Madison-Tallulah v. LA Board of Elementary et al

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM RULING re 13 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by John C White, LA Board of Elementary & Secondary Education, LA Dept of Education. Signed by Judge Terry A Doughty on 4/12/2018. (crt,Crawford, A)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
MADISON-TALLULAH EDUCATION
CENTER

CIVIL ACTION 18-00234

VERSUS

JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

LOUISIANA BOARD OF ELEMENTARY
AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, ET AL.

MAG. JUDGE KAREN L. HAYES

RULING
Plaintiff Madison-Tallulah Education Center a/k/a Tallulah Charter School (“TCS”) filed
this lawsuit against Defendants Louisiana Board of Elementary & Secondary Education (“BESE”),
Louisiana Department of Education (“LDE”), and John C. White (“White”), Superintendent of the
LDE (referred to collectively as “Defendants”), for purported violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
state law.
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. 13]. For the following
reasons, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
TCS is a Louisiana nonprofit corporation domiciled in Madison Parish, Louisiana. Under

LA. REV. STAT. § 17:3983, BESE approved TCS to operate a Type 2 public charter school,
beginning in July 2013. BESE and TCS entered into a written contract (“the Charter Contract”)
pertaining to TCS’s operation of the school.
Since 2013, TCS has continuously operated the Type 2 charter school in Madison Parish

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ruling.

The Court accepts as true the facts contained in TCS’ Complaint for purposes of this

under the initial term of the Charter Contract. Most of the students attending TCS reside in
Madison Parish.
Under LA. REV. STAT. 17:3981, BESE oversees the operation of Type 2 charter schools for
the State of Louisiana. Pursuant to LA. REV. STAT. § 17:3981(5), BESE has rule-making
authority to determine policy and direction to LDE with regard to the schools’ BESE charters.
Under LA. REV. STAT. § 17:3981(3), BESE must adopt rules for the efficient, effective, and fair
undertaking of its duties.
BESE adopted rules contained in the Administrative Code. Pursuant to LA. ADMIN. CODE
§ 28:1502A, the Superintendent of LDE makes a recommendation to BESE whether a charter shall
be renewed after completion of its initial term of operation.
On or about May 5, 2017, the LDE allegedly received a complaint about potential

testing

irregularity at TCS during the 2016-17 school year. The LDE conducted an investigation, which
included multiple site visits and interviews in 2017. TCS contends that the LDE questioned
students without providing advanced parental/guardian notice and without first securing
parental/guardian authorization.

The LDE also sought and gathered records and other

information maintained at TCS.
TCS contends that the LDE did not seek or permit use of the Complaint Procedures under
La. Admin. Code 28:3301, to address the May 5, 2017 complaint. TCS further contends that the
LDE and the Superintendent did not use the due process components specified in the Charter
School Performance Compact, which is referred to in BESE Bulletin 126, when conducting the
investigation. In particular, the LDE did not issue to TCS a Notice of Concern, Notice of Breach,
or like or similar notices.
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In a May 17, 2017 notice, the LDE advised parents and guardians of TCS students that
their children had been questioned by LDE staff regarding LEAP testing and further advised that
the LDE’s investigatory visit would not impact the children or their assessment results.
As a result of its investigation, the LDE decided to void 106 LEAP tests administered to
students in the 2016-17 school year. The LDE advised TCS of its decision in an October 25, 2017
notice.
On November 24, 2017, TCS provided a written response to the LDE’s factual findings.
Nevertheless, the LDE decided to void 106 LEAP tests administered in 2016-2017.
The voiding of the LEAP test scores reduced TCS’ School Performance Score (“SPS”)
for the 2016-2017 school year and dropped its Assessment Index Score and student scores in math
proficiency. Prior to the voiding of the tests, TCS had a SPS letter grade of “C” for the 2014-2015
and 2015-2016 school years. For the 2016-2017 school year, the LDE assigned an SPS of “F” to
TCS.
Under BESE regulations, a Type 2 charter school that has a failing SPS (“F” grade) has no
right of renewal of its initial charter contract. According to TCS, Type 2 charter schools with SPS
grades higher than F have statutory, regulatory, and contract rights to a recommendation from the
State Superintendent for charter renewal and to an affirmative vote by the BESE to authorize
renewal of their charters beyond their initial term.
TCS contends that the LDE was “arbitrary, did not consider alternative measures available
for measuring student performance for the 106 voided examination results, used criteria not
authorized when evaluating and measuring school quality for TCS’ SPS scores, and did not take
into account the impact of such decision on approximately 430 students served by TCS and the
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educational alternatives remaining for said students in the event of TCS’ closure based on failing
SPS scores.” [Doc. No. 1, § 36].
TCS further contends that the LDE violated LA. ADMIN. CODE 28:1101 B, C and G and
TCS’ statutory and contract rights under its Charter Contract, as well as the Louisiana Charter
School Performance Compact, by voiding the 106 LEAP test results and calculating TCS’s SPS
rating “without an actual measure of student performance.” [Doc. No. 1, §§ 37-38].
On December 11, 2017, BESE’s School Innovation and Turnaround Committee

