Reed et al v. Department of Corrections et al
Filing
121
MEMORANDUM RULING re 107 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Richwood Correctional Center L L C, Ray Hanson, Princeton Excess & Surplus Lines Insurance Co. Signed by Judge Terry A Doughty on 7/28/2023. (crt,Crawford, A)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
LESLIE REED, ET AL.
CASE NO. 3:17-CV-01382
VERSUS
JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, ET AL.
MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY
MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 107] filed by Defendants
Richwood Correctional Center, LLC (“RCC”), Ray Hanson (“Hanson”), and The Princeton Excess
and Surplus Lines Insurance Company (the “Insurance Company”) (collectively, “Defendants”).
Plaintiffs Leslie Reed (“Reed”) and Otis McGinnis (“McGinnis”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed
a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 109] in response.
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
This action revolves around the death of Brandon Reed (“Reed”), a former inmate of RCC
in Monroe, Louisiana.1 Reed was arrested by the Monroe Police Department and booked at RCC
on or about August 25, 2016.2 Reed was released on or about October 17, 2016.3 Before his
incarceration at RCC, Reed was in the custody of Ouachita Correctional Center (“OCC”). 4 While
at OCC, Plaintiffs allege that Reed began experiencing a chronic cough, difficulty eating and
digesting food, and significant weight loss.5 Plaintiffs, in their Amended Complaint, allege that
1
[Doc. No. 107, p. 1]
[Id.]
3
[Id.]
4
[Id. at p. 2]
5
[Doc. No. 109, p. 2] Plaintiffs made these allegations in the factual background section of the Memorandum in
Opposition. Plaintiffs did not provide citations or evidentiary support for these claims.
2
Reed’s symptom persisted during his incarceration at RCC, and despite his symptoms, RCC did
not provide Reed with adequate care or any care at all.6
As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiffs assert claims against RCC, Ray Hansen, and the
Insurance Company.7 Ray Hanson is the former Warden of RCC.8
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleges several claims against Defendants. First, Plaintiffs
claim that Defendants violated Reed’s constitutional rights by showing deliberate indifference to
his medical needs while he was in the custody of the RCC.9 Second, Plaintiffs assert claims against
Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants failed to provide adequate medical
care and treatment despite Reed’s condition when he entered RCC.10 Plaintiffs argue that
Defendants’ neglect in providing adequate care or total denial of care directly contributed to Reed’s
death.11 Finally, Plaintiffs appear to allege state law claims under Louisiana Civil Code Articles
2315, 2315.1, and 2315.2.12 While it is somewhat unclear from the Amended Complaint, it appears
that Plaintiffs argue that Defendants breached their duty in failing to provide Reed with proper
medical care and failing to adequately supervise or train employees. 13
In response to these claims, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No.
115]. Defendants first contend that all claims against them have prescribed, or, in the alternative,
lack merit.14 Additionally, Defendants point out that Reed’s weight was continuously monitored
while he was incarcerated at RCC and that he received prescription medications for certain medical
6
[Doc. No. 38, p. 2–3]
[Id. at p. 1–2]
8
[Id. at p. 2]
9
[Id.]
10
[Id.]
11
[Id. at 3–4]
12
[Doc. No. 115, p. 3]
13
[Doc. No. 38, p. 2]
14
[Doc. No. 115, p. 3]
7
2
conditions.15 Thus, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs will be unable to establish necessary elements
on all claims and that they are entitled to summary judgment.16
Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition [Doc. No. 109] to the instant motion;
however, Plaintiffs did not respond to any arguments made by Defendants.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) states:
A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim
or defense--or the part of each claim or defense--on which summary
judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court
should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the
motion.
“If the moving party meets the initial burden of showing there is no genuine issue of
material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidence or designate specific
facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.” Distribuidora Mari Jose, S.A. de C.V. v.
Transmaritime, Inc., 738 F.3d 703, 706 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1).
