Mathis v. Pinnacle Entertainment Inc et al

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM RULING: Mr. Mathis, a former employee of Boomtown Casino, brings this suit alleging FMLA violations arising out of the termination of his employment. Before the Court is 35 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Pinnacle Enterta inment Inc and PNK Inc, Tracey Page, and Kimberly Haigh. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' 35 Motion for Summary Judgment and DISMISSES with prejudice Mr. Mathis' claims against Defendants. Signed by Judge Elizabeth E Foote on 6/23/2014. (crt,Putch, A)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
JOHN-TALMAGE MATHIS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-2199

VERSUS

JUDGE ELIZABETH ERNY FOOTE

PINNACLE ENTERTAINMENT, INC., ET AL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING
Mr. Mathis, a former employee of Boomtown Casino, brings this suit alleging
FMLA violations arising out of the termination of his employment. Before the Court is a
Motion for Summary Judgment [Record Document 35] filed by Defendants Pinnacle
Entertainment, Inc. and PNK, Inc. (doing business as “Boomtown” and “Boomtown
Casino - Bossier City,” respectively, and both hereinafter referred to as “Boomtown”),
Tracey Page, and Kimberly Haigh. Ms. Page and Ms. Haigh are both Boomtown
employees. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment [Record Document 35] and DISMISSES with prejudice Mr.
Mathis’ claims against Defendants.
I.

Factual and Procedural Background1
Mr. Mathis appears pro se. His pleadings are somewhat confused, so it is

necessary to carefully review the facts in order to determine the nature of his claims.

Unless otherwise noted, the following narrative is taken from those portions of
Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts that Mr. Mathis has not genuinely disputed.
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A.

The Facts

Mr. Mathis was hired by Boomtown as a Player Development Coordinator on
March 23, 2010. On April 12, 2011 he informed his supervisor, Ms. Zablonski, that his
back had been injured in a work-related accident and that he would not be able to come
to work on April 13. On April 13, he notified Ms. Zablonski that he did not intend to
return to work until April 14. And on April 15, he stated that he needed the weekend to
rest, but that he anticipated returning to work next week. Ms. Zablonski attempted
unsuccessfully to contact Ms. Mathis by telephone. She sent an email message to his
personal and business email addresses informing him that he would need to come to
Boomtown to fill out an accident report about his injury no later than April 18. Ms.
Haigh also advised Mr. Mathis that he needed to complete paperwork for his injury no
later than April 18. Mr. Mathis did not fill out the required paperwork, but on April 18 he
contacted Ms. Haigh and informed her that he had tried to meet with her on April 17,
Easter Sunday, but that she was not in the office.
Mr. Mathis did not return to work, so on April 21, Tracey Page, the Risk Human
Resources Manager, sent a letter to Mr. Mathis advising him that Boomtown had still not
heard from him, asking him to come to the office to file the necessary paperwork
regarding his injury, and advising him that if he did not contact Boomtown by May 1 he
would be considered to have voluntarily resigned. On May 5, after the deadline passed
without word from Mr. Mathis, Ms. Page sent another letter by regular and certified mail
warning Mr. Mathis that if he did not respond by May 13, he would be considered to

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have voluntarily resigned.
On May 13, Mr. Mathis contacted Boomtown and requested leave under the
Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Ms. Page informed him
that if he wanted FMLA leave, he would have to return a completed FMLA medical
certification. She emailed and mailed, via regular and certified mail, FMLA certification
forms to him with instructions to return them within fifteen days after their completion
by a physician. Mr. Mathis neither returned to work nor provided the requested FMLA
certification.2 On June 6, 2011, Boomtown informed him that he had been terminated
for violating the attendance policy.
Mr. Mathis apparently filed a worker’s compensation claim regarding his injury.
Defendants have filed the compromise agreement executed by Mr. Mathis and
Boomtown in which he agrees to settle his worker’s compensation claim as well as the
following other claims:
any and all causes and rights of action whatsoever that EMPLOYEE may or
might have and to which EMPLOYEE may be entitled, known and unknown,
anticipated and unanticipated under the Louisiana Worker’s Compensation
Law . . . and any and all other laws in any way resulting from or to result
from the accidents that EMPLOYEE complains of herein and any and all
other accidents sustained by EMPLOYEE in the past arising out of or
occurring during the course of his employment with EMPLOYER . . .
[Record Documents 35-8, p.7]. The compromise also includes the following handwritten