received

the LDE’s recommendation of non-renewal, allegedly based on TCS’SPS score of “F.” The
Committee acted in reliance on the LDE’s SPS 2016-2017 report on TCS, and without notice to
or input from TCS, voted to accept the recommendation of non-renewal.
On December 12, 2017, BESE, acting on the Committee’s recommendation, voted to
accept the LDE’s recommendation of non-renewal without notice to or input from TCS. TCS
contends that BESE’s decision of non-renewal was not based on a specific recommendation
communicated from White to BESE, as purportedly required by state law.
In a January 4, 2018 letter, BESE notified TCS, through the president of the board of
Directors, of the non-renewal decision. As a result, TCS will close at the end of the 2017-18
school year and its approximately 430 students will need to attend another school. The other public
schools in Madison Parish are also rated as failing.
TCS contends that it did not receive the opportunity to create and implement a corrective
action plan, as permitted under LA. ADMIN. CODE 28:1503B(7).
On January 11, 2018, counsel for TCS filed a request for reopening, rehearing, and
reconsideration with BESE and the LDE. BESE’s Executive Director responded, summarizing
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BESE’s prior actions and providing 139 pages of assorted records. The letter did not indicate that
any further hearing or reconsideration would be given.
On or about February 1, 2018, BESE’s Executive Director responded a second time,
indicating that there would be no reopening, rehearing, or reconsideration of the December 12,
2017 non-renewal decision. TCS has since received written notification from the LDE that it will
begin closure procedures for TCS.
TCS contends that the decision was made without a hearing, without an opportunity for the
BESE to receive any evidence from TCS, and without a fair and impartial process.
On February 23, 2018, TCS filed a Complaint in this Court against BESE, the LDE, and
White in his official capacity. [Doc. No. 1]. TCS asserts six causes of action as follows:
(1) preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting Defendants from “continuing to act
under color of state law to encroach upon [TCS’] constitutional due process rights in
rendering and implementing a final decision not to renew TCS’ charter . . . without . . .
[s]atisfying the requirements of the Charter School Performance Compact . . . , [r]requiring
[White] to timely issue a recommendation . . . , permitting [White] to act under . . . LAC
28:503B(7) in authorizing a renewal . . . , affording TCS a fair hearing . . . under LSA-R.S.
49:950, 955 and other pertinent sections of the Louisiana Administrative Code . . . ,
[a]ffording [TCS] a process hearing that meets the basic due process dictates of
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sec.
2 of the Louisiana Constitution (1974) . . . , [r]equiring the LDE to adhere to the
requirements of LAC 28:1101 when determining TCS’ performance rating for 2016-2017
. . . , [u]tilizing the complaint procedures required under state regulation LAC 28:3301 in
addressing alleged testing irregularities.
(2) The Court should declare that each law, policy, rule, regulation and practice referenced
herein that was used to assign a failing SPS rating to TCS [and to deny TCS renewal of its
charter], as applied by the defendants, unconstitutionally deprives [TCS] of due process
guaranteed under the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution and under the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974.