A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of
the lawsuit under applicable law in the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248,
106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the
evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
“[A] party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated
assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.” Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337,
15
16
[Id. at pp. 17–18]
[Id. at p. 3]
3
343 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). However, in evaluating the evidence
tendered by the parties, the Court must accept the evidence of the nonmovant as credible and draw
all justifiable inferences in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. “A non-conclusory affidavit can
create genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment, even if the affidavit is selfserving and uncorroborated.” Lester v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 805 F. App'x 288, 291 (5th Cir.
2020) (citations omitted).
B. Analysis
Defendants argue the following in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment: 1) All
claims prior to October 2016 have prescribed;17 2) Plaintiffs have not properly pleaded their
Section 1983 claims against RCC;18 3) Plaintiffs have failed to establish Section 1983 claims
against Hanson in his individual capacity;19 4) Plaintiffs cannot prove medical causation;20 5)
Plaintiffs have not presented a valid claim under the Rehabilitation Act;21and 6) Plaintiffs have not
established valid claims under Louisiana state law.22 Plaintiffs do not respond to Defendants’
arguments.
The Court will address each argument below.
1. Claims made prior to October 2016 are prescribed.
Defendants first argue that all claims arising prior to October 25, 2016, are prescribed.23 In
support of their argument, Defendants cite 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which states that federal courts—in
the absence of a federal statute of limitations—apply the state’s prescription statute.24 Defendants
17
[Id. at p. 8]
[Id. at p. 15]
19
[Id. at p. 19]
20
[Id. at p. 21]
21
[Id. at p. 23]
22
[Id. at p. 25]
23
[Id. at p. 8]
24
[Id. at p. 7]
18
4
note that Louisiana’s one-year prescriptive period for personal injury actions applies to both
federal and state law claims.25
As noted above, Plaintiff does not respond to Defendants’ arguments.
Plaintiffs’ claims arise under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana state law. Because
Section 1983 does not provide a statute of limitations, “federal courts apply the state prescription
statute governing [the] most analogous cause of action.” Drury v. U.S. Army Corps. of Eng’rs, 359
F.3d 366, 367 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004) (referencing Braden v. Texas A & M Univ. Sys., 636 F.2d 90, 92
(5th Cir. 1981) (holding that because Section 1983 has no statute of limitations period, federal
courts apply the state prescription statute governing the most analogous cause of action)).
Accordingly, both the federal and state law claims here are subject to the prescriptive period
provided by Louisiana law. For actions brought pursuant to Section 1983, federal courts borrow
the forum state’s personal-injury limitations period. Brown v. Cain, 546 F. App'x 471 (5th Cir.
2013). In Louisiana that period is one year. La. C.C. art. 3492. The party pleading prescription
bears the burden of proving that the claim has prescribed; however, “when the face of the petition
reveals that the plaintiff’s claims have prescribed, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate
prescription was suspended or interrupted.” Harris v. Breaud, 243 So. 3d 572, 579 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 2018).
In Harris, the plaintiffs argued that their claim had not prescribed because of the discovery
rule. Id. Under the discovery rule, “prescription does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows of
sufficient facts and has a reasonable basis for filing suit against a certain defendant.” Id. The Harris
court found that the plaintiffs’ claims had prescribed on their face, and the plaintiffs bore the
burden of proving the claims were not prescribed. Id. However, the plaintiffs alleged no facts
25
[Id.]
5
regarding their inability to discover the claim, and the plaintiffs did not allege a date that the claim
was discovered on. Id. at 579–80. Given the lack of facts and evidence, the Harris court found that
the plaintiffs failed to carry their burden. Id.
