Easter vs. Caldwell et al

Filing 38

MEMORANDUM RULING granting 34 MOTION for Entry of Final Judgment filed by Willie Shaw; and denying 29 MOTION for Entry of Final Judgment filed by Charlie Caldwell, Jr and 31 MOTION for Entry of Final Judgment filed by Steve Prator. Signed by Judge Elizabeth E Foote on 10/27/2015. (crt,Keifer, K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
NIDA M. EASTER

CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-0967

VERSUS

JUDGE ELIZABETH ERNY FOOTE

CHARLIE CALDWELL, ET AL.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court are Motions for Entry of Final Judgment submitted by Shreveport
City Marshal Charlie Caldwell, Jr. ("Marshal Caldwell") [Record Document 29], Caddo
Sheriff Steve Prator ("Sheriff Prator") [Record Document 31], and Shreveport Police Chief
Willie Shaw ("Chief Shaw") [Record Documents 34].

The Plaintiff, Nida M. Easter

(“Easter”), filed this suit against named Defendants, as well as Shreveport Clerk of Court
Robert Shemwell and former Shreveport Mayor Cedric Glover, alleging that their roles in
her purportedly unlawful arrest violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana tort law. [Record
Document 1]. The Court has dismissed Easter’s claims against Marshal Caldwell, Sheriff
Prator, Chief Shaw, and Robert Shemwell. [Record Document 26, 37]. After consideration
of the foregoing, the Court hereby GRANTS Chief Shaw’s Motion for Entry of Final
Judgment but DENIES the motions filed by Marshal Caldwell and Sheriff Prator.

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I.

Background
The parties and the Court are well-versed in the alleged facts of this case. Easter

alleges that on the night of Friday, May 10, 2013, Caddo Parish Sheriff’s deputies arrested
her pursuant to a bench warrant originating from Shreveport City Court. Record Document
1, pp. 2-6. She alleges that she remained in custody until the morning of Sunday, May 12,
when she was released on bond. As later events unfolded, Easter apparently learned that
before her arrest, Shreveport City Court had recalled the warrant on which the Caddo
deputies had relied in arresting Easter. Id. at pp. 6-7.
Based on these events, Easter sought federal and state relief from five Defendants,
each in his official capacity: Chief Shaw; Marshal Caldwell; Sheriff Steve Prator; Robert
Shemwell, Clerk of Court for Shreveport City Court; and Cedric Glover, Mayor of the City
of Shreveport.1 Id. at pp. 1-2, 10. Upon motion, the Court dismissed Easter’s claims
against Chief Shaw, Marshal Caldwell, and Sheriff Prator. Record Document 26, p. 1.
Because a police chief and a mayor in their official capacities represent the same municipal
defendant, the Court dismissed the claims against Chief Shaw as redundant of those
against Mayor Glover. Id. at pp. 3-4. The Court dismissed the claims against Sheriff
Prator and Marshal Caldwell pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2 Based
on their dismissals, Chief Shaw, Marshal Caldwell, and Sheriff Prator respectively move the

Subsequent to the filing of this lawsuit, the Court substituted the present
mayor of Shreveport, Ollie Tyler, for Cedric Glover pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
[Record Document 25].
1

The Court also dismissed the claims against Robert Shemwell pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Record Document 37.
2

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Court to enter final judgment in their favor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b). Record Documents 29, 31, and 34. Easter does not contest the motions before the
Court. Record Document 33, 36.
II.

Discussion
A.

