Candler v. Sisters of Charity of Incarnate Word

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM RULING finding that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. The case will be REMANDED, via separate judgment, to the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, State of Louisiana. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen L Hayes on 12/3/14. (crt,Crawford, A)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
DAVID CANDLER

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-2774

VERSUS

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JUDGE ELIZABETH E. FOOTE

SISTERS OF CHARITY OF THE
INCARNATE WORD d/b/a CHRISTUS
HEALTH NORTHERN LOUISIANA

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MAG. JUDGE KAREN L. HAYES

MEMORANDUM RULING
The instant matter is before the undersigned Magistrate Judge, on reference from the
District Court. For reasons assigned below, the undersigned finds that the court does not enjoy
subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the matter, and therefore, the matter must be remanded to
the 1st Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, State of Louisiana, whence it was
removed.1
Background2
On July 31, 2014, David Candler filed the instant “Petition for Damages” against
defendant, Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word d/b/a Christus Health Northern Louisiana
(“Christus”) in the 1st Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo State of Louisiana. On

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As this matter is not excepted within 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), nor dispositive of any
claim on the merits within the meaning of Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this
order is issued under the authority thereof, and in accordance with the standing order of this
court. Any appeal must be made to the district judge in accordance with Rule 72(a) and L.R.
74.1(W).
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The court adopts and incorporates herein the description and history of the case as
detailed in the court’s November 3, 2014, Order [doc. # 6].

September 22, 2014, Christus removed the instant case to federal court on the sole basis of
federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Notice of Removal. On November 3, 2014,
the court questioned the presence of federal subject matter jurisdiction, and invited the parties to
submit memoranda addressing the issue. (Nov. 3, 2014, Order [doc. # 6]). The court cautioned
that if subject matter jurisdiction was found to be absent, then the matter would be remanded to
state court. Id.
On November 14, 2014, Christus filed a response to the court order in which it
represented that it had removed the case to federal court because it appeared that plaintiff “had
artfully pled allegations of gender-based wrongful discharge actionable under Title VII of the
Civil Rights of 1964.” (Def. Response [doc. # 7]). Christus did not otherwise seek to establish
the existence of federal question jurisdiction.
Following receipt of Christus’s response which all but conceded remand, plaintiff
nonetheless filed his own memorandum decrying the baseless removal, and petitioning the court
to award damages and attorney’s fees as a result. (Pl. Mem. [doc. # 8]).
Discussion
I.

No Federal Question Jurisdiction
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d

912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Thus, a suit is presumed to lie outside this limited
jurisdiction unless and until the party invoking federal jurisdiction establishes otherwise. Id.
Federal law authorizes the removal to federal court of “any civil action brought in a State court of
which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
A Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Here, removing
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defendant invoked federal subject matter jurisdiction solely on the basis of federal question,
which confers district courts with “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Notice of Removal.3
To support removal premised on federal question jurisdiction, a removing defendant must
show that the plaintiff has alleged (1) a federal claim; (2) a state law cause of action that
Congress has transformed into an inherently federal claim by completely preempting the field;
(3) a state-law claim that necessarily raises a disputed and substantial issue of federal law that a
federal court may entertain without disturbing federal/state comity principles; or (4) a claim for
injunctive relief from state regulation on the basis that such regulation is preempted by a federal
statute. Marren v. Stout, Civil Action No. 12-0631, 2013 WL 1117539 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 18,
2013) (as to bases 1-3) (citations omitted); Gillis v. Louisiana, 294 F.3d 755, 760 (5th Cir. 2002)
(as to basis 4).
Christus represented that it believed that federal question jurisdiction was supported only
as a result of plaintiff’s artful pleading, i.e. ground two. See Def. Response. The “artful
pleading” doctrine is an “independent corollary” to the well-pleaded complaint rule. MSOF
Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 295 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana,
522 U.S. 470, 118 S.Ct. 921 (1998)). This principle provides that a “plaintiff may not defeat
removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions.” Rivet, supra (citation omitted). The

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Federal courts are obliged to examine the basis for the exercise of federal subject matter
jurisdiction. Smith v. Texas Children’s Hospital, 172 F.3d 923, 925 (5 th Cir. 1999). A lack of
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Giles v. Nylcare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d
332, 336 (5th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, a court must raise the issue sua sponte if it discovers it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Indeed, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) provides that, “[i]f at any time before
final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
remanded.” Those circumstances are present here.

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artful pleading doctrine permits removal in cases where federal law completely preempts the
plaintiff’s state law claim. Id. In fact, without complete preemption, the artful pleading
doctrine does not apply. Terrebonne Homecare, Inc. v. SMA Health Plan, Inc., 271 F.3d 186,
189 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Rivet, supra).
Removing defendant contends that plaintiff artfully pleaded allegations of gender-based
wrongful discharge under Title VII. (Def. Memo.). However, plaintiff, as master of his
complaint, is permitted to eschew available federal remedies. Furthermore, as noted previously,4
the court is unable to discern from the complaint any asserted claim for relief as a result of
gender discrimination. Moreover, even if plaintiff had asserted a jurisdictionally ambiguous
claim for gender discrimination, defendant neither alleged, nor demonstrated that federal law
completely preempts the field of gender discrimination as required to invoke the artful pleading
doctrine.
In sum, removing defendant has not established that this court enjoys federal question
jurisdiction. Accordingly, subject matter jurisdiction is lacking and remand is required. 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c).
II.

Plaintiff is Not Entitled to Damages or Fees
An order remanding a case to state court may require payment of “just costs and any

actual expenses, including attorney fees,” that were incurred as a result of removal. 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c). “Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney's fees under § 1447(c) only
where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.
Conversely, when an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied.” Martin v.
4

See Nov. 3, 2014, Order [doc. # 6].
4

Franklin Capital Corp. 546 U.S. 132, 141, 126 S.Ct. 704, 711 (2005).
Here, plaintiff has not demonstrated that he suffered any quantifiable damages
attributable to the removal. Although lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any
time, plaintiff did not expeditiously seek remand within 30 days of removal, and only filed a brief
after prompting from the court and after defendant all but conceded remand. Under these
circumstances, an award for damages, costs, fees, and/or expenses is not warranted.
Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, the court finds that plaintiff’s petition does not arise
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Accordingly,
subject matter jurisdiction is lacking and remand is required. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The case will
be REMANDED, via separate judgment, to the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of
Caddo, State of Louisiana. In addition,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s request for damages, fees, etc. is DENIED.
In Chambers, at Monroe, Louisiana, this 3rd day of December 2014.

__________________________________
KAREN L. HAYES
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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