In the present action, the conduct giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claim against Defendants
allegedly occurred from August 25, 2016 to October 17, 2016, the time in which Reed was
incarcerated at RCC.26 Since this action was not filed until October 25, 2017, Plaintiffs’ claims
have prescribed on their face, and the burden has shifted to them to show that their claims have
not prescribed. Plaintiffs have not responded to Defendants’ arguments on this issue; however, in
their Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 109], Plaintiffs
claimed that the discovery rule applied.27
Even applying the discovery rule, Plaintiffs fail to carry their burden. Similar to the Harris
case, Plaintiffs have failed to allege an alternative date that the claims were discovered on or a date
on which they were made aware of the claims. To the contrary, Plaintiffs have conceded
throughout their complaint that they were aware of the alleged denial of adequate care to Reed
during his incarceration at both OCC and RCC. Since Plaintiffs have not provided any argument
in opposition to this motion and have not alleged an alternative date on which prescription began
to run, all of Plaintiffs’ claims arising prior to October 17, 2016, have prescribed and must be
dismissed.
2. Plaintiffs do not have valid claims against RCC under Section 1983.
Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs have failed to establish their Section 1983 claims.28
Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to identify and adequately describe an
26
[Id. at p. 1]
[Doc. No. 109, p. 6]
28
[Doc. No. 115, p. 14–15]
27
6
unconstitutional policy or pattern of similar conduct sufficient to establish the existence of an
unconstitutional custom or policy.29 Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs rely on vague
assertions and an alleged single incident to establish their failure-to-train claim.30
Plaintiffs do not respond to Defendants’ argument on this issue.
a. Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts to survive a motion for
summary judgment on their Section 1983 Monell claims.
In Rosborough v. Mgt. & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 2003), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (“the Fifth Circuit”) held that private prisons, like
RCC, are subject to Section 1983 claims. To establish their Section 1983 claim and survive
summary judgment, Plaintiffs “must show that (1) an official policy” (2) promulgated by RCC
“(3) was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right.” Hicks-Fields v. Harris
Cty., Tex., 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Peterson v. City of Ft. Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d
838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009)). An official policy “includes the decisions of a government’s law-makers,
the acts of its policy making officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically
have the force of law.” Pena v. City of Rio Grande, Tex., 879 F.3d 613, 621–22 (5th Cir. 2018)
(quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citations omitted)). Additionally, “a
complaint’s ‘description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional
violation…cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.’” Id. at 622 (quoting Spiller v. City
of Tex. City, Police Dep't, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997)).
In Pena, the plaintiff was injured after being tased by police officers. The plaintiff asserted
a Monell claim against the municipality alleging that the municipality had a policy of tasing nonsuspect minors. Id. In support of her allegation, the plaintiff cited the department’s written taser
29
30
[Id. at p. 12]
[Id. at p. 15]
7
policy. Id. The court, however, concluded that the plaintiff failed to show a causal connection
because the policy allowed for tasing of moving individuals and did not permit tasing non-suspect
minors. Id. Since the policy was irrelevant to the injury alleged, the court disregarded the policy.
Id. Next, the court found that the only other specific fact alleged by the plaintiff was the description
of the incident involving the plaintiff. Id. at 623. Since more than the incident giving rise to the
claim is required to establish a custom or practice, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument and
dismissed the Monell claim. Id.
In the instant action, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants implemented and enforced
unconstitutional policies at RCC and as a result are liable for Reed’s inadequate medical treatment
and subsequent injuries.31 Similar to Pena, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ policy or practice
allowed for the injury to occur. Plaintiffs, however, have failed to specifically identify a policy or
provide specific facts showing a causal relationship between the alleged policy and the injury
suffered by Reed. Moreover, to support their allegation that RCC had a custom or practice of
depriving inmates of medical care, Plaintiffs have failed to do more than recite the facts that gave
rise to the present action, and as noted in Pena, more is required to survive a motion for summary
judgment. Thus, Plaintiffs’ Monell claims fail as a matter of law.
b. Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to avoid summary
judgment on their failure-to-train claim.
