Copeland v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM RULING re 12 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Kansas City Southern Railway Co. Signed by Judge S Maurice Hicks on 12/23/2014. (crt,McDonnell, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
MICHAEL COPELAND

CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-3019

VERSUS

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN
RAILWAY COMPANY

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is an unopposed Motion for Summary Judgment (Record
Document 12) filed on behalf of Defendant The Kansas City Southern Railway Company
(“KCSR”). KCSR moves for summary judgment, arguing there is no genuine dispute of any
material facts regarding KCSR’s lack of liability. See id. According to KCSR, “this case
involves a trespasser unlawfully entering the vicinity of trackage, at night, in a highly
impaired state, and somehow falling and placing his left arm under moving railcars.”
Record Document 12-1 at 1. KCSR contends that Plaintiff Michael Copeland (“Copeland”)
“violated Louisiana law in trespassing on the mainline trackage and placing himself in a
position of great peril by entering upon the trackage and somehow placing his left arm
under the moving train.” Id.
Summary judgment is proper pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Quality Infusion Care, Inc. v. Health Care Serv.
Corp., 628 F.3d 725, 728 (5th Cir.2010).1 “Rule 56[(a)] mandates the entry of summary

1

The Court notes that Rule 56 now employs the phrase “genuine dispute,” rather
than “genuine issue.” This 2010 amendment does not alter the Court’s analysis, as there
was not a substantive change to the summary judgment standard. See F.R.C.P. 56(a) and
advisory committee’s note.

judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Patrick v. Ridge, 394
F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir.2004).
“A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986). If the
movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, “the nonmovant
must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine
[dispute] for trial.” Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 141 (5th Cir.2004). In
sum, the motion for summary judgment “should be granted so long as whatever is before
the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set
forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.
Additionally, Local Rule 56.1 requires the moving party to file a statement of material
facts as to which it contends there is no genuine issue to be tried. All material facts set
forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party “will be deemed admitted,
for purposes of the motion, unless controverted as required by this rule.” Local Rule 56.2.
In the present matter, Copeland has not filed an opposition to KCSR’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. On October 31, 2014, this Court issued a “Notice of Motion Setting”
(Record Document 13) giving Copeland 21 calendar days to file an opposition. To date,
no opposition has been filed. Thus, all the material facts set forth by KCSR have not been
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controverted and are hereby deemed admitted. See Record Document 12-2. Such facts
include:
•

Plaintiff admitted that he was significantly impaired at the time of the
subject incident [May 31, 2013 and June 1, 2013] due to excessive
alcohol consumption.

•

Plaintiff testified that on the night of the subject incident, he had been
drinking heavily for a period of several hours preceding the incident.

•

Plaintiff admitted that he knew that walking around trains can be
hazardous and that a pedestrian walking in and around a train can be
a dangerous situation.

•

Plaintiff was unable to recall how he arrived at the location where the
subject incident occurred from Commerce Street.

•

There are numerous “No Trespassing” signs located in the area where
Commerce Street meets the mainline tracks near the Red River Rail
Bridge.

•

There are also “No Trespassing” signs to the west of this location.

Record Document 12-2 at ¶¶ 3-5, 17, 19-20.
Other facts deemed admitted establish that the train involved in the subject incident
had its locomotive headlights and ditch lights brightly shining at the time of the incident and
that the train was traveling westbound at approximately 10 miles per hour, well below the
KCSR authorized track speed of 20 miles per hour and the federal authorized track speed
of 40 miles per hour. See id. at ¶¶ 27-28. The Engineer observed Copeland leaning
motionless against a fence located approximately 30 feet from the mainline trackage, with
a ditch running between the fence where Copeland was standing and the trackage. See
id. at ¶ 29. (Ex. 4, Declaration of Murray). The Engineer continued to watch Copeland in
the rearview mirror of the locomotive until he could no longer see him. See id. at ¶ 30.
Copeland never made any movement throughout the entire time that the Engineer was
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observing him. See id. at ¶ 31. The Engineer, with 74 cars trailing the three locomotives,
had no knowledge of any incident and continued his route to the KCSR Shreveport Yard.
See id. at ¶ 32. The crew first learned of the incident with Copeland when they were called
to the tower in the Shreveport Yard upon arrival. See id. at ¶ 33.
Copeland admitted in his deposition, and such testimony has gone uncontroverted,
that he has no specific memory of the events leading up to the subject incident, and he only
recalls seeing his arm on the tracks and it being run over by the wheel of a railcar. See id.
at ¶ 34. An eye witness, who was waiting to pick up newspapers to deliver, observed
Copeland on the night of the incident. See id. at ¶ 35. According to the witness, Copeland
appeared to be intoxicated, walking westbound behind the Shreveport Times Building and
in the vicinity of the tracks. See id. The witness confirmed that Copeland was leaning
against the fence when a clearly visible train approached with its headlights and ditch lights
shining. See id. at ¶ 37. The witness also confirmed that, well after the locomotives had
passed, Copeland appeared to walk from the fence and towards the tracks and passing rail
cars, and that Copeland then appeared to reach for the train as if he was attempting to
mount a moving rail car. See id. at ¶ 38.
Copeland was transported the LSU Health Sciences Center in Shreveport, Louisiana
after the incident. See id. at ¶ 41. A blood alcohol test was performed on him shortly after
his admittance at 4:03 a.m., which confirmed a blood alcohol level of 0.321 gm%, over four
times the legal intoxication limit in Louisiana. See id. at ¶ 42. The medical records
repeatedly confirm that Copeland was “obviously intoxicated” and that he was subsequently
treated for alcohol withdrawal symptoms. See id. at ¶ 43.
Based on the foregoing undisputed material facts, which have now been deemed
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admitted, this Court finds that summary judgment in favor of KCSR is appropriate as a
matter of law. The summary judgment record establishes that Copeland was grossly
negligent and violated Louisiana law by trespassing and attempting to get on a moving
railcar on KCSR’s mainline trackage while highly intoxicated in the dark of night. Under
Louisiana law,2 and the facts and circumstances of this case, KCSR owed Copeland, as
an intoxicated trespasser, no duty to protect him from the harm he encountered. The
record is devoid of any evidence that KCSR acted intentionally to harm Copeland or that
any acts on the part of KCSR were grossly negligent.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Record Document 12) filed
on behalf of KCSR is GRANTED. All of Copeland’s claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
A judgment consistent with the terms of the instant Memorandum Ruling shall issue
herewith.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 23rd day of December,
2014.

2

“Longstanding jurisprudence provides that a railroad company owes no duty to one
who enters premises of railroad without license, invitation, or other right, except after
discovering his peril the railroad must refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring a
trespasser.” Anderson v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 2011 WL 1303865, at * 3 (E.D. La. 2011),
aff’d, 475 Fed.Appx. 30 (5th Cir. 2012).
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