Cargo et al v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co

Filing 833

MEMORANDUM RULING granting 821 MOTION for Summary Judgment on the Claims of Group 14 Plaintiff, Renee Caldwell filed by Kansas City Southern Railway Co. Signed by Judge S Maurice Hicks on 01/17/2014. (crt,Yocum, M)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

CLARENCE CARGO, ET AL.,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 05-2010

VERSUS

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN
RAILWAY COMPANY

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Renee Caldwell’s
various employment discrimination claims (Record Document 821) filed by Defendant
Kansas City Southern Railway Company (“KCSR”). The motion conveys reasons for the
Defendant seeking dismissal of all claims raised by Caldwell. In opposition to Defendants
Motion for Summary Judgment, Caldwell replies “Ms. Caldwell has established a Prima
Facie case to present sufficient evidence of pretext to overcome summary judgment and
present genuine issues of material fact to a jury.” Record Document 829 at 3. Plaintiff
concedes her retaliation and state law claims. Id. At 9. Additionally, Plaintiff fails to address
the hostile work environment / constructive discharge claim, which, therefore, is conceded.
For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Accordingly, all of Caldwell’s claims are DISMISSED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Renee Caldwell is an African American female. Record Document 821-2 at § 1.
Caldwell was hired by KCSR to serve as an Extra Board Clerk in the Customer Service
Center (“CSC”) in January 2001. Record Document 821-2 at § 3. In March of 2001,
Caldwell was separated from KCSR, but subsequently applied for re-employment in the

same capacity and was rehired on December 14, 2001. Record Document 821-2 at §§ 4
and 5.

As an Employee in the CSC, Caldwell’s role included communicating with

customers and the transportation department regarding specific shipments. Record
Document 821-1 at 2. Because CSC employees communicated with customers, they were
expected to be present and punctual in order to fulfill their duties. Id. Accordingly, KCSR
created rules and policies to govern attendance, tardiness and the duty to report, including,
for example, General Responsibilities 1.15, which provides “[e]mployees must report for
duty at the designated time and place...” Id. at 2. Caldwell received a copy of KCSR’s roles
and policies as well as others, and acknowledged her receipt in writing. Id. at 2. Caldwell
admits that employees were required to report to work on time, and that employees must
contact a supervisor if an employee desired leave. Id. at 3.
The rules and regulations regarding attendance were strictly enforced. KCSR
enforced its regulations with this employee through various actions. On April 29, 2004,
Caldwell received a formal letter of reprimand for her second instance of tardiness in the
same week. Id at 3. On May 12, 2004, Caldwell was again late to work and received a
second formal reprimand. On June 19, 2004, Caldwell signed a waiver accepting
responsibility for her failure to timely report for work on June 4, 2004, and June 5, 2004. Id
at 3. Because of her past attendance issues, Caldwell received a 10 day suspension for
the June 4 tardiness, and a 30 day suspension for the June 5 violation, which was deferred.
Id at 3. On June 30, 2004, Caldwell was notified of her tardiness violation on June 20,
2004, and that an investigation was scheduled to determine her responsibility. She was
likewise informed of an investigation regarding making false statements and being
argumentative with a supervisor on June 20, 2004. Id at 4. On July 29, 2004, the
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investigation concluded and Caldwell received a thirty day suspension for failing to report
for duty on June 20, 2004, and her previous thirty day deferred suspension was activitated.
A sixty day suspension for making false statements and being argumentative was also
imposed. Prior to the imposition of that suspension, however, Caldwell again reported late
to work on July 19, 2004. Id at 3. These repeated violations of KCSR policies resulted in
an another investigation, and ultimately the termination of Caldwell’s employment with
KCSR. Id at 3.
Caldwell appealed the final two suspensions and her termination to the Special
Board of Adjustment (“SBA”), which after reviewing the evidence determined that “[b]ased
upon a review of these three cases, it is evident to this Board that [Caldwell] had a
continuing problem with appearing for work at the scheduled time.” Id. at 4. The SBA
permitted Caldwell to return to work, without back pay. A harsh warning regarding the
importance of timeliness was issued in the SBA’s decision, and also included wording that
stated this was a last chance warning. Id. At 4. Caldwell however chose to not return to
KCSR and instead continued with her other employment. Id. At 4.
Caldwell later filed this lawsuit against KCSR, alleging: discrimination, hostile work
environment, constructive discharge, retaliation, and related state law claims.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”1 Quality Infusion Care, Inc. v. Health Care Serv.
1

The Court notes that the newly amended Rule 56 requires that there be “no genuine
dispute as to any material fact,” but this change does not alter the Court’s analysis.
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Corp., 628 F.3d 725, 728 (5th Cir. 2010). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” See
Id. “Rule 56[(a)] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir.2004).
If the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, “the
nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 141 (5th
Cir.2004). Where critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could
not support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant, then summary judgment should be
granted. See Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir.2005).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Discrimination Claim
Employers are prohibited from discriminating “against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A claim
for discrimination may be proven with direct or circumstantial evidence. Nasti v. CIBA
Specialty Chemicals Corp., 492 F.3d 589,593 (5th Cir. 2007). If a Plaintiff lacks direct
evidence to prove such a claim, courts are to implement a burden shifting analysis as
established under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817

F.R.C.P. 56(a) and advisory committee’s note (emphasis added).
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(1973); Nasti v. CIBA Specialty Chemicals Corp., 492 F.3d at 593. Because Anderson has
not provided this Court with any direct evidence of discrimination, analysis under the
McDonnell Douglas framework is appropriate. The Fifth Circuit has explained this
framework as follows:
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must first
establish a prima facie case of...discrimination. The employer
then bears the burden of producing a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its actions. The employer is not
required to convince the Court that it was actually motivated by
this reason; it need only raise a genuine issue of fact as to
whether or not it discriminated against the plaintiff. Once the
employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
plaintiff's treatment, the presumptions of the McDonnell
Douglas framework dissipate, and the plaintiff bears the
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
defendant engaged in intentional discrimination. To satisfy this
burden, a plaintiff must produce substantial evidence that the
employer's proffered reasons for its actions were a pretext for
discrimination. A plaintiff can establish pretext either through
evidence of disparate treatment or by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is false or ‘unworthy of
credence.’

