Sipes v. Monroe et al

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM RULING granting 9 Motion for Summary Judgment. IT IS ORDERED that Metro Narcotics' motion for summary judgment is granted and the claim against Metro Narcotics is dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Judge Elizabeth E Foote on 3/28/2013. (crt,Keifer, K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

STEPHEN SIPES, JR.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-1668

VERSUS

JUDGE ELIZABETH ERNY FOOTE

CITY OF MONROE, ET AL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING
The Plaintiff, Stephen Sipes, Jr., filed this Section 1983 suit against the City of
Monroe, Metro Narcotics Unit (“Metro Narcotics”), and Officer Triche Passman
(“Passman”), asserting that he was falsely arrested and subjected to unlawful search
and seizure and malicious prosecution.

Currently before the Court is Metro

Narcotics’ Motion for Summary Judgment, which seeks a determination by the
Court that it is not an entity capable of being sued, and therefore the claims against
it must be dismissed. [Record Document 9]. Sipes opposes Metro Narcotics’
motion.

[Record Document 11]. After a thorough review of the record, the

undisputed facts, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that Metro Narcotics
is not a juridical entity capable of being sued. Accordingly, Metro Narcotics’ motion
for summary judgment [Record Document 9] shall be GRANTED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Although the facts underlying this Section 1983 action are contested, the facts
germane to the issue before the Court are primarily undisputed. In September of
2010, Sipes collected money from Monroe and Shreveport businesses, purportedly
for advertising in Louisiana Narcotics Officer magazine. Sipes’ complaint states that
he was hired by Bill Fielder of Callan Publishing, the company responsible for
publishing Louisiana Narcotics Officer. On September 15, 2010, Sipes attempted to
pick up a check from the office of Dr. Karen L. Koehler, DDS in Monroe. Evidently,
Metro Narcotics received a phone call from a local business reporting that a man
named Mark Davis was claiming to be a member of Metro Narcotics and seeking
donations and advertisements in law enforcement magazines.
Passman, an officer assigned to Metro Narcotics, confronted Sipes at Dr.
Koehler’s office, where he asked if Sipes was claiming to be Mark Davis. Sipes
denied that; nevertheless, he was handcuffed, read his rights and taken outside of
the office where the handcuffs were removed. A number of additional events
occurred that same day, none of which is relevant to the motion before the Court.
However, those events ultimately culminated in Sipes’ arrest for impersonating an
officer of Metro Narcotics. He was formally charged by a bill of information,
although those charges were dismissed in November 2011. In September 2011,

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Sipes filed suit against the City of Monroe, Metro Narcotics, and Passman, claiming
false arrest, unlawful search and seizure, and malicious prosecution.
In April of 2012, Magistrate Judge Hornsby held a status conference with the
parties, during which the issue of whether Metro Narcotics is a legal entity capable
of being sued was raised. See Record Document 8. Magistrate Judge Hornsby
allowed the parties three months to conduct discovery on this issue and set a
deadline of thirty days thereafter for dispositive motions to be filed. The instant
motion for summary judgment by Metro Narcotics is directly responsive to the
Court’s order.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I.

Motion for Summary Judgment.
Summary judgment is proper pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
(1986). The materiality of facts is determined by the substantive law’s identification
of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). A genuine issue of

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material fact exists when the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. “Factual disputes that are irrelevant or
unnecessary will not be counted.” Id.
Rule 56(c) “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. If the
party moving for summary judgment fails to satisfy its initial burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the motion must be
denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37
F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). If the motion is properly made, however,
Rule 56(c) requires the nonmovant to go “beyond the pleadings and designate
specific facts in the record showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Wallace
v. Texas Tech. Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). While the
nonmovant’s burden may not be satisfied by conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated
assertions, metaphysical doubt as to the facts, or a scintilla of evidence, Little, 37
F.3d at 1075, Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1047, all factual controversies must be resolved in
favor of the nonmovant. See Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Farese, 423 F.3d 446, 456

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(5th Cir. 2005). However, a factual controversy only exists when “both parties have
submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
Local Rule 56.1 requires the moving party to file a statement of material facts
as to which it contends there is no genuine issue to be tried. Pursuant to Local Rule
56.2, the party opposing the motion for summary judgment must set forth a “short
and concise statement of the material facts as to which there exists a genuine issue
to be tried.” All material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the
moving party “will be deemed admitted, for purposes of the motion, unless
controverted as required by this rule.” Local Rule 56.2.
II.

