Haygood et al v. Begue et al

Filing 106

MEMORANDUM RULING re 20 MOTION to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim Unfair Trade Practice Claims, antitrust claims, claims under 42 USC 1983, claims under 15 USC Sections 1 and 2, defamation claims, and dismissal based on running of the statute of limitations filed by Ross H Dies J Cody Cowen Benjamin A Beach, Ross H Dies. Signed by Judge S Maurice Hicks on 03/31/2014. (crt,McDonnell, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
RYAN HAYGOOD, DDS, ET AL

CIVIL ACTION NO: 13-0335

VERSUS

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

BRIAN BEGUE, ET

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY
MEMORANDUM RULING

Before this Court is a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) filed by Defendants, Ross H. Dies, DDS, and Ross H. Dies, J. Cody Cowen, and
Benjamin A. Beach, DDS, LLP (hereafter collectively referred to as “Defendants”). See
Record Document 20. For the reasons which follow, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are well-established and provided in its Memorandum Ruling
of the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Robert K. Hill, DDS and Hill, DDS, Inc.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows for dismissal of an action “for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” While a complaint attacked by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion does not need detailed factual allegations, in order to avoid dismissal, the
plaintiff’s factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007);
see also Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007). A plaintiff’s obligation
“requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do.” Id. The Supreme Court recently expounded on the Twombly

standard, explaining that a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, – U.S. –, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must construe the complaint
liberally and accept all of the plaintiff’s factual allegations in the complaint as true. See In
re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2009).
Although courts generally are not permitted to review materials outside of the
pleadings when determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim for which relief may be
granted, there are limited exceptions to this rule. Specifically, a court may consider
documents attached to a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to be part of the pleadings if the
plaintiff refers to those documents and they are central to the claim. See Collins v. Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-499 (5th Cir. 2000); Causey v. Sewell CadillacChevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004). Additionally, pleadings filed in state or
other federal district courts are matters of public record and the Court may take judicial
notice of those documents in connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Cinel
v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1994).
II. Legal Analysis
A. Claims Against Defendants for Alleged Violations of Louisiana Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Act
The pending claim against the Defendants under the Louisiana Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Act (“LUTPA”), in regard to the Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, has been ruled upon in favor of the Plaintiffs by the Louisiana Second Circuit
Court of Appeal. The ruling permitted discovery to move forward regaring the LUTPA claim.

The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the Defendants’ writ of certiorari on the issue,
thereby making the Second Circuit ruling final. The Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C.
1738, mandates that federal courts give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments
that those judgments would be given in the courts of the state from which the judgments
emerged. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443,90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194 (1970). Therefore,
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on this issue is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE.1
B. All Other Claims Against Defendants
The Memorandum submitted to the Court by these Defendants on all other issues
adopts and incorporates by reference the arguments and authorities cited by Dr. Hill’s
Motion to Dismiss, Record Document 18-3. The Court finds the differences between these
Defendants and Dr. Hill substantially different.2 Therefore, the Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss these issues is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, because there is a final decision by the state court, the
LUTPA claims are DENIED WITH PREJUDICE. All other claims are DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE because the Defendants’ brief fails to adequately address the issues
pertaining to these Defendants. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss filed these Defendants

1

While the Court declines to dismiss this cause of action based on the decision of
the Louisiana Supreme Court to deny the defendants writ of certiorari regarding the
holding by the Louisiana Second Circuit, it may decline to assert supplemental
jurisdiction depending upon further rulings on Motions to Dismiss by the other named
Defendants, including those added with the First Supplemental, Amended and Restated
Complain [Record Document 71-2].
2

Dr. Hill, unlike these Defendants, was not named in the state court lawsuit which
may have interrupted prescription. Dr. Hill’s brief [Record Document 18-3] fails to
address this particular issue, and therefore, the issue is not address in this instant
Motion to Dismiss.

is hereby DENIED in all respects.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana this 31st day of March, 2014.