King v. Ellis Pottery Inc

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM RULING re 14 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Ellis Pottery Inc. Signed by Judge S Maurice Hicks on 09/21/2016. (crt,McDonnell, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
WILLIAM L. KING

CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-2363

VERSUS

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

ELLIS POTTERY, INC.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Record Document 14) filed by
Defendant Ellis Pottery, Inc. (“Ellis Pottery”). Ellis Pottery moves for summary judgment
on all employment discrimination claims presented by pro se Plaintiff William L. King
(“King”). King has opposed the motion. See Record Document 16. For the reasons set
forth below, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Ellis Pottery is hereby GRANTED
and all of King’s claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND
King’s pro se complaint (Record Document 1) is vague, but it appears he alleges a
racial discrimination claim under Title VII against his former employer, Ellis Pottery, all in
relation to his termination in July 2015. Ellis Pottery is a Louisiana retailer with its principal
place of business in Bossier City, Louisiana. See Record Document 14-2 at ¶ 1. Ellis
Pottery has more than 15 employees and is subject to the provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. See id. at ¶ 2. As part of its operations, Ellis Pottery maintains a
warehouse in Bossier City, Louisiana. See id. at ¶ 3. The warehouse and the main
business office of Ellis Pottery are at the same location. See id.
King is a black male who started working at the Ellis Pottery warehouse in Bossier
City on February 22, 2012. See id. at ¶ 4; Record Document 1-3. The individuals primarily

responsible for his hiring were Derek Ellis (“Ellis”), currently the CEO of Ellis Pottery, and
Wesley York (“York”), the warehouse manager.

See id. at ¶ 4.

The typical non-

management staffing at the Ellis Pottery warehouse is two drivers and two warehouse
employees. See id. at ¶ 5. There is one manager. See id.
It is a long-standing policy of Ellis Pottery that warehouse employees may not take
take boxes out of the warehouse without first breaking them down. See id. at ¶ 6, citing
Record Document 14-3 (Affidavit of Ellis) & Record Document 14-4 (Affidavit of Becky
Crumpler (“Crumpler”), Human Resources Director at Ellis Pottery). According to the Ellis
Pottery policy, an employee may not take empty boxes out to their personal vehicles
without (1) notifying the manager of the warehouse and (2) breaking down the boxes so
that they are flat and cannot contain anything. See id. Such policy is designed to prevent
employees from removing property from the warehouse by concealing the property in
boxes. See id.
In late June or early July 2015, King placed two boxes on a dolly and took them
outside the warehouse. See id. at ¶ 8, citing Record Document 14-3 (Affidavit of Ellis); see
also Record Documents 19 & 20. It is undisputed that the boxes were not broken down.
See Record Document 14-2 at ¶ 8, citing Record Document 14-3 (Affidavit of Ellis); Record
Document 16 at 1. King did not take the boxes to the trash dumpster, but instead
proceeded towards his personal vehicle. See Record Document 14-2 at ¶ 9, citing Record
Document 14-3 (Affidavit of Ellis).

