Haygood et al v. Begue et al

Filing 108

MEMORANDUM RULING re 24 MOTION to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim MOTION for Summary Judgment MOTION for More Definite Statement filed by Hill D D S Inc, Robert K Hill. Signed by Judge S Maurice Hicks on 03/31/2014. (crt,McDonnell, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
RYAN HAYGOOD, DDS and
HAYGOOD DENTAL CARE, LLC

CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-CV-0335

VERSUS

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

BRIAN BEGUE, ET AL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY
MEMORANDUM RULING

Before this Court is a Motion to Dismiss (Record Document 24) filed by Robert K.
Hill, D.D.S. (hereafter referred to as Dr. Hill), and Hill, D.D.S., Inc. under Rule 12(b)(6) and
in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for a More Definite Statement
Under Rule 12(e) filed by Robert K. Hill, DDS and Hill, DDS, Inc. See Record Document
24. For the reasons which follow, the Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
The allegations in the instant suit relate to formal complaints by patients and other
dentists which eventually led to an investigation and administrative proceeding wherein Dr.
Ryan Haygood’s dental license was revoked by the Louisiana State Board of Dentistry
(“Dental Board”). The Dental Board initially became involved because of a complaint
against Dr. Haygood, claiming that he recommended extensive and expensive treatment
plans after over-diagnosing/unnecessarily diagnosing patients with peridontal disease. The
investigation and resulting administrative proceeding took place over a three year period.
On November 8, 2010, at the conclusion of four days of adversarial hearings, which
included the presentation of witnesses, experts and medical / dental evidence, a threemember disciplinary panel revoked Dr. Haygood’s dental license and levied fines against
him. This punishment was imposed due to Dr. Haygood’s violations of the Dental Practice

Act. Louisiana Revised Statute Section 37:751 et seq.
Dr. Haygood appealed the November 8, 2010 decision of the Dental Board to the
Civil District Court of Orleans Parish (“CDC”) Docket No. 2010-12060. On May 31, 2011,
the CDC affirmed some of the findings, but remanded part of the case the to Dental Board
due to the erroneous inclusion of charges against Dr. Haygood that were previously
dismissed. In all other respects, the CDC affirmed the Dental Board’s decision. Dr.
Haygood appealed the portion of the May 31, 2011 decision of the CDC which was affirmed
to the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, Docket No. 2011-CA-1327.
On August 29, 2011, the Dental Board issued a decision regarding the remanded
portion of the suit. It again levied fines against Dr. Haygood and affirmed the revocation of
his dental license in its Amended Decision After Remand. This decision was also appealed
by Dr. Haygood to the CDC, which affirmed the ruling on December 9, 2011. The two
decisions by the CDC (May 31, 2011 and August 29, 2011) were consolidated on appeal
to the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded
the Dental Board’s ruling, finding that the Dental Board’s independent counsel participated
in the administrative hearing in dual roles as prosecutor and adjudicator in violation of Dr.
Haygood’s due process rights.
Plaintiffs, Ryan Haygood, DDS and his dental limited liability company, brought the
instant lawsuit against Dr. Hill and Hill, D.D.S., Inc., among other defendants, on February
13, 2013, alleging damages arising out of violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983, and 15 U.S.C. § 1
and § 2, as well as Louisiana state law claims for defamation and for violations of the
Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act - LSA-R.S. 51:1409 et seq. (Document 1). The
defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim and dismissal due to
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untimeliness in regards to violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, antitrust violations, defamation,
and violations of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows for dismissal of an action “for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” While a complaint attacked by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion does not need detailed factual allegations, in order to avoid dismissal, the
plaintiff’s factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007);
see also Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007). A plaintiff’s obligation
“requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do.” Id. The Supreme Court recently expounded on the Twombly
standard, explaining that a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, – U.S. –, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must construe the complaint
liberally and accept all of the plaintiff’s factual allegations in the complaint as true. See In
re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2009).
Although courts generally are not permitted to review materials outside of the
pleadings when determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim for which relief may be
granted, there are limited exceptions to this rule. Specifically, a court may consider
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documents attached to a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to be part of the pleadings if the
plaintiff refers to those documents and they are central to the claim. See Collins v. Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-499 (5th Cir. 2000); Causey v. Sewell CadillacChevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004). Additionally, pleadings filed in state or
other federal district courts are matters of public record and the Court may take judicial
notice of those documents in connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Cinel
v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1994).
I. Claims against Hill, D.D.S., Inc.
Plaintiffs fail to address their claims against Hill, D.D.S., Inc. in their response to
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs therefore concede all claims against Hill, D.D.S.,
Inc. As demonstrated by the filing with the Louisiana Secretary of State, Hill, D.D.S., Inc.
Was dissolved in 2006. [Record Document 24-3]. Therefore, Hill, D.D.S., Inc.’s Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED.
II. Claims against Dr. Hill
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Dr. Haygood claims a violation by Dr. Hill under Title 42, Section 1983 of the United
States Code. To state a claim under this statute, Dr. Haygood must establish that he was
deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the
alleged deprivation was committed under the color of state law. See American Mfrs. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50, 119 S.Ct. 977, 985 (1999). “[T]he under color-ofstate-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how
discriminatory or wrongful.” Id.

