William v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals Inc et al

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM RULING re 14 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Janssen Pharmaceuticals Inc, Johnson & Johnson, Janssen Research & Development L L C, 17 MOTION for Leave to File Under Seal filed by Karon-Jahlil William. Signed by Judge S Maurice Hicks on 10/20/2016. (crt,McDonnell, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
KARON-JAHLIL WILLIAMS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-3354

VERSUS

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS,
INC. ET AL.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is Defendants Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Johnson &
Johnson, and Janssen Research and Development, LLC’s (collectively “Defendants”)
Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”)
56 regarding Plaintiff Karon-Jahlil Williams’ (“Williams”) Louisiana Product Liability Act
(“LPLA”) causes of action and other claims. See Record Document 14. Defendants filed
the instant Rule 56 motion on the grounds that Williams cannot demonstrate a genuine
issue of material fact on several different elements of his claims. See id. For the reasons
which follow, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED, and all of Williams’ claims against
Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Williams is a domiciliary of Bienville Parish, Louisiana. See Record Document 1 ¶
1. Defendants are pharmaceutical companies that designed, manufactured, and
marketed the prescription medications Risperdal, Risperdal Consta, and Invega. See id.
at ¶ 2. Williams alleges that after taking these medications, he experienced
gynecomastia, an abnormal enlargement of the breasts in males. See Record Document
1 at ¶ 7. According to Williams, developing this condition caused him to suffer a variety

Page 1 of 9

of damages, including mental anguish and loss of enjoyment of life from the social stigma
that resulted from this condition. See id. at ¶ 58.
Williams filed the instant suit on December 2, 2014, asserting all four of the
possible causes of action under the LPLA, negligence, breach of warranty of fitness for
ordinary use, breach of warranty of merchantability and fitness, strict liability, violations of
federal regulations, and redhibition. See id. at 11. Defendants filed this Motion for
Summary Judgment on July 1, 2016. See Record Document 14. Williams responded in
opposition to the Motion. See Record Document 16. Defendants filed a reply to Williams’
response. See Record Document 18.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I.

LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment
Rule 56 of the F.R.C.P. governs summary judgment. This rule provides that the

court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” F.R.C.P.
56(a). Also, “a party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support
the motion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including . . . affidavits .
. . or showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support
the fact.” F.R.C.P. 56(c)(1)(A) and (B). “If a party fails to properly support an assertion of
fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c),
the court may . . . grant summary judgment.” F.R.C.P. 56(e)(3).

Page 2 of 9

In a summary judgment motion, “a party seeking summary judgment always bears
the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of the pleadings . . . [and] affidavits, if any, which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (U.S. 1986) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). If the movant meets this initial burden, then the non-movant has the burden of
going beyond the pleadings and designating specific facts that prove that a genuine issue
of material fact exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2554 (U.S. 1986);
see Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). A non-movant, however,
cannot meet the burden of proving that a genuine issue of material fact exists by providing
only “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by
unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.” Little, 37 F.3d 1069, 1075
(5th Cir. 1994).
Additionally, in deciding a summary judgment motion, courts “resolve factual
controversies in favor of the nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual
controversy, that is when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Id.
Courts “do not, however, in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party
could or would prove the necessary facts.” Id.
B. The LPLA
The LPLA provides the exclusive remedy for products liability actions against
manufacturers under Louisiana law. See La. R.S. § 9:2800.52 et seq. “A claimant may
not recover from a manufacturer for damage caused by a product on the basis of any
theory of liability” outside of the LPLA. Id. A successful LPLA claim requires proof that an