Rule 54(b)

Where there are multiple claims or parties to a suit, Rule 54(b) permits a court to
“direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon
an express direction for the entry of judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Determining
whether there is a just reason for delaying entry of final judgment requires the court to
weigh judicial administrative interests, on the one hand, and equity to the parties, on the
other hand. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980).3 In evaluating
the interests of sound judicial administration, courts should consider whether the claims
under review are separable from the others remaining to be adjudicated and, more
importantly, whether granting final judgment on the claims at issue would create the
possibility of an appellate court having to decide the same issues in the case more than
once. Id.; see also PYCA Indus., Inc. v. Harrison Cty. Waste Mgmt., 81 F.3d 1412, 1421
3

Before determining whether there is a just reason for delay, a court must
ensure that the ruling before it qualifies as a final judgment. See Curtiss-Wright, 446
U.S. at 7. It must be final in the sense that it is "an ultimate disposition of an individual
claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action" and a judgment in the sense
that it is a "decision upon a cognizable claim for relief." Id. (quoting Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 (1956)). Those requirements are easily met here
because the rulings at issue dismiss all claims against Marshal Caldwell, Sheriff Prator,
and Chief Shaw, respectively.
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(5th Cir. 1996) (“One of the primary policies behind requiring a justification for Rule 54(b)
certification is to avoid piecemeal appeals.”). The concern for avoiding piecemeal appeals,
however, is not dispositive and does not prevent a district court from properly granting
final judgment on a claim where similar claims stemming from the same facts remain
before it. See Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8 n.2; H & W Indus., Inc. v. Formosa Plastics
Corp., USA, 860 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that a district court’s decision to
enter final judgment on its dismissal of a plaintiff’s claim under section 1 of the Sherman
Act was within its discretion even though the plaintiff’s claim under section 7 of the Clayton
Act for the same conduct remained before it). Indeed, where appellate resolution of some
claims would also answer questions affecting similar claims that remain before the district
court, granting Rule 54(b) final judgment may enhance judicial efficiency because appellate
reversal would no longer require the district court to retry the remaining claims. See
Brown v. Miss. Valley State Univ., 331 F.3d 328, 332 (5th Cir. 2002); Looney Ricks Kiss
Architects, Inc. v. Bryan, No. CIV.A. 07-572, 2011 WL 52470, at *1 (W.D. La. Jan. 6, 2011)
(“[A]llowing the matter to proceed to trial without resolving the question of insurance
coverage could lead to substantial judicial inefficiency if the Court were forced to retry the
action.”).
Once a court is satisfied that entry of final judgment will not harm efficient judicial
administration, it has considerable discretion in evaluating whether delay creates hardship
for a party. See Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 2, 10-11 (“[B]ecause the number of possible
situations is large, we are reluctant either to fix or sanction narrow guidelines for the
district courts to follow.”). Nonetheless, in the Fifth Circuit, Rule 54(b) final judgment is
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disfavored, and the burden upon a party seeking final judgment under Rule 54(b) is
substantial: “A district court should grant [Rule 54(b) final judgment] only when there
exists some danger of hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated by
immediate appeal; it should not be entered routinely as a courtesy to counsel.” PYCA
Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d at 1421 (citing Ansam Assocs., Inc. v. Cola Petroleum, Ltd., 760 F.2d
442, 445 (2d Cir. 1985)); Looney Ricks, 2011 WL 52470, at *1 (citing Id.). Hardship is
recognized, for instance, when the ruling at issue awarded substantial damages to the
party moving for Rule 54(b) final judgment yet resolution on the remaining issues in the
case was months, perhaps even years, away. See Curtis-Wright, 446 U.S. at 11-12.
B.

Easter’s Claims against Chief Shaw

Chief Shaw asks the Court to enter final judgment on the Court’s prior Memorandum
Ruling that dismissed all claims against him as redundant of the claims against Mayor Ollie
Tyler.

