Cargo et al v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co

Filing 782

MEMORANDUM RULING re 745 MOTION for Summary Judgment on the Claims of Group 12 Plaintiff, Darren Stanley filed by Kansas City Southern Railway Co. Signed by Judge S Maurice Hicks on 10/01/2012. (crt,McDonnell, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

CLARENCE CARGO, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 05-2010

VERSUS

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN
RAILWAY COMPANY

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Darren Stanley’s
(“Stanley”) remaining federal and state employment discrimination claims filed by
Defendant, Kansas City Southern Railway Company (“KCS”). (Record Document 745).
Stanley, in opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, concedes all state
law claims, including his Louisiana Employment Discrimination Claims. (Record Document
753 at 10). Given this response, the Court will treat all state related claims against KCS
as abandoned. Additionally, Stanley’s Title VII claims have already been dismissed by this
Court as Stanley failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies. (Record Document
374). The Court must now only address Stanley’s remaining claims that KCS violated 42
U.S.C. 2000-e, et seq. by unlawfully terminating his employment and subjecting him to a
hostile work environment.

For the reasons that follow, KCS’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED. Accordingly, all of Stanley’s claims are hereby DISMISSED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Stanley, an African American male, began working for the defendant, KCS, on June
28, 1998. (Record Document 753 at 1). Stanley was initially hired as a customer service
representative, where his duties required, among other things, that he work daily on a

computer and be knowledgeable of the KCS computer systems. (Record Document 745-1
at 1). KCS had specific policies governing computer use as well as policies prohibiting
harassment. Id. In October 1998, Stanley was personally counseled by KCS after sending
an email containing a sexually explicit joke that violated KCS’s computer use policy.
Nevertheless, in September of 2000, Stanley was promoted to Assistant Manager of the
Customer Service Center; he was again promoted in August 2002 to the position of
Manager of Production Control in the Customer Service Center (“CSC”).

(Record

Document 753-1 at 2). This position was created especially for him and resulted in
approximately a 17.5% pay raise. Id. There were no other employees at KCS who held
an identical management position. During his tenure from June 1998 through October
2002, Stanley received a total of 4 pay raises. Id.
As a manager in the CSC, Stanley was again required to operate a workplace
computer in accordance with KCS’s policy governing computer use. (Record Document
745-2 at 1-2). Additionally, KCS had policies that prohibited harassment of any kind and
mandated that all employees comply with all regulations and laws. Id. Stanley admits to
having signed a written authorization confirming receipt of said rules. (Record Document
753 at 1). Stanley’s knowledge of KCS’s computer policy is further demonstrated by the
repeated warnings he gave to co-workers that they should not be transmitting personal
messages via KCS computers. Stanley also received a written notice from manager Janice
McNeal reminding him of the prohibition against inappropriate emails. (Record Document
745-1 at 1).
During a company-wide email audit, KCS discovered that Stanley sent more than
46 non-business, inappropriate emails, many of which were sexually explicit and/or
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specifically directed toward a specific subordinate female employee.

(See Record

Document 745-2 at 4). Despite Stanley’s knowledge that his conduct violated KCS’s policy,
Stanley repeatedly sent sexually explicit or harassing emails. (Record Document 745-1 at
1).

Examples of the personal, inappropriate emails sent from Stanley’s workplace

computer include a barrage of sexual advances toward a subordinate female employee and
an email containing moving animations of cartoon characters, such as Fred Flintstone,
Homer Simpson, and the Simpson children engaging in sexual acts. (Record Document
745). In fact, Stanley has even admitted the emails were “inappropriate” and “lewd” and
does not dispute that his 46 emails at issue were a violation of KCS’s computer use and
anti-harassment policies. Id. The moving party, KCS, has clearly shown that there is no
material issue of fact as to either the content of the 46 emails or whether Stanley violated
KCS’s computer use and harassment policies.
Following KCS’s decision to dismiss Stanley from service on December 10, 2002,
Stanley appealed the company’s decision to the Special Board of Adjustment (“SBA”), an
independent board established by federal law. On September 22, 2004, an independent
arbitrator on the board considered the appeal and ruled that the termination must stand.
(Record Document 745-1 at 2). The neutral SBA arbitrator clearly found Stanley’s action
to be in violation of both written policy and basic workplace rules governing supervisors.
The arbitrator’s opinion included the following:
While [Stanley] maintained that his personal communications
with this subordinate employee was none of the Company’s
business, clearly the use of Company equipment, on company
time for this purpose not only violated well understood
communication policies, but also was contrary to all basic
standards of appropriate workplace relations between
Supervisors and employees at the workplace.
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(Record Document 745-5 Ex. 10). The instant federal suit against KCS followed.1 (Record
Document 1; 48).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”2 Quality Infusion Care, Inc. v. Health Care Serv.
Corp., 628 F.3d 725, 728 (5th Cir. 2010). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
See Id. “Rule 56[(a)] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir.2004).
If the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, “the
nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 141 (5th
Cir.2004). Where critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could
not support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant, then summary judgment should be
granted. See Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir.2005).