At the same time, Katie Ellis, an Ellis Pottery

management employee, was leaving the office. See id. at ¶ 10, citing Record Document
14-3 (Affidavit of Ellis) & Record Document 14-5 (Affidavit of Katie Ellis). Katie Ellis
attested in her affidavit:
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My car was parked near the area where William King was. When I got into
my car, I saw Mr. King moving toward his truck with a dolly and the two
boxes. . . . Mr. King appeared to notice that I was watching him. He stopped
doing what he was doing when he saw me. He stayed behind his truck,
facing the wall, for about twenty seconds. He then started heading back in
the direction of the trash dumpster with the boxes as if he was taking them
to the dumpster. . . . I exited the parking lot.
Record Document 14-5 at ¶ 2. Katie Ellis subsequently reported what she observed to Ellis
and York. See Record Document 14-2 at ¶ 12, citing Record Document 14-5 (Affidavit of
Katie Ellis). Ellis and York, along with Crumpler, viewed the security tape, which showed
King’s actions once Ms. Ellis left the parking lot. See id. Once Katie Ellis exited the
parking lot, King reversed direction and went back towards his truck with the two boxes.
After going back to his truck with the two boxes, King took the dolly and the boxes back to
the trash dumpster and placed the boxes into the trash dumpster. See id. at ¶ 13, citing
Record Document 14-3 (Affidavit of Ellis).
When confronted with the security video, King never offered any explanation as to
why he took the boxes to his truck and why he reversed course when he saw Katie Ellis in
the parking lot. See id. at ¶ 10, citing Record Document 14-3 (Affidavit of Ellis) & Record
Document 14-4 (Affidavit of Crumpler). King’s removal of the boxes without management
consent violated Ellis Pottery’s warehouse policy concerning removal of items from the
warehouse, in particular, boxes. See id. at ¶ 16, citing Record Document 14-4 (Affidavit
of Crumpler) & Record Document 14-6 (Affidavit of York). King was aware of the policy;
in fact, he had previously asked York for permission to take broken down boxes home on
a number of occasions. See id., citing Record Document 14-6 (Affidavit of York). Following
the review of King’s actions and after King failed to offer any explanation for his actions, a
decision was made to terminate his employment. See id. at ¶ 17, citing Record Document
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14-3 (Affidavit of Ellis) & Record Document 14-4 (Affidavit of Crumpler). His employment
was terminated on July 9, 2015. See id.
After receiving his “right-to-sue” letter, King filed the instant lawsuit on September
14, 2015. See Record Document 1. King alleges racial discrimination under Title VII. See
id. Ellis Pottery has now moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all of King’s
claims. See Record Document 14.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I.

Summary Judgment Standard.
Summary judgment is proper pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Quality Infusion Care, Inc. v. Health Care Serv.
Corp., 628 F.3d 725, 728 (5th Cir. 2010). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
See Id. “Rule 56[(a)] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir.2004).
If the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, “the
nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 141 (5th
Cir.2004). Where critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could
not support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant, then summary judgment should be

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granted. See Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir.2005).
While the Court must resolve all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, it has no duty to search the record for material fact issues. See Pylant
v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 497 F.3d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 2007); Galindo v.
Precision American Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985). The nonmovant must
identify specific evidence in the record and articulate precisely how this evidence supports
his claim. See RSR Corp. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2010). Conclusory
allegations unsupported by specific facts will not prevent an award of summary judgment.
See Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emp.’s v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, Tex., 40 F.3d 698,
713 (5th Cir. 1994). “A liberal reading of plaintiff’s pleadings is the only special treatment
afforded pro se plaintiffs by the courts.” Kiper v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 2015 WL
2451998, *1 (M.D.La. May 21, 2015), citing Callahan v. C.I.R., Civ. A. 99-0295-C-M1, 2000
WL 1141607, at *1 (M.D.La. Apr. 10, 2000). A “court is not required to search for or try to
create causes of actions or find material issues of fact for pro se plaintiffs.” Id.
II.

Title VII Analysis.
In order to establish a Title VII race discrimination claim, King must first establish a