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Dr. Haygood alleges that Dr. Hill, together with the other named defendants,
including the state dental board, conspired to limit competition in the Shreveport/ Bossier
City area. Dr. Haygood is essentially claiming that Dr. Hill was a willful participant in
conspiracy with the Dental Board. Dr. Hill denies the allegation, and further asserts that the
claim for the alleged wrongdoing has prescribed.
This court will first address the prescription issue. Claims brought under Title 42,
Section 1983 of the United States Code are subject to state statutes of limitation for
personal injury actions. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-251 (1989). In Louisiana, there
is a one (1) year prescriptive period for § 1983 claims, as established by LSA-C.C. Art.
3492. Hawkins v. McHugh, 46 F.3d 10, 12 (5th Cir. 1995); Smith v. Humphrey, 10-1070,
2012 WL 1970883 *2 (W.D. La. 04/09.12); adopted by 2012 WL 1969317. In the case of
a conspiracy, the prescriptive period begins to toll from the moment that the plaintiff knew
or should have known of the overt acts involved in the conspiracy. Helton v. Clements, 832
F.2d 332, 335 (5th Cir. 1987); Smith, supra at *3. Therefore, the claims asserted under 42
USC § 1983 in the instant case are subject to a one (1) year prescriptive period.
Dr. Haygood filed a state court claim against all of the defendants, except Dr. Hill
and Hill D.D.S., Inc. on September 27, 2011. See Record Document 24-1, page 24. There
was no action brought against Dr. Hill and Hill D.D.S., Inc. until the instant case was filed
on February 13, 2013. Because over two years elapsed between the filing of the initial
proceeding in state court and the instant case, this Court finds that the plaintiffs clearly
knew, or should have known, of the overt acts involved in the alleged conspiracy at least
two years before the instant suit was filed. Therefore, this court finds that the alleged
wrongdoing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Dr. Hill has prescribed under Louisiana law.
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The Court additionally notes that, even if this action had not prescribed, Dr.Hill’s
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion would be granted because Dr. Haygood’s bald conclusory allegation
that these defendants were involved in a conspiracy with the Dental Board fails the
plausibility standard established in Twombly and Iqbal. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
B. 15 U.S.C. § 1 and § 2
The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 and § 2, provides the framework to forbid
monopolies within the United States. To establish a violation under Section 1, the plaintiff
must prove: (1) the defendants engaged in a conspiracy, (2) that restrained trade (3) in the
relevant market. Gold Bridge Technology, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 271 (5th Cir.
2008), cert denied 556 U.S. ______ (2009); Apani Sw. Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enter., Inc., 300
F.3d 620, 627 (5th Cir. 2002); Johnson v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 95 F.3d 383, 392 (5th Cir.
1996). To establish the first element, “the complaint must contain enough factual matter to
suggest that an agreement among the alleged conspirators was actually made.” Dowdy &
Dowdy Partnership v. Arbitron, Inc., 2010 WL 3942755, *3 (S.D. Miss. 2010)(ctiing
Twombly at 556). The first element that must be shown by the plaintiff is that the
defendants engaged in a conspiracy. Dr. Haygood cites a holding by the Fifth Circuit in a
pre-Twombly world which stated, “although plaintiffs may be unable to allege specific facts
proving actual of agreement or conspiracy, the pleadings are sufficient if they set forth facts
which an inference of unlawful agreement can be drawn.” Brett v. First Federal Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 461 F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir., 1972). However, Twombly changed federal pleading
practice.The Twombly decision, which provides the current pleading rules, was also cited
by Dr. Haygood. The Supreme Court in that decision stated:
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Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a
probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
agreement.
Twombly at 545.
Here, Plaintiffs allege that Dr. Hill wrote a letter to a state dental board about Dr.
Haygood and helped patients do the same. Dr. Haygood argues that these actions provide
a basis for the Court to hold that there is a “reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence of an illegal agreement.” The Court is unpersuaded by this argument. The
drafting of a letter by a licensed dentist to the Dental Board, and helping patients do the
same, fails to rise to the minimum pleading requirement to infer the existence of a
conspiracy.
C. State Law Defamation Claim
Dr. Haygood’s next cause of action against Dr. Hill is for defamation under Louisiana
state law. Under Louisiana law, defamation, which is a delictual action, is subject to a one
year prescriptive period. La. C.C. art. 3492. W.T.A. v. N.Y., 2010-839 (La. App. 3rd Cir.
3/9/11) 58 So.3d 612, 617, writ denied, 2011-0491 (La. 05/06/11) 250 So.3d 1285; Farber