Page 3 of 9

unreasonably dangerous characteristic of the manufacturer’s product proximately caused
damages to the claimant when the claimant used the product in a reasonably anticipated
manner. See La. R.S. § 9:2800.54(A). The LPLA provides that a manufacturer can be
held liable for its product if and only if the product is unreasonably dangerous in at least
one of four ways: (1) unreasonably dangerous in construction or composition; (2)
unreasonably dangerous in design; (3) unreasonably dangerous because an adequate
warning about the product has not been provided; (4) unreasonably dangerous because
it does not conform to an express warning of the manufacturer about the product. See La.
R.S. 9:2800.54(B).
In any personal injury suit, including a product liability action, the “plaintiff bears
the burden of proving a causal relationship between the injury sustained and the accident
which caused the injury.” Maranto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 650 So. 2d 757, 759
(La. 02/20/1995); see also Kemp v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18738 at
*10 (E.D. La. 2004). “Proof of causation has two components, general and specific.” Pick
v. American Medical Systems, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1151, 1164 (E.D. La. 1997). “General
causation deals with whether the substance at issue . . . can cause diseases or disorders
in people in general.” Id. “Specific causation focuses upon whether the substance . . . was
in fact the cause of the ailments or symptoms in the particular patient.” Id. A plaintiff must
have expert medical testimony to prove causation in a product liability claim involving
prescription medications. See Lewis v. Pfizer Pharm. Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99648
at *1 (W.D. La. 2010); see also Kemp, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18738 at *10-12.

Page 4 of 9

II.

ANALYSIS
A. The LPLA Claims
Defendants argue that there is no genuine issue of material fact on several

elements of Williams’ LPLA claims, including the elements of the existence of a defect in
the products and proximate cause. See Record Document 14-1 at 5. Citing to Lewis and
other similar cases, Defendants argue that because Williams has presented no medical
or scientific evidence of causation linking Defendants’ products to Williams’ injuries, there
is no genuine issue of material fact on the element of causation. See id. Defendants also
argue that because expert testimony is necessary to show that a complex product like a
prescription medication is defective, Williams cannot demonstrate a genuine issue of
material fact on the element of a defect either. See id. at 6-11; see Zachary v. Dow
Corning Corp., 884 F. Supp. 1061, 1065 (M.D. La. 1995) (granting summary judgment in
product liability action when plaintiff provided no expert testimony of a defect in the
product).
Williams did not address either argument in his Opposition to the Motion for
Summary Judgment. See Record Document 16. In fact, Williams admits in his Response
to Defendants’ Statement of Uncontested Material Facts that he has not submitted any
expert reports to Defendants. See Record Document 16-1 ¶ 8. There are no expert
affidavits attached to the Opposition, and none of the other attached evidence
demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact on whether the product is defective or
whether any alleged defect caused Williams injuries.1 See Record Document 16.

1

Williams did provide some medical records from one treating physician and deposition
testimony from another, which he seeks to file under seal. See Record Document 17.
None of the evidence from the treating physicians addresses the elements of causation
Page 5 of 9

Therefore, Defendants carried their summary judgment burden by pointing out a lack of
evidence on two necessary elements of Williams’ LPLA causes of action, and Williams
did not meet his burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact on these two
elements. The Court must grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Williams’
LPLA claims.
B. Negligence, Breach of Warranty, Strict Liability, and Violation of Federal
Regulations.
Williams bases his other causes of action against Defendants on the same conduct
upon which he bases his LPLA causes of action: the design, manufacture, and marketing
of three prescription drugs. See Record Document 1 at ¶¶ 2, 8-15. However, “the LPLA
establishes the exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for damage caused by
their products” in Louisiana. La. R.S. § 9:2800.52.
Williams agrees that his causes of action for negligence, breach of warranty, and
strict liability “are subsumed within the framework of the LPLA.” Record Document 16 at
7. Williams does not mention his claim for violation of federal regulations in the same
section of his Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment as these other claims, but
it appears that there is no such cause of action. See id. Williams’ complaint alleges
violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 331, 351, and 352 as a separate cause of action, but these
provisions do not create a cause of action for private parties based upon a violation of
their requirements. See Record Document 1 at ¶¶ 53, 54. A violation of a statute or
regulation could of course serve as some evidence of a defect in a product or as the basis