Nasti, 492 F.3d at 593 (Internal citations omitted). Accordingly, Caldwell must first establish
a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge by showing that (1) she belongs to a
protected class, (2) she was qualified for his position, (3) she suffered an adverse
employment action, and (4) similarly situated employees were treated more favorably. See
id.
It is apparent from both the statement of material facts admitted by Caldwell and the
parties’ briefs that this claim of discriminatory discharge rests on the fourth element of the
McDonnell Douglas framework, as there is no dispute over elements one through three.
Caldwell must show that other KCSR employees were similarly situated yet received more
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favorable treatment. The Fifth Circuit has been clear that “for employees to be similarly
situated[,] those employees' circumstances, including their misconduct, must have been
‘nearly identical.’” Perez v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 395 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2004).
In summation, Caldwell has failed to satisfy this requirement, as she did not provide the
Court with adequate evidence to show that there is a genuine question of fact regarding
whether the individuals proffered as comparators are similarly situated.
In the instance case, Caldwell alleges that three KCSR employees, Sharon Scott,
Ashley Collins, and Angela Von Zynda, were similarity situated employees that were
treated more favorably. (Record Document 821-1 at 10). In fact, the three employees
referenced in Caldwell’s response to KCSR’s Third Set of Interrogatories would not qualify
as similarly situated employees given their status with KCSR.
Sharon Scott served as a crew dispatcher. See SOF ¶ 71. It is undisputed that
Caldwell served as an Extra Board Clerk and then in the transportation division on a bid.
In accordance with Fifth Circuit precedent, a similarly situated employee is one which holds
the same position as the claimant. See Lee v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253,
259 (5th Cir. 2009). Therefore was not a similarly situated employee.
Ashley Collins, on the other hand, worked as a Customer Service Representative.
See SOF ¶ 80. Her title is different than Caldwell, and therefore is not a similarly situated
employee under the Fifth Circuit precedent established in Lee, supra. However, even if
Collins and Caldwell held the same title, Caldwell’s discipline record was significantly worse
than that of Collins. During the course of Collins’ employment with KCRS, she received
only one letter of reprimand and no other discipline. See SOF ¶ 81. This minimal discipline
record pales in comparison with Caldwell, who received eight instances of discipline. See
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SOF ¶¶ 26-41.
Finally, Caldwell lists Angela Von Zynda as a similarly situated employee. Caldwell,
however, again fails to show that Von Zynda’s held the same title has her own. Von Zynda
held the position of Customer Service Representative. See SOF ¶ 83. Because Von
Zynda’s title is different than Caldwell, she is not a similarly situated employee under the
Fifth Circuit precedent established in Lee, supra. Additionally, even if these two employees
held the same title, their work history is substantially different. Von Zynda received only one
warning for her tardiness during her six year tenure at KCSR, and she was not tardy again.
See SOF ¶ 84. Caldwell, on the other hand, was tardy multiple times and disciplinary
actions, from verbal and written warnings to suspensions warned multiple times, were used
to reform Caldwell’s behavior. See SOF ¶¶ 26-41. Nonetheless, Caldwell continued to be
tardy to work. Accordingly, Van Zynda was not a similarly situated employee. Based on the
fact that Caldwell fails to provide any similarly situated employees, she fails to provide the
required prima facie case of discrimination.
Even if Caldwell were able to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, KCSR
has provided a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for his discharge. The high
number of times Caldwell was tardy to work in direct violation of KCSR’s policies more than
justify Caldwell’s dismissal. Caldwell failed to present evidence linking her termination to
anything other than her repeated violation of KCSR policies.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the burden now shifts to Caldwell to prove
KCSR’s reason for discharge was pretextual. The burden Caldwell carries at this point in
the Court’s analysis is to show that this reason is “unworthy of credence.” Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,144, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000). Caldwell fails
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to meet this burden. In this instance, Caldwell does not put forth any evidence that the
dismissal had a discriminatory purpose.
Caldwell, therefore, failed to prove the prima facie elements of her discriminatory
discharge claim. She failed to show a similarly situated employee was treated more
favorably than she was. Additionally, even if she had met her burden, KCSR has sufficiently
proved a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Caldwell’s discharge. For this reason,
summary judgment in favor of KCSR is appropriate.
II. Retaliation Claim
Caldwell conceded her claim for retaliation.
III. State Law Claims
Caldwell conceded her claims under state law.
IV. Hostile Work Environment / Constructive Discharge Claim
Caldwell failed to address her claim for hostile work environment / constructive
discharge in her response to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. She therefore
concedes this argument.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that Plaintiff Renee Caldwell
abandoned her hostile work environment/ constructive discharge claim. Additionally,
Caldwell conceded her retaliation and state law claims. This leaves only the claim for
discrimination to be addressed by this Court. On the discrimination issue, Caldwell failed
to provide sufficient competent summary judgment evidence to raise a dispute of
material fact that Caldwell endured discrimination under the framework provided by the

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United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. V. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973).
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT the foregoing motion filed by Defendant
KCSR (Record Document 821) be and is hereby GRANTED.
A Judgment consistent with the terms of the instant Memorandum Ruling shall
issue herewith.
Thus done and signed, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 17th day of January, 2014.

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