Haygood et al v. Begue et al

Filing 186

MEMORANDUM RULING re 175 MOTION to Dismiss, MOTION to Stay filed by David L Melancon, Wilton Guillory, Jr, Lynn Philippe, Aubrey Baudean, Jr, Dean Manning, Russell Mayer, Patricia Cassidy. Signed by Judge S Maurice Hicks on 3/17/2016. (crt,Keifer, K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
RYAN HAYGOOD, DDS, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-0335

VERSUS

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

BRIAN BEGUE, ET AL.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY
MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively to Stay (Record Document
175) filed by Defendants, Dean Manning, Aubrey Baudean, Jr., Patricia Cassidy, Wilton
Guillory, Jr., Russell Mayer, David L. Melancon, and Lynn Phillippe (“Defendants”).
Defendants move this Court to dismiss or alternatively stay this case pursuant to the
Younger Abstention Doctrine under Rule 12(b)(1). See id. Defendants further seek
dismissal of any claims by Haygood Dental Care, LLC pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See id.
Plaintiffs Ryan Haygood, DDS and Haygood Dental Care, LLC (hereinafter referred to as
“Dr. Haygood” or the “Haygood Plaintiffs”) opposed the motion. See Record Document
179. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
The facts of this case have been set forth in numerous memorandum rulings
entered by this Court. See Record Documents 106, 108, 110, 112, 182 and 184. The
instant Defendants were added on March 7, 2014, when the Haygood Plaintiffs filed a First
Supplemental, Amended and Restated Complaint. See Record Document 100. These
Defendants were named in their official capacities and were made defendants “solely for
purposes of declarative relief.” Id. at ¶¶ 14-17, 20, 22, 24. While the “official capacity” is
not identified in the First Supplemental, Amended and Restated Complaint, Defendants

state in their opposition that it is “presumably” Defendants’ position as members of the
Louisiana State Board of Dentistry (“the Board”). Record Document 175 at 1. Count Five
of the First Supplemental, Amended and Restated Complaint provides:
Plaintiffs seek declarations under 28 U.S.C. § 2201-2202 that the
Board cannot provide Dr. Haygood a fair and impartial hearing that comports
with the due process requirements of the United States Constitution.
...
All of the current Board members are biased against Plaintiff due to
their receipt of information regarding the prior proceedings and/or the
lawsuits Dr. Haygood has initiated in which the Board and its agents and
employees are named as conspirators acting in concert to deny him due
process and to otherwise damage him.
The current Board members are incapable of impartiality as a result
of their prior exposure to information pertaining to the case. They have
undoubtedly prejudged the facts to such an extent that their minds are
“irrevocably closed” before actual adjudication.
Cronyism and financial biases are fundamentally inconsistent with
impartiality and neutrality.
A tribunal that has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the
proceedings before it, real or perceived, cannot provide a fair and impartial
hearing.
...
The Board has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of its proceedings
against Plaintiffs.
The Board is incapable of bringing charges against dentists without
the appearance of unfairness or partiality due to its precarious financial
condition, its reliance on fines and penalties to sustain its operations, and its
failure to insulate the judicial officers from this financial need[.]
Dr. Haygood cannot receive a fair and impartial hearing before the
Board. Due to the bias of its current members and its pecuniary interest in
the outcome, the Board is unable to adjudicate his case in keeping with the
requirements of due process.
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The Board’s decision to proceed burdened with all the foregoing
indicia of unfairness and partiality reflects its inability to provide the
defendant with due process.
If the proceedings of the Board against Plaintiffs move forward as
planned, there is a dangerous probability that Plaintiffs will be denied due
process, and thus will suffer irreparable damage.
The Board’s bias and its intent to pursue charges based on evidence
obtained through illegal means pose a great and imminent threat that
Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury for which there is no adequate remedy
at law.
Judicial review of Board’s decision does not serve as a sufficient
avenue for Plaintiffs to pursue their constitutional claims. Hearings before
a partial tribunal are not constitutionally acceptable simply because the
disadvantaged party has the opportunity to appeal.
If the Board continues with the prosecution of Dr. Haygood, he has no
adequate remedy at law, and he will sustain irreparable injury.
Record Document 100 at ¶¶ 178-197.
Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, asking the Court to decline
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) based on Younger abstention, or alternatively stay the
claims asserted by the Haygood Plaintiffs against the instant Defendants pending a final
resolution of the state proceedings. See Record Document 175 at 2. Pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), Defendants also seek dismissal of all claims asserted by Haygood Dental Care,
LLC. See id. They argue that such entity is not a party to the disciplinary proceedings
before the Board; thus, Haygood Dental Care, LLC can state no cognizable claim or cause
of action against the instant Defendants, as they have been sued solely for declaratory
judgment relating to their service as members of the Board. See id.

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LAW AND ANALYSIS
A.

Legal Standards.
1.

Rule 12(b)(1) and Younger Abstention.

