving around
10:30 p.m. See id. at 111. Chelsea Jenkins estimated that anywhere from 50 to 100
people were at the party. See id. at 93-95. Guests at the party were both inside and
outside the Jenkins’ residence. See id. at 93-96. There was a disc jockey at the party

and two speakers were placed inside the residence. See id. at 107-110. Chelsea Jenkins
stated in her deposition that the party reached its peak attendance around 11:30 p.m.
See id. at 111. Chelsea Jenkins admitted that the sound from the party could probably
be heard across the street. See id. at 114.
On July 28, 2016, at approximately 11:50 p.m., the Ruston Police Department
received a call from a woman who identified herself as Keisha Perry (“Perry”). Perry
complained of a “loud, obnoxious party” that was keeping her child awake. Record
Document 26-5 (Ruston Police Department Audio Recordings). Perry was standing at
3029 Courtney Avenue when she called and knew the party was “somewhere down from
3029 Courtney.” Id. She also stated that “parking is everywhere.” Id.
Officer Haskell “Trey” Tull (“Officer Tull”), Officer Cindy Abbott (“Officer Abbott”),
and Officer Hannah Laborde (“Officer Laborde”) were dispatched to Courtney Avenue in
response to Perry’s call.

See id.; see also Record Document 26-7 (Officer Tull

Deposition), Record Document 26-8 (Officer Laborde Deposition), Record Document 2612 (Ruston Police Department Incident Detail Report), & Record Document 26-13 (CAD
Response Report). Upon arrival at Courtney Avenue, the officers noticed “a lot of people
grouped up at an apartment” and “in front of the same apartment.” Record Document 268 at 14-16, 21. The roadway was also blocked with cars. See id. at 24 The officers
began searching for the person who was responsible for the party and eventually Chelsea
Jenkins advised that she was hosting the party at her residence at 3100 Courtney
Avenue. See id. at 14-16 & 20. As evidenced by the officers’ Motor Vehicle Recording
System (“MVR”), specifically Officer Laborde’s MVR, Chelsea Jenkins was informed that
she got one warning, the vehicles had to be moved, and that if the officers returned, then

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she would be taken to jail. See Record Document 26-6 (MVR Recordings); Record
Document 26-6(a) (Officer Laborde MVR at approximately 00:02:20-00:02:40). Chelsea
Jenkins responded, “okay.” See id. The officers left Courtney Avenue. See Record
Document 26-8 at 24-27; Record Document 26-6.
On July 29, 2016, at approximately 12:29 a.m., the Ruston Police Department
received another call regarding a loud party on Courtney Avenue. See Record Document
26-5. This call was received after the officers had already left Courtney Avenue. See id.
More officers responded to the second noise complaint. See Record Document 26-6;
Record Document 26-7; Record Document 26-9 (Officer Cindy Abbott Deposition). In
addition to Officers Tull, Laborde, and Abbott, Sergeant Justin Brown (“Sergeant Brown”),
Lieutenant Thomas Evans (“Lieutenant Evans”), and Officer Tyler Book dispatched to
Courtney Avenue in response to the second noise complaint. See id. According to Officer
Laborde, upon her arrival, there were still people gathered and cars blocking the roadway.
See Record Document 26-8 at 26-27. Officer Laborde placed Chelsea Jenkins under
arrest for disturbing the peace in violation of Ruston City Ordinance § 11-103.1 (Noiseproducing instruments; sound amplification). See Record Document 26-6(c) (Officer
Laborde MVR); Record Document 26-8 at 28-31; Record Document 26-12. Chelsea
Jenkins was transported to the Lincoln Parish Detention Center. See Record Document
26-6(c).
In order to clear the parked cars, the officers remained on scene after Chelsea
Jenkins was transported to the Lincoln Parish Detention Center. See Record Document
26-7 at 30; Record Document 26-9 at 17; Record Document 26-6. According to the
officers, it was during this time that Brittany Jenkins approached Lieutenant Evans and

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Sergeant Brown and started yelling at them.

See Record Document 26-7; Record

Document 26-9. They maintain that she balled her hand into a fist and lunged at them.
See id. They admit that no contact was made. See id. The officers contend that Brittany
Jenkins got into a vehicle for a very short period of time, then opened the door and started
yelling at them again. See Record Document 26-9 at 17-21. Brittany Jenkins can be
heard yelling on Sergeant Brown’s MVR. See Record Document 26-6(d) (Sergeant
Brown MVR at approximately 00:43:15-00:45:00). The officers warn Brittany Jenkins not
to get any closer and ask her friends to “get her out of here.” Id. Notwithstanding, Brittany
Jenkins denies yelling or having any contact with the officers. See Record Document 309 at 9-10. Officer Tull ultimately arrested Brittany Jenkins for violating Ruston City
Ordinance § 11-103.3 (Music; yelling; animals). See Record Document 26-7; Record
Document 26-12.
In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the police officers “illegally, unlawfully,
willingly, wrongfully, maliciously, and intentionally shut down [their] party and placed them
under arrest for Disturbing the Peace by Excessive Sound or Noise.” Record Document
1 at ¶ 5. They further allege that the police officers “willfully and maliciously” threatened
them and “forcefully and violently seized [them] against their will and without any cause
or justification, putting [them] in mortal fear.” Id. at ¶ 7. In addition to this “trespass,
assault, and battery,” Plaintiffs allege that the police officers detained and imprisoned
them against their will without any warrant or authority of law. Id. at ¶ 8.
Plaintiffs sued the City of Ruston and the Ruston City Police Department under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for assault, battery, false arrest/false imprisonment, and trespass, all based
on the actions of individual police officers. See id. Defendants now seek dismissal of

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Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Rule 12(c), and Rule 56.

