Dupree v. Belton et al

Filing 39

MEMORANDUM RULING re 31 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Ray L Belton, Sharon F Green, Southern University & Agricultural & Mechanical College Board of Supervisors, Janice Sneed, 31 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Ray L Belton, Sharon F Green, Southern University & Agricultural & Mechanical College Board of Supervisors, Janice Sneed. Signed by Judge S Maurice Hicks on 02/26/13. (crt,McDonnell, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

JEREMY DUPREE

CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-1592

VERSUS

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

DR. RAY L. BELTON,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY, DR. SHARON
F. GREEN, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN
HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY, JANICE
SNEED, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN
HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY, BOARD
OF SUPERVISORS OF SOUTHERN
UNIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURAL
AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 31) filed by the
Defendants, the Board of Supervisors of Southern University and Agricultural and
Mechanical College (hereinafter “Southern University Board”), Dr. Ray Belton, Dr. Sharon
Green, and Janice Sneed (hereinafter referred to by name or collectively as “University
officials”). The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment rests on two distinct grounds:
(1) Southern University Board is an arm of the State and as such is immune from suit for
damages in federal court, (2) the University officials sued in both their individual and official
capacities are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. The Plaintiff, Jeremy Dupree
(hereinafter “Dupree”), opposes the motion. Rec. Doc. 35.
For the reasons that follow, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is
hereby GRANTED.

Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s claims against Southern University Board, Dr.
Belton, Dr. Green, and Ms. Sneed, in both their individual and official capacities, be and are
hereby DISMISSED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This action, which is being brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,1 stems from Dupree’s
administrative suspension from Southern University and subsequent eviction from the
student housing on Southern University’s campus. On October 19, 2009, Dupree, a white
male enrolled at Southern University at Shreveport, was arrested on campus for
possession of marijuana. See Rec. Doc. 31-1; 31-3 at 4; 35-2 at 1. The record also
indicates that Dupree was in possession of alcohol at the time of the arrest. Southern
University has a policy banning illegal drugs, including marijuana, as well as alcohol from
being possessed on campus. Id. Byron Fizer, a black male, was also involved in the same
incident and was likewise arrested and treated in the same manner as Dupree. Id.
Immediately after the October 19th arrest, Dupree was given a notice of suspension
which informed him of his right to appeal under Southern University rules and regulations.
Rec. Doc. 31-2 at 2; 35-2 at 2.

Because of the administrative suspension, Southern

University banned Dupree from Southern University’s campus and evicted him from oncampus student housing in accordance with University policies. Rec. Doc. 1 at 5. Dupree

1

Dupree invokes pendent jurisdiction over his state law claims which have been brought
pursuant to Article 1, Sections 2 and 3 of the Louisiana Constitution and Louisiana Civil Code article
2315. Rec. Doc. 1 at 1.

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signed a statement indicating that he received this information. Id. However, rather than
submitting a letter of appeal as instructed in his letter of suspension issued by Dr. Green,
Vice Chancellor of Student Affairs at Southern University, Dupree contacted Janice Sneed,
an employee in the Southern University Office of Student Affairs, and Dr. Ray Belton,
Chancellor of Southern University regarding his suspension and the appeal process. Each
of the three school officers, Dr. Belton, Dr. Green, and Ms. Sneed specifically advised
Dupree that if he wished to appeal his suspension, he should do so in writing. Id. Dupree
never filed a written appeal and the suspension was never reconsidered or reversed. As
a result of the suspension, Southern University did not permit Dupree to complete his
classes or continue his residence in the on-campus housing for the remainder of the fall
2009 semester. Id. Dupree received no refund for the tuition and rent he had prepaid for
the 2009 fall semester. Rec. Doc. 35-2 at 2. Dupree’s Section 1981 claims are based on
the University officials’ handling of the appeal process following his arrest, which he claims
deprived him of fulfillment of his contract with Southern University for on-campus housing.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”2 Quality Infusion Care, Inc. v. Health Care Serv.
Corp., 628 F.3d 725, 728 (5th Cir. 2010). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the

2

The Court notes that the amended Rule 56 requires that there be “no genuine dispute as
to any material fact,” but this change does not alter the Court’s analysis. F.R.C.P. 56(a) and
advisory committee’s note (emphasis added). This Court considers this change to be a distinction
without a difference.