Motions filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a
party to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case. See
F.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three
instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts
evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the
court's resolution of disputed facts. See Barrera-Montenegro v. U.S., 74 F.3d 657, 659
(5th Cir.1996). The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party
asserting jurisdiction. See McDaniel v. U.S., 899 F.Supp. 305, 307 (E.D.Tex.1995). Thus,
the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist. See
Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir.1980). When a Rule
12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider
the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits. See Hitt
v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir.1977) (per curiam). In examining a Rule
12(b)(1) motion, the district court is empowered to consider matters of fact which may be
in dispute. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir.1981).
Though the Fifth Circuit does not appear to have examined the point, district courts
seem to apply Rule 12(b)(1) to motions seeking dismissal pursuant to the Younger
abstention doctrine. See M.D. v. Perry, 799 F.Supp.2d 712, 715 n. 3 (S.D.Tex. 2011)
(recognizing issue and observing, “Younger abstention is ‘often raised through a Rule

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12(b)(1) motion.’” (citing 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure, § 1350 at 96–100)). Younger abstention applies when three criteria are met:
“(1) the dispute should involve an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the state must have
an important interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim; and (3) there should be
an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.”
Wightman v. Tex. Supreme Court, 84 F.3d 188, 189 (5th Cir.1996).
2.

Rule 12(b)(6) Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be
Granted.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows for dismissal of an action “for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” While a complaint attacked by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion does not need detailed factual allegations, in order to avoid dismissal, the
plaintiff’s factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007);
see also Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007). A plaintiff’s obligation
“requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do.” Id. The Supreme Court expounded on the Twombly
standard, explaining that a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must construe the
complaint liberally and accept all of the plaintiff’s factual allegations in the complaint as
true. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2009).
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Although courts generally are not permitted to review materials outside of the
pleadings when determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim for which relief may be
granted, there are limited exceptions to this rule. Specifically, a court may consider
documents attached to a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to be part of the pleadings if the
plaintiff refers to those documents and they are central to the claim. See Collins v. Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-499 (5th Cir. 2000); Causey v. Sewell CadillacChevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004). Additionally, pleadings filed in state or
other federal district courts are matters of public record and the Court may take judicial
notice of those documents in connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Cinel
v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1994).
B.

Analysis.
1.

Younger Abstention.

Defendants argue that the Younger abstention doctrine bars this action, as
intervention by this Court in ongoing state proceedings would entangle the federal court
in matters of state interest where the state provides an avenue for the vindication of Dr.
Haygood’s rights. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669
(1971). Again, Younger abstention applies when three criteria are met: “(1) the dispute
should involve an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the state must have an important
interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim; and (3) there should be an adequate
opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Wightman, 84 F.3d
at 189.