Metro Narcotics’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
The question before the Court is whether Metro Narcotics is an entity capable

of being sued.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), an entity’s

capacity to sue or be sued is determined by the law of the state in which the court
is located. F.R.C.P. 17(b); Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep’t, 939 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir.
1991). As such, this Court will look to Louisiana law to determine whether Metro
Narcotics is an entity capable of being sued. Louisiana Civil Procedure Article 24
provides:
There are two kinds of persons: natural persons and juridical persons.
A natural person is a human being. A juridical person is an entity to
which the law attributes personality, such as a corporation or a
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partnership. The personality of a juridical person is distinct from that
of its members.
“Juridical persons . . . are creatures of the law.” Brown v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
2000-0539 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/22/01), 804 So. 2d 41, 44. The law grants them “the
power to participate in legal life by the attribution of legal personality.” Id. (citing
Prof. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law System § 48 (1977)). A juridical
person “has no more legal capacity than the law allows.” Id. at 45.
This Court has been unable to locate any jurisprudence directly determining
whether Metro Narcotics is a juridical person that can sue or be sued. However, in
Roberts v. Sewerage and Water Bd. of New Orleans, 634 So. 2d 341 (La. 1994), the
Louisiana Supreme Court set forth the analysis to determine whether an entity is a
juridical person capable of being sued. There, the court instructed:
The important determination with respect to the juridical status or legal
capacity of an entity is not its creator, nor its size, shape, or label.
Rather the determination that must be made in each particular case is
whether the entity can appropriately be regarded as an additional and
separate government unit for the particular purpose at issue. In the absence
of positive law to the contrary, a local government unit may be deemed to
be a juridical person separate and distinct from other government
entities, when the organic law grants it the legal capacity to function
independently and not just as the agency or division of another governmental
entity.
...
Such a determination will depend on an analysis of specifically what
the entity is legally empowered to do.

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Id. at 346-47 (emphasis added). The Roberts court focused on the Sewerage and
Water Board’s independent management, financing, and operations, ultimately
concluding that it was a juridical person capable of being sued. See id. at 352. In
addition to a number of other factors, the court noted the Sewerage and Water
Board’s independent source of revenues, direction and control of its work force (via
the ability to hire and fire), and the fact that it established a pension fund for its
employees and made rules and regulations governing employees’ pensions. See id.
at 347-48, 352.
In contrast, in City Council of Lafayette v. Bowen, 94-584 (La. App. 3 Cir.
11/2/94), 649 So. 2d 611, 613, the court held that the City Council of Lafayette had
no capacity to sue or be sued, as there was “no authority, constitutional, statutory,
or via home rule charter that authorizes the Lafayette City Council to institute of its
own motion, a lawsuit.” In the wake of Roberts and Bowen, courts seem to hold
uniformly that sheriff’s departments and police departments are not juridical entities
capable of being sued, see Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council-President Gov’t, 279
F.3d 273, 283 (5th Cir. 2002); Parnell v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office, 2010 WL
1817814, *2 n.1 (E.D. La. Mar. 31, 2010)(collecting cases), nor are parish jail facilities.
See Jones v. St. Tammany Parish Jail, 4 F. Supp. 2d 606, 613 (E.D. La. 1998); see also
Darby, 939 F.2d at 313 (“our cases uniformly show that unless the true political

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entity has taken explicit steps to grant the servient agency with jural authority, the
agency cannot engage in any litigation except in concert with the government
itself.”); Harris v. City of Hammond, 2008 WL 4469112 (E.D. La. Sept. 30,
2008)(holding that the Louisiana Attorney General’s Internet Crimes Against
Children Task Force did not have legal capacity to function independently and thus
was not a juridical entity that could be sued); and Angers v. Lafayette Consol. Gov’t,
2007 WL 2908805 (W.D. La. Oct. 3, 2007)(holding that animal shelter was not a
juridical entity capable of being sued).
In the instant case, it is undisputed 1 that Metro Narcotics is a task force
comprised of law enforcement officers from the Ouachita Parish Sheriff’s Office,
Monroe Police Department, West Monroe Police Department, and Louisiana State
Police. The United States Government also contributes two Drug Enforcement
Administration agents to work with Metro Narcotics. Metro Narcotics’ purpose is
to investigate drug crimes and enforce state and federal drug laws in Ouachita
Parish and surrounding areas. Metro Narcotics’ “general direction and policies” are
determined by a group of people, made up of the Ouachita Parish Sheriff, the
Monroe Chief of Police, the West Monroe Chief of Police, and the District Attorney

