Cassesse et al v. Old Republic General Insurance Co et al

Filing 69

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 54 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Elizabeth E Foote on 8/3/2016. (crt,Keifer, K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
RICHARD P. CASSESSE, JR., ET AL

CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-2777

VERSUS

JUDGE ELIZABETH ERNY FOOTE

PROTECTIVE INSURANCE CO., ET AL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HAYES

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Now before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant
Philip B. Carpenter (“Carpenter”). Record Document 54. Carpenter asks that Plaintiffs’
claims against him be dismissed with prejudice, at Plaintiffs’ cost, on the grounds that
there is no evidence to support a finding that he is liable for any part of Plaintiffs’
claims. Record Document 54-2. Because the Court finds that there are genuine
disputes of material facts regarding whether Carpenter is liable, at least in part, for the
instant accident, Carpenter’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Factual and Procedural Background
This matter arises from an accident that occurred on October 4, 2013 involving
multiple vehicles on Interstate 20. Record Document 54-1. Plaintiffs Richard P.
Cassesse, Jr., Lisa F. Cassesse, and Richard P. Cassesse, III (on behalf of the minor
A.C.) have sued for injuries and damages allegedly caused by the accident the drivers,
owners, and related insurance companies of two vehicles: Vehicle A’s driver Nolan D.
Eggins (“Eggins”), Vehicle A’s owner and Eggins’ employer R & L Transfer Inc., and R +

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L Transfer Inc.’s insurance company, Protective Insurance Co.; and Vehicle B’s driver
Philip B. Carpenter, Vehicle B’s owner Penske Truck Leasing Co. LP, and Penske Truck
Leasing Co. LP’s insurance company, Old Republic Insurance Co. Record Documents 1,
26, and 29. The picture of the accident painted by Carpenter’s motion is that Vehicle A,
an 18-wheeler owned by Defendant R + L Transfer, Inc. and driven by Eggins, hit
Vehicle B, a Penske moving truck driven by Carpenter, while Vehicle B was stopped
behind Vehicle C, the vehicle containing the Plaintiffs. Record Document 54-1.
Carpenter states that Vehicle A’s collision with Vehicle B occurred with such force as to
cause Vehicle B to crash into Vehicle C. Id. The Plaintiffs have not opposed
Carpenter’s motion. However, R + L Transfer, Inc., Defendant Protective Insurance
Company, and Nolan D. Eggins (hereinafter jointly “R + L”) opposed the motion for
summary judgment, stating that there are genuine issues of material fact as to
“whether Carpenter’s vehicle was stopped before the impact” and as to “whether he
braked suddenly and without warning.” Record Document 68, p. 1. See also Record
Document 58-1. R + L argues that these disputed facts are material because, if Vehicle
B was not stopped, or had “braked suddenly and without warning,” then Carpenter may
be found to be at least partly at fault for the accident. Record Documents 58 and 68.
Carpenter has filed a reply brief and a supplemental memorandum in support of his
motion for summary judgment. Record Documents 59 and 67. R + L filed an
opposition brief to the motion for summary judgment and a supplemental
memorandum in opposition. Record Documents 58 and 68.

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Summary Judgment Standard Under Rule 56
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) directs that a court “shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”1 Summary judgment is
appropriate when the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, admissions, depositions
and affidavits filed with the Court after an appropriate time for discovery demonstrate
that a party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). When the burden at trial will rest on
the non-moving party, the moving party need not produce evidence to negate the
elements of the non-moving party’s case; rather, it need only point out the absence of
supporting evidence. See id. at 322-323.
If the movant satisfies its initial burden of showing that there is no genuine
dispute of material fact with the motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must
demonstrate that there is, in fact, a genuine issue for dispute at trial by going “beyond
the pleadings” and designating specific facts for support. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37
F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). “This burden is not satisfied with ‘some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts,’” by conclusory or unsubstantiated allegations, or by a
mere scintilla of evidence. Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
1

Rule 56 was amended effective December 1, 2010. Per the comments, the 2010 amendment
was intended “to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding summary judgment motions and to
make the procedures more consistent with those already used in many courts. The standard for granting
summary judgment remains unchanged.” Therefore, the case law applicable to Rule 56 prior to its
amendment remains authoritative, and this Court will rely on it accordingly.