Citing another provision of Rule 54(b) that permits the Court to revise its

Memorandum Ruling at any point before final judgment, Chief Shaw argues that entering
final judgment in his favor would allow him to avoid the expense of monitoring this suit as
it progresses. Chief Shaw does not address the effect that final judgment could have on
the administration of justice.
Because the Court cannot envision final judgment on Chief Shaw’s dismissal causing
any potential for duplicative appeals or otherwise interfering with the sound administration
of justice, Chief Shaw is entitled to final judgment in his favor. The reason for Chief
Shaw’s dismissal–that the claims against him are redundant of the claims against another
party–is unique to Chief Shaw. No other similar claims are before the Court, and the
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circumstances of this case do not present an opportunity for a similar issue to arise at a
later junction. Thus, if the Court were to enter final judgment on Chief Shaw’s claims, “no
appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than once . . . if there were
subsequent appeals.”

Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8.

Also, though the expense of

monitoring a lawsuit may be a relatively modest hardship, it is sufficient to allay any
concern that the Court is granting final judgment merely as “a courtesy to counsel.” See
PYCA Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d at 1421 (citation omitted). The Court therefore GRANTS Chief
Shaw’s Motion for Entry of Final Judgment in his favor.
C.

Easter’s Claims against Marshal Caldwell and Sheriff Prator

Marshal Caldwell and Sheriff Prator ask the Court to enter final judgment on the
Court’s prior Memorandum Ruling that dismissed all claims against them pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Like Chief Shaw, Marshal Caldwell and Sheriff
Prator argue that monitoring the progress of this suit is a needless burden and decline to
address what effect, if any, that final judgment on their claims would have on the sound
administration of justice.
Because granting final judgment in their favor would create the potential for
duplicative appellate review, Marshal Caldwell and Sheriff Prator are not entitled to Rule
54(b) judgment. The reason this Court dismissed Easter’s claims against Marshal Caldwell
and Sheriff Prator–failure to state a claim that is entitled to relief–is not unique to these
Defendants. The Court dismissed Easter’s claims against Shreveport Clerk of Court Robert
Shemwell for the same reason under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).

More

important, Rule 12(c) permits the remaining Defendant in this case, Mayor Ollie Tyler, to
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seek judgment on the pleadings well into the advanced stages of this litigation. See Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Sargent & Lundy, 916 F.2d 1119, 1123, 1131 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that a
Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings filed two days before trial was not
untimely); 5C Charles Allen Wright et al, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1367 (3d ed.
2015) (“Generally, a Rule 12(c) motion is considered timely if it is made early enough not
to delay trial or cause prejudice to the non-movant. . . . However, if it seems clear that
the motion may effectively dispose of the case on the pleadings, the district court should
permit it regardless of any possible delay consideration of the motion may cause.”). The
potential therefore exists for the Fifth Circuit to twice hear an appeal of whether Easter has
stated claims that are entitled to relief. See Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8. And unlike the
advantages of early appellate resolution found in Brown and Looney Ricks, reversal of the
Court’s 12(b)(6) ruling in favor Marshal Caldwell and Sheriff Prator subsequent to the
Court’s adjudication of the claims against Mayor Ollie Tyler would have no bearing on the
disposition of the claims against Mayor Tyler. See Brown, 331 F.3d at 332; Looney Ricks,
2011 WL 52470, at *1. There is thus no danger that declining to enter final judgment in
Marshal Caldwell’s and Sheriff Prator’s favor would require the Court to retry any other
claims in this suit. Finally, while the risk of creating multiple appeals of the same issue is
not dispositive to a Rule 54(b) determination, Marshal Caldwell and Sheriff Prator have not
presented a sufficiently compelling hardship to offset this concern. The Court therefore
DENIES Marshal Caldwell’s and Sheriff Prator’s Motions for Entry of Final Judgment.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons,
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IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Entry of Final Judgment submitted by
Shreveport Police Chief Willie Shaw [Record Document 34] is hereby GRANTED. A
judgment consistent with this Memorandum Ruling shall issue herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motions for Entry of Final Judgment submitted
by Shreveport City Marshal Charlie Caldwell, Jr., and Caddo Sheriff Steve Prator [Record
Documents 29, 31] are hereby DENIED.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED on this ___ day of October, 2015.
27th

____________________________
ELIZABETH ERNY FOOTE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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