Jordan v. Garrison et al

Filing 70

MEMORANDUM ORDER granting 59 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge S Maurice Hicks on 2/14/2014. (crt,Dauterive, C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
RICKEY ALLEN JORDAN

CIVIL CASE NO. 11-CV-0723

VERSUS

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

MARTHA S. GARRISON, ET AL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Plaintiff claims that he
was not provided proper medical treatment while in pre-trial custody. Defendants assert
that they are entitled to summary judgment because: (1) Deputies Martha Garrison and
Michael Pye are entitled to qualified immunity; (2) Deputies Garrison and Pye cannot be
liable for harms caused by others; (3) Sheriff Prator is no longer a named defendant; (4)
no medical staff personnel are named defendants; (5) the Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Office
provided plaintiff timely and reasonable medical treatment and did not act with deliberate
indifference regarding plaintiff’s medical complaints; (6) plaintiff did not suffer substantial
harm as a result of the medical care provided; and (7) there is no evidence of an official
policy or custom to establish liability against the Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Office for the claims
alleged herein.
For the reasons set forth below, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on this
issue is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was arrested on Sunday, May 16, 2010. During his intake screening that
day, he was seen at the Medical Unit of the Caddo Correctional Center (“CCC”). Plaintiff
told the staff that he had Type 2 diabetes and several other conditions, for which he was

being treated at the Overton Brooks VA hospital. Plaintiff’s blood pressure and blood sugar
were tested as part of the intake screening. (Rec. Doc. 59-3, Affidavit of Sheila Wright).
During intake, at the request of the Medical Unit staff, Plaintiff signed a release of his
medical records. The release was subsequently faxed to the staff at Overton Brooks.
At 8:30 pm that same day, the nurse at CCC called LSU Health Sciences Center and
spoke to Dr. Woods regarding the Plaintiff. Dr. Woods ordered various medications,
including a one-time dose of Metformin, 500 mg, and six (6) units of Novolin, an insulin, to
treat the Plaintiff’s blood sugar. The Plaintiff was also to be seen during the next regularly
scheduled, non-emergency doctor’s call, scheduled for Tuesday, May 18, 2010. At 8:35
pm, the medical records note that the nurse distributed the medications to the Plaintiff.
(Rec. Doc. 59-3, Affidavit of Sheila Wright).
The next day, May 17, 2010, the Medical Unit staff ordered all of the medications
currently being prescribed to the Plaintiff after receiving the records from Overton Brooks.
Plaintiff was placed on a 2,000 calorie diabetic diet program, and that information was
forwarded to the kitchen. (Rec. Doc. 59-3, Affidavit of Sheila Wright) The staff also checked
the Plaintiff’s blood sugar before breakfast, before lunch, and before dinner. A nurse
administered 10 units of Insulin NPH after the last blood sugar check. (Rec. Doc. 59-3,
Affidavit of Sheila Wright). Subsequently, Plaintiff was released from custody. (Rec. Doc.
59-3, Affidavit of Sheila Wright).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I.

Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment should be granted if the record, taken as a whole, "together with

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 1996). The Supreme
Court has interpreted the plain language of Rule 56(c) to mandate "the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); see also,
Gunaca v. Texas, 65 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1995). A party moving for summary judgment
"must 'demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,' but need not negate
the elements of the nonmovant's case." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th
Cir. 1994) (en banc) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-25, 106 S. Ct. at 2552). If the
moving party "fails to meet this initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the
nonmovant's response." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
If the moving party meets this burden, Rule 56(c) requires the nonmovant to go
beyond the pleadings and show by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
admissions on file, or other admissible evidence that specific facts exist over which there
is a genuine issue for trial. Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1046-47 (5th Cir.
1996).

The nonmovant's burden may not be satisfied by conclusory allegations,

unsubstantiated assertions, metaphysical doubt as to the facts, or a scintilla of evidence.
Little, 37 F.3d at 1075; Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1047. Factual controversies are to be resolved
in favor of the nonmovant, "but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both
parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1048 (quoting
Little, 37 F.3d at 1075); see also, S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 494 (5th

Cir. 1996). The Court will not, "in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving
party could or would prove the necessary facts." McCallum Highlands v. Washington
Capital Dus, Inc., 66 F.3d 89, 92 (5th Cir. 1995), as revised on denial of rehearing, 70 F.3d
26 (5th Cir. 1995). Unless there is sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict in the
nonmovant's favor, there is no genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 249-51, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). When the nonmovant
has the burden of proof at trial, he “must come forward with evidence which would be
sufficient to enable it to survive a motion for directed verdict at trial." Stults v. Conoco, Inc.,
76 F.3d 651, 656 (5th Cir. 1996). If the nonmovant can not meet this burden, then “the
motion for summary judgment must be granted." Id., Little, 37 F.3d at 1076.
In order to determine whether or not summary judgment should be granted, an
examination of the substantive law is essential. Substantive law will identify which facts are
material in that “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. at 2510.

II.