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evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id
(citations omitted). “Rule 56[(a)] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate
time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir.
2004). If the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, “the
nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 141 (5th Cir.
2004).
The nonmovant's burden may not be satisfied by conclusory allegations,
unsubstantiated assertions, metaphysical doubt as to the facts, or a scintilla of evidence.
Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994); Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ.,
80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996). Where critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an
essential fact that it could not support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant, then summary
judgment should be granted. See Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th
Cir. 2005). Factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, "but only
when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence
of contradictory facts." Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1048 (quoting Little, 37 F.3d at 1075); see also,
S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 1996). The Court will not, "in
the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the
necessary facts." McCallum Highlands v. Washington Capital Dus, Inc., 66 F.3d 89, 92
(5th Cir. 1995), as revised on denial of rehearing, 70 F.3d 26 (5th Cir. 1995). Unless there
is sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict in the nonmovant's favor, there is no
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genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-51, 106 S. Ct.
2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). When the nonmovant has the burden of proof at trial,
he “must come forward with evidence which would be sufficient to enable it to survive a
motion for directed verdict at trial." Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 656 (5th Cir. 1996).
If the nonmovant can not meet this burden, then “the motion for summary judgment must
be granted." Id., Little, 37 F.3d at 1076.
In order to determine whether or not summary judgment should be granted, an
examination of the substantive law is essential. Substantive law will identify which facts are
material in that “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. at 2510.
II.

Section 1981 Claims
a. Southern University Board

42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides as follows, “All persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts....” However, there are limitations to the exercise of jurisdiction for Section 1981
claims, notably, the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution. “The Eleventh Amendment
to the United States Constitution bars suits in federal court by citizens of a state against
their own state or a state agency or department.” Richardson v. S. Univ., 118 F.3d 450, 452
(5th Cir. 1997)(citing Delahoussaye v. City of New Iberia, 937 F.2d 144, 146 (5th
Cir.1991)). The Fifth Circuit has directly held that Southern University and its Board of
Supervisors qualify as an arm of the State of Louisiana and, as such, are entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Richardson, 118 F.3d at 456. The Plaintiff does not
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contest this point. See Rec. Doc. 35. The State of Louisiana is the real party in interest,
and all suits by a private party against the State are barred in federal court. Therefore, the
Board is immune from any action against it, whether for retroactive or prospective relief.
See Rodriguez v. Bd. of Trustees for State Colleges & Universities, No. 92-2448, 1993 WL
484909 (E.D. La. Nov. 2, 1993). Accordingly, all claims against Southern University and
its Board of Directors are hereby DISMISSED.
b. University Officials in their Official Capacity
Official-capacity suits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.
Ct. 358, 361 (1991)(internal citations omitted). Suits against state officials in their official
capacity therefore should be treated as suits against the State. Id. While the doctrine of
Ex parte Young provides an exception to this general rule by allowing plaintiffs to sue state
officials for prospective injunctive relief to end a continuing violation of federal law (see Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441 (1908); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94
S.Ct. 1347 (1974)), it is unclear from the record whether Dupree seeks such relief. Dupree
does not seek to be reinstated as a student in good standing or to revive the terms of his
housing contract with Southern University in order to end the alleged violation of Section
1981; rather, Dupree seeks an order from this Court requiring the Defendants to change
his transcript to reflect that he withdrew from his classes during the fall 2009 semester at
Southern University. It is theoretically possible to interpret this suit as seeking an injunction
from this Court preventing the University officials from distributing any transcript or record

