Hile v. Town of Plain Dealing

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM RULING re 18 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Elizabeth E Foote on 8/11/2016. (crt,Keifer, K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
RODNEY E. HILE

CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-57

VERSUS

JUDGE ELIZABETH ERNY FOOTE

TOWN OF PLAIN DEALING

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY
MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by the Defendant, Town
of Plain Dealing (the “Town”). Record Document 18. For the reasons announced below,
the Court GRANTS the Defendant’s motion.
I.

Background
Rodney Hile (“Hile”), a deputy marshal employed by the Town, alleges that the

Town has deprived him of retirement benefits to which he is entitled. Record Document
1-4. Central to Hile’s allegation is that the mayor and former police chief violated his right
to participate in the Louisiana Municipal Police Officers Retirement System (“MPERS”) by
coercing him to sign a form waiving that right. Record Document 1-4, pp. 2-3. Hile also
claims that by establishing a retirement plan for all of its employees except law
enforcement officers, the Town violated “the non-discrimination rules under federal law
regarding allowing all employees of governmental employers to participate in the plan” as
well as the substantive due process and equal protection provisions of the federal
constitution. Record Document 1-4, pp. 3-4.
Among other reasons, the Town argues that it is entitled to summary judgment
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because Hile has failed to state any facts that give rise to a claim under federal law. The
Town first disputes Hile’s allegation that the Town has created a retirement system that
specifically excludes law enforcement officers. According to the Town’s mayor, Wiley
Robinson, the Town has recently established a retirement system in which “[a]ll employees
are entitled to participate, including the Marshall and Deputy Marshalls [sic].” Record
Document 18-7, p. 2. Hile refutes this assertion, stating that he “and other police officers
were not offered the right to enroll in the City’s retirement system until after this lawsuit
was filed.” Record Document 20-1, pp. 3-4. The Town also argues that even if the Town
had excluded deputy marshals like Hile from its retirement system, such an exclusion
would not give rise to a federal claim. Hile does not address the legal grounds for his
federal claims in his brief opposing the Town’s motion for summary judgment.
II.

Standard
Summary judgment is proper pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). Rule 56(c) "mandates the
entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against
a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial." Id. If the party moving for summary judgment fails to satisfy its initial burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the motion must be denied,
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regardless of the nonmovant's response. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075
(5th Cir. 1994).

If the motion is properly made, however, Rule 56(c) requires the

nonmovant to go "beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts in the record showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial." Wallace v. Texas Tech. Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047
(5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). While the nonmovant's burden may not be satisfied by
conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, metaphysical doubt as to the facts, or
a scintilla of evidence, Little, 37 F.3d at 1075; Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1047, all factual
controversies must be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Farese, 423 F.3d 446, 456 (5th Cir. 2005).
III.

Law & Analysis
A. Federal Claims
Based on his and other law enforcement officers’ alleged exclusion from the Town’s

retirement plan, it appears that Hile asserts three federal claims. The first is that this
exclusion violates “the non-discrimination rules under federal law regarding allowing all
employees of governmental employers to participate in the plan.” Record Document 1-4,
pp. 3-4. Hile provides no further elaboration on this claim in the complaint or elsewhere
in the record.

Although federal pleading rules “do not countenance dismissal of a

complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted,”
Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 135 S. Ct. 346, 346 (2014), they also cannot sustain a
cause of action where the statement of law supporting the claim is so unintelligibly vague
that it prevents the plaintiff from “showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This defect compels the Court to dismiss the claim under either Rule
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12(b)(6) or Rule 56. See United States ex rel. Simmons v. Zibilich, 542 F.2d 259, 260 n.3
(5th Cir. 1976) (“[T]he standard to be met in granting a 12(b)(6) motion . . . and the
standard for granting a motion for summary judgment . . . both reduce to the same
question in this case: Was defendant entitled to judgment on the basis that the law does
not recognize a federal cause of action for the facts alleged by plaintiff.”). Consequently,
the Court dismisses Hile’s claim that the exclusion of law enforcement officers from the
Town’s retirement plan violates “non-discrimination rules under federal law.”
The second federal claim that Hile asserts is that his exclusion from the Town’s
retirement plan violates his substantive due process rights.

In analyzing whether the

Town’s retirement plan violates Hile’s substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court first must determine whether Hile has shown that the plan
encroaches upon a fundamental liberty interest. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 721 (1997). Hile has made no showing that his inclusion in the Town’s retirement
plan constitutes a fundamental liberty interest. Because the Town’s retirement plan does
not encroach upon a fundamental liberty interest, the Court evaluates whether the plan
has violated Hile’s substantive due process rights under a rational basis standard. See Doe
v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 773 (7th Cir. 2004). Under rational basis review, the
Court asks whether the challenged law is “rationally related to a legitimate government
interest.” See id. In this inquiry, the Court may propose its own rational basis for the
Town’s plan. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955).
Here, the exclusion of law enforcement officers from the Town’s retirement plan could be
rationally related to the Town’s legitimate budget constraints. Consequently, even when
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the Court resolves all disputes of material fact in favor of Hile and assumes that the Town
did in fact exclude law enforcement officers from its retirement system, the Town is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law that this exclusion did not violate Hile’s substantive
due process rights. The Court accordingly dismisses this claim with prejudice.
Finally, Hile argues that his exclusion from the Town’s retirement plan violates his
equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

To establish a claim of

discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff
must show that “a state actor intentionally discriminated against her because of her
membership in a protected class.” Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 705 (5th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 1989)). Hile has alleged that the
Town discriminated against him because he is a law enforcement officer, but he has failed
to show that law enforcement officers are a protected class under the Equal Protection
Clause. The Town is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law that the exclusion
of law enforcement officers from the Town’s retirement plans did not violate Hile’s equal
protection rights. The Court accordingly dismisses this claim with prejudice.
B. State Law Claims
Without a federal claim before it, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Hile’s state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The Court accordingly
dismisses Hile’s state law claims without prejudice.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons assigned above:
IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Record
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Document 18] be and is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims by the Plaintiff alleging violations of
"anti-discrimination rules" under federal law are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims by the Plaintiff alleging violations of the
Plaintiff's substantive due process and equal protection rights are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiffs state law claims are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
A judgment consistent with this memorandum ruling shall issue herewith.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana, this il__th day of August,
2016.

I

ELIZABETH ERN1 / OOTE
UNITED STATES DI RICT JUDGE

I

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