or the existence of a defect. See id. Though the treating physicians may be qualified to
discuss medical causation, the evidence provided merely confirms that Williams was
prescribed the medications in question, and the doctors discuss neither the existence of
a defect nor medical causation. See id.
Page 6 of 9

for establishing negligence per se, but the mere existence of a regulation does not
automatically grant the ability for a private party to sue for a violation of the regulation.
Therefore, because Williams attempts to base his other causes of action on Defendants’
allegedly defective products and the LPLA provides the exclusive causes of action for
such claims, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Williams’
negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability, and violation of federal regulations causes
of action.
C. Redhibition
Williams argues that his redhibition cause of action is not subsumed within the
framework of the LPLA. See Record Document 16 at 8-9. Williams cites to Pipitone v.
Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) to support this argument. There, the
Fifth Circuit held that the LPLA does not prevent a claimant from also bringing a
redhibition cause of action, but any damage recovery from such a cause of action is
limited to “the value of the product or other economic loss.” Pipitone, 288 F.3d at 251.
Defendants offer no argument to the contrary, and Pipitone’s holding has not been
overruled; therefore, the Court finds that Williams’ redhibition cause of action is not barred
by the LPLA. However, the Court also finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact
on Williams’ redhibition cause of action. A redhibition cause of action seeks either
rescission of a contract or damages equal to a reduction in the price of a thing sold when
there is a defect in the thing that renders it either totally useless or of diminished
usefulness. See La. C.C. art. 2520. Obviously, this requires proof that the thing sold is
actually defective. See Parker v. Dubus Engine Co., 563 So. 2d 355, 358 (La. App. 3 Cir.

Page 7 of 9

05/23/1990) (“to establish a prima facie case in redhibition, a buyer must show that a nonapparent defect existed at the time of sale”).
The Court has not found any cases directly stating that expert testimony is
necessary for a successful redhibition cause of action. However, most redhibition cases
involving products of any complexity involve expert testimony. See, e.g., id. (discussing
expert trial testimony related to the cause of an engine fire); Pipitone, 288 F.3d at 244-50
(reversing the trial court’s ruling on a Daubert motion in an LPLA and redhibition action);
Harris v. Drexler Motor Co., 339 So. 2d 1304, 1305-07 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/15/1976)
(evaluating expert testimony by dueling experts related to the existence of an alleged
defect in an automobile at the time of sale). If proof of a defect in a product for the
purposes of an LPLA cause of action requires expert testimony, it would be illogical to
conclude that the same product could be proven defective in a redhibition cause of action
without expert testimony. See Zachary, 884 F. Supp. at 1065. Thus, the Court concludes
that, at least in the context of a redhibition action involving an allegedly defective
prescription medication, expert testimony is necessary to prove that the medication is
defective.
As discussed above, Williams has provided no expert evidence to support his
allegations that the Defendants’ products were defective. Therefore, the Court finds that
there is no genuine issue of material fact on Williams’ redhibition cause of action.
CONCLUSION
Defendants met their summary judgment burden by pointing out a lack of evidence
on several elements of Williams’ causes of action. Williams failed to demonstrate a
genuine issue of material fact on the challenged elements. Defendants’ Motion for

Page 8 of 9

Summary Judgment is therefore GRANTED, and all of Williams’ causes of action against
Defendants are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Williams also filed a Motion for
Leave to file certain medical records under seal (Record Document 17). Because the
Court grants summary judgment for Defendants on all of Williams’ causes of action, the
Motion for Leave to file certain medical records under seal is DENIED AS MOOT, and the
Court has accordingly not taken these records into account other than to determine that
they would add nothing to Williams’ argument against summary judgment.
A judgment consistent with the terms of the instant Memorandum Ruling shall
issue herewith.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this the 20th day of
October, 2016.

Page 9 of 9