Plaintiffs similarly fail to allege more than conclusory allegations to establish their failureto-train claim. To succeed on a failure-to-train claim, the plaintiff must “prove that (1) the city
failed to train or supervise the [employee] involved; (2) there is a causal connection between the
alleged failure to supervise or train and the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s rights; and (3) the
failure to train or supervise constituted a deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional
31
[Doc. No. 38, p. 3]
8
rights.” Id. (citing Thompson v. Upshur Cty., 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001)). Ordinarily, to
show deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must establish “a pattern of similar constitutional
violations by untrained employees.” Id. (citing Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011)).
In Pena, discussed above, the court held that the plaintiff could not succeed on her failureto-train claim because she failed to allege that the defendant engaged in a pattern of similar
unconstitutional conduct. Id. Here, Plaintiffs, in attempting to assert their claim under the
Rehabilitation Act, allege that Reed was denied access to medical treatment while other similarly
situated individuals were afforded access to medical treatment.32 In making this argument,
Plaintiffs acknowledge that no pattern of similar conduct existed and that, while Reed was
allegedly denied medical care, others received the care needed.
By failing to allege a pattern of unconstitutional conduct, Plaintiffs attempt to establish
their claim through a single incident. A single incident can sometimes establish a failure to train
claim; however, case law suggests that the plaintiff must show that the individual who committed
the constitutional violation received no training whatsoever. Id. at 624 (noting that the single
incident exception is a narrow one that the Supreme Court has declined to extend multiple times).
Plaintiffs have likewise failed to allege that the medical staff at RCC received no training and have
failed to establish the single incident exception. Thus, these claims must also be dismissed.
3. Plaintiffs fail to state a valid Section 1983 claim against Hanson in his
individual capacity.
In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Hanson failed to properly
supervise and train employees, which resulted in the injuries sustained by Reed.33 In response,
32
33
[Doc. No. 1, p. 8]
[Doc. No. 38, p. 3]
9
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs cannot establish the requisite elements to succeed on a Section
1983 supervisory claim or failure-to-train claim.34
Again, Plaintiffs have not responded to Defendants’ argument on this issue.
Supervisory officials, like Hanson, cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for the actions
of their subordinates on the theory of respondeat superior. Est. of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of
N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005). Instead, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant’s conduct resulted in a denial of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id. To succeed on a
failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise claim, the plaintiff must show that: “(1) the supervisor either
failed to supervise or train the subordinate official; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to
train or supervise and the violation of the plaintiffs rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise
amounts to a deliberate indifference.” Id.
Here, Plaintiffs’ claims fail at the third prong of the analysis. To prove that a defendant
acted with deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that the official was aware of facts from
which an inference could have been drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also have drawn the inference. Id. “Deliberate indifference requires a showing more than
negligence or even gross negligence.” Id. Generally, to show deliberate indifference, “a plaintiff
must demonstrate a pattern of violations and that the inadequacy of the training is obvious and
obviously likely to result in a constitutional violation.” Id.
Plaintiffs appear to assert that Hanson is liable for the conduct of the treating nurses and
other prison workers because Hanson was aware of Reed’s condition;35 however, other than
conclusory assertions, Plaintiffs offer no evidence showing that Hanson was aware of Reed’s
condition. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not asserted a pattern of similar conduct, but rather Plaintiffs
34
35
[Id. at p. 21]
[Doc. No. 38, p. 3–4]
10
conceded in their Opposition that other individuals were afforded adequate medical care.36 Without
alleging a pattern of similar conduct, Plaintiffs have failed to establish the third element required
to hold Hanson liable under Section 1983. Hanson is thus entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
4. Plaintiffs have not presented a valid claim under the Rehabilitation Act.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not presented a valid claim under the Rehabilitation
Act.37 In support, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have not and cannot produce any medical
evidence showing that Reed suffered from a disability.38 Further, Defendants contend that
Plaintiffs have offered nothing more than conclusory allegations in support of this claim.39
Therefore, Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs’ claim under the Rehabilitation Act claim must be
dismissed.40
Plaintiffs failed to respond to Defendants’ arguments on this issue.