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in the future indicating that Dupree had been suspended from Southern University.3
Accordingly, out of an abundance of caution, this Court will proceed as if Dupree seeks
prospective injunctive relief as it does not change the outcome or affect liability in this case.
However, this federal claim brought against Dr. Belton, Dr. Green, and Ms. Sneed in their
official capacity, is only permitted insofar as it pertains to the narrow exception arising out
of Ex parte Young.
Dupree alleges that Dr. Belton, Dr. Green, and Ms. Sneed violated his constitutional
and statutory rights in refusing to overturn his suspension. These University officials’
interaction with Dupree over this matter was limited. Dr. Green sent Dupree a letter stating
that he was being placed on administrative suspension for possession of alcohol/illegal
drugs, narcotics or marijuana on campus, classified as a Code One Offense under
Southern University’s published Student Code of Conduct. Rec. Doc. 31-3 at 1.
Furthermore, Dr. Green’s letter informed Dupree that he had the right to submit additional
evidence in a letter of appeal within four business days. Following the issuance of the
above letter, Dr. Belton and Ms. Sneed advised Dupree that if he wished to submit an
appeal, he must do so in writing. Dupree submitted nothing. The University officials did
not assist Dupree in drafting an appeal and upheld the suspension after the time period to
appeal had expired.4
Dupree has not pointed to any statute or case demonstrating that the University
3

This Court is aware that this is a generous reading of an ambiguous and unclear complaint,
as Dupree’s federal cause of action is brought “pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1981, pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment” (Rec. Doc. 1 at 1), without specifying how Dupree’s transcripts would
constitute a continuing violation of federal law.
4

Dupree contends that, technically, it was within the power of Southern University officials
to reverse his suspension without receiving a formal appeal.

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officials’ advice to submit any appeal in writing, their refusal to assist Dupree in drafting his
appeal, or their refusal to reverse a suspension that was never appealed in writing,
constitutes a violation of any constitutional right. It is clear from the record that University
officials followed Southern University’s policies by advising Dupree to file a timely written
appeal of his suspension. Dupree does not have a constitutional right to receive assistance
from school officials to draft an appeal. Ultimately, Dupree’s right to contract with Southern
University and its student housing under Section 1981 was not violated, as the contract
between Dupree and Southern University’s on-campus housing was conditioned upon
continued enrollment in good standing with Southern University. Dupree’s administrative
suspension, which afforded Dupree sufficient due process by giving him the opportunity to
appeal,5 terminated Dupree’s status as a student in good standing and ended the right be
present on campus or live in student housing.
Furthermore, Dupree has not shown that the University officials intentionally
discriminated against Dupree by treating him more harshly than minority university students
guilty of similar offenses. In fact, Dupree has shown that Southern University officials
treated all similarly situated university students the same regardless of race. Frazier, a
black student arrested with Dupree for the same conduct, was also suspended from
Southern University and evicted from the student housing. Southern University officials
treated Dupree and Frazier in exactly the same manner. While Dupree does allege that
other students’ suspensions were often overturned, he has not provided this Court with
evidence that Southern University overturned black students’ suspensions who failed to

5

A full analysis of Dupree’s federal and state procedural due process rights can be found
in the subsequent section pertaining to Dupree’s state law claims.

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appeal their disciplinary action. After reviewing the nearly 100-page attachment provided
by Dupree, much of which was irrelevant because it included documents relating to
students who had properly followed Southern University’s appeal process, the Court is
satisfied that Dupree has not shown that he was treated more harshly than similarly
situated black students. Ultimately, Dupree has not provided any evidence demonstrating
a continuing violation of any federal law; therefore, Dupree is not entitled to prospective
injunctive relief of any kind.
c. Section 1981 Claims; Officials in their Individual/Personal Capacity6
“Personal-capacity suits, on the other hand, seek to impose individual liability upon
a government officer for actions taken under color of state law and are permitted in federal
court.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25, 112 S. Ct. at 361. However, Defendants are entitled raise
the defense of qualified immunity in an action against the officers in their individual
capacity. It is well settled that, “[p]ublic officials acting within the scope of their official
duties are shielded from civil liability by the qualified immunity doctrine.” Kipps v. Caillier,
197 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19, 102
S.Ct. 2727(1982); Morris v. Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657, 665 (5th Cir.1999)). Dupree does
not dispute that at all relevant times, Dr. Ray Belton, Dr. Sharon Green, and Ms. Sneed
were officials or employees of Southern University and were acting in their official
capacities, i.e. in the course and scope of their employment with Southern University. See
Rec. Doc. 1, 31, and 35. Additionally, Dr. Belton, Dr. Green, and Ms. Sneed’s position with

6

This Court exercises federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as these
claims against the University officials arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.

