USA v. Davis et al

Filing 75

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 69 Motion to Consolidate Cases ; denying 69 Motion for Extension of Time. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen L Hayes on 5/5/15. (crt,Crawford, A)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-1602

VERSUS

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JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS

S.P. DAVIS, SR., ET AL.

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MAG. JUDGE KAREN L. HAYES

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the undersigned magistrate judge on reference from the District Court is a
disjunctive motion to consolidate the above-captioned matter with United States v. S.P. Davis,
Sr., Civ. Action No. 15-0050, or alternatively, for extension of time to file supplemental briefs
[doc. # 69] filed by defendants, S.P. Davis, Sr.; Kharmen Davis; S.P. Davis, Jr; Willie J.
Singleton; and Andrew Davis, Jr. For reasons assigned below, the motion [doc. # 69] is
DENIED, in its entirety. 1
Rule 42(a) provides that “[i]f actions before the court involve a common question of law
or fact, the court may: (1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions;
(2) consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a). However, Rule 42(a) is permissive and consolidation lies within the
discretionary authority of the court. In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades on
December 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006, 1013-1014 (5th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted). “[I]t is for the
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As this is not one of the motions excepted in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), nor dispositive
of any claim on the merits within the meaning of Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, this ruling is issued under the authority thereof, and in accordance with the standing
order of this court. Any appeal must be made to the district judge in accordance with Rule 72(a)
and L.R. 74.1(W).

court to weigh the saving of time and effort that consolidation would produce against any
inconvenience, delay, or expense that it would cause.” Daybrook Fisheries, Inc. v. American
Marine Const., 1998 WL 748586, *2 (E.D. La. 10/19/1998) (quoting 9 Wright & Miller,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2383 at 439 (2nd ed.1995)). Consolidation is
properly denied where suits are at different stages of preparation, the transactions forming the
basis of the suits are entirely separate, or where consolidation would prejudice the rights of the
parties involved. See Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Inc., 886 F.2d 758, 762 (5th Cir. 1989); Alley
v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 767 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. 1983); and St. Bernard Gen. Hosp., Inc. v.
Hos. Serv. Ass’n of New Orleans, Inc., 712 F.2d 978, 989-90 (5th Cir. 1983).
Here, the government filed both suits to foreclose on properties to satisfy the tax debt of
S. P. Davis, Sr. and/or Willie J. Singleton. Thus, while the cases may share a common basis for
liability and one or more overlapping defenses, that is where the similarities end. For instance,
the subject of the foreclosure in Civil Action No. 12-1602 is the residence of S.P. Davis, Sr.,
which presents issues of community property, whereas Civil Action No. 15-0050 seeks
foreclosure of separate, commercial property. Furthermore, all parties in both suits are not
identical. The court emphasizes that Civil Action No. 12-1602 is an almost three year old case,
with pending summary judgment motions that are fully briefed and ripe. See discussion, infra.
In contrast, Civil Action No. 15-0050, remains in its infancy, with one party that has not even
answered the suit.
In addition, the court does not discern any considerations of judicial economy or threat of
inconsistent judgments that would compel consolidation. Both cases are assigned to the same
District Judge. Thus, to the extent that there are any common issues of law between the suits, the
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parties and the court can readily transfer the principles settled in the earlier suit to the subsequent
case. Similarly, with the same judge in both suits, inconsistent judgments are unlikely.
Finally, defendants have not established good cause to support additional briefing on the
pending dispositive motions, or why they need an additional 60 days to do so. Defendants last
filed a supplemental memorandum in June 2014. [doc. # 60]. To the extent that they intend to
update the court regarding the status of payments made towards satisfaction of judgment, they
clearly do not require an additional 60 days to do so. In fact, defendants previously managed to
update the court regarding their payments simply by filing notices in the record – without
obtaining prior court approval. See doc. #s 64 & 66. Moreover, more than 40 days have lapsed
since defendants filed their motion – a delay that is more than sufficient for them to have
prepared and submitted their proposed memorandum so that the court might have considered it
together with the motion, rather than the motion in the present, speculative vacuum.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the disjunctive motion to consolidate the above-captioned matter
with United States v. S.P. Davis, Sr., Civ. Action No. 15-0050, or alternatively, for extension of
time to file supplemental briefs [doc. # 69] filed by defendants, S.P. Davis, Sr.; Kharmen Davis;
S.P. Davis, Jr; Willie J. Singleton; and Andrew Davis, Jr, is hereby DENIED, in its entirety.
In Chambers, at Monroe, Louisiana, this5th day of May 2015.

__________________________________
KAREN L. HAYES
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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