Davis v. Trinidad Drilling L P et al

Filing 50

MEMORANDUM RULING re 46 APPEAL OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE DECISION to District Judge re 45 Order filed by Ronnie Davis. Signed by Judge S Maurice Hicks on 04/16/2013. (crt,McDonnell, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

RONNIE DAVIS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-1828

VERSUS

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

TRINIDAD DRILLING LP, d/b/a
TRINIDAD DRILLING LLC, ET AL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HAYES

MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a Motion and Written Statement of Appeal [Rec. Doc. 46] from
Magistrate Judge Karen Hayes’ Order [Rec. Doc. 33], denying both Plaintiff’s motion for
leave of court to file an amended complaint and Plaintiff’s motion to remand. Based on the
following, Magistrate Judge Karen Hayes’ Order is AFFIRMED.
I.

Background
This tort suit stems from an incident which occurred while Plaintiff Ronnie Davis

worked at a drill site in Frierson, Louisiana. See Petition, Rec. Doc. 1-1. Davis alleges that
on June 3, 2011, while working as a truck driver, an employee of Trinidad or Exco
improperly loaded one or more sections of drill pipe on to Davis’ truck, which caused Davis
to fall some ten feet from the flatbed trailer to the ground. Id. Davis suffered disabling and
permanent injuries as a result of Defendants' alleged negligence, and seeks compensatory,
special, exemplary, and punitive damages. Id.
On July 3, 2012, Trinidad removed this case to federal court on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Notice of Removal; Rec. Doc. 1. After discovery
began, Trinidad identified Sam Lee as the operator of the forklift and employee of Trinidad
at the time of Davis’ injury. Trinidad also revealed that Lee’s last known contact information
was for an address in Rayville, Louisiana. Davis subsequently filed a motion for leave to

amend his petition to join as defendant, Sam Lee, who, per the proposed amended
complaint, is domiciled in Louisiana. This proposed joinder would destroy the Court’s
diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, Davis filed a motion to remand along with his motion for
leave to amend. After a full analysis of the “Hensgens factors,”1 Magistrate Judge Hayes
denied both motions. Rec. Doc. 45. Davis appealed this decision focusing much of its
opposition on the argument that Lee is a necessary party to this litigation so that he can
participate in discovery. See Rec. Doc. 46. Additionally, Davis also expressed concern
that Defendants may withdraw the admission that Lee was working as their employee in
the course and scope of his employment at the time of the incident. Id.
II.

Analysis
Any party may appeal a magistrate judge’s ruling on a non-dispositive matter to a

district court judge under Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule
74.1 M & W. The decision by Magistrate Judge Hayes to deny the plaintiff’s motion to stay
is a non-dispositive matter. In reviewing a non-dispositive pretrial matter, the Court must
determine whether the Magistrate Judge’s order was clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

1

See Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1179, 1182 (5th Cir. 1987)(The
court must balance the defendant’s interest in maintaining a federal forum,
with the competing interest of avoiding parallel lawsuits by considering the
following:
[1] the extent to which the purpose of the amendment is to defeat
federal jurisdiction,
[2] whether the plaintiff has been dilatory in asking for amendment,
[3] whether plaintiff will be significantly injured if amendment is not
allowed, and
[4] any other factors bearing on the equities. The district court, with
input from the defendant, should then balance the equities and
decide whether amendment would be permitted. If it permits the
amendment of the non-diverse defendant, it must remand to the
state court. If the amendment is not allowed, the federal court
maintains jurisdiction.

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 72(a).
Magistrate Judge Hayes’ analysis of the Hensgens factors was not clearly erroneous
or contrary to law. As expounded upon by Magistrate Judge Hayes, the Complaint alleges
Lee acted negligently during the course and scope of his employment, ensuring any
potential liability is imputed to his employer(s). She also found no indication that the
existing defendants are insolvent or otherwise incapable of funding a judgment or
settlement. Lee is not a necessary and/or indispensable party to this litigation, as Lee’s
inclusion as a party in no way alters Defendents’ scope of potential liability stemming from
allegations in Davis’s complaint. Lee’s inclusion as a party also does not affect Davis’
ability to collect on any judgment rendered. Accordingly, this Court agrees with Magistrate
Judge Hayes that Lee is neither a necessary nor indispensable party to this litigation.
Furthermore, the evidence and arguments now included in the instant appeal do not
change the Court’s analysis. Davis places great weight on his argument that Lee is a
necessary party and that Lee’s inclusion as a defendant is essential so that he can
participate in discovery. Davis also argues that Defendants could potentially retract their
concession that Lee was acting within the course and scope of his employment, leaving
Davis without a remedy. Neither of these arguments render Magistrate Judge Hayes’ ruling
clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Furthermore, the Court finds obvious fault with both
of Plaintiff’s arguments.
First, Davis does not cite any statute or case standing for the proposition that a
party, who is not personally liable per the complaint,2 must be included as a party defendant
so that they can participate in discovery. As is evident by the information submitted to this
2

Davis’s proposed complaint specifically alleges that Lee was acting during
the course and scope of his employment; thus, even if Davis prevails on
all claims, Lee’s negligence would be imputed to his employer(s).

Court by Plaintiff, Lee’s inclusion as a party defendant is not necessary to subject him to
the subpoena power of this Court. Davis states Lee is domiciled at 831 Charleston Drive,
Rayville, Louisiana 71269: an address within the jurisdiction of the Western District of
Louisiana. Davis has also failed to produce any evidence that he unsuccessfully sought
letters rogatory or a subpoena in order to secure the deposition of Lee.

Contrary to

Davis’s assertion, including Lee as a party is not the only available channel to conduct
discovery related to Lee. Accordingly, this Court is not inclined allow a non-liable party to
be forced into this litigation as a defendant solely for ease of conducting discovery.
Davis’ second argument that Defendants could potentially withdraw their admission
that Lee was acting in the course and scope of employment is not only speculative, but
lacks legal merit. Defendants have consistently admitted throughout this entire litigation
that Lee was an employee acting in the course and scope of employment at the time of the
incident. To withdraw this admission now would require both extenuating, extraordinary
circumstances and Court approval; a highly unlikely scenario.
III.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, this Court finds that the Magistrate's decision

denying Davis’s Motion to Amend Complaint and Motion to Remand was neither clearly
erroneous nor contrary to law. The Order of March 8, 2013 issued by Magistrate Judge
Karen Hayes is AFFIRMED.
An order consistent with the terms of this Memorandum Ruling shall issue herewith.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 16th day of April, 2013.