prima facie case of discrimination, which requires a showing that he “(1) is a member of a
protected group; (2) was qualified for the position at issue; (3) was discharged or suffered
some adverse employment action by the employer; and (4) was replaced by someone
outside his protected group or was treated less favorably than other similarly situated
employees outside the protected group.” McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556
(5th Cir. 2007). If King is able to make this prima facie showing, the burden then shifts to
Ellis Pottery “to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory . . . reason for its employment
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action.” Id. at 557. Ellis Pottery’s “burden is only one of production, not persuasion, and
involves no credibility assessment.” Id. If met, then King “bears the ultimate burden of
proving that the . . . proffered reason is not true but instead is a pretext for the real
discriminatory.” Id. “To carry this burden, [King] must rebut each nondiscriminatory . . .
reason articulated by [Ellis Pottery].” Id.
As to his prima facie case, King has met requirements one through three and the
case turns on requirement four, that is, was he replaced by someone outside his protected
group or was he treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the
protected group. In his verified complaint, King asserts that “other employees were
permitted to put empty boxes in their vehicles.” Record Document 1 at 1.1 In unverified
pleadings, King contends he was the “only black employee [in the warehouse] part-time”;
he was the only black employee in the warehouse; when Ellis terminated him he said that
his position would not be replaced; a white employee named “Peyton was caught on [the]
security camera talking on his cell phone over 15 minutes.” Record Document 1-2 at 3;
Record Document 16 at 4. In yet another unverified pleading, King alleged:
Wesley York my supervise [sic] said his complaint some what me a
scavenger. That is a race commit [sic] about me cause he put me down as
a slave an animal. That was not right all for him to say that race words about
me at all.
Record Document 16 at 7.
1

King’s complaint, which is a two page document filed on September 14, 2015,
contains the following provision, “Under penalty of perjury, I declare that the information
given in this complaint is true and correct.” Record Document 1 at 2. Governing Fifth
Circuit law permits the Court to consider factual averments in a pro se litigant’s verified
pleadings (or pleadings submitted under penalty of perjury or of making a false statement)
as controverting evidence. See Hart v. Hairston, 343 F.3d 762, 765 (5th Cir.2003); King
v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir.1994).
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Based on the allegations set forth above, King has not established his prima facie
case of racial discrimination. He has presented no competent summary judgment evidence
demonstrating that he was replaced by someone outside his protected group or that he was
treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the protected group.
See McCoy, 492 F.3d at 556. King stated in his opposition that when Ellis terminated him
he said that his position would not be replaced; yet, this is an unverified allegation.
Conversely, Ellis Pottery has presented competent summary judgment evidence that all of
the individuals who replaced King were black. See Record Documents 14-4 (Affidavit of
Crumpler) & 14-7. Likewise, King has presented no competent summary judgment
evidence showing that he was treated less favorably than other similarly situated
employees outside the protected group.2 In his verified complaint, King refers to other
employees who were permitted to put empty boxes in their vehicles, but he goes into no
further factual detail concerning if those employees sought permission from management.
In an unverified pleading, he references a white employee who was caught on the security
camera talking on his cell phone over 15 minutes, but presumably was not terminated. Yet,
none of this evidence, even if the Court assumes it all to be competent summary judgment
evidence, satisfies the narrow definition of “similarly situated.” Ellis Pottery has again
presented the affidavit of its human resource director, Crumpler, wherein she stated that

2

Similarly situated employees are employees who are treated more favorably in
nearly identical circumstances. See Lee v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253,
259–260 (5th Cir. 2009). The Fifth Circuit defines “similarly situated” narrowly. Wheeler v.
BL Dev. Corp., 415 F.3d 399, 406 (5th Cir.2005). For instance, employees with different
responsibilities, different supervisors, different capabilities, different work rule violations or
different disciplinary records are not considered to be “nearly identical.” Hockman v.
Westward Communications, LLC, 282 F.Supp.2d 512, 527-528 (E.D.Tex.2003).
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she knew “of no other employee who has engaged in actions similar to those of Mr. King.”
Record Document ¶ 6. Thus, based on the foregoing, King has not met his burden of
establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Ellis Pottery’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED and King’s claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
CONCLUSION
This Court finds that King has failed to meet his burden of establishing, with
competent summary judgment evidence, a prima facie case of racial discrimination.
Accordingly, Ellis Pottery’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Record Document 14) is
GRANTED and King’s claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
A Judgment consistent with the terms of the instant Memorandum Ruling shall issue
herewith.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 21st day of September,
2016.

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