Mr. Mathis claims, without support, that he submitted a response that
“contained the specifics of the legal requirements of what constitutes a medical
certificate under FMLA.” [Record Document 40-1, p.3]. He also claims, without
supporting evidence, that he responded to Defendants’ previous repeated attempts to
contact him. Id. at 2-4.
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addition: “with employee to reserve rights to EEOC claims and unemployment claims.”
Id.
Mr. Mathis appears to have also attempted unsuccessfully to obtain
unemployment benefits. The details are not clear, but he alleges that the
unemployment court initially found that Boomtown’s stated reason for termination,
namely that he voluntarily resigned, did not disqualify him from receiving unemployment
benefits. [Record Document 1, p.4]. Mr. Mathis alleges, however, that Boomtown
subsequently “amended there [sic] Complaint spontaneously on the day of the hearing”
to state that he “was terminated for FMLA paperwork not being received on time,” and
that “[t]his allegation disqualified [him] from receiving Unemployment Benefits.” Id. at
3. The ALJ then held that he was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.
He appealed the decision, but the Louisiana Board of Review upheld it on the grounds
that his failure to follow Boomtown’s leave requirements constituted misconduct
connected with employment under La. R.S. 23:1601(2). [Record Document 35-10, pp.
16-18]. He has since filed a petition in Louisiana State Court to review the Board of
Review’s decision. Id. at 1-2.
B.

Mr. Mathis’ Claims

Read liberally, Mr. Mathis’ pleadings state the following claims. He first asks this
Court to review the ALJ’s decision that he was disqualified from receiving unemployment
benefits. The extent of review he requests is unclear. At times, he appears to seek
review of the entirety of the substantive and procedural rulings made by the state

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agency:
the Complaints [sic] herein are submitted for the Court to determine
whether the Claim made by BOOMTOWN to the Unemployment Court is in
fact a true Complaint and merits the actions taken by BOOMTOWN and the
Unemployment Court. BOOMTOWN amended there [sic] Complaint
spontaneously on the day of the hearing. This last minute Complaint,
which did not provide time for a true defense, declared that MATHIS was
terminated for FMLA paperwork not being received on time.
[Record Document 1, p.3]. At times, he appears to seek only a ruling on only “the
FMLA issue:”
Instead of the FMLA issue, let’s replace this with a charge of
‘embezzlement’, ‘rape’, ‘murder’, or ‘counterfeit.’ Each is a violation of law
beyond the scope of a telephonic tribunal judge. FMLA is a federal law
enacted by Congress. Thus, this Court, a federal court, is the ‘appropriate
forum’ for this matter.
[Record Document 40, p.3]. When he uses the term “the FMLA issue,” Mr. Mathis
appears to refer to the question of whether he complied with the statutory and
regulatory requirements for obtaining FMLA leave and whether Boomtown violated the
FMLA by terminating his employment.
Mr. Mathis also lodges FMLA claims that are separate from his claim for
unemployment benefits. He alleges that Defendants discriminated and retaliated against
him when they fired him after he requested FMLA leave. [Record Document 1, pp. 7-8].
He also alleges that the Boomtown employees interfered with his attempts to take FMLA
leave. While some of the allegations in his complaint give the impressing that he is also
bringing a discrimination claim under the ADA, he expressly disclaims any such
intention:

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MATHIS suffers from a disability—narcolepsy . . . MATHIS has filed a
disability complaint with the EEOC and has been in contact with this
Agency to determine if the discrimination claim will be investigated,
handled, or mediated by the EEOC. This Complaint herein does not
address the disability discrimination.
Id. at 3. Accordingly, the Court will disregard Mr. Mathis’ occasional references to his
disability discrimination claim.3
II.

Summary Judgment Standard
Summary Judgment is proper pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
movant bears the burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the moving party does not
bear the ultimate burden of persuasion on the claim at issue, it may meet its burden of

In his opposition, Mr. Mathis moves to amend his complaint to add an ADA
claim he previously filed in a separate suit:
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Docket Number 5:13-cv-630 is discussed. For a multitude of reasons, I am
unaware of its status. The Defendant states that it has been dismissed
for my failure to serve the defendants. What a shame. Upon Ms.
Nowell’s advice, service to defendants were [sic] made to her office. Yet
the legal wizadry of the Defendant has yet again skirted the accountability
for its wrongdoing. Perhaps this Court will then allow the Complaint to be
amended to include the discrimination of ADA.
[Record Document 40, p.3]. The Court denies Plaintiff’s request to amend his
complaint for a third time and in the middle of summary judgment briefing. While “the
Court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires,” failure to effect
proper service and to keep abreast of the status of one’s cases is not good cause to
upset the scheduling order at this late hour, and it would not serve to promote justice.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
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production by offering affirmative evidence in the form of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials proving that the non-moving party
cannot show a genuine issue of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). When ruling
on a motion for summary judgment, the Court evaluates the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant and does not weigh evidence or judge credibility. EEOC v.
Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 615 (5th Cir. 2009). A genuine dispute for
trial exists when a rational trier of fact looking at the record could find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Co., 475 U.S. 574, 58687 (1986); Wallace v. Tex. Tech. Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted).
III.