(3) The Court should declare that December 12, 2017 nonrenewal decision made by the BESE,
in the absence of a recommendation of nonrenewal communicated directly by [White],
unconstitutionally deprives [TCS] of due process under the law guaranteed under the 14th
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Amendment of the United States Constitution and under Article I, Section 2 of the
Louisiana Constitution (1974).
(4) The Court should declare that the actions of the BESE’s School Innovation and Turnaround
Committee meeting on December 11, 2017 and of the BESE on December 12, 2017 in
making a final decision to not renew the TCS charter, without advance notice to TCS and
without first affording an opportunity to TCS to appear and be heard, to be actions that
unconstitutionally deprived [TCS] of due process under the law guaranteed under the 14th
Amendment of the United States Constitution and under Article I, Section 2 of the
Louisiana Constitution (1974).
(5) The Court should grant declaratory relief recognizing that the LDE,
BESE and Superintendent’s use of voided high stakes test scores to
determine SPS rating was unauthorized and done without use [of] “objective and
quantifiable indicators” as required by BESE Bulletin 126 to determine TCS’
SPS rating for the 2016-2017 scholastic year. The Court should further declare that TCS’
SPS rating if calculated using objective and quantifiable indicators gained from objective
and quantifiable measures of student performance and not voided test results, results in a
passing SPS grade for TCS higher than “F,” and entitles TCS to a charter renewal beyond
its initial charter term.
(6) The Court should grant declaratory relief decreeing that the nonrenewal decision made by
the BESE on December 12, 2017 was not final because it was not based on a
recommendation of renewal or nonrenewal received from [White], a requirement of State
law.

[Doc. No. 1, pp. 13-17]. Thus, TCS asserts claims for breach of contract and other state lawbased claims and for violations of its Due Process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
TCS further requested expedited consideration and prayed for the following:
a)

Issue preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining and enjoining
[BESE], the [LDE], [White], their agents, employees, and those acting in
concert with them from acting on or making any final decision to not renew
the charter contract of TCS and from taking steps to close TCS without
first affording TCS due process, and basing any final decision regarding
TCS’ charter renewal on fair objective and quantifiable indicators required
by law;

b)

Declare that TCS’ constitutional due process rights were violated;

c)

Declare that the BESE’s decision of December 12, 2017 to not renew the
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charter of TCS was not based on a recommendation received from [White]
and, therefore, is invalid;
d)

Declare that TCS has satisfied the criteria for renewal of its charter contract
for an additional renewal term;

e)

Awarding to TCS reasonable attorney’s fees and damages as provided for
by law; and

f)

Awarding such other relief as to which plaintiff proves itself justly entitled,
including all costs of this proceeding.

[Doc. No. 1, pp. 17-18].
On March 2, 2018, then-presiding Judge Robert G. James held a telephone conference with
counsel to discuss the case and scheduling. Counsel for all parties participated. The Court set a
hearing for April 16, 2018, at 9:00 a.m. Defendants were instructed to file any motions prior to
the hearing.
On March 14, 2018, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 13]. TCS
filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion on April 4, 2018. [Doc. No. 16]. On April 10,
2018, with leave of Court, Defendants filed a reply memorandum. [Doc. No. 24].
The matter is now ripe.
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
A.

Standard of Review

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss raises arguments that are addressed under Rules 12(b)(1)
ad 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure allows a defendant to move for dismissal of an action for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. “A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court
lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Home Builders Ass’n of Miss.,
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Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment
arguments are properly addressed under Rule 12(b)(1). United States v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d
279 (5th Cir. 1999) (treating motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds as a 12(b)(1)
motion to dismiss).
Additionally, Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move
for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In
evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all “well-pleaded facts” as true, “‘viewing
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,’” and drawing all inferences in its favor. In re
Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr.
Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, the plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level, on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful
in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion is also the
proper motion to seek dismissal of parties without the procedural capacity to be sued. See Indest
v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1999).
B.