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Adequate Opportunity in the State Proceedings to Raise Constitutional Challenges
The Haygood Plaintiffs argue that “the circumstances under which abstention is
warranted are not present” and “the bad faith exception to Younger is applicable to this
case.” Record Document 179 at 12. The Haygood Plaintiffs concede the existence of
ongoing state proceedings and agree that the State of Louisiana “arguably” has an interest
in the subject matter of those proceedings. Id. at 13. Yet, they argue that Dr. Haygood
lacks any adequate opportunity in the course of the Board’s proceedings to raise the issues
asserted in the instant matter:
[Dr. Haygood] has already exhausted the appeals process established under
Louisiana law, and now finds himself back before the same tribunal that has
already violated his rights to due process once.
Id. The Haygood Plaintiffs contend that the Board cannot provide Dr. Haygood with a
“prompt” disposition of the claims asserted against him. Id. The Haygood Plaintiffs also
argue that neither Board proceedings nor administrative proceedings allow a mechanism
for Dr. Haygood to challenge the ability of the Board to conduct fair and unbiased
proceedings. See id. at 15. It appears that via his federal declaratory judgment action, Dr.
Haygood seeks a process by which he could recuse members of the Board from
participating in the disciplinary proceedings against him. The Haygood Plaintiffs further
argue that the bad faith exception to the Younger abstention doctrine applies because the
Board’s decision to initiate renewed proceedings against Dr. Haygood was made in bad
faith. See id. at 17. See Hefner v. Alexander, 779 F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1985) (“federal
court should not interfere with state . . . proceedings unless the proceedings were brought
in bad faith, for purposes of harassment, or under other extraordinary circumstances where
the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate.”).
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Defendants argue in their motion that Dr. Haygood can raise his constitutional
challenges in the state court system. This Court agrees. The Louisiana Administrative
Procedure Act, La. R.S. 49:955 et seq., and the Louisiana Dental Practice Act, La. R.S.
37:751 et seq., regulate disciplinary actions against Louisiana licensed dentists. The
Board is empowered under Louisiana law to investigate complaints of illegal practice and
to conduct proceedings for revocation or restriction of dental licenses for those found in
violation. See La. R.S. 37:760(A)(7) & La. R.S. 37:776 and 778. This process begins with
the filing of an administrative complaint or charge, and the appointment of a committee of
three or more members of the Board to hear the administrative complaint or charge. See
La. R.S. 37:779. Judicial review of this decision is available in the state courts under both
the Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act and the Louisiana Dental Practice Act. See
La. R.S. 49:964A(1) & La. R.S. 37:786(A)(1). Judicial review of the panel adjudication is
made by appeal to the Orleans Civil District Court. See La. R.S. 37:786(A); La. R.S.
49:964A(1). The district court may affirm the decision or remand or may reverse or modify
on several grounds, including violations of constitutional or statutory violations. See La.
R.S. 37:786(I) & La. R.S. 49:964(G). A preliminary, procedural or intermediate ruling by
the Board is immediately reviewable if review of the final agency decision would not provide
an adequate remedy and would inflict actual injury. See La. R.S. 37:786A(1) & La. R.S.
49:964A(1). Any party aggrieved by the district court’s action on appeal may obtain review
thereof by appeal to the appropriate circuit court of appeal. See La. R.S. 49:965.
Under the aforementioned process, the hearing officer’s decision on a motion to
recuse is redressable. Specifically, Section 964A(1) and Section 786(A)(1) authorize
review of constitutional violations. Louisiana law first affords the Haygood Plaintiffs a full
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and fair opportunity to vindicate any legal, constitutional and due process claims in the
administrative process. If unsuccessful in the administrative process, then additional
redress is available in the state court system on appeal.
Bad Faith Exception
The Haygood Plaintiffs point to the factual allegations in Paragraphs 159, 160, and
163 to support their argument in support of the bad faith exception to the Younger
abstention doctrine:
Plaintiffs believe that the decision to proceed with reinstitution of the
former charges and the addition of new charges is based on the Board’s
desire to retaliate against Plaintiffs and to gain an advantage in the pending
civil lawsuits. The Board also seeks adverse findings against Haygood in an
ill-conceived effort to mitigate damages for the denial of due process Dr.
Haygood sustained in the prior proceedings.
As set forth in more detail in Plaintiffs’ original Complaint, the Board
is entirely self-funded, and thus has a pecuniary interest in reaching a finding
adverse to Dr. Haygood and in levying financial penalties.
Plaintiffs believe that the named Defendants and their co-conspirators
are currently working to initiate a second sham peer review proceeding
based on improper charges, supported by unlawfully gathered evidence, and
presided over by an improper hearing panel. Accordingly, the conspiracy to
damage Plaintiffs is currently continuing, and Plaintiffs’ due process rights
granted by the Constitutions of the State of Louisiana and the United States
continue to be violated.
Record Document 100 at ¶¶¶ 159-160, 163. The Haygood Plaintiffs argue that “clearly”
the Board’s renewed attempts to deprive Dr. Haygood of his license to practice dentistry
are motivated by bad faith.” Record Document 179 at 19.
The Haygood Plaintiffs’ bad faith exception argument likewise fails. At the outset,
the Court notes that “Younger and its progeny make it obvious that the bad faith exception
is narrow and should be granted parsimoniously.” Hefner, 779 F.2d at 280. In the context
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of Younger abstention, “a state court proceeds in bad faith when it has no hope of
obtaining a valid conviction.” Gibson v. Orleans Par. Sheriff, 971 F. Supp. 2d 625, 631
(E.D. La. 2013), citing Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85, 91 S.Ct. 674, 677 (1971). The
claims of bad faith in this case rest upon conclusory allegations in the First Supplemental,
Amended and Restated Complaint and unsupported statements/arguments in the
opposition memorandum. Additionally, the Haygood Plaintiffs do not allege that the
hearing instituted by the Board was undertaken in bad faith without the hope of obtaining
a conviction on the charges, an allegation that is essential to the bad faith exception to the
application of Younger abstention.

Accordingly, this Court finds that the Younger

abstention doctrine applies to the Haygood Plaintiffs’ claims against the instant
Defendants. The Rule 12(b)(1) motion is, therefore, GRANTED.
2.

Failure to State a Claim by Haygood Dental Care, LLC.

The instant Defendants are sued in their official capacities as Board members solely
for declaratory judgment relating to the administrative proceedings before the Board. The
proceedings before the Board were brought against Dr. Haygood. Haygood Dental Care,
LLC is not a party to the disciplinary proceeding; thus, Haygood Dental Care, LLC has no
cognizable claim or cause of action for declaratory judgment against the instant
Defendants. The Rule 12(b)(6) motion is GRANTED and any and all claims by and on
behalf of Haygood Dental Care, LLC against the instant Defendants are DISMISSED.1

1

The Court notes that the Haygood Plaintiffs filed no opposition to the request for
dismissal of any and all claims by and on behalf of Haygood Dental Care, LLC against the
instant Defendants pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Record Document 179.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that the Younger abstention
doctrine requires this Court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over the claims asserted
against Defendants, Dean Manning, Aubrey Baudean, Jr., Patricia Cassidy, Wilton Guillory,
Jr., Russell Mayer, David L. Melancon, and Lynn Phillippe. Moreover, Haygood Dental
Care, LLC has no cognizable claim or cause of action for declaratory judgment against the
instant Defendants and any and all claims by and on behalf of Haygood Dental Care, LLC
against the instant Defendants are dismissed.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Record Document 175) filed by
Defendants be and is hereby GRANTED.
An order consistent with the terms of the instant Memorandum Ruling shall issue
herewith.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 17th day of March, 2016.

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