See Record

Document 26. 1
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I.

Rule 12(b)(1) Standard.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides that a party may assert lack of

subject matter jurisdiction as a defense by motion. See F.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). “Subject
matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s power to hear a case, can never be
forfeited or waived.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 1244
(2006). Federal courts have limited jurisdiction and possess only that power authorized
by the Constitution and federal statute. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511
U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994). Subject matter jurisdiction “is not to be
expanded by judicial decree.” Id. In fact, “it is to be presumed that a cause lies outside
this limited jurisdiction and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party
asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Subject matter jurisdiction is implicated when a claim is “so insubstantial,
implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of [the Supreme Court], or otherwise completely
devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.” ACS Recovery Servs., Inc. v.
Griffin, 723 F.3d 518, 523 (5th Cir. 2013), citing Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cnty. of
Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666, 94 S.Ct. 772, 777 (1974). A party may challenge subject
matter jurisdiction facially or factually. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523
(5th Cir. 1981). If the defense makes a facial challenge, “the trial court is required merely

1The

Court has decided the defense motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1); thus, the merits of
the Rule 12(c) and Rule 56 motions were not reached.
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to look to the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint because they are presumed
to be true.” Id. If those allegations are sufficient to establish jurisdiction, then the
complaint stands. See id. “If a defendant makes a factual attack upon the court’s subject
matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit, the defendant submits affidavits, testimony, or other
evidentiary materials.” “[The] plaintiff is also required to submit facts through some
evidentiary method and has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that the trial court does have subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.
II.

Analysis.
Here, Plaintiffs have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

See Record Document 1 at ¶ 1. Section 1331 provides for federal question jurisdiction.
See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 513, 126 S.Ct. at 1244. A plaintiff properly invokes Section
1331 jurisdiction when he pleads a colorable claim “arising under” the Constitution or laws
of the United States. Id. Plaintiffs seek relief against the City of Ruston and the Ruston
City Police Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for assault, battery, false arrest/false
imprisonment, and trespass, all based on the actions of individual police officers.
A.

Claims Against the Ruston City Police Department.

The Ruston City Police Department is not a legal entity capable of being sued in
federal court. See Hicks v. Louisiana, No. CIV.A. 13-3000, 2014 WL 869247, at *1 (W.D.
La. Mar. 5, 2014); Evans v. City of Homer, No. 07-0383, 2007 WL 2710792
(W.D.La.2007); Martin v. Davis, No. 06-1770, 2007 WL 763653 (E.D.La.2007) (“Under
Louisiana law, police departments are not juridical entities capable of suing or being
sued.”). All claims against the Ruston City Police Department shall be dismissed with
prejudice and the Court will now consider Plaintiffs’ claims against the City of Ruston.

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B.

Claims Against the City of Ruston.

Again, Plaintiffs have attempted to invoke federal question subject matter
jurisdiction as to their Section 1983 claims against the City of Ruston. Pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1), the City of Ruston asserts both facial and factual challenges to this Court’s
federal question subject matter jurisdiction.
1.

Facial Challenge.

Here, the City of Ruston argues that Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to allege facts upon
which federal question subject matter jurisdiction can be based.

Plaintiffs’ factual

allegations set forth in their complaint will be taken as true and their complaint will survive
the facial challenge if it alleges sufficient facts to invoke subject matter jurisdiction. See
Paterson, 644 F.2d at 523. In evaluating the City of Ruston’s facial challenge to subject
matter jurisdiction, this Court will use the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard. See Silha
v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 174 (7th Cir. 2015); Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557
(5th Cir.2008).
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a pleading
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” The standard for the adequacy of complaints under Rule 8(a)(2) is now a
“plausibility” standard found in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127
S.Ct. 1955 (2007), and its progeny. Under this standard, “[f]actual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555-56, 127 S.Ct. at
1965 (citations omitted). Dismissal is appropriate only if the complaint fails to plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S. Ct.

