Dennis v. Collins, II et al
Filing
70
MEMORANDUM RULING re 37 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Ernest Collins, II, Greyhound Lines Inc, National Union Fire Insurance Co of Pittsburgh PA. Signed by Judge S Maurice Hicks on 11/09/2016. (crt,McDonnell, D)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
YOLANDA DENNIS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-2410
VERSUS
JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.
ERNEST COLLINS, II, ET AL.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY
MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is Defendant Greyhound Lines, Inc.’s (“Greyhound”) Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”) 56
regarding Plaintiff Yolanda Dennis’ (“Dennis”) negligent supervision and training causes
of action against Greyhound. See Record Document 37. Greyhound filed the instant Rule
56 motion on the ground that Dennis cannot simultaneously pursue both (1) a negligence
claim against an employee (Collins) and (2) negligent supervision and training claims
against the employer (Greyhound) when the employer has stipulated to the fact that the
employee was acting in the course and scope of his employment. See id. For the reasons
which follow, Greyhound’s Motion is GRANTED, and Dennis’ negligent supervision and
training causes of action against Greyhound are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Greyhound is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Texas
that is engaged in the business of transporting passengers by bus throughout the United
States. See Record Document 1-2 at ¶¶ 1-9. Ernest Collins, II (“Collins”) is a citizen of
Texas who works as a bus driver for Greyhound. See Record Document 37-3 at 5-17.
National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA is Greyhound’s insurer. See Record
Document 1-2 at ¶ 4. On June 15, 2014, Collins was driving a Greyhound bus from
Shreveport to Dallas, Texas. See Record Document 37-3 at 8. While traveling south on
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Market Street just before entering the on-ramp to take Interstate 20 westbound, Collins
collided with a vehicle in which Dennis was a passenger. See Record Document 1-2 at ¶
5. Dennis suffered injuries as a result of the collision. See id. at ¶ 10-11.
Dennis filed the instant action in the First Judicial District Court of Caddo Parish,
Louisiana, on June 15, 2015, alleging that (1) Collins’ negligent driving and (2)
Greyhound’s negligent supervision, teaching, and training of Collins caused the collision
and Dennis’ injuries. See id. at 2, 6. After receiving a discovery response indicating that
the amount in controversy was greater than $75,000, Defendants removed the case to
this Court on September 23, 2015. See Record Document 1. Defendants filed the instant
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on July 1, 2016. See Record Document 37. Dennis
filed a response opposing the Motion, and Defendants filed a reply. See Record
Documents 40, 44.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment
Rule 56 of the F.R.C.P. governs summary judgment. This rule provides that the
court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” F.R.C.P.
56(a). Also, “a party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support
the motion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including . . . affidavits .
. . or showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support
the fact.” F.R.C.P. 56(c)(1)(A) and (B). “If a party fails to properly support an assertion of
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fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c),
the court may . . . grant summary judgment.” F.R.C.P. 56(e)(3).
In a summary judgment motion, “a party seeking summary judgment always bears
the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of the pleadings . . . [and] affidavits, if any, which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (U.S. 1986) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). If the movant meets this initial burden, then the non-movant has the burden of
going beyond the pleadings and designating specific facts that prove that a genuine issue
of material fact exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2554 (U.S. 1986);
see Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). A non-movant, however,
cannot meet the burden of proving that a genuine issue of material fact exists by providing
only “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by
unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.” Little, 37 F.3d 1069, 1075
(5th Cir. 1994).
Additionally, in deciding a summary judgment motion, courts “resolve factual
controversies in favor of the nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual
controversy, that is when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Id.
Courts “do not, however, in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party
could or would prove the necessary facts.” Id.
“A partial summary judgment order is not a final judgment but is merely a pre-trial
adjudication that certain issues are established for trial of the case.” Streber v. Hunter,
221 F.3d 701, 737 (5th Cir.2000). Partial summary judgment serves the purpose of
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rooting out, narrowing, and focusing the issues for trial. See Calpetco 1981 v. Marshall
Exploration, Inc., 989 F.2d 1408, 1415 (5th Cir.1993).
II.
