Todd v. Cameron International Corp

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 23 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Defendant may reurge its motion for summary judgment by Friday, April 8, 2016. Signed by Judge Elizabeth E Foote on 3/24/2016. (crt,Keifer, K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

ROBERT ELTON TODD

CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-736

VERSUS

JUDGE ELIZABETH ERNY FOOTE

CAMERON INT'L CORP.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. [Record Document
23.] Because the affidavits on which the Defendant relies in seeking summary judgment
do not conform with the personal knowledge requirement of Rule 56( c)( 4), the Court

DENIES the Defendant's motion without prejudice.
In its memorandum opposing summary judgment, the Plaintiff argues, inter alia,
that the Court should deny summary judgment because the stated basis of the affidavits
supporting summary judgment, the affiants"'personal knowledge, information, and belief,"
does not satisfy the personal knowledge requirement of Rule 56. Record Document 30-2,
pp. 16-17. Rule 56(c)(4) states in pertinent part, "An affidavit or declaration used to
support or oppose a motion [for summary judgment] must be made on personal knowledge
.... " Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 56(c)(4). The Fifth Circuit interprets this provision strictly,
forbidding a court to consider an affidavit supporting or opposing summary judgment
where the affidavit states that it is based both on information and belief and the affiant's
personal knowledge. See Bolen v. Dengel, 340 F.3d 300, 313 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding

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affidavit inappropriate for summary judgment where the affiant's statement that an
agreement was signed by the affiant and the affiant's wife was based "on information and
belief, and to the best of the affiant's recollection").

Courts that have interpreted the

exact language used by the affiants in this matter-"personal knowledge, information, and
belief"-considered the affidavit to the extent that the statements in the affidavit
unambiguously indicate that they were based on the affiant's personal knowledge. See,
~'Mendez v.

Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 910 F. Supp. 2d 784, 790-91 n.5 (D. Md.

2012); Malina v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 18 F. Supp. 2d 596, 604 n.4 (D. Md. 1998).
The Court is not satisfied that the four affidavits supporting the Defendant's
summary judgment motion unambiguously indicate that they are based on the affiants'
personal knowledge. See Malina, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 604 n.4; Record Documents .23-4, 237, 23-10, and 29. For instance, the Court cannot ascertain whether the assertion made by
affiant Gary Townsend, one of the Defendant's district managers, that the Plaintiff's ''job
assignments and the manner in which he performed those assignments . . . were
exclusively controlled by [the Defendant]" was based on Townsend's personal knowledge
or, rather, on information and belief. See Malina, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 604 n.4 (''The fatal
defect in Plaintiff's affidavit is that it is impossible to discern what 'facts' contained within
it are based on his own personal knowledge ... as opposed to those based on 'information'
from other sources or his beliefs."); Record Documents 23-4. The affidavits therefore do
not comply with the personal knowledge requirement of Rule 56( c)( 4). Consequently, the
Court may not consider them in addressing the Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

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Without any affidavits to support its summary judgment motion, there remain genuine
disputes of facts material to the grounds on which the Defendant seeks summary
judgment.
Accordingly, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The
Defendant may reurge its motion for summary judgment by Friday, April 8, 2016, if it
is substantially similar to the motion now denied by the Court. In such case, the Plaintiff,
having already set forth the grounds of his opposition, may file an opposition brief only
with leave of Court and for good cause shown. This Memorandum Order disturbs neither
the deadlines set forth in the scheduling order nor either party's ability to timely file other
dispositive motions.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 24th day of March,

2016.

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