Hile v. Town of Plain Dealing
Filing
24
AMENDED MEMORANDUM RULING re 18 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Town of Plain Dealing. Signed by Judge Elizabeth E Foote on 8/15/2016. (crt,Keifer, K)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
RODNEY E. HILE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-57
VERSUS
JUDGE ELIZABETH ERNY FOOTE
TOWN OF PLAIN DEALING
MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY
AMENDED MEMORANDUM RULING
The Court previously entered a Memorandum Ruling granting the Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. Record Document 22. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Rule 60(a), the Court issues this Amended Memorandum Ruling solely for the purpose of
remanding, rather than dismissing without prejudice, the Plaintiff’s state law claims.
I.
Background
Rodney Hile (“Hile”), a deputy marshal employed by the Town, alleges that the
Town has deprived him of retirement benefits to which he is entitled. Record Document
1-4. Central to Hile’s allegation is that the mayor and former police chief violated his right
to participate in the Louisiana Municipal Police Officers Retirement System (“MPERS”) by
coercing him to sign a form waiving that right. Record Document 1-4, pp. 2-3. Hile also
claims that by establishing a retirement plan for all of its employees except law
enforcement officers, the Town violated “the non-discrimination rules under federal law
regarding allowing all employees of governmental employers to participate in the plan” as
well as the substantive due process and equal protection provisions of the federal
constitution. Record Document 1-4, pp. 3-4.
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Among other reasons, the Town argues that it is entitled to summary judgment
because Hile has failed to state any facts that give rise to a claim under federal law. The
Town first disputes Hile’s allegation that the Town has created a retirement system that
specifically excludes law enforcement officers. According to the Town’s mayor, Wiley
Robinson, the Town has recently established a retirement system in which “[a]ll employees
are entitled to participate, including the Marshall and Deputy Marshalls [sic].” Record
Document 18-7, p. 2. Hile refutes this assertion, stating that he “and other police officers
were not offered the right to enroll in the City’s retirement system until after this lawsuit
was filed.” Record Document 20-1, pp. 3-4. The Town also argues that even if the Town
had excluded deputy marshals like Hile from its retirement system, such an exclusion
would not give rise to a federal claim. Hile does not address the legal grounds for his
federal claims in his brief opposing the Town’s motion for summary judgment.
II.
Standard
Summary judgment is proper pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). Rule 56(c) "mandates the
entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against
a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."
Id. If the party moving for summary judgment fails to satisfy its initial burden of
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demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the motion must be denied,
regardless of the nonmovant's response. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075
(5th Cir. 1994).
If the motion is properly made, however, Rule 56(c) requires the
nonmovant to go "beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts in the record showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial." Wallace v. Texas Tech. Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047
(5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). While the nonmovant's burden may not be satisfied by
conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, metaphysical doubt as to the facts, or
a scintilla of evidence, Little, 37 F.3d at 1075; Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1047, all factual
controversies must be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Farese, 423 F.3d 446, 456 (5th Cir. 2005).
III.
Law & Analysis
A. Federal Claims
Based on his and other law enforcement officers’ alleged exclusion from the Town’s
retirement plan, it appears that Hile asserts three federal claims. The first is that this
exclusion violates “the non-discrimination rules under federal law regarding allowing all
employees of governmental employers to participate in the plan.” Record Document 1-4,
pp. 3-4. Hile provides no further elaboration on this claim in the complaint or elsewhere
in the record.
Although federal pleading rules “do not countenance dismissal of a
complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted,”
Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 135 S. Ct. 346, 346 (2014), they also cannot sustain a
cause of action where the statement of law supporting the claim is so unintelligibly vague
that it prevents the plaintiff from “showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ.
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P. 8(a)(2). This defect compels the Court to dismiss the claim under either Rule 12(b)(6)
or Rule 56. See United States ex rel. Simmons v. Zibilich, 542 F.2d 259, 260 n.3 (5th Cir.
1976) (“[T]he standard to be met in granting a 12(b)(6) motion . . . and the standard for
granting a motion for summary judgment . . . both reduce to the same question in this
case: Was defendant entitled to judgment on the basis that the law does not recognize a
federal cause of action for the facts alleged by plaintiff.”). Consequently, the Court
dismisses Hile’s claim that the exclusion of law enforcement officers from the Town’s
retirement plan violates “non-discrimination rules under federal law.”
The second federal claim that Hile asserts is that his exclusion from the Town’s
retirement plan violates his substantive due process rights.
In analyzing whether the
Town’s retirement plan violates Hile’s substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court first must determine whether Hile has shown that the plan
encroaches upon a fundamental liberty interest. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 721 (1997). Hile has made no showing that his inclusion in the Town’s retirement
plan constitutes a fundamental liberty interest. Because the Town’s retirement plan does
not encroach upon a fundamental liberty interest, the Court evaluates whether the plan has
violated Hile’s substantive due process rights under a rational basis standard. See Doe v.
City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 773 (7th Cir. 2004). Under rational basis review, the Court
asks whether the challenged law is “rationally related to a legitimate government interest.”
See id. In this inquiry, the Court may propose its own rational basis for the Town’s plan.
See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955). Here, the
exclusion of law enforcement officers from the Town’s retirement plan could be rationally
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related to the Town’s legitimate budget constraints. Consequently, even when the Court
resolves all disputes of material fact in favor of Hile and assumes that the Town did in fact
exclude law enforcement officers from its retirement system, the Town is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law that this exclusion did not violate Hile’s substantive due
process rights. The Court accordingly dismisses this claim with prejudice.
Finally, Hile argues that his exclusion from the Town’s retirement plan violates his
equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
To establish a claim of
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff
must show that “a state actor intentionally discriminated against her because of her
membership in a protected class.” Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 705 (5th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 1989)). Hile has alleged that the
Town discriminated against him because he is a law enforcement officer, but he has failed
to show that law enforcement officers are a protected class under the Equal Protection
Clause. The Town is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law that the exclusion
of law enforcement officers from the Town’s retirement plans did not violate Hile’s equal
protection rights. The Court accordingly dismisses this claim with prejudice.
B. State Law Claims
When a district court dismisses all federal claims in a suit and the only claims
remaining are pendant state law claims, the court may in its discretion remand the suit.
Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 936 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Carnegie-Mellon
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988)). Accordingly, the Court hereby remands the
remaining state law claims in this suit to the 26th Judicial District Court in Bossier Parish,
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Louisiana.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons assigned above:
IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Record
Document 18] be and is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims by the Plaintiff alleging violations of
“anti-discrimination rules” under federal law are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims by the Plaintiff alleging violations of the
Plaintiff’s substantive due process and equal protection rights are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all state law claims by the Plaintiff against the
Defendant are REMANDED to the 26th Judicial District Court, Bossier Parish, Louisiana,
where they were pending in a case numbered 146,004.
A judgment consistent with this memorandum ruling shall issue herewith.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 15th day of August,
2016.
__________________________
ELIZABETH ERNY FOOTE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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