ANALYSIS
Greyhound argues that “under Louisiana law, when an employer accepts vicarious
liability for the negligence [if any] of its employee, a plaintiff cannot maintain at trial a
separate or independent cause of action against the employer for negligent supervision
and training.” Record Document 37-2 at 1. Dennis argues that “Louisiana cases
demonstrate that even when an employer stipulates to vicarious liability, it does not
magically shield that employer from being independently liable for its negligent behavior.”
Record Document 40-1 at 4.
From the cases the parties cite as well as the Court’s own research, it appears that
there is no binding precedent on this issue under Louisiana law. Thus, the Court will (1)
outline the two arguments as made by the parties, (2) discuss relevant jurisprudence from
the Court’s own research, and then (3) decide the issue as applied to this case. In the
absence of binding Louisiana authority on the issue, the Court seeks to make its best Erie
guess under Louisiana’s civilian methodology. See Vanderbrook v. Unitrin Preferred Ins.
Co. (In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig.), 495 F.3d 191, 206 (5th Cir. 2007) (explaining
the proper method for federal courts to make an Erie guess under Louisiana law).
A. Greyhound’s Argument
As stated above, Greyhound argues that, as a matter of law, a plaintiff cannot
simultaneously pursue both (1) a negligence cause of action against an employee for
which the employer is vicariously liable and (2) a direct negligent supervision and/or
negligent training cause of action against the employer when the employer stipulates that
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the employee was in the course and scope of employment when he committed the alleged
negligence. See Record Documents 37-2 at 1, 44 at 1-2.
Greyhound relies upon two cases to support this argument. See id. The first such
case is Libersat v. J & K Trucking, Inc., 772 So. 2d 173 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/11/2000).
There, a truck driver (Mitchell) decided to make a U-turn at a break in the highway. See
id. at 174. Another driver (Libersat) was driving in the opposite direction of the truck driver
and struck the trailer attached to the truck driver’s truck; Libersat died at the scene. See
id. In the wrongful death and survival action that followed, Libersat’s wife and daughters
alleged negligence against Mitchell as well as independent causes of action against
Mitchell’s employer, Patterson Truck Line, Inc., for negligent hiring and training. See id.
at 179. The trial court refused to instruct the jury regarding the plaintiffs’ negligent hiring
and training causes of action, allowing only the negligence cause of action against
Mitchell to go to the jury. See id.
The plaintiffs challenged this refusal on appeal, but the appellate court affirmed.
See id. Though technically the court reviewed the trial court’s decision for an abuse of
discretion, the court used language expressly agreeing with the trial court’s decision, as
if the court were reviewing the trial court’s decision de novo. See id. (stating that “the
Court finds that the trial court’s instructions . . . are an accurate reflection of the law” and
that the plaintiff’s proposed instructions “were not appropriate in this case”). In support of
this decision, the court stated as follows:
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Patterson, as Mr. Mitchell's employer, would be liable for his actions under
the theory of respondeat superior. If Mr. Mitchell breached a duty to the
Appellants, then Patterson is liable under the theory of respondeat superior.
If Mitchell did not breach a duty to the Appellants then no degree of
negligence on the part of Patterson in hiring Michell (sic) would make
Patterson liable to the Appellants.
Id.
The second case Greyhound relies upon is Griffin v. Kmart Corp., 776 So. 2d 1226
(La. App. 5 Cir. 11/28/2000). There, the plaintiffs (Griffin and her adult daughter) went to
the sporting goods counter at Kmart and asked for a price check on an item. See id. at
1229. Brown, the employee at the counter, suddenly pulled out an air pistol and shot both
of them without provocation. See id. The plaintiffs sued Kmart, alleging both that Kmart
was vicariously liable for the intentional tort of its employee Brown and that Kmart had
negligently hired, trained, and supervised Brown. See id.
At trial, there was evidence that: (1) Kmart had hired Brown despite the
reservations of its human resources manager; (2) Brown had been fired from his previous
job at Wal-Mart close to Christmas for insubordination; (3) Brown only filled out the
prospective employee questionnaire after he was already hired; (4) Kmart’s human
resources manager had not contacted any of Brown’s personal references prior to hiring
him; and (5) that Brown had received one or two days of training and no training in gun
safety. See id. at 1229-30. The jury found that (1) Kmart was negligent in the hiring,
training, and supervision of Brown and that this negligence proximately caused the
injuries to the plaintiffs, and (2) that Brown committed an intentional tort, but that Kmart
was not liable for his tort. See id. at 1230, 1232-33. On appeal, the court affirmed the
jury’s determination that Kmart was negligent in the hiring, training, or supervision of
Brown; Kmart had put Brown at a sales counter with guns present, providing him with a
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“unique opportunity” to cause injury to customers, while providing him with no training to
avoid such injury. Id. at 1231, quoting Lou-Con Inc. v. Gulf Bldg. Servs., 287 So. 2d 192,
199 (La App. 4 Cir. 01/08/1974).