Analysis4
A.

The Compromise Agreement

Defendants first argue that Mr. Mathis settled the FMLA discrimination and
retaliation claims when he agreed to the compromise offered during his workers
compensation proceeding. The compromise states that Mr. Mathis agrees to settle all

The Court extended M. Mathis’ deadline for filing an opposition to the motion
for summary judgment. [Record Document 39, p.1]. Mr. Mathis, however, filed his
response six days after the extended deadline. [Record Document 40]. Accordingly,
Defendants contend the Court should treat their motion as unopposed. As Mr. Mathis is
representing himself pro se and the slight delay caused little if any prejudice to
Defendants, the Court will consider the arguments made in his opposition.
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causes of action “resulting from” all accidents sustained by him while he was employed
at BOOMTOWN, that is to say:
any and all causes and rights of action whatsoever that EMPLOYEE may or
might have and to which EMPLOYEE may be entitled, known and unknown,
anticipated and unanticipated under the Louisiana Worker’s Compensation
Law . . . and any and all other laws in any way resulting from or to result
from the accidents that EMPLOYEE complains of herein and any and all
other accidents sustained by EMPLOYEE in the past arising out of or
occurring during the course of his employment with EMPLOYER . . .
[Record Documents 35-8, p.7]. Defendants argue that while Mr. Mathis reserved his
rights to “EEOC claims” and “unemployment claims,” he did not reserve his right to
pursue FMLA claims. Mr. Mathis does not contest that his FMLA claims “resulted from”
his workplace accident. Rather, he argues that because his unemployment claims
turned on what he calls his “FMLA defense,” the term “unemployment claims” in the
compromise necessarily includes any FMLA claims he brings here:
Discussion of FMLA derives from the claims of the unemployment tribunal.
My defense–or “claims”—during the unemployment hearing were that the
Defendant had violated FMLA. Those were my “claims”. [sic] And so when
it was handwritten into the Agreement that I reserve the right of
unemployment “claims”, [sic] the discussion of FMLA were [sic] therefore
cast into the protection of this reserved right.
[Record Document 40, p.5].5 In support, he cites to his brief before the Louisiana Board
of Review and his state court petition. In both documents he discusses his and
Mr. Mathis does not seriously contest the enforceability of the settlement
agreement apart from arguing that the Boomtown has not yet performed. [Record
Document 40, p.5]. No competent summary judgment evidence has been provided to
support this claim, however, and Mr. Mathis has failed to show that Boomtown’s alleged
failure to perform thus far constitutes a breach of the agreement, let alone a material
breach. He has therefore failed to raise a genuine question of material fact concerning
the agreement’s enforceability.
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Boomtown’s compliance with the provisions of the FMLA, but neither document contains
any affirmative evidence.
The Court finds that the compromise language unambiguously covers the FMLA
claims Mr. Mathis brings here. “When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and
lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the
parties' intent.” La. Civ. Code art. 2046; see also Hudson v. Progressive Sec. Ins. Co., 1
So.3d 627, 632 (La. App. Ct. 2008) (“The compromise instrument is governed by the
same general rules of construction applicable to contracts”) (citing Brown v. Drillers,
Inc., 639 So.2d 741 (La. 1994)). The agreement clearly states that Mr. Mathis
intend[s] this to be a compromise and full settlement of . . . any and all
causes and rights of action whatsoever that [Mr. Mathis] may or might
have . . . under the Louisiana Worker’s Compensation Law . . . and any
and all other laws in any way resulting from or to result from the accidents
that [Mr. Mathis] complains of herein and any and all other accidents
sustained by [Mr. Mathis] in the past arising out of or occurring during the
course of his employment with [Boomtown] . . .
[Record Document 35-8, p.7]. There can be no question, and Mr. Mathis does not
contest, that this language is broad enough to cover the FMLA claims brought here.
Furthermore, the handwritten language providing for the reservation of Mr. Mathis’ right
to bring unemployment claims and his right to continue to prosecute his EEOC charge do
not cover his FMLA claims. Even assuming that Mr. Mathis intended the words
“unemployment claims” to refer to the FMLA claims brought here, the unambiguous
language of the contract controls. “The words of a contract must be given their
generally prevailing meaning. Words of art and technical terms must be given their