Motion to Dismiss

Defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment bars all claims for relief against them
because the actual party in interest is the State of Louisiana. TCS responds that White is not a
state agent or sovereign body, the State is not immune from a contract or tort suit under Article
XII, § 10(A) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, and its Due Process claims may be considered
under the Ex Parte Young exception.
The Eleventh Amendment and attendant principle of sovereign immunity generally bar
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suits against the state and its agencies in federal court unless the state consents to the suit. Cozzo
v. Tangipahoa Parish Council-President Gov’t, 279 F.3d 273, 280 (5th Cir. 2002). It is irrelevant
whether the requested relief is injunctive or monetary. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101–02 (1984) (“a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against
a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.”) (citations omitted);
see also Carpenter v. Miss. Valley State Univ., 807 F.Supp.2d 570, 580 (N.D. Miss. 2011) (“This
immunity is far reaching. It bars all suits, whether for injunctive, declaratory, or monetary relief,
against the state and its departments.”).
A plaintiff can escape this rule by suing state officials in their official capacity for
prospective injunctive (or declaratory) relief based on a continuing violation of federal law. See
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). This exception to the Eleventh Amendment is often referred
to as the Ex Parte Young exception. However, the exception does not save pendant state law claims
against state officials in their official capacity. See Wilson v. UT Health Ctr., 973 F.2d 1263,
1271 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 104 (“a federal court's grant of relief against
state officials on the basis of state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the
supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary, it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on
state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct
to state law. Such a result conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the
Eleventh Amendment.”). Nor does it save declaratory or injunctive claims if the plaintiff seeks
retroactive relief pursuant to these claims. See Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md.,
535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (holding that court considering an Ex parte Young claim “need only
conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of
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federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective” ) (emphasis added) (quotation
omitted); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986) (Ex parte Young does not apply to suits
seeking retroactive relief; it only applies to suits seeking prospective relief because “‘[r]emedies
designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest
in assuring the supremacy of that law. But . . . deterrence interests are insufficient to overcome the
dictates of the Eleventh Amendment.’”) (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68) (1985)).
Finally, the Eleventh Amendment ordinarily allows claims, whether based on federal or
state law, against state officials in their individual capacities which seek monetary damages when
the individual will be personally liable for the judgment. Henley v. Simpson, 527 Fed. App’x 303,
305-06 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159 (1985)). The Court now applies those principles to the parties and claims in this case.
1.

BESE and LDE

BESE 2 and LDE, 3 as an agent and department of the state, respectively, are entitled to

[BESE] is an agency within the executive branch of the state government. La.
R.S. 36:4(A)(14); La. R.S. 36:642(B). BESE has the authority to sue and be sued
in the courts of Louisiana and to hold and use property in its own name. La. R.S.
17:6(A)(1) & (4). BESE has extensive independent authority, La .R.S. 17:6(A),
17:7 & 17:9, and is concerned about the statewide operation of education in
Louisiana. Its operating budget is subject to approval by the state legislature, and
its funds come from general appropriations by the legislature from the public
treasury. BESE may borrow money. La. R.S. 17:2152. Any judgment rendered
against it must be satisfied from the state's coffers after specific approval from the
legislature. See LA. CONST. ART. XII, § 10(C). The state of Louisiana is the real
party in interest in this suit against BESE.
2

Kiper v. Louisiana State Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 592 F. Supp. 1343, 1352 (M.D.
La. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Kiper v. La State Bd. of Ele/Sec Ed., 778 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1985).
Louisiana Department of Education and the Board of Elementary and
Secondary Education, are arms of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity.
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3

The

Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit absent waiver or abrogation. See, e.g., Delahoussaye
v. New Iberia, 937 F.2d 144, 148 (5th Cir. 1991); Richardson v. Southern Univ., 118 F.3d 450,
456 (5th Cir. 1997); Jones v. Board of Sup’rs of the Univ. of La. Sys., 58 F.Supp.3d 670, 673 (W.D.
La. 2014). Contrary to TCS’ contentions, Louisiana has not waived its immunity from suit in
federal court. LA. CONST. ART. XII § 10; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5106; see also
Fairley v. Stalder, 294 F. App'x 805, 811 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding in a §1983 action that “[t]here
is no express consent to suit in Federal Court in section 10, article XII of the Louisiana
Constitution"). Thus, BESE and LDE are immune from suit in this Court no matter whether the
relief sought is injunctive or monetary, or whether the cause of action is based on federal or state
law. To the extent Defendants seek dismissal of all claims against BESE and LDE, the motion is
GRANTED and those claims are dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
2.

Claims against Superintendent White

Although TCS cannot proceed with claims against BESE and the LDE, it is possible that
it may proceed with certain claims against White. The Court thus considers the claims as against
White.

See LA. CONST. ART. VIII, SEC. 2 (Board of Elementary and Secondary Education
appoints a superintendent of education who is the administrative head of the
Department of Education and who implements the policies of the BESE); Bd. of
Elementary and Secondary Ed. v. Nix, 347 So.2d 147, 150 (La.1977) (The BESE
“is given the constitutional power to determine educational policy for the public
schools of the state”). See also Swindle v. Livingston Parish Sch. Bd., 655 F.3d
386, 399 (5th Cir.2011) (LDOE and BESE are entitled to sovereign immunity);
Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 285 (5th Cir.2005) (finding that
LDOE and BESE waived sovereign immunity). Accordingly, any claims against
LDOE or BESE for monetary damages must be dismissed.
Williams v. Recovery Sch. Dist., 859 F. Supp. 2d 824, 832 (E.D. La. 2012)
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a.