Thus, Greyhound uses Libersat as the source of its main argument, and offers
Griffin in support to demonstrate a situation in which a negligent hiring, training, and/or
supervision cause of action against an employer can be maintained simultaneously with
an attempt to hold the employer liable for his employee’s torts: when the employee’s
alleged tort is an intentional tort. See Record Document 44 at 2-3. Absent the situation in
Griffin, Greyhound argues that negligent training and supervision causes of action against
the employer are subsumed within a negligence cause of action against the employee
when there is no doubt that the employee committed the negligence, if any, within the
course and scope of employment. See id. at 3.
B. Dennis’ Argument
Conversely, Dennis contends that Greyhound’s argument “is a complete
misrepresentation of Louisiana jurisprudence and truly against public policy.” Record
Document 40-1 at 5. Dennis argues that theories of vicarious liability of employers for
their employees’ torts and direct liability of employers for their own torts are separate and
independent causes of action such that maintaining one does not preclude
simultaneously maintaining the other. See id. In response to Defendants’ argument based
on Libersat, Dennis points out that the court in that case technically affirmed the trial
court’s decision on an abuse of discretion review, arguing that this means the appellate
court did not expressly approve of the trial court’s rationale. See id.; see Libersat, 772 So.
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2d at 179. Thus, according to Dennis, the Libersat decision does not state a generally
applicable rule.
Dennis also argues that Greyhound’s reliance on Griffin is misplaced. According
to Dennis, “in Griffin, the court found the employer liable on theories of both negligent
training and vicarious liability.” Record Document 40-1 at 5. “Thus, Louisiana law supports
theories of direct negligence and vicarious liability to hold employers accountable for their
actions and the actions of their employees.” Id. Finally, Dennis cites to several cases for
the general proposition that Louisiana law recognizes negligent hiring, supervision, and
training as “stand-alone claims of negligence separate and apart from the theory of
vicarious liability” and that these claims are rooted in the general tort principles of
Louisiana law as expressed in La. C.C. art. 2320. See id. at 6, citing Harris v. Pizza Hut
of Louisiana, 455 So. 2d 1364 (La. 1984), Smith v. Orkin Exterminating, 540 So. 2d 363
(La. App. 1 Cir. 02/28/1989), and Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1991), aff’d on
rehearing, 605 So. 2d 1050 (La. 1992).
C. Louisiana Jurisprudence Weighs in Favor of Greyhound’s Argument.
i.
Greyhound’s Brief Presents a Stronger Argument under Louisiana
Jurisprudence.
From the briefs alone and the cases cited therein, Greyhound’s argument is more
persuasive. It is true that the Louisiana Civil Code states broad tort principles in favor of
allowing claimants to recover against anyone who is at fault for causing them injury, and
that the Code holds masters responsible for their servants’ torts. See La. C.C. arts. 2315,
2320. It is also true that the cases Dennis cites stand for the general proposition that it is
possible to simultaneously maintain both (1) a tort cause of action against an employee
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in an attempt to hold the employer vicariously liable for that tort and (2) an independent
negligent hiring, training, and/or supervision cause of action against the employer.
However, these cases do not address the core of Greyhound’s argument, and they
are factually distinguishable from the instant case. Harris did not involve both a direct
negligence cause of action like negligent hiring, training, and/or supervision against an
employer and a separate negligence cause of action against an employee for which the
plaintiff sought to hold the employer vicariously liable. 455 So. 2d at 1368-69. Rather, the
opinion only discusses a negligence cause of action against the employee for which the
employer was found liable.1 See id. at 1369-72. Smith only confirms that a plaintiff can
mount a successful independent negligent hiring and training cause of action against an
employer when an employee commits an intentional tort. 540 So. 2d at 366, 368. The
plaintiffs in Smith did not file suit based upon the employee’s tort, and if they had, it would
have been for an intentional tort rather than negligence because that case involved a
sexual assault by the employee. See id. at 364, 365 n.3.