1

The following facts are derived primarily from Metro Narcotics’ statement of
undisputed facts, which facts were largely uncontroverted by Sipes. Accordingly, any
fact not controverted is deemed admitted.
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of the Fourth Judicial District Court. This group meets on an informal basis. They
are responsible for selecting a commander, who oversees the daily activities of
Metro Narcotics. All officers assigned to work with Metro Narcotics are both
employed and paid by their respective agencies and remain under the direct control
of those agencies.
Metro Narcotics obtains funding from various grants, including grants
applied for by the City of West Monroe and grants provided by the Office of
National Drug Policy, High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area. These grants are
“subject to final review and approval as to the allowability of expenditures by the
grantor agency.” Record Document 9-1, p. 20. Metro Narcotics also receives
revenue from the seizure and forfeiture of drug-related assets. Because Metro
Narcotics “handle[s] public funds, an annual financial audit is filed by the Unit . .
.” Record Document 9-2, p. 1, ¶ 5. Although older audit reports contained language
reflecting that Metro Narcotics had commercial insurance to cover its risks, in fact,
this information was incorrect and was deleted from later audit reports.

Larry

LaBorde, who was the Metro Narcotics commander from 1983 until 2003, submitted
an affidavit in which he represented that it was his decision to have audits
conducted “solely to document how funds were being spent, and because some of
the sources for the federal grants required such an audit.” Record Document 14-1,

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p. 2, ¶ 7. He further stated that Metro Narcotics never purchased liability insurance,
as “the people who were assigned to the task force were paid by and under the
ultimate control of the various participating agencies, and were covered by their
employer’s risk management systems.” Id. at ¶ 8. In addition, as to the personnel
assigned to Metro Narcotics, LaBorde stated that not only are the officers assigned
to it employed and paid by their respective agencies, they can be “pull[ed] or reassign[ed]” by their agencies at any time. Id. at ¶ 4. The affidavit of Jay Ellerman
(“Ellerman”), the current commander of Metro Narcotics, confirms this. See Record
Document 9-1, p. 2, ¶ 5.
Applying a Roberts analysis to the facts of this case, the Court concludes that
Metro Narcotics is not a juridical entity capable of being sued. The primary inquiry
is whether it is an independent entity, separate and distinct from other
governmental entities, or whether it functions as an agency or division of other
governmental entities. Here, it is clear that Metro Narcotics functions at the behest,
direction, and control of other governmental agencies.

That is, it is a law

enforcement unit comprised of employees assigned by four local law enforcement
agencies and is wholly dependent on those agencies for its continued existence.
While Metro Narcotics has a specialized purpose (to enforce drug laws), that
purpose is merely an extension of the purpose of the agencies comprising it, rather

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than a unique enterprise handled exclusively by this law enforcement group. The
officers who work with Metro Narcotics are not employed by it, but rather are on
loan from their own agencies. They can be reassigned at the pleasure of their own
agency. Indeed, based on the materials submitted to the Court, Metro Narcotics has
no ability to hire, fire, or promote employees.

Metro Narcotics does not pay

personnel; rather, officers are paid by their respective agencies. Metro Narcotics
does not maintain insurance; rather, insurance is carried by each individual agency.
Metro Narcotics does not generate its own funding; rather, it receives grant money
from other governmental agencies and obtains some funding through the seizure
and forfeiture of drug-related proceeds and/or assets.
As in Bowen, there is no authority, constitutional, statutory, local ordinance,
or otherwise that created Metro Narcotics as a juridical entity or gave it the power
to sue or be sued. Metro Narcotics operates under the direction and supervision of
the heads of the agencies comprising it and is not separate or distinct from those
agencies, either in terms of funding, operations, or employment decisions. Plainly,
then, Metro Narcotics cannot function independently of the agencies comprising it,
but rather is fully dependent on them in almost every significant aspect.
Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that Metro Narcotics is not a juridical
entity capable of being sued.