1

After preliminary motion practice, the plaintiffs were broken into 29 trial groups.
(Record Document 492). The groups were based on the plaintiffs’ respective claims.
Stanley was placed alone in group 12 given the fact that he is the only managerial plaintiff.
2

The Court notes that the newly amended Rule 56 requires that there be “no genuine
dispute as to any material fact,” but this change does not alter the Court’s analysis.
F.R.C.P. 56(a) and advisory committee’s note (emphasis added).
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LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Discriminatory Discharge
Employers are prohibited from discriminating “against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A claim
for discrimination may be proven with direct or circumstantial evidence. Nasti v. CIBA
Specialty Chemicals Corp., 492 F.3d 589,593 (5th Cir. 2007). If a Plaintiff lacks direct
evidence to prove such a claim, courts are to implement a burden shifting analysis as
established under McDonnell Douglas Corp. V. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817
(1973); Nasti v. CIBA Specialty Chemicals Corp., 492 F.3d at 593. Because Stanley has
not provided this Court with any direct evidence of discrimination, analysis under the
McDonnell Douglas framework is appropriate. The Fifth Circuit has explained this
framework as follows:
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must first
establish a prima facie case of...discrimination. The employer
then bears the burden of producing a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its actions. The employer is not
required to convince the Court that it was actually motivated by
this reason; it need only raise a genuine issue of fact as to
whether or not it discriminated against the plaintiff. Once the
employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
plaintiff's treatment, the presumptions of the McDonnell
Douglas framework dissipate, and the plaintiff bears the
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
defendant engaged in intentional discrimination. To satisfy this
burden, a plaintiff must produce substantial evidence that the
employer's proffered reasons for its actions were a pretext for
discrimination. A plaintiff can establish pretext either through
evidence of disparate treatment or by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is false or ‘unworthy of
credence.’
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Nasti, 492 F.3d at 593 (Internal citations omitted). Accordingly, Stanley must first establish
a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge by showing that (1) he belongs to a
protected class, (2) he was qualified for his position, (3) he suffered an adverse
employment action, and (4) similarly situated employees were treated more favorably. See
id.
It is apparent from both the statement of material facts admitted by Stanley and the
parties’ briefs that this claim of discriminatory discharge rests on the fourth element of the
McDonnell framework, as there is no dispute over elements one through three. Stanley
must show that other KCS employees were similarly situated yet received more favorable
treatment. The Fifth Circuit has been clear that “for employees to be similarly situated[,]
those employees' circumstances, including their misconduct, must have been ‘nearly
identical.’” Perez v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 395 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2004). In
summation, Stanley has failed to satisfy this requirement, as he did not provide the Court
with adequate evidence to show that there is a genuine question of fact regarding whether
the six individuals proffered as comparators are similarly situated.
Stanley’s Third Amended Complaint alleges that three KCS employees, Debbie
Allen, Steve Busch, and Angela Von Zynda, were similarity situated employees that were
treated more favorably. (Record Document 43 at 38). It should be noted that Stanley failed
to even mention Debbie Allen, Steve Busch, and Angela Von Zynda, let alone refute KCS’s
arguments regarding these three individuals, in his opposition to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (See Record Document 753); therefore, Stanley waives any claim that
the above listed individuals are similarly situated employees guilty of the same misconduct.
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Irrespective of his waiver of his initial claim regarding Debbie Allen, Steve Busch,
and Angela Von Zynda, Stanley has not provided even minimal evidence that these three
KCS employees are proper comparators. In fact, Stanley admits that the three employees
referenced in the Third Amended Complaint would not qualify as similarly situated
employees given their status as non-management employees. (Record Document 753-1
at 3-4).

Even if the he could somehow get past the management/non-management

distinction between Stanley and three proffered employees, he has still failed to show that
their circumstances, including their misconduct, were nearly identical. As such, this Court
hereby finds that there is no genuine dispute regarding Debbie Allen, Steve Busch, and
Angela Von Zynda.
The crux of the Stanley’s discrimination claims now rests on his haphazard inclusion
of three newly proffered employees added at an untimely stage in this litigation. Stanley
named “Mr. Sanders,” Tom Hadel, and Mark Redd as comparators for the first time in his
Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.3

However, Stanley fails to

establish that the comparators were similarly situated employees and therefore cannot
survive summary judgment.