Breach of Contract and Other State Law Claims

TCS complains that BESE and LDE, through White, the state official named as Defendant
in this suit, breached the Charter Contract with it by not adhering to procedures. Breach of
contract is a state law claim. Additionally, TCS asserts that White violated certain provisions
contained in the Louisiana Revised Statutes and Louisiana Administrative Code.

To the extent

these claims are brought against White in his official capacity, they must be dismissed because the
Ex Parte Young exception does not apply to pendant state law claims. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. 89,
104-06 (1984); see also Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S.Ct. 1632,
1638 (2011) (Ex Parte Young “permit[s] the federal court to vindicate federal rights.”).
Thus, to the extent Defendants move the Court to dismiss TCS’ state law breach of
contract and/or other state law claims, the motion is GRANTED, and those claims against White
in his official capacity are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.4
b.

Claims for Monetary Damages Against White in his Official Capacity

The Eleventh Amendment bars all claims for monetary relief against the state or its
agencies without the state’s consent. Because a suit against state officials in their official capacities
is akin to a suit against the state itself, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED to the extent
they seek dismissal of TCS’ claims for monetary damages against White in his capacity based on

4

TCS does not appear to have asserted any breach of contract or other state law claims
against White in his individual capacity. The Court notes that, in any event, White, in his
individual capacity, was not a party to the contract. See, e.g. Mathai v. Board of Sup’rs of LSU,
959 F.Supp.2d 951, 961-62 (E.D. La. 2013 (“Regardless of any contract that plaintiff may have
formed with the school, she has not alleged that Dr. Nelson was a party to the contract and thus
liable for its breach.”); Bisong v. Univ. of Houston, 06-1815, 2006 WL 2414410 at *3 (S.D. Tex.
Aug. 18, 2006); Allen v. Tulane Univ., No. 92-4070, 1993 WL 459949 at *9 (E.D. La. Nov. 2,
1993) (dismissing breach of employment contract claim against school dean, since he was not
party to the contract); Dover Elevator Co. v. Ark. State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 447 (8th Cir. 1995).
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alleged violations of state and federal law. Those claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
c.

The Eleventh Amendment and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Sought Against White in his Official Capacity

Defendants also move the Court for dismissal of TCS’s claim for injunctive and declaratory
relief, contending that, under the Ex Parte Young exception, the Eleventh Amendment also bars a
plaintiff from seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state agencies or state officials in
their official capacities which is retroactive in effect. See Saltz v. Tenn. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 976
F.2d 966, 968 (5th Cir. 1992) (“The essential ingredients of the Ex parte Young doctrine are that a
suit must be brought against individual persons in their official capacities as agents of the state and
the relief sought must be declaratory or injunctive in nature and prospective in effect.”) (emphasis
added); see also Simmang v. Tex. Bd. Of Law Examiners, 364 F.Supp.2d 874, 886 (W.D. Tex.
2004) (noting that the Ex Parte Young exception applies only to suits for prospective injunctive
relief).
After careful review of the Complaint in this matter, the Court agrees with Defendants.
Although TCS has done a credible job of attempting to characterize the relief sought as prospective
and/or as continuing violations,

the Court finds that the relief TCS actually seeks is

retroactive in nature. All of its complaints related to a completed investigation, completed
hearing, and completed vote on the non-renewal of its charter. Accordingly, to the extent
Defendants seek dismissal of TCS’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against White in
his official capacity on Eleventh Amendment grounds, the motion is also GRANTED, and those
claims are also DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
d.

Defendants as “Persons” under § 1983
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Defendants also move to dismiss TCS’ claims against them under § 1983. The Fifth
Circuit has indeed held that “State agencies and state officials acting in their official capacity are
not ‘persons’ within the meaning of [§ 1983.]” Lumpkins v. Office of Cmty. Dev., No. 14-31216,
2015 WL 4317700, at *2 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
70-71 (1989)). However, having found that Defendants are immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment, the Court need not address this remaining, related argument.
III.

CONCLUSION
Although TCS ostensibly raised federal Due Process claims, this lawsuit, at its base, is a

complaint about the State’s application (misapplication in TCS’ view) of the procedures under
applicable statutes, the Charter Contract, the Charter School Performance Compact, and the
Administrative Code. Those are the very types of state law issues in which this Court should not
intervene under the Eleventh Amendment. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and TCS’ claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 12th day of April, 2018.

TERRY A. DOUGHTY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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