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In reaching this conclusion, the Court notes that Sipes has cited no law that
grants Metro Narcotics the legal capacity to function independently, rather than as
a division of the other governmental entities. Furthermore, his argument in defense
of summary judgment relies exclusively on a Standard Operating Procedure manual
(the “Manual”) produced in discovery, as well as the audits performed on Metro
Narcotics. Although the Manual indicates that Metro Narcotics has a Chairman of
the Board and a Board of Directors who have authority over the commander, the
record is devoid of any evidence showing the Manual was even in force at the
relevant time. In fact, Ellerman’s affidavit reflects that the Manual was “found in a
filing cabinet in the office, but to affiant’s knowledge, this document was likely
drafted in the early 1980's and has not been used or adhered to by [Metro Narcotics]
for many years.” Record Document 9-1, p. 2, ¶ 6. There is no evidence as to who
drafted the Manual, whether and/or when it became effective, and if so, for how
long. Moreover, despite being given a number of months to conduct discovery,
Sipes has failed to produce any evidence indicating that there is, in fact, a Board of
Directors or a Chairman of the Board, or what the respective duties and obligations
of those positions would be. In short, the Manual is insufficient to demonstrate that
Metro Narcotics is a juridical entity.

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Furthermore, the Court notes that information contained in the Manual also
cuts against Sipes’ position, in that it includes information that would indicate that
Metro Narcotics is not a juridical entity. Indeed, there are provisions stating that:
each agency must supply insurance for its officer’s vehicle; Metro Narcotics’
expenses are to be shared by the agencies comprising it; and when disciplinary
action is necessary, the problem is to be reported to the officer’s respective agency
for appropriate action. See Record Document 9-1, pp. 27-44.
As previously mentioned, Sipes also unsuccessfully relies on Metro Narcotics’
financial audit reports, claiming that these reports demonstrate the intent for Metro
Narcotics to constitute a distinct unit. In so arguing, Sipes points to audit provisions
which indicate that Metro Narcotics obtained insurance coverage, that Metro
Narcotics holds funds in its own name and makes expenditures, and that the audit
opinion letters are addressed to the Board of Directors. With respect to insurance
coverage, as discussed above, Metro Narcotics has provided sufficient summary
judgment evidence establishing that it never had insurance coverage and that the
audit language stating to the contrary was in error. Sipes has not contradicted this
evidence. The other audit information that Sipes highlights -- that Metro Narcotics
holds and spends money and that the audit letters were addressed to the Board of

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Directors-- is insufficient to prove that Metro Narcotics is a juridical entity under the
Roberts analysis.2
In addition to his reliance on the Manual and audit reports, Sipes’ opposition
to the motion for summary judgment simply cites to a number of other Louisiana
statutes in a failed attempt to prove that Metro Narcotics is capable of being sued.3
By merely quoting the language of these statutes, with no legal analysis whatsoever,
Sipes wholly fails to demonstrate the relevance or applicability of these provisions
to the facts of this case.

Such conclusory and unsupported arguments are

insufficient to defeat summary judgment.
Finally, Sipes concludes his opposition with an ultimatum for Metro
Narcotics:

it must either acknowledge that it is a “governmental entity or

acknowledg[e] that it is engaged in potential donations of public funds” in violation
of the Louisiana Constitution. Record Document 11-1, p. 6. Clearly, this is an
inappropriate argument to defeat summary judgment. Moreover, because the issue
of donation of public funds is not properly before the Court, it will not be
considered.
2

The Court points out that not only are the facts insufficient to prove that Metro
Narcotics is a juridical entity under Roberts, Sipes did not even attempt to analyze this
case under the Roberts guidelines.
3

Sipes cites to La. R.S. 12:501 (unincorporated associations), La. R.S. 33:1321
(intergovernmental agencies); and La. R.S. 33:1329 (commission under Local Services
law).
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In short, in defending this motion, Sipes has provided the Court with no
jurisprudence to support any of its contentions, nor has it offered any exhibits,
affidavits or other competent summary judgment evidence to show that, under a
Roberts analysis, Metro Narcotics is a juridical entity. Therefore, Sipes is not entitled
to any relief against Metro Narcotics.
Accordingly, based on the undisputed facts, the evidence before the Court,
and the applicable law, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material
fact precluding summary judgment in favor of Metro Narcotics.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Metro Narcotics’ motion for summary judgment
[Record Document 9] be and is hereby GRANTED and the claim against Metro
Narcotics is dismissed with prejudice. .
THUS DONE AND SIGNED on this 28 th day of March, 2013.

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