3

The Court has concerns about both the timeliness and competency of the evidence
presented in the Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. The
Court finds it suspect that Stanley failed to identify these newly named individuals until this
late stage in the litigation. This skepticism is bolstered by the fact that the Stanley failed
to even provide the Court with Mr. Sanders’ first name. The Third Amended Complaint was
filed nearly seven years ago; more than adequate time and discovery have passed for the
Stanley to fully identify any alleged comparators to the Court. However, the Court, in an
abundance of caution, will analyze this evidence as if it were admissible, as it does not
change the outcome of its analysis.
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Stanley attempts to show that Sanders, Hadel and Redd are similarly situated by
pleading that: (1) all KCS managers are adequate comparators given the fact that Stanley
occupied a unique management position, and (2) Sanders, Hadel, and Redd were
managers who violated KCS’s computer use policy yet were not fired. However, these
pleadings still fall short of the Fifth Circuit standard set forth in Perez.
Stanley did not provide any evidence regarding the three comparator’s discipline
history, including any warnings they may have received, their work location and
department, or whether they shared supervisors. Specifically, Stanley did not provide
evidence showing that Sanders, Hadel, and Redd had received both verbal and written
warnings prohibiting them from sending sexually explicit or personal emails. He also did
not provide evidence demonstrating that these three individuals worked in the same
department, CSC.
Additionally, Stanley has not established that Sanders, Hadel, and Redd committed
nearly identical rule infractions. The conduct that led to Stanley’s dismissal was: (1)
sending sexually explicit emails to co-workers in violation of KCS’s Acceptable Use Policy;
and (2) sending female subordinates emails containing sexual advancements in violation
of KCS’s anti-harassment policy. (Record Document 765 at 5). The second type of
misconduct separates Stanley from Sanders, Hadel, and Redd. While Stanley alleges that
the three comparators sent out sexually explicit emails, he has not provided the Court any
evidence showing that the three named comparators misconduct was of a similar nature
or as serious as Stanley’s repeated violation of KCS’ anti-harassment policy. Specifically,
no evidence was proffered showing that the comparators were guilty of sending a barrage
of sexually harassing or seducing emails to a subordinate employee. While Stanley argues
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that the other managers allegedly sent sexually explicit or personal emails in violation of
KCS’s acceptable computer use policy, such a violation is not “nearly identical” to repeated
sexual advances towards a subordinate. Accordingly, Stanley has not met his prima facie
case of discrimination.
Even if Stanley were able to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, KCS has
provided a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for his discharge. KCS’s claim that
Stanley continued to send out sexually explicit emails despite being specifically warned not
to do so, remains unchallenged. Additionally, Stanley sent sexually explicit personal emails
to a subordinate employee in violation of KCS’s anti-harassment policy potentially exposing
KCS to liability. Rule violations are legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for discharging
an employee. Mayberry v. Vaught Aircraft Co., 55 F3.d 1086, 1090-91 (5th Cir. 1995).
Stanley admitted responsibility for transmitting over 46 non-business, pornographic,
harassing and inappropriate emails via the KCS email system. Transmitting the sexually
explicit Flintstones/Simpson email, which included cartoon characters of children engaging
in sexual activity was, in itself, a terminable offense. The overwhelming number of
inappropriate and/or sexually explicit emails sent in direct violation of KCS’s policies and
federal law more than justify Stanley’s dismissal. KCS asserts that as a result of Stanley’s
actions, he has violated its trust in his ability to manage subordinate employees. This is
further substantiated by the SBA’s review of the evidence and decision to uphold Stanley’s
removal. (Record Document 745). Stanley has presented no evidence that his termination
was motivated by anything other than his repeated and serious violation of KCS policies.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the burden shifts to Stanley to prove
KCS’s reason for discharge was pretextual. The burden Stanley carries at this point in the
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Court’s analysis is to show that this reason is “unworthy of credence.”

Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,144, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000). Stanley
cannot meet this burden. The SBA arbitrator gives credence to KCS’s proffered reason in
the following statement:
Claimant had a clear discipline record and was not a long-term
employee, having a seniority date of June 26, 1998. The
length of service in this case, however, is irrelevant. Claimant
violated the trust Carrier had in him as Supervisor and his
termination must stand.
(Record Document 745-5 Ex. 10). The only evidence Stanley relies on is the fact other
managers allegedly violated KCS’s computer use policy and were not terminated.
However, as explained above, this blatantly ignores the individual differences of the names
proffered. Therefore, Stanley has failed to meet his burden of showing KCS’s reason for
discharge is pretextual.
Stanley cannot prove the prima facie elements of his claim of discriminatory
discharge. He has failed to show a similarly situated employee was treated more favorably
than he was; however, even had he been able to meet that burden, KCS offered and
proved a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Stanley’s discharge that Stanley failed
to prove that the reason was pretextual. For this reason, summary judgment in favor of
KCS is appropriate.
II. Retaliation
Stanley has conceded this claim. In his opposition of summary judgment, Stanley
fails to address this claim at all and therefore fails to meet his summary judgment burden.
Celotex Corp. V. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317. 333 n.3 (1986). While Stanley alleges retaliation

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in the heading found on page three of his Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, Stanley failed to mention this claim in the body of his response. Stanley did not
provide any evidence in support of any protected activity. Furthermore, Stanley failed to
establish any causal connection between any alleged protected activity and his termination.
III. Hostile Work Environment
A hostile work environment exists “when the workplace is permeated with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
environment.” Stewart v. Mississippi Transport Commission, 586 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 2009)
(quoting National R.R. Passenger Corp. V. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002)). To establish his
claim for a hostile work environment, Stanley must show that:
1) he belongs to a protected class; 2) he was subjected to
unwelcome harassment; 3) the harassment was based on
race; 4) the harassment affected a term, condition or privilege
of employment; and 5) the employer knew or should have
known of the harassment and failed to take remedial action.

Septimus v. Univ. of Houston, 399 F.3d 601, 611 (5th Cir. 2005). The alleged discrimination
must have “created an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.”
Id. Courts in this Circuit determine hostile environment considering the totality of the
circumstances. Factors to consider include: “the frequency of the conduct, its severity, the
degree to which the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, and the degree to
which the conduct unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.” Id .; see
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993).

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Although “[d]iscriminatory verbal intimidation, ridicule, and insults may be sufficiently
severe or pervasive” to support evidence of a Title VII violation,” DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun.
Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 593 (5th Cir.1995), “simple teasing, offhand comments,
and isolated incidents, (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory charges”
that can survive summary judgment. Hockman v. Westward Communications, LLC, 407
F.3d 317, 328 (5th Cir.2004). A plaintiff's own subjective beliefs, however genuine, cannot
form the basis of judicial relief. Nichols v. Lewis Grocer, 138 F.3d 563 (5th Cir.1998); Little
v. Republic Refining Co., 924 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir.1991). The jurisprudence of this Circuit
establishes a very high burden for a plaintiff advancing a claim for a hostile work
environment on racial grounds. From this Court’s review of the total record, Stanley has
failed to meet that burden.
Stanley’s claim of a hostile work environment stems from the alleged racially
charged statements of three co-workers. Stanley alleges: (1) Ronnie Vail (“Vail”), a
supervisor, told him “[b]oy you need to get to work;” (2) Jim Hunter (“Hunter”), the day shift
manager in the CSC, called Stanley a “fucking nigger” after getting upset with him over a
report; and (3) Sharon Scott (“Scott”), a co-worker, referred to Stanley as a “black bastard”
and a “porch monkey.” (Record Document 753 at 8).
In order to be probative, the harassment alleged by a plaintiff in a hostile work
environment claim must be based on the plaintiff’s race. Septimus v. Univ. of Houston, 399
F.3d 601, 611 (5th Cir. 2005). As an initial matter, Stanley has failed to present any
evidence that Vail’s use of the word “boy” was, by itself, related to Stanley’s race or
contained racial animus. Further, Vail ceased using this term upon Stanley’s request. In
fact, according to Vail’s deposition, Vail made it clear that his use of the word “boy” or
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“attaboy” was not meant to be derogatory. Stanley accepted Vail’s explanation and stated,
“I would never think that of you.” (Record Document 765 at 8). According to Stanley, this
was an isolated incident that was immediately resolved. In conclusion, Stanley has not
provided evidence corroborating his belief that Vail’s words possessed racial animus.
However, even assuming that “boy” was a derogatory reference to Stanley’s race, this
isolated incident was insufficient in frequency or severity to constitute a hostile work
environment claim. See Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 348 (5th
Cir. 2007).
This leaves the Court with two instances of claimed racial harassment, (1) Hunter
calling Stanley the “N” word, and (2) Scott referring to Stanley as “black bastard” and
“porch monkey.” In Lindsey v. Chevron USA Inc., 2002 WL 31415255 (5th Cir. 2002), the
plaintiff brought a hostile work environment claim listing multiple instances of harassment.
The Fifth Circuit found that many of the instances listed were not based on race and
therefore not probative. The instances of racial harassment were: (1) the defendant not
visiting the plaintiff in the hospital when he did so for white employees; (2) the use of racial
epithets; and (3) the hanging of confederate flags by co-workers. The Fifth Circuit held that
these three instances were not sufficient to show a hostile work environment. The Fifth
Circuit addressed whether the harassment alleged was severe and pervasive so as to
affect a term, condition, or privilege of the plaintiff’s employment. It was found that these
three instances “do not rise to the requisite degree of severity and pervasiveness that our
precedents require.” See id. at *4.
Similar to Lindsay, Stanley has failed to show that Hunter’s use of the “N” word and
Scott’s use of two racial slurs were routine in nature. In fact, Stanley only alleges one
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incident where the “N” word was used. Therefore, just as hanging a confederate flag and
the isolated use of racial slurs were not sufficient to show severe and pervasive
harassment, neither are isolated uses of racial slurs.
While the alleged statements do appear to possess racial animus, it does not appear
that these relatively isolated incidents occurred with such frequency and severity to
unreasonably interfere with the employee’s work performance. “For racial comments, slurs,
and jokes to constitute a hostile work environment, there must be ‘more than a few isolated
incidents of racial enmity,’ meaning that ‘[i]nstead of sporadic racial slurs, there must be a
steady barrage of opprobrious racial comments.” Lester v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs,
514 F.Supp. 2d. 866, 873 (W.D.La., 2007) (citing Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106,
110 (2d Cir. 1997)). Mere utterance of an epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an
employee does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII.
Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. A hostile work environment can only be found when the workplace
is “permeated” by the offensive conduct. Id.