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technical meaning when the contract involves a technical matter.” La. Civ. Code art.
2047. The term “unemployment claims” is clear and explicit. It refers to claims for
benefits paid by the state, pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1601 et. seq., to qualified individuals
who have lost their jobs. The FMLA, by contrast, entitles the eligible employee of a
covered employer to take unpaid leave for a certain amount of time per year if “the
employee has a serious health condition that makes [him or her] unable to perform the
functions of [his or her] position[.]” Bocalbos v. Nat'l W. Life Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 379,
383 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Act also prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining, or denying
an employee’s rights, and from discriminating or retaliating against an employee for
exercising his or her FMLA rights. Bocalbos, 162 F.3d at 383. The two types of claims
spring from entirely separate sources of law and provide entirely different rights and
remedies. Regardless of whether FMLA issues might arise during the adjudication of an
unemployment claim, no reasonable person reading the words “unemployment claims”
would think that the parties who wrote it intended it to refer to FMLA claims.6 Because
the language of the compromise clearly and explicitly manifests the intent of the parties

Mr. Mathis argues that because “it was the Defendant that had insisted that
only matters that pertained to workmans’ [sic] compensation be addressed” in the
settlement, his FMLA claims must fall outside of the scope of the agreement. [Record
Document 40, pp. 2, 6]. Assuming that such a statement was made, however, it does
not affect that fact that the language of the agreement is unambiguous and therefore
must be interpreted without the aid of additional evidence. La. Civ. Code art. 2046.
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to settle Mr. Mathis’ FMLA claims against Boomtown, those claims must be dismissed.7
B.

The Merits of the FMLA Claims

Even if the settlement were not valid, Mr. Mathis has failed to make out a prima
facie case for discrimination or retaliation under the FMLA. To make out a discrimination
or retaliation claim, he must show “that: (1) he is protected under the FMLA; (2) he
suffered an adverse employment decision; and either (3a) that [he] was treated less
favorably than an employee who had not requested leave under the FMLA; or (3b) the
adverse decision was made because of [his] request for leave.” Bocalbos, 162 F.3d at
383. If Mr. Mathis succeeds in making a prima facie case, the burden shifts to
Defendants to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason for his
termination. Id. Once Defendants have done so, Mr. Mathis must offer sufficient
evidence to raise a genuine question of fact regarding whether Defendants’ stated

Mr. Mathis’ two remaining arguments on this point merit little discussion. Citing
La. Civ. Code art. 7, he argues that his FMLA rights are unwaivable. [Record Document
40, pp. 5-6]. Article 7 reads: “Persons may not by their juridical acts derogate from
laws enacted for the protection of the public interest. Any act in derogation of such
laws is an absolute nullity.” The article’s comments make clear that “a private person
may renounce a right or privilege unless renunciation is expressly or impliedly
forbidden, affects the rights of others, or is contrary to public good.” La. Civ. Code art.
7, comment (c); see also Lafayette Prof’l Firefighters Ass’n v. Lafayette City-Parish
Consol. Gov’t, 971 So.2d 487, 490 n.4 (La. App. Ct. 2007) (La. Civ. Code art. 7 does not
interfere with the freedom to contract on all matters not forbidden by law). Mr. Mathis
has not shown how his decision to renounce his FMLA claims is expressly or implicitly
forbidden by law, notwithstanding his unsupported contention that Congress made
FMLA rights unwaivable, affects the rights of others, or is contrary to the public good.
There is nothing extraordinary about the settlement of FMLA claims that would remove
them from the purview of the codal articles governing compromises. See Folse v. IMCAgrico, Civ. A. No. 95–1849, 1996 WL 517708, at *1-2 (E.D. La. Sept. 12, 1996)
(settlement of FMLA claim is enforceable under Louisiana Civil Code Article 3071).
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reason is a pretext for discrimination or retaliation. Id.
Assuming for the sake of argument that Mr. Mathis has made out a prima facie
case, Defendants have put forward a legitimate nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory
reason for his termination—namely, that he was absent from work for approximately
two months and that he never submitted the forms that were necessary in order for him
to take leave during that time. The burden now shifts to Mr. Mathis to put forward
evidence that this reason was pretextual. His argument appears to be either that he
actually submitted the required forms or that merely requesting FMLA leave entitled him
to received an answer regarding whether Boomtown would grant the leave. [Record
Document 40, pp. 8-10]. In either case, he implies that since Defendants did not follow
the dictates of the FMLA, their decision to terminate him must have retaliatory or
discriminatory. Mr. Mathis, however, has offered absolutely no evidence to support his
arguments. The Court can find nothing in the materials he has submitted, or that
Defendants have submitted, that tends to show that the decision to terminate his
employment was pretextual. In particular, Mr. Mathis has presented no evidence, apart
from his own allegations in this and other cases, that he submitted the required forms
and no legal support for his claim that Defendants’ actions before his termination
violated the FMLA in any way. Because Mr. Mathis has failed to put forward any
evidence of pretext, his FMLA claims against all Defendants must be dismissed.8
C.