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Southern University qualify them as public officials of the State of Louisiana. See generally,
Kipps, 197 F.3d 765; Richardson, 118 F.3d 450.
Accordingly, this Court must conduct a “bifurcated analysis to assess whether the
University officials are entitled to qualified immunity.” Evett v. DETNTFF, 330 F.3d 681,
687 (5th Cir. 2003)(citing Harper v. Harris County, Tex., 21 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir.1994)).
“First, the plaintiff must allege the violation of a clearly established right.” Evett, 330 F.3d
at 687 (5th Cir. 2003)(citing Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir.1994)). Part
of the Court’s analysis in this first step is to determine whether the “record shows that the
violation occurred, or at least gives rise to a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the defendant actually engaged in the conduct that violated the clearly-established right.”
Kipps v. Caillier, 197 F.3d at 768 (citing Morris v. Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657, 666 (5th
Cir.1999)). Second, if it is determined that the official's conduct was unconstitutional, the
court must then decide whether the conduct was nonetheless “objectively reasonable under
the circumstances, such that a reasonably competent officer would not have known his
actions violated then-existing clearly established law.” Evett, 330 F.3d at 687; see also
Kipps, 197 F.3d at 768. “The question of whether an official's conduct was objectively
reasonable is a question of law to be decided by the Court.” Id. Dupree’s claims fail to
satisfy either prong of this bifurcated analysis.
Dupree has not alleged a violation of a clearly-established right under 42 U.S.C. §
1981. “To establish a Section 1981 claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) he or she is a
member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant had an intent to discriminate on the basis of
race; and (3) the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the
statute; in this case, the making and enforcing of a contract.” Bellows v. Amoco Oil Co.,
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118 F.3d 268, 274 (5th Cir. 1997).7 It is undisputed that Dupree is a white male and is not
a member of a racial minority. Rec. Doc. 1 at 5. However, given the Fifth Circuit’s holding
that a heightened standard for establishing a prima facie case is not necessary in cases
of reverse discrimination in the employment context, the Court will continue its analysis
under the presumption that all discrimination based on race is a violation of Section 1981,
regardless of whether or not Dupree was a member of a “minority.” See Young v. City of
Houston, Tex., 906 F.2d 177, 180 (5th Cir.1990); Ulrich v. Exxon Co., 824 F.Supp. 677, 683
(S.D.Tex.1993). Therefore, to prevail on a § 1981 claim, Dupree must prove purposeful
discrimination by defendants because he is white. See, e.g., Brown v. American Honda
Motor Co., 939 F.2d 946, 949 (11th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1058, 112 S.Ct. 935,
117 L.Ed.2d 106 (1992); Lee v. Washington County Bd. of Educ., 625 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th
Cir.1980); see also Ulrich, 824 F. Supp. 677 at 682-83. After a thorough review of the
record, this Court hereby finds that Dupree has failed to show that there is a genuine issue
of material fact on the claim that the Defendants actually engaged in discriminatory conduct
that violated a clearly-established right. Dupree has not supported his legally insufficient
conclusory allegations against the University officials with facts.
Nevertheless, this Court will address the second prong the Section 1981 analysis,
as the reasonableness of their conduct is an important factor in Dupree’s state-law tort
claim. In the second prong of the analysis, the Court must decide whether the conduct was
objectively reasonable under the circumstances, such that a reasonably competent officer

7

Dupree cites the Eighth Circuit Case, Williams v. Lindenwood Univ., 288 F.3d 349, 353
(8th Cir. 2002) as the appropriate standard in analyzing Section 1981 claims. However, this
standard is identical to the analysis used here under Bellows.