v. Bobear, 2010-0985 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1/19/11), 56 So.3d 1061, 1069; Doughty v.
Cummings, 44,812 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 12/30/09), 28 So.3d 580, 583, writ denied, 2010-0251
(La. 04/09/10), 31 So.3d 394; Clark v. Wilcox, 2004 - 2254 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/22/05), 928
So.2d 104, 112,writ denied, 2006-0185 (La. 6/2/06), 929 So.2d 1252; see also Federal &
Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Smith, 730 F.2d 1026, 1035 (5th Cir. 1984). Under Article 3492
of the Louisiana Civil Code, prescription in a defamation case tolls from the date injury or
damage is sustained. Farber, 56 So.3d at 1069. Each publication or communication of a
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defamatory statement is a separate cause of action; therefore, multiple publications or
communications are independent and cannot be considered to be continuous. Wiggins, 475
So.2d at 781; see also Collinson v. Tarver Land Dev., LLC., 11-1787, 2012 WL 688551 *1
(W.D. La. 02/01/2012).
The defendant pleading prescription typically bears the burden of proving that the
claim has prescribed. However, when the face of the petition reveals that the plaintiff’s
claim has prescribed, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show why the claim has not
prescribed. Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 2009-2632 (La. 7/6/10), 45 So.3d 991, 998;
W.T.A., 58 So.3d at 617; Farber 56 So.3d at 1069.
According to the Complaint the instant case, in 2006 Dr. Hill encouraged his patients
to draft complaints to the Dental Board, and assisted patients in the process. See Record
Document 1, paragraphs 21, 54). Further, Dr. Hill drafted his own letter to the dental
board’s private investigator on April 16, 2007. (See Exhibit “B” referenced in Record
Document 1, paragraph 56). Dr. Haygood filed his initial claim for damages against all of
the defendants’ listed in the instant case, except Dr. Hill and Hill D.D.S., on September 26,
2011. Paragraph 60 of the original Petition for Damages alleges damages suffered by Dr.
Haygood and Haygood Dental Care, LLC, including “both financial loss, reputational loss
and substantial general damages of embarrassment, humiliation and worry.” See Record
Document 24-5, labeled Exhibit “C.” Additionally, Dr. Haygood alleges that he was
“deprived of the opportunity to practice dentistry in his home town” due to intentional and
malicious acts. See Record Document 24-5, labeled Exhibit “C.”
Based on this information, it is apparent that Dr. Haygood was fully aware of any
damages caused by the allegedly defamatory letters not later than September 26, 2011,
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the date of his state court filing, at the very latest. Plaintiffs failed to name Dr. Hill and Hill
D.D.S. as defendants in the state court proceeding. Accordingly, Court finds that the claim
for defamation against Dr. Hill and Hill D.D.S., Inc. have also prescribed.
D. Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act - LSA-R.S. 51:1409 et seq.
As set forth above, the plaintiffs have not established a plausible claim of
conspiracy between Dr. Hill and the other named defendants. Therefore, the Court will
examine this claim separately.
LSA-R.S. 51:1405(A) prohibits any “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce.” The Courts have the power to determine, on a
case-by-case basis, the type of conduct that falls within that category. Sheramine
Services, Inc. v. Shell Deepwater Production Company, Inc., 2009-1633 (La. 04/23/10),
35 So.3d 1053, 1059. The Sheramine decision provides additional guidance. There the
Louisiana Supreme Court required that a plaintiff must allege conduct that “offends
established public policy and is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or
substantial[ly] injurious.” Id.; Cargill, Inc. v. Degesch America, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 667,
676 (E.D. La. 2012); Jones Energy Co., LLC v. Chesapeake Louisiana, L.P., 873 F.
Supp. 2d 779, 789 (W.D. La. 2012).
The allegations that Dr. Hill wrote a letter to the Dental Board and encouraged
patients to do the same fails to rise to the level of facts necessary to support a claim
under this Louisiana statute. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss this claim is granted.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Dismiss filed by Dr. Hill and Hill, D.D.S.,

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LLC is GRANTED. Court finds that (1)Plaintiffs fail to address their claims against Hill,
D.D.S., Inc. in their response to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) the
claimed violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the state law defamation by Dr. Hill have
prescribed; (3) Plaintiffs failed to meet the Twombly standard regarding the alleged
violation of 15 U.S.C. §1 and §2; and (4) Plaintiffs failed to allege conduct that “offends
established public policy and is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or
substantial[ly] injurious” in regards to the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act. All of Dr.
Haygood’s claims against Dr. Hill and Hill, D.D.S., Inc. are hereby DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 31st day of March,
2014.

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