Coburn v. Bossier et al

Filing 45

MEMORANDUM RULING re 38 MOTION for Reconsideration of ruling on cross motions for summary judgment. Signed by Judge Elizabeth E Foote on 6/26/2012. (crt,Keifer, K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

ROBERT COBURN

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:09-cv-01970

VERSUS

JUDGE ELIZABETH ERNY FOOTE

CITY OF BOSSIER CITY AND
AND GEORGE BRICE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING
Defendants, the City of Bossier City (“the City”) and George Brice (“Brice”), have
filed a Motion for Reconsideration [Record Document 38] requesting that the Court
reconsider its ruling on cross motions for summary judgment [See Record Documents 36
and 37]. For the reasons enunciated in its original Memorandum Ruling, the Court entered
the following judgment:
“Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part.
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part.
More specifically, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
is GRANTED insofar as it pertains to his claims under the due
process protections afforded by the Louisiana Constitution and
the minimum standards set forth in
La. R.S.
33:2181(B)(1),(3),(4),(5), and (6). The Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment is DENIED insofar as it pertains to La. R.S.
33:2181(B)(2). The Defendants’ motion seeking dismissal of
Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to La. R.S. 33:2181(B)(2) is
GRANTED. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is
DENIED on all other grounds.”
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For the reasons enunciated below, that judgment is modified in part only.
The Defendants raise several issues in their Motion for Reconsideration. First, the
Defendants argue that the Plaintiff’s admission that he did in fact take the Benadryl from
the medicine cabinet in the firehouse creates a genuine issue of material fact. However,
an admission by definition cannot create a fact issue: it is a fact admitted to be true. The
Court considered this fact in rendering its original ruling and deemed it irrelevant to the
inquiries before the Court. This admission occurred at what Defendants euphemistically
refer to as the “pre-disciplinary hearing”, that is, the only hearing which the Plaintiff was
afforded before he was terminated. The Court has detailed in its previous ruling how this
“hearing” violated the Plaintiff’s due process rights as well as the statutory protections of
La. R.S. 33:2181.
Second, Defendants contend that the Court’s holding that the Plaintiff was “under
investigation” within the meaning of La. R.S. 33:2181 required the Court to weigh
evidence, evaluate credibility, and resolve factual disputes. For the detailed reasons set
out in its Memorandum Ruling, this Court notes that there was no material dispute as to
the facts in this matter. What was in dispute was a matter of law: whether or not these
facts are sufficient to constitute an “investigation” within the meaning of the law. The
Court specifically held that the undisputed facts did constitute an “investigation” such that
the protections afforded under La. R.S. 33:2181 were triggered. Defendants argue in the
pending motion that Defendant George Brice’s statement that he did not consider the
Plaintiff “under investigation” is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. This

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Court disagrees. Such a conclusory statement standing alone is insufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact.
Third, Defendants note that the Plaintiff raised only one violation of the Louisiana
Firefighters Bill of Rights, that is, La. R.S. 33:2181(B)(5), the right to call witnesses.
Defendants’ point is well taken. This Court did do an analysis of all six of the minimum
standards set forth in La. R.S. 33:2181(B). However, that statute provides that any
violation of any one of the six minimum standards renders the proceedings a nullity. Thus,
the Court’s holdings as to sub-sections 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 of the statute are superfluous.
However, Defendants’ point is well taken and the judgment should be modified to reflect
same.
The fourth issue raised by Defendants is that any determination that the state law
procedural due process had been violated also required a factual determination by the
Court. Here again, for the detailed reasons in its memorandum, the Court notes that there
are no material facts in dispute. The only question is whether or not under those facts the
proceedings were fundamentally unfair to the Plaintiff, that is, whether he received real
notice before the hearing and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.

The Court held that the undisputed facts do not constitute

meaningful due process to the Plaintiff.
The issue of what inferences can be raised from the Plaintiff’s assertion of his Fifth
Amendment rights in the discovery process in this lawsuit is discussed in detail in the
Memorandum Ruling. Nothing in Defendants’ motion causes this Court to reconsider that

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ruling.
For the reasons enunciated above, the original judgment [Record Document 37] will
be modified by a separate judgment to read in its entirety as follows:
For the reasons enunciated in the original Memorandum Ruling
[Record Document 36] and for the reasons enunciated in the
Memorandum Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED
and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED at Shreveport, Louisiana, this 26th day of June, 2012.

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