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would not have known his actions violated then-existing clearly established law. Evett, 330
F.3d at 687. Dupree has not presented any evidence, fact, statute, rule, or case law
demonstrating a refusal to assist in the drafting of an individual student’s appeal or a refusal
to reverse a suspension, despite the fact that Dupree never field an appeal, violates a
clearly established law. Dupree was arrested and suspended for possession of illegal
drugs on campus, an offense not only in violation of state law, but clearly against Southern
University’s policies. The Court hereby finds that it was objectionably reasonable for the
University officials to enforce Southern University’s policies following Dupree’s arrest.
III.

State Law Claims
a. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Dupree also alleges a violation of Louisiana Constitution article 1, §§ 2 and 3, and
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315. As an initial matter, this Court hereby exercises
supplemental jurisdiction over Dupree’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1367.
However, the Eleventh Amendment precludes federal courts from exercising pendent
jurisdiction over state law claims against state officials in their official capacities, whether
the claims are for prospective or retroactive relief. Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101–02 (1984). Federal courts, on the other hand, are not
precluded from exercising pendent jurisdiction over state law claims against state officials
strictly in their personal capacities. Wilson v. UT Health Center, 973 F.2d 1263, 1271 (5th
Cir.1992). The remainder of this Court’s analysis pertain to the University officials in their
individual/personal capacity.