The three isolated incidents alleged by

Stanley during his four years of employment at KCS do not constitute a steady barrage of
opprobrious racial comments. While the Court does not condone the alleged use of racially
derogatory terms, the Court is not satisfied that Stanley has met the above cited standard
to survive summary judgment; the alleged racially charged comments from the other KCS
employees were not consistent or severe enough to show that the workplace was pervasive
with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.
For conduct to affect a term, condition, privilege of employment it must be so severe
and pervasive that it destroys the protected classmember’s opportunity to succeed in the
workplace. In the case at hand, the opposite has been demonstrated. Stanley received
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two promotions, including one promotion to a special management position created
specifically for him, and three pay raises. Stanley also testified that he received support
and promotions from both white and black managers. Further, Stanley has failed to
articulate a single example of how this harassment interfered with his work performance.
Without a sufficient showing of how the racial harassment endured by Stanley was severe
or pervasive enough to affect a term, condition or privilege of his employment, Stanley
cannot satisfy his prima facie burden.4 Stanley has simply not shown that the harassment
he endured was severe or pervasive enough so as to affect a term, condition, or privilege
of his employment.

Therefore, these three instances listed by Stanley, even when

considered together, are not probative of a hostile work environment claim. Accordingly,
Stanley cannot meet his prima facie burden and therefore cannot survive summary
judgment.5

CONCLUSION

4

Stanley fails to address how the alleged racial remarks affected a term, condition,
or privilege of his employment. Stanley argues that the conduct was severe and pervasive
but fails to articulate how the harassment affected his working environment. “Such
unsubstantiated assertions, without more, do not constitute competent summary judgment
evidence.” Shonowo v. Transcocean Offshore Deepwater, Inc., 2011 WL 3418405 *6 (S.D.
Tex. 2011). In fact, the record shows that Stanley thrived at KCS, receiving multiple
promotions and pay raises.
5

KCS raises the issue of notice, the fifth element of Stanley’s prima facie case, with
respect Hunter’s use of the “N” word, Stanley’s most serious allegation. Stanley has not
demonstrated that he reported this incident to KCS. (Record Document 745-1 at 18).
Failing to report this incident is significant since it appears to be the crux of Stanley’s
hostile work environment claim. While there is doubt as to whether Stanley could meet his
burden on the fifth element, the Court finds no need to make a direct finding on this issue
since Stanley cannot show the fourth element of his prima facie case,.
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Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that Stanley has failed to provide
sufficient evidence to raise a dispute of material fact that Stanley was discriminated against
in violation of any federal law or that he indeed endured a hostile work environment.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT the foregoing motion (Record Document 745)
be and is hereby GRANTED. All of Darren Stanley’s claims against KCS are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Record Documents 767, 768, 769, 771, 772,
773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 779, 780, and 781 be and are hereby DENIED AS MOOT. An
Order consistent with the terms of the instant Memorandum Ruling shall issue herewith.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 1st day of October, 2012.

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