Defendants are Entitled to Qualified Immunity.
Government officials, including police officers, are entitled to immunity “from liability

for civil damages insofar as their condue does not violate clearly established statutory or
consitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).
In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), the
Supreme Court held that a court ruling upon the issue of qualified immunity must apply a

two-step analysis.1 The Court must determine whether “the facts alleged show the officer’s
conduct violated a constitutional right.” Id. If a violation is established, the Court must then
determine whether the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable in light of clearly
established law at the time of the conduct in question. 2 Id.; Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d
404, 411 (5th Cir. 2007). “The touchstone of this inquiry is whether a reasonable person
would have believed that his conduct conformed to the constitutional standard in light of the
information available to him and the clearly established law.” Goodson v. Corpus Christi,
202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000). If officers of reasonable competence could disagree as
to whether the plaintiff’s rights were violated, the officer’s qualified immunity remains intact.
Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 750 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (the qualified immunity standard “gives
ample room for mistaken judgments” by protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.”)); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206 (“qualified immunity can apply
in the event the mistaken belief was reasonable). The question of whether an official’s
conduct was objectively reasonable is a question of law which should be decided by the
Court at the earliest possible stage of the litigation. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227,
112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (per curiam); Evett v. DETNTFF, 330 F.3d 681, 688
(5th Cir. 2003) (citing Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1994)). In summary,

1

In Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009), the
Supreme Court held that while the sequence set forth in Saucier is often appropriate, it is no longer
mandatory. Instead, lower courts “should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding
which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the
circumstances in the particular case at hand.”
2
“A constitutional right is clearly established for purposes of section 1983 only if the law is clear
enough such that ‘a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’”
Kovacic v. Villarreal, 628 F.3d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2995 (2011),
quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)).

if no reasonably competent officer could have believed, under the facts and circumstances
available, that his conduct conformed to clearly established law, only then would the officer
not be entitled to qualified immunity.
a.

Qualified Immunity Applies to Medical Care Claim Under
the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments

Because plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged incident, his
constitutional rights are derived from the Fourteenth Amendment. Edwards v. Loggins, 476
Fed.Appx. 325 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th
Cir. 1996) (en banc)).

The Eighth Amendment case law explains that not every

governmental action adversely affecting the interests or well-being of a prisoner is subject
to constitutional scrutiny; only the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” constitutes
“cruel and unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers,
475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986); Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 670, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1412, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977). There is no genuine dispute
of material fact that the Caddo Correctional Center Medical Unit provided appropriate
medical treatment. There is no evidence that defendants acted with deliberate indifference
with regard to plaintiff’s medical conditions.
With regard to medical care, the jurisprudence in the Fifth Circuit is abundantly clear
that the standard applied is whether the plaintiff’s “serious medical needs are met with
deliberate indifference.” Abrams v. Jones, 2004 WL 1197099, p.5 (E.D. La. 2004) (citing
Thompson v. Upshur County, Texas, 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Edwards
v. Loggins, 476 Fed. Appx. 325, 327. Recently, the Eastern District of Louisiana quoted
Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 650, and more fully explained that the
deliberate indifference standard for a pretrial detainee applies to episodic acts or omissions,

unless the plaintiff is able to demonstrate the existence of pervasive acts, an identifiable
intended practice, or the implementation of a rule. Ford v. Gusman 2012 WL 2567063.
The Supreme Court explained the deliberate indifference standard in Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). The Court explained that guards could
show deliberate indifference by “intentionally denying access to medical care or
intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Id. at 104-105. In the context
of medical care, the Court further explained that “a complaint that a physician has been
negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of
medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 106. The plaintiff “must allege
facts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs.” Id. A plaintiff must show a wanton disregard for his serious medical needs, such
as a refusal to treat him, ignoring his complaints, or intentionally treating him incorrectly.
Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). Lastly, a “delay
in medical care can only constitute an Eighth Amendment violation if there has been
deliberate indifference, which results in substantial harm.” Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d
191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993).
In this instance, there is no dispute that the Plaintiff received medical care for his
diabetes under the supervision of the Medical Unit at CCC during the intake process,
and, during the course of Plaintiff’s confinement at CCC, he received timely and
appropriate medical care. The staff at CCC contacted a physician to determine what
medications should be provided to the Plaintiff, and the nurse administered them. (Rec.
Doc. 59-3, p. 9) The Medical Unit also checked Plaintiff’s blood sugar level throughout
the day of May 17, 2010 and administered another dose of insulin that evening. (Rec.

Doc. 59-3, Affidavit of Sheila Wright). These actions, clearly directed to the medical care
of Plaintiff, clearly permit summary judgment to be granted under current case law.3
Accordingly, the facts fail to indicate that the medical unit at CCC acted with a deliberate
indifference toward the Plaintiff.
Plaintiff also fails to provide any evidence that the alleged delay or failure to
provide appropriate medical care resulted in “substantial harm” to him. The Plaintiff
states that his employment was affected by the lack of treatment of his diabetes.
However, no witnesses nor documents were provided which support his claim.
In addition, there is no evidence that Deputies Garrison and Pye, the only two
remaining defendants in the instant case, knew of Plaintiff’s diabetes or showed
deliberate indifference toward his condition.
Therefore, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the Caddo
Parish Sheriff’s Office provided plaintiff timely and reasonable medical treatment and
did not act with deliberate indifference regarding plaintiff’s medical complaints.

3

Brandenburg v. Corrections Corp. of America, 2014 WL31345, p. 3 (W.D. La. 2014, J.
Trimble) (plaintiff failed to state a claim when he received treatment for his diabetes
when he requested sick call and was provided medication. “Even if he had …
experienced a two to three month delay in obtaining medications, his claim would still
fail because he suffered no substantial harm.”); Rainey v. Brown, 2011 WL2620344
(W.D. La. 2011, J. Hayes) (plaintiff failed to state a claim when he failed to describe how
the diabetic meal program was not appropriate or describe substantial harm resulting
from the care provided); Harris v. Donaldson, 71 F.3d 876 (5th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff’s
claims dismissed when he received continual medical treatment for his diabetes,
including blood sugar monitoring and insulin).

CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Office provided Plaintiff timely and
reasonable medical treatment and did not act with deliberate indifference regarding
Plaintiff’s medical complaints. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the Defendants
is appropriate as a matter of fact and law.
THEREFORE,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment of the defendants [Doc. No.
59] shall be GRANTED.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana this 14th day of February,
2014.