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at 1974. If a pleading only contains “labels and conclusions” and “a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action,” the pleading does not meet the standards of Rule
8(a)(2). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citation
omitted).
Section 1983 provides a cause of action against anyone who, under color of state
law, deprives another of his or her constitutional rights. In Monell v. Department of Social
Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2037-2038 (1978),
the Supreme Court held that Congress intended Section 1983 to apply to local
government entities as well as to persons. The Monell Court further held that
municipalities and local government agencies cannot be held liable for constitutional torts
under Section 1983 pursuant to a theory of respondeat superior, but they can be held
liable “when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,
inflicts the injury.” Id. Therefore, to succeed on a Monell claim against a local government
entity, the plaintiff must establish (1) an official policy, practice, or custom, of which (2) a
policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a
constitutional violation whose moving force is that policy, practice, or custom. See
Fuentes v. Nueces Cnty., Tex., 689 F. App’x 775, 777 (5th Cir. 2017), quoting Valle v.
City of Hous., 613 F.3d 536, 541-42 (5th Cir. 2010). Locating an official policy, practice,
or custom ensures that a local government entity will be held liable only for violations of
constitutional rights that resulted from the decisions of those officials whose acts may
fairly be said to be those of the government entity itself. See Bd. of Comm’rs of Bryan
Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04, 117 S. Ct. 1832, 1388 (1997).

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A review of the complaint demonstrates that all of their factual allegations relate to
the individual actions of unnamed police officers on July 28-29, 2016. See Record
Document 1. The individual police officers are not identified by name in the complaint
and are not named as individual defendants. There are no factual allegations regarding
unconstitutional policies, practices, and/or customs of the City of Ruston. Likewise, no
policymaker is identified. Thus, the factual allegations in the complaint, even if accepted
as true, do not establish the necessary elements of a Monell municipal liability claim. See
ACS Recovery Servs., Inc., 723 F.3d at 523, citing Oneida, 414 U.S. at 666, 94 S.Ct. at
777 (Subject matter jurisdiction is implicated when a claim is “so insubstantial,
implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of [the Supreme Court], or otherwise completely
devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.”). Because Plaintiffs have failed
to allege facts that would survive the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard, they have
likewise failed to meet their pleading burden to invoke federal question subject matter
jurisdiction. The factual allegations relating to the actions of unnamed, individual police
officers on the night in question, even taken as true, are not sufficient to impose Section
1983 municipal liability upon the City of Ruston.
2.

Factual Challenge.

In a factual challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), the trial court’s jurisdiction - “its very
power to hear the case” – is at issue. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412-413 (5th
Cir. 1981). Thus, “there is substantial authority that the trial court is free to weigh the
evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Id. at 413.
The Fifth Circuit has held “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations,
and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating

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for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” Id. The plaintiff bears “the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that the trial court does have subject matter
jurisdiction.” Paterson, 644 F.2d at 523.
As discussed supra, Plaintiffs have not satisfied the Monell standard because they
have not plead a policy, practice, and/or custom of the City of Ruston that is allegedly
unconstitutional. Discovery has produced no such policy, practice, or custom. Under
Monell, “a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or,
in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036.
Moreover, Plaintiffs’ argument in their reply brief that a directive from Sergeant
Brown to arrest them “constituted the municipality and police department final decision”
fails as a matter of law. Record Document 30 at 17. A Monell claim is based on the acts
of a governmental official “with final policymaking authority for the local government actor
concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory
violation at issue.” Burge v. Par. of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 468 (5th Cir. 1999).
Here, Sergeant Brown was not the final policymaking authority for the City of Ruston.
Instead, Chief Stephen Rogers is the final policymaking authority for the City of Ruston
with respect to the police department. See Record Document 26-5 (Affidavit of Chief
Stephen Rogers) (generally discussing the normal practices and course of activities for
the Ruston Police Department). This Court has held that police officers such as Sergeant
Brown are not final policymaking authorities. See Adams v. City of Shreveport, 269 F.
Supp. 3d 743, 753 (W.D. La. 2017). 2

2In

Adams, this Court explained:
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In sum, Plaintiffs have failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that this
Court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction and their case must be dismissed.
This case presents an instance where a jurisdictional dismissal is appropriate because
the alleged federal claim against the City of Ruston is immaterial, insubstantial, and
foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Monell. See ACS Recovery Servs., Inc.,
723 F.3d at 523, citing Oneida, 414 U.S. at 666, 94 S.Ct. at 777. Plaintiffs have simply
presented no federal case or controversy.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, this Court hereby dismisses, with prejudice, all
claims against the Ruston City Police Department, as the police department is not a legal
entity capable of being sued. Further, all claims against the City of Ruston are dismissed,
without prejudice, as the Court lacks federal question subject matter jurisdiction over such
claims.
Accordingly,

Under the undisputed facts in the summary judgment record, Officers
Coleman and Neville are both corporals in the SPD, a rank one rank above
the rank of an ordinary officer. See Record Documents 21–5 at 8 (deposition
of Officer Coleman page 25, lines 9–12) and 21–6 at 10 (deposition of
Officer Neville page 32, lines 4–7). Therefore, these officers are
unquestionably not the final policymaking authorities for the SPD, and as
such are not the appropriate officials to sue in their official capacity to
impose liability on the City of Shreveport.
Adams, 269 F.Supp.3d at 753.
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IT IS ORDERED that the Rule 12(b)(1) Motion, Rule 12(c) Motion, and Rule 56
Motion for Summary Judgment (Record Document 26) filed by Defendants, the City of
Ruston and the Ruston City Police Department, be and is hereby GRANTED.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 19th day of September,
2019.

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