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b. Louisiana Constitution article 1 § 2
Article 1, Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 states that “[n]o person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law.” Dupree alleges
that the defendants violated his procedural due process rights by placing him on
administrative suspension, evicting him from on-campus housing, failing to assist in
formulating his appeal, and refusing to overturn the suspension.
The Louisiana Constitution’s guarantee of due process does not vary semantically
from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaquemines Parish Gov't v.
River/Rd. Const., Inc., 2001-2222 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/28/02), 828 So. 2d 16, 24 writ denied,
2002-2456 (La. 11/22/02), 829 So. 2d 1055 (citing Progressive Security Insurance Co. v.
Foster, 97-2985, (La.4/23/98), 711 So.2d 675, 688). “Consequently, federal jurisprudence
is relevant in determining the nature and extent of La. Const. Art. I, § 2's due process
protection.” Id. In summary, “Article I, § 2 of [the Louisiana] state constitution, which
guarantees to our citizens due process of law, embodies the fundamental fairness
guarantees inherent in its federal counterpart.” In re C.B., 97-2783 (La. 3/4/98), 708 So.
2d 391, 397. “The Louisiana Constitution due process clause does not offer greater
protection against government misconduct than does federal constitutional due process.”
Johnson v. State, Louisiana Dept. of Educ., No. 01-2002, 2007 WL 2398815 (E.D. La. Aug.
9, 2007) aff'd sub nom. Johnson v. Louisiana State, 275 F. App'x 392 (5th Cir. 2008)(citing
State v. Smith, 614 So.2d 778, 780, (La.App. 2 Cir.1993). Given these holdings, the Court
will analyze Dupree’s state law claims under the standard set forth in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Procedural due process claims require a two-part analysis. The Court must
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determine: (1) whether plaintiff has a liberty or property interest whose deprivation requires
that he be afforded due process; and (2) if plaintiff does have such an interest, what
process is due. See generally, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538,
105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). It is well settled that a student subject to school
disciplinary proceedings is entitled to some procedural due process. See Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729 (1975). At its core, due process requires notice of the charges
brought against the plaintiff and an opportunity to be heard. Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657. However, due process is “flexible
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Gilbert v.
Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 117 S. Ct. 1807, 1809 (1997).
“Courts overwhelmingly agree that students, whether dismissed for academic or
disciplinary reasons, are not entitled to as much procedural protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment as employees who are terminated from their jobs.” Shaboon v. Duncan, 252
F.3d 722, 730 (5th Cir. 2001). Following the principle that due process is a flexible concept,
the Supreme Court held in Loudermill that a tenured public employee is only entitled to “oral
or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and
an opportunity to present his side of the story,” as opposed to a full pre-termination
adversarial hearing. Loudermill , 470 U.S. at 546. Dupree is certainly not entitled to more
procedural protection that described in Loudermill. To illustrate, the Fifth Circuit has held
that even if a student is dismissed for disciplinary rather than academic reasons, “[a]ll that
Goss required [for disciplinary actions against students] was an informal give-and-take
between the student and the administrative body dismissing him that would, at least, give
the student the opportunity to characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems the
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proper context.” Swift v. Siesel, No. 01-2691, 2002 WL 1585617 (E.D. La. July 15, 2002)
(citing Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 85-86; Goss, 419 U.S. at 584).
As outlined in Whiteside v. Kay, 446 F. Supp. 716, 721 (W.D. La. 1978), Dupree was
entitled to receive notice of the charges against him sufficient to prepare a defense of those
charges. See Whiteside, 446 F. Supp. 716 at 721 (citations omitted). The charges need
not have been drawn with the specificity required for a criminal trial proceeding. Id. Dupree
was also entitled to a hearing, but the hearing need not have been in accordance with
criminal trial procedure. Id. Southern University was not required to provide Dupree or his
counsel with a list of witnesses and a summary of their testimony. Id. Additionally,
Southern University need not have afforded Dupree the advantages of compulsory process
or cross-examination. Id.
It is exceedingly clear from the record that Dupree was not deprived of his right to
procedural due process. The individuals named as defendants correctly followed Southern
University’s policy. Dupree received a letter from Southern University Office of Student
Affairs which detailed the charges against him, specifically, that he committed a Code One
Offense as defined by the University’s Student Handbook and Residential Living Handbook.
The University also had evidence that he was in possession of alcohol on campus, which
is also a violation of its policies. Southern University explained to Dupree the evidence that
it had against him by advising him that they had knowledge that he had been arrested for
possession of alcohol/illegal drugs, narcotics, or marijuana. Finally, the letter advised
Dupree of his right to appeal in writing, which provided Dupree with the opportunity to
present “his side of the story” or characterize his conduct and put it in what he deemed the
proper context. Dupree failed to submit a written letter of appeal, a fatal flaw in Dupree’s
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claims. This Court is satisfied that requiring a student to present a written appeal to present
any new evidence and tell his side of the story constitutes sufficient process under the Due
Process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment and mirrored in the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974. While this holding only applies to the Defendants in their individual
capacity, this Court believes that the above reasoning would also be dispositive of all
claims brought in state court by Dupree against Southern University in addition to any state
law claims brought against its officers acting in their official capacity.
Additionally, Louisiana courts have previously held that an individual officer acting
solely in their official capacities cannot be held personally liable for alleged violations of a
plaintiff’s due process rights. See Driscoll v. Stucker, 2004-0589 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So. 2d
32, 52; see also Washington v. Louisiana, No. 11-334, 2012 WL 4159079 (M.D. La. Aug.
21, 2012) report and recommendation adopted, No. 11-334, 2012 WL 4120441 (M.D. La.
Sept. 18, 2012). While Dupree alleges that Dr. Belton, Dr. Green, and Ms. Sneed
“maliciously” and “outrageously” acted with deliberate indifference with regards to Dupree’s
constitutional, civil, and statutory rights,8 Dupree concedes that at all relevant times these
individuals named as defendants acted within the course and scope of their employment.
c. Louisiana Constitution article 1 § 3
Article 1, Section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution states the following:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law
shall discriminate against a person because of race or religious
ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously,
or unreasonably discriminate against a person because of birth,
age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or

8

To get the full scope of various adjectives used by Dupree’s counsel in describing
defendants’ alleged conduct see Record Document 1 at 12-13.