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Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). However, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1985) (internal citations omitted); Reid v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986) (the court must “review the
facts drawing all inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion”). While
not weighing the evidence or evaluating the credibility of witnesses, courts should grant
summary judgment where the critical evidence in support of the nonmovant is so weak
and tenuous that it could not support a judgment in the nonmovant’s favor. Little, 37
F.3d at 1075.
Additionally, Local Rule 56.1 requires the movant to file a “statement of the
material facts as to which [it] contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” In
response, pursuant to Local Rule 56.2, the opposing party must set forth a “short and
concise statement of the material facts as to which there exists a genuine issue to be
tried.” All material facts set forth in the statement required under Local Rule 56.1 “will
be deemed admitted, for purposes of the motion, unless controverted” by the
statement required by Local Rule 56.2.
Analysis
Carpenter’s motion argues that there is no evidence that would “establish fault
on behalf of Carpenter.” Record Document 54-2. Carpenter states that the evidence
supports only one conclusion, that Carpenter’s vehicle was stopped behind the Cassesse
vehicle prior to Carpenter’s vehicle being hit from the rear by R + L’s 18-wheeler, a

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conclusion which Carpenter states precludes a finding of liability against Carpenter. Id.
Carpenter’s version of events is supported by several sources. Carpenter’s own
affidavit which accompanied his Motion for Summary Judgment states that he “applied
his brakes and came to a stop behind the Cassesse vehicle . . . thereafter, an 18
wheeler operated by Nolan Eggins ran into the rear of [Carpenter’s] Penske truck.
Record Document 54-3. Eggins, the driver of the 18-wheeler, indicates in his answer to
interrogatories that Carpenter’s vehicle came to a stop prior to the collision. Record
Document 59-1, pp. 8–9 (“the Penske van in front of him stopped abruptly, moving
partially onto the right hand shoulder.”). The “Preliminary Event Report” created by R
+ L Transfer, Inc. and based upon Eggin’s own account of the accident taken minutes
after the accident stated that, “[Eggins] looked up and saw police on side of road with
lights on and there was a sign saying construction ahead two miles, Penske truck
setting [sic] still in front of him and he could not get stopped. . . .” Record Document
59-2. Additionally, Eggins’ deposition testimony was that the Penske truck had come to
a stop behind the Cassesse’s vehicle prior to being impacted by Eggins’ 18-wheeler.
Record Document 67-2, p. 11.
In response, R + L asserts that “there are genuine issues of material fact [that
preclude summary judgment on Carpenter’s liability] as to whether Carpenter’s vehicle
was stopped before the impact, whether he braked suddenly and without warning, and
whether his conduct contributed to this accident.” Record Document 68, p. 1. Plaintiff
Richard Cassesse (“Cassesse”) testified in his deposition that while his vehicle was

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stopped in the traffic on Interstate 20, he turned to talk to his grandson. Record
Document 58-2, p. 4. Upon turning, Cassesse observed through the rearview window
Carpenter’s truck coming towards his vehicle and audibly remarked, “I don’t think the
truck’s going to be able to stop, it’s not going to stop.” After making that statement in
the vehicle, Cassesse testified that he saw Carpenter’s truck begin to “jackknife, and
that’s when I realized that the R + L truck [was] basically pushing him into us.” Id.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, R+L, this evidence
may support a finding that Carpenter was not stopped prior to the collision.
Two additional items indicate that there are genuine issues of material fact as to
whether Carpenter may be found to be liable in some part for this accident. The
deposition testimony of Louisiana State Police Trooper Charles Partin (“Trooper Partin”)
indicates that both Carpenter and Carpenter’s passenger, Kirk Whittle (“Whittle”),
stated soon after the accident to an interviewing officer that the Penske truck they were
in was forced to veer onto the right shoulder of Interstate 20 to avoid hitting the
Cassesses’ stopped car prior to the accident with the 18-wheeler. Record Document
68-2, pp. 6–7. Based upon additional representations by Carpenter and Whittle,
Trooper Partin estimated that at the time of the collision of Carpenter’s vehicle and the
18-wheeler, Carpenter’s truck was traveling at 25 miles-per-hour and was attempting to
avoid hitting the Cassesses’ vehicle. Id. at 8–9. This account is corroborated to a
degree by Eggins’ deposition testimony that prior to the collision he witnessed the
Carpenter vehicle “coming to a stop, abrupt stop” and that, in an apparent effort to

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come to a stop quickly, Carpenter’s truck had smoking tires and had “cut to the right.”
Record Document 68-3, p. 6.
It is apparent that the factual allegations made to this Court are in conflict as to
whether Carpenter’s truck was at a stop prior to the collision with R+L’s 18-wheeler,
whether Carpenter was in some way negligent in his operation of the Penske truck,
and, ultimately, whether Carpenter may be liable in part for the accident. Accordingly,
summary judgment would be inappropriate at this time.
Conclusion
Because the Court finds that there are genuine disputes of material facts,
Carpenter’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Record Document 54] is DENIED.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana on the 3rd day of August,
2016.

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