Review of the ALJ’s Decision

Mr. Mathis has also failed to point to any evidence showing that any of the
Defendants interfered with his attempt to take FMLA leave.
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Mr. Mathis’ only remaining claim is his request that this Court “determine whether
the Claim made by BOOMTOWN to the Unemployment Court is in fact a true Complaint
and merits the actions taken by BOOMTOWN and the Unemployment Court.” [Record
Document 1, p.3]. He has filed an appeal in state district court regarding the Louisiana
Review Board’s ruling upholding the ALJ’s decision. The Court does not know the status
of that case.
The Court always has an obligation to determine whether it has subject matter
jurisdiction. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“subject-matter
delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative”); Stockman v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir.1998) (without subject matter jurisdiction,
a federal court lacks the power to adjudicate claims). Mr. Mathis appears to argue that
federal subject matter jurisdiction is present merely because the FMLA is a federal
statute:
FMLA is a federal law enacted by Congress. Thus, this Court, a federal
court, is the “appropriate forum” for this matter. It’s [sic] this Court, in
regards to FMLA, that is the most “appropriate” jurisdiction to examine the
issues here on FMLA.
[Record Document 40, p.3] (emphasis in original); see also [Record Document 1, p.1]
(“The action involves application of the Family and Medical Leave Act. This Court has
jurisdiction of the action.”). That the unemployment law adjudication may have
involved an issue of federal law—namely, whether Mr. Mathis complied with the medical
certification requirement of the FMLA—does not necessarily give this Court federal
question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides that “[t]he district courts shall have
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original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States.” Whether an action “arises” under the laws of the United States is
determined by the well-pleaded-complaint rule. Gilbert v. Donahoe, --- F.3d ---, 2014
WL 1704129, at *6 (5th Cir. 2014). Under this rule, a claim “arises under federal law
when the plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon
federal law or the Constitution.” Id. (quoting Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S.
1, 6 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if a well-pleaded complaint does
not state a federal cause of action, however, federal question jurisdiction may still exist
if:
(1) resolving a federal issue is necessary to resolution of the state-law
claim; (2) the federal issue is actually disputed; (3) the federal issue is
substantial; and (4) federal jurisdiction will not disturb the balance of
federal and state judicial responsibilities.
Hughes v. Chevron Philips Chemical Co. LP, 478 Fed. App’x 167, 170 (5th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Singh v. Duane Morris, LLP, 538 F.3d 334, 338 (5th Cir. 2008)); see also Grable
& Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng. & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312-14 (2005).
Mr. Mathis has failed to demonstrate that federal question jurisdiction exists
under either the well-pleaded complaint rule or the Grable factors. Mr. Mathis seeks
review of his disqualification from receiving unemployment benefits, which is clearly a
state law claim. Furthermore, he has failed to show that resolution of a substantial
federal issue is necessary in order to adjudicate this claim. The only federal issue that
Mr. Mathis raises is whether he turned in the FMLA medical certification or its equivalent
in a timely manner. [Record Document 1, p. 5]. Whether or not he submitted
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documents in a timely manner is simply not a substantial issue; nor is it actually
disputed. Mr. Mathis has failed to offer any evidence in support of his allegation that he
complied with Boomtown’s request for medical certification. Whether or not the failure
to turn in the documentation disqualifies Mr. Mathis for state unemployment benefits is
a question for the state. Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Mathis’ unemployment
claim does not present a federal question and this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over that claim.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be and

hereby is GRANTED. Mr. Mathis’ claims against Defendants are DISMISSED with
prejudice.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana on this 23rd day of June,
2014.

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