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affiliations. Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited, except
in the latter case as punishment for crime.
Courts have previously held that Article I, § 3, deals with laws that discriminate against an
individual and does not create a cause of action against a private individual or company for
violation of rights. Smolensky v. General Electric Co., 2000 WL 341031 (E.D.La.2000)
(citing Hornsby v. Enterprise Transportation Co., 987 F.Supp. 512 (M.D.La.1997). Dupree
has not alleged any specific law which discriminated against him because of race, religious
ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. Dupree has also failed to cite any law which was arbitrarily,
capriciously, or unreasonably discriminated against him because of birth, age, sex, culture,
physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations. Because Dupree is not challenging a
specific law, but rather the acts of the individual defendants, he does not have a cause of
action under Article 1, § 3. See Washington v. Louisiana, 2012 WL 4159079.
Dupree has only provided legally insufficient conclusory allegations that similarly
situated black students were treated more favorably. In fact, as noted above, Frazier, a
black student arrested under the same circumstances as Dupree was also suspended and
expelled. Dupree never appealed his suspension as required by University policy, a key
distinction between Dupree and the students he alleges were treated more favorably. The
Equal Protection Clause is not implicated when dissimilarly situated individuals are treated
differently.

State v. Cooper, 2010-2344 (La. 11/16/10), 50 So. 3d 115, 132. Dupree’s

claim under article 1, § 3 of the Louisiana Constitution is without merit.
d. Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315
Article 2315(A) states the following: “Every act whatever of man that causes damage
to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.” La. Civ. Code art. 2315.
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“[Article 2315] represents the very foundation upon which all tort law in Louisiana has been
constructed; it provides the causes giving rise to tort actions and denominates the persons
who possess the right to assert such causes of action, as well as the preferences among
the different categories of such claimants.” Hightower v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of
Shreveport, Inc., 117 So. 2d 642, 654 (La. Ct. App. 1959). Dupree has failed to specify
with clarity exactly how Article 2315 was allegedly violated by the defendants. However,
it appears from a liberal reading of the pleadings that Dupree alleges Dr. Belton, Dr. Green,
and Ms. Sneed “maliciously, negligently, and outrageously” acted with deliberate
indifference with regards to Dupree’s constitutional, civil, and statutory rights in violation of
Section 2315, which resulted in severe mental, physical, and emotional injuries. As has
been extensively analyzed throughout this memorandum, it is exceedingly clear from the
record that neither Dupree’s federal or state constitutional/statutory rights were violated.
Therefore, such claims cannot form the basis of Dupree’s article 2315 allegation, as no
wrong has been done. Additionally, defendants could not have acted negligently in
violating Dupree’s rights because no rights were actually violated.
Finally, the Court will address Dupree’s allegation that the Defendants’ actions
toward him constituted intentional infliction of emotion distress under Louisiana law. See
Rec. Doc. 1 at 12. In White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So.2d 1205 (La.1991), the Louisiana
Supreme Court set forth the following criteria by which such claims are determined: (1) the
conduct of defendants was extreme and outrageous; (2) the emotional distress suffered by
plaintiff was severe; and (3) the defendants desired to inflict severe emotional distress or
knew that severe emotional distress would be certain or substantially certain to result from
their conduct. See Adamo v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Louisiana State Univ., No. 93-4297, 1994 WL
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202368 (E.D. La. May 16, 1994).
Dupree has not satisfied the first criteria, therefore, this Court need go no further in
its analysis. Under White,
“[t]he conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances,
petty oppression, or other trivialities. Persons must necessarily be
expected to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to
occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind.”
White, 585 So.2d at 1209. Dr. Belton, Dr. Green, and Ms. Sneed’s actions were not
extreme or outrageous, and certainly do not go beyond all possible bounds of decency so
that it is utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue or
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Board of Supervisors of Southern University is entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Additionally, Dr. Belton, Dr. Green, and Ms. Sneed are entitled to qualified
immunity. The record clearly demonstrates that Dupree’s constitutional rights were not
violated. Even if Dupree had met his burden with respect to showing a violation of a
constitutional right, the individually named defendants’ conduct was nonetheless objectively
reasonable under the circumstances, such that a reasonably competent officer would not
have known their actions violated then-existing clearly established law. The record shows
that no federal or state constitutional due process or equal protection violation occurred.
All federal and state claims of the Plaintiff are without merit.

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Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT the foregoing motion (Rec. Doc. 31) be and is
hereby GRANTED and the Plaintiff’s claims in this case are hereby DISMISSED.
An order consistent with the terms of the instant Memorandum Ruling shall issue
herewith.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 26th day of February,
2013.

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