In Roberts, the Supreme Court of Louisiana officially recognized the tort of
negligent hiring2 as a cognizable tort under Louisiana law. 605 So. 2d at 1044. The Court
also characterized direct negligence claims against employers and tort claims against
employees for which the employer may be liable as “separate and independent.” Id. at
As the concurring opinion points out, the majority opinion’s dicta hints at other possible
negligence theories, but it appears that the plaintiffs only filed suit on the basis of the
employee’s negligence and not upon any sort of negligent hiring, training, and/or
supervision causes of action. See id. at 1372-73 (Dennis, J., concurring).
2 Though the Court only stated “we now expressly recognize the tort of negligent hiring
as cognizable under” Louisiana law, the preceding and following discussion refers to
negligent hiring, training, commissioning, and retaining employees, so the Court seems
to have extended recognition to all such causes of action. Roberts, 605 So. 2d at 1044.
1
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1037. Additionally, this case did involve allegations of both negligence on the part of an
employee (a deputy sheriff) and negligent hiring and training by his employer (the sheriff),
so it is more factually similar to the instant case than either Smith or Harris. See id. at
1036. However, in Roberts there was a fact question at trial as to whether the deputy
acted in the course and scope of employment when he committed the negligence; the
Court held on appeal that the deputy was not acting in the course and scope of
employment as a matter of law under the evidence presented at trial. See id. at 1041. The
“course and scope” question is not at issue in the instant case, as Greyhound has
stipulated to the fact that the collision occurred while Collins was in the course and scope
of employment. See Record Document 37-2 at 1. Thus, though these cases demonstrate
that it is possible to maintain a direct negligence claim and a tort claim against an
employee for which the employer may be held vicariously liable, they do not directly
address Greyhound’s argument.
Additionally, Dennis misreads Griffin. Dennis reads Griffin correctly in that the
appellate court (1) affirmed the jury’s finding that Kmart was negligent in the training of its
employee and (2) found that the employee’s tortious actions were taken in the scope of
his employment3, such that the employer was liable for all of the plaintiff’s damages. See
Griffin, 776 So. 2d at 1232-33. Dennis errs, however, by failing to recognize two distinct
differences between Griffin and the instant case upon which Greyhound’s argument
3
The actual point of error on appeal was that the trial court had improperly posed a jury
question that called for a legal conclusion by asking, “Is Kmart liable for the intentional
tort of its former employee, Robbie Brown?” Griffin, 776 So. 2d at 1232. Finding that the
question did improperly call for a legal conclusion, the court stated that the correct
question was whether Brown was in the course and scope of employment, found that he
was, and amended the judgment accordingly. See id. at 1232-33.
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relies: (1) the employee’s tort in Griffin was an intentional tort, not mere negligence, and
(2) there was a fact question regarding whether the employee’s tortious actions took place
within the scope of employment, while there is no such question in the instant case. As
explained more fully in Section II, C, ii, infra, these are two major distinctions under a
close reading of Louisiana jurisprudence.
Finally, the general principle Dennis draws from the jurisprudence upon which he
relies does not truly address Greyhound’s argument. Dennis’ broad conclusion based
upon her misreading of Griffin and the other case law she cites that “Louisiana law
supports theories of direct negligence and vicarious liability to hold employers
accountable for their actions and the actions of their employees,” though true, is
overbroad. Record Document 40-1 at 5. This broad conclusion fails to recognize that
while “direct negligence” is an independent negligence cause of action against the
employer, “vicarious liability” is not a cause of action, but rather a method of holding one
party liable for the conduct of another, of which respondeat superior is merely a species.
Greyhound does not argue that a plaintiff can never simultaneously maintain both
(1) a direct negligence (i.e., negligent hiring, training, and or/supervision) cause of action
against an employer and (2) a tort cause of action against an employee for which the
plaintiff seeks to hold the employer vicariously liable. As stated above, Greyhound argues
only that a plaintiff cannot simultaneously maintain both (1) a direct negligence cause of
action against an employer and (2) a negligence cause of action against an employee for
which the plaintiff seeks to hold the employer vicariously liable when the defendant
stipulates that the employee acted in the course and scope of employment. Thus, Dennis’
argument does not address the crux of Greyhound’s basis for the instant Motion.
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ii.
Jurisprudence from the Court’s Own Research Aligns with
Greyhound’s Argument.
In addition to reviewing the authorities the parties rely upon, the Court has
independently searched for other Louisiana jurisprudence on the issue. The most relevant
case the Court has found confirms and expands upon Greyhound’s argument. In S. Pac.
Transp. Co. v. Builders Transp. Inc., a Louisiana federal district court addressed a similar
question and had to make its best Erie guess as to Louisiana law. 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7380 (E.D. La. 1993). There, a tractor-trailer and a train collided. See id. at *2-3. The
railroad (Southern Pacific) filed suit against the owner of the tractor-trailer company
(Builders) and its employee, and Builders filed a counterclaim alleging negligence by the
train crew and negligent entrustment by Southern Pacific. See id. at *3, 27-31. During
discovery, Builders found evidence of negligence by the same train crew on a prior
occasion, and Southern Pacific filed a motion in limine as to the evidence of any prior
collisions or negligent acts involving this crew. See id. at *27-31.
The court granted the motion in limine. See id. at 31. Analyzing the admissibility of
such character evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404, the court stated that generally evidence
of other acts is inadmissible to prove that a person later acted in conformity with a
propensity to engage in such acts. See id. at *28-29. However, evidence of prior acts is
admissible to show negligent entrustment, because such a cause of action involves
analyzing the information the entrustor knew or should have known about the competence
of the entrustee to be entrusted with the vehicle or other item in question.4 See id.
4
Thus, negligent entrustment, though not identical to negligent hiring, training, and/or
supervision causes of action, similarly focuses on the acts of the entrustor/employer in
light of the information available about the entrustee/employee. See Roberts, 605 So. 2d
at 1049-50 (Dennis, J., dissenting). The torts fall into the same category of “direct
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The court held that Builders’ negligent entrustment claim was subsumed in its
negligence claim against the train crew for which Builders sought to hold Southern Pacific
liable under respondeat superior. See id. at 29. Though the court found no Louisiana
cases on the topic and the parties had not cited to any authorities, the court found that
other jurisdictions “have determined that the two causes of action are mutually exclusive”
in this situation. Id. at *30, citing Estate of Arrington v. Fields, 578 S.W.2d 173, 178-79
(Tex.
Civ.
App.—Tyler
1979,
no
writ)
(a
plaintiff
may
not
maintain
a
negligence/respondeat superior claim versus an employee and a negligent hiring or
entrustment claim versus his employer when course and scope of employment is
conceded); see also Roberts, 605 So. 2d at 1047 (stating that common law jurisprudence
can be considered in Louisiana courts under the civilian methodology so long as it is not
inconsistent with the Civil Code’s general principles of liability) (Dennis, J., dissenting).
Thus, because the negligent entrustment claim was subsumed within the negligence
claim versus the train crew, the character evidence of the train crew’s prior acts was
inadmissible. See id. at *30-31.
The above discussion demonstrates that though there is no binding Louisiana
authority on the issue raised in the instant Motion, the available Louisiana jurisprudence
weighs in favor of Greyhound’s argument. In the Court’s opinion, the best synthesis of
these decisions into single rule statements is as follows:
A plaintiff may simultaneously maintain independent causes of action in tort
against both an employee and an employer for the same incident when:
(1) the plaintiff alleges both
(a) an intentional tort by the employee and
negligence” causes of action, and therefore cases like S. Pac. Transp. Co. are still useful
in addressing the issues involved in the instant Motion.
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(b) negligent hiring, training, and/or supervision by the
employer5; or
(2) the plaintiff alleges both
(a) negligence by the employee and
(b) negligent hiring, training, and/or supervision by the
employer; and
(c) the employer does not stipulate that the employee acted in
the course and scope of employment.6
Conversely, a plaintiff may not simultaneously maintain independent
causes of action in tort against both an employee and an employer for the
same incident when the plaintiff alleges both
(a) negligence by the employee and
(b) negligent hiring, training, and/or supervision by the employer; and
(c) the employer stipulates that the employee acted in the course and
scope of employment.7
iii.
The Elements of Cause-in-Fact and Legal Cause Support the
Court’s Conclusion that Greyhound’s Argument is Correct,
Particularly in the Instant Action.
The rule stated above is based, at least in part, on the elements of cause-in-fact
and legal cause, also known as proximate cause. In Roberts, the Louisiana Supreme
Court stated that “cause in fact is generally a ‘but for’ inquiry; if the plaintiff probably would
have not sustained the injuries but for the defendant's substandard conduct, such conduct
is a cause in fact.” 605 So. 2d at 1042. In the Roberts opinion on rehearing, the Court
stated that the key question in a legal cause determination is “whether the risk and harm
encountered by the plaintiff fall within the scope of protection of the [duty].” Id. at 1054.
This inquiry is “ultimately a question of policy.” Id. at 1052.
5
See Griffin, 776 So. 2d 1226 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/28/2000).
See Roberts, 605 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1991), aff’d on rehearing, 605 So. 2d 1050 (La.
1992).
7 See Libersat, 772 So. 2d 173 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/11/2000); see also S. Pac. Transp.
Co., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7380 (E.D. La. 1993).
6
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Libersat most clearly demonstrates that these two causation elements support the
rule the Court is applying on these facts. See 772 So. 2d at 179; see Section II, C, i,
supra. Though the Libersat court did not use the term legal cause in explaining its
decision, the court appears to state that if the driver (Mitchell) was not negligent, then
even if the employer (Patterson) had been negligent in hiring and training Mitchell, there
is no way that Patterson’s negligence could have been either the but-for cause or the
legal cause of the damages to Libersat such that Patterson would be liable for them. In
other words, underlying the court’s decision was the conclusion that even a complete lack
of training or supervision could not have been either a but-for or legal cause of the
plaintiff’s injuries absent some negligence on the part of the employee on the day of the
collision.
The instant case presents a situation that is very factually similar to Libersat, and
it necessitates the same conclusion. As this case is at the summary judgment stage, the
Court must answer the question: is there a genuine issue of material fact on each element
of Dennis’ negligent supervision and training causes of action? See F.R.C.P. 56. Stated
differently, could a reasonable jury find by a preponderance of the evidence presented on
summary judgment that each element of these causes of action is met?
The Court’s answer to this question is that there is no genuine issue of material
fact on the elements of cause-in-fact or legal cause. As in Libersat, the driver (Collins)
was unquestionably acting in the course and scope of employment, and Greyhound has
stipulated to this fact. See Record Document 37-2 at 1. If the trier of fact finds that he was
negligent and that his negligence was a cause-in-fact and legal cause of Dennis’ injuries,
then Greyhound is liable for Collins’ actions. If he was not negligent, then no amount of
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negligence on the part of Greyhound in training and supervising him could have been the
cause-in-fact or legal cause of the collision and Dennis’ injuries. In other words, if the trier
of fact does not find that Collins (exercising his training and under the supervision of
Greyhound on the day of the collision) was negligent on the day of the collision, the trier
of fact could not reasonably find that but-for Greyhound’s failure to properly train and
supervise Collins, the injuries to Dennis would not have occurred. Nor could the trier of
fact reasonably find that Greyhound’s failure to properly train and supervise Collins was
a legal cause of Dennis’ injuries if Collins was not negligent; Greyhound should not be
held liable if its failure to train and supervise Collins did not result in an actual breach of
duty by Collins on the day of the collision. Greyhound’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment must therefore be GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
Greyhound’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment argued that a plaintiff cannot
simultaneously pursue both (1) a negligence cause of action against an employee for
which the employer is vicariously liable and (2) a direct negligent training and supervision
cause of action against the employer when the employer stipulates that the employee
was in the course and scope of employment when he committed the alleged negligence.
See Record Documents 37-2 at 1, 44 at 1-2. From the authorities cited by the parties and
the Court’s own research, the Court finds that Greyhound’s argument is correct. The
Court also finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact on the elements of causein-fact and legal cause, a conclusion that is inherent in the jurisprudence that supports
Greyhound’s argument. Greyhound’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is therefore
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GRANTED, and Dennis’ negligent training and supervision causes of action against
Greyhound are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
A judgment consistent with the terms of the instant Memorandum Ruling shall
issue herewith.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this the 9th day of
November, 2016.
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