This Court agrees that the Rehabilitation Act does not apply in this case. The Rehabilitation
Act “prohibits disability discrimination by recipients of federal funding.” Frame v. City of
Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 223 (5th Cir. 2011). Specifically, the Act provides that “no qualified
individual with a disability shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
In the instant action, Plaintiffs have not claimed that Reed was disabled as defined under
the Act or that he was denied benefits because of such disability. Because Plaintiffs have failed to
36
[Doc. No. 1, p. 8]
[Doc. No. 115, p. 23]
38
[Id.]
39
[Id.]
40
[Id.]
37
11
allege a disability or discrimination because of a disability, their claims under the Rehabilitation
Act fail.
5. Plaintiffs do not have a valid claim under Louisiana state law.
Lastly, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs do not have a valid claim under Louisiana state
law.41 Defendants acknowledge that prison authorities have a duty to provide reasonable medical
care to inmates, but they assert that this duty does not require a full hospital at the prison site.42
Defendants argue that Reed was provided with adequate medical treatment while incarcerated at
RCC. Additionally, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot produce any evidence to the contrary
and are thus entitled to summary judgment.
Plaintiffs failed to respond to Defendants’ arguments on this issue.
In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs appear to allege that Defendants are liable under
Louisiana Civil Code Articles 2315, 2315.1, and 2315.2.43 Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants breached their standard of care by depriving Reed of adequate medical treatment and
refusing to treat him after several requests were made. The applicable standard of care requires
prison officials to provide inmates with reasonable medical care. Neidlinger v. Warden, Med.
Dept., 38 So. 3d 1171, 1173 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2010). Reasonable medical care “does not require
the maintenance of a full hospital” at the prison “in order to protect an inmate against every medical
risk but does encompass the risk that an inmate will become sick or injured and require life-saving
medical attention.” Id.
In Neidlinger, the plaintiff was bitten by a spider while in the care of the defendants. The
spider bite caused a serious infection that required hospital care. Id. at 1171. The plaintiff claimed
41
[Id. at p. 24]
[Id.]
43
[Doc. No. 38, p. 2–3]
42
12
that the defendants did not act reasonably in failing to provide him with antibiotics in the earlier
stages of his infection. Id. at 1174. Further, the plaintiff argued that had he been administered
antibiotics sooner, the infection would not have required hospital care. Id. In affirming the trial
court’s decision to grant summary judgment, the appellate court found that the plaintiff “merely
stated his version of the facts, without the support of affidavits, depositions, or any other supporting
evidence that would have been sufficient to establish” that he could prevail at trial. Id.
In the instant action, Reed was booked at RCC on August 25, 2016, and released on
October 17, 2016.44 Shortly after Reed arrived, he was seen by the medical staff at RCC and given
prescription medication for his reported conditions.45 Additionally, Reed’s weight was
continuously monitored throughout his incarceration at RCC.46
Plaintiffs claim that Reed was not afforded adequate medical care when in OCC’s custody;
however, Plaintiffs have not supported their assertions with affidavits, depositions, or any other
evidence. Similar to the plaintiff in Nwedlinger, Plaintiffs have merely stated their version of facts
with no evidentiary support. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not shown that they will be able to establish
the breach element of their claims or satisfy their evidentiary burden at trial. For this reason,
Plaintiffs’ state law negligence claims under Louisiana Civil Code Articles 2315 and 2315.2 fail.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein,
IT IS ORDERED, ADUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. No. 107] is GRANTED. All claims filed by Plaintiffs against Defendants are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
44
[Doc. No. 115, p. 1]
[Id. at p. 17]
46
[Id. at p. 17–18]
45
13
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 28th day of July, 2023.
Terry A. Doughty
United States District Judge
14
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