Adams v. Shreveport et al

Filing 118

MEMORANDUM RULING re 112 MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by Coleman, Neville, City of Shreveport. Signed by Chief Judge S Maurice Hicks, Jr on 6/12/2018. (crt,McDonnell, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
LEGEE ADAMS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-2637

VERSUS

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

CITY OF SHREVEPORT, ET AL.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a “Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs” (Record Document
112) filed by Defendants, the City of Shreveport (the “City”), Cpl. Colin Neville (“Neville”),
and Cpl. Stacy Coleman (“Coleman”) (collectively the “Defendants”). Defendants seek to
recover all attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
Plaintiff LeGee Adams (“Plaintiff”) opposed the motion. See Record Document 114. For
the reasons set forth below, the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART.
BACKGROUND 1
On November 5, 2015, Plaintiff, through his attorneys, filed a Complaint alleging
various claims against Defendants. See Record Document 2. Prior to filing the Complaint,
Plaintiff’s counsel, specifically the attorneys at Romanucci & Blandin, LLC, submitted a
preservation letter and a public records request to the City, and the City provided copies
of various reports pertaining to Plaintiff’s arrest. See Record Document 112-2, Exh. A;
Record Document 117-1, Exh. A. Plaintiff’s Complaint included the following allegations:
13. At that time, OFFICERS NEVILLE and COLEMAN spotted LEGEE
ADAMS walking with the other male and, without reasonable suspicion or

1

A more detailed factual background can be found in the Court’s Memorandum Ruling on Defendants’
Motion for Partial Summary. See Record Document 64. This “Background” section only states the relevant
facts to Defendants’ instant Motion.

Page 1 of 18

provocation, activated the lights and sirens on their patrol vehicle and
accelerated towards LEGEE ADAMS and the other male.
***
18. Near or on Prentiss Avenue, OFFICER COLEMAN then approached
LEGEE ADAMS, by forcefully and violently grabbing LEGEE ADAMS’
shoulder and then throwing LEGEE ADAMS to the ground.
***
22. Despite hearing and acknowledging LEGEE ADAMS’ statements, and
aware that LEGEE ADAMS was not resisting arrest or attempting to flee,
OFFICER COLEMAN violently grabbed LEGEE ADAMS’ arm, which was
then position below LEGEE ADAMS’ body in an injured and protective
position, and forcefully pulled it behind LEGEE ADAMS’ back.
Record Document 2.
Defendants filed an Answer on December 10, 2015, denying the allegations and
also raising the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. See Record Document 4.
Defendants also affirmatively sought relief in the form of attorneys’ fees and costs
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See id. Defendants did not file a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint, but rather, after the completion of discovery, filed a motion for summary
judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims of false arrest, failure to intervene, the
claim of excessive force against Neville, and all claims against the City. See Record
Document 21. On August 28, 2017, the Court granted the motion and dismissed all claims
except the claim of excessive force against Coleman. See Record Document 64. The
findings of fact and law made by the Court in dismissing these claims were based on
clearly established law. See id.
Defendants acknowledged that there was a genuine dispute of material fact
precluding summary judgment as to the Plaintiff’s claims against Coleman, but at all times
maintained that such claims were disputed. See Record Document 21 at 7. On Sunday,
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March 25, 2018, prior to proceeding to trial, Defendants requested that Plaintiff voluntarily
dismiss his claim against Coleman. See Record Document 112-2, Exh. B. Plaintiff
refused. On March 26, 2018, a jury trial began on Plaintiff’s claims of excessive force
against Coleman. On March 27, 2018, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of
Coleman. See Record Document 102, 103, 110, 111.
Through the course of litigation, the Court held three (3) scheduling conferences
and one (1) pre-trial conference. See Record Documents 14, 36, 75, 95. Prior to filings
related to trial, only twenty (20) documents were filed by both parties in this matter. See
Record Document 114-3. Plaintiff filed six (6) motions in limine prior to trial and one (1)
motion to reconsider the Court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s motions in limine. At trial, Plaintiff’s
case in chief on liability consisted of two witnesses and some other evidence, with the
entirety of the liability portion lasting only a day and a half. See Record Document 114-2.
Defendants filed the instant Motion for Attorneys’ Fees on April 11, 2018, arguing
they are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927. See Record Document 112. Plaintiff opposed the motion and asserts he brought
no frivolous claims and his course of litigation did not unreasonably and vexatiously
multiply the proceedings. See Record Document 114. Defendants have filed a reply. See
Record Document 117. Thus, this matter is fully briefed and ripe for decision.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Defendants argue they are the prevailing party with respect to the Section 1983
claims; thus, they maintain they are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs under
Section 1988(b) and Section 1927, as “Plaintiff’s counsel disregarded well-established
law and/or advocated claims they either knew or should have known lacked factual and

Page 3 of 18

legal support after a reasonable inquiry, and therefore unreasonably and vexastiously
multiplied these proceedings.” Record Document 112-1 at 9.
I.

LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988
Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1988 provides the Court with discretion

to award attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party in Civil Rights' litigation. See 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (2018). The governing law permits prevailing defendants an award of
attorney's fees under section 1988 only upon a finding that the plaintiff's action “was
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after
it clearly became so.” Nance v. New Orleans & Baton Rouge Steamship Pilots Ass'n,
2006 WL 2338193, *8 (E.D. La. 2006), quoting Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434
U.S. 412, 422, 98 S.Ct. 694 (1978) (emphasis added). In the context of prevailing
defendants, Section 1988(b) is meant “to protect defendants from burdensome litigation
having no legal or factual basis.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 833, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 2213
(2011) (citation omitted). The Fox court further reasoned:
[A] defendant may deserve fees even if not all the plaintiff's claims were
frivolous.... That remains true when the plaintiff's suit also includes nonfrivolous claims. The defendant, of course, is not entitled to any fees arising
from these non-frivolous charges. But the presence of reasonable
allegations in a suit does not immunize the plaintiff against paying for the
fees that his frivolous claims imposed.
Id. at 834, 131 S.Ct. at 2214 (internal citations omitted). When a plaintiff has asserted
both frivolous and non-frivolous claims, a court may grant reasonable attorney's fees to
the defendant “only for the costs that the defendant would not have incurred but for the
frivolous claims.” Id.

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In determining whether a suit is frivolous, a district court must focus on the question
of whether or not the case is so lacking in arguable merit as to be groundless or without
foundation rather than whether the claim was ultimately successful. See Jones, 656 F.2d
at 1145. Factors to be considered in making such determination include: “(1) whether the
plaintiff established a prima facie case, (2) whether the defendant offered to settle, and
(3) whether the court held a full trial.” Myers v. City of W. Monroe, 211 F.3d 289, 292 (5th
Cir. 2000). These factors are “guideposts,” and frivolousness must be judged on a caseby-case basis. See Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 440 Fed.Appx. 421, 425 (5th Cir.
2011) (per curiam).The Fifth Circuit has “generally affirmed awards of attorney's fees
where the plaintiff's civil rights claim lacks a basis in fact or relies on an undisputably
meritless legal theory.” Id. “Implicit in this approach is the premise that plaintiff knew or
should have known the legal or evidentiary deficiencies of his claim.” Id.
II.

ANALYSIS
Here, there is no dispute that Defendants were the prevailing parties based on the

Court’s August 28, 2017 memorandum ruling granting partial summary judgment in favor
of the Defendants and the jury verdict in favor of Coleman. 2 See Record Documents 64,
110, 111. The question thus becomes whether Plaintiff’s claims were frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation, or whether Plaintiff continued to litigate after it
clearly became so. The Court will analyze each of Plaintiff’s claims to reach its conclusion.

2

All of Plaintiff’s claims, except for Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Coleman, were dismissed by
the Court’s ruling on Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. See Record Document 65. It is also
apparent that Defendants never offered to settle any of Plaintiffs’ claims.

Page 5 of 18

A. False Arrest Claim
Plaintiff and his counsel argued that Neville and Coleman lacked probable cause
for the arrest, but that argument was rejected by this Court. As the Court recognized,
even under Plaintiff’s version of events, the officers had probable cause to arrest him for
a violation of City Ordinance § 90-462, which requires pedestrians to walk on the left side
of the road facing oncoming traffic, as Plaintiff testified that he was walking on the right
side of the road. See Record Document 64 at 13. Accordingly, the Court granted the
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed Plaintiff’s false arrest claim.
See Record Document 65. As such, Defendants argue this claim was frivolous and
without factual or legal support. See Record Document 112-1. Plaintiff asserts that at the
time he filed his Complaint, he had proper foundation to present a prima facie case for
his claim of false arrest. See Record Document 114 at 11.
Plaintiff was arrested for possession of marijuana and resisting arrest; however,
the resisting arrest charge was subsequently dropped and Plaintiff was only convicted of
possession of marijuana. See Record Document 21-9. Because of this, Plaintiff believes
the Heck doctrine did not bar his claim which was “suitably based on Plaintiff’s
understanding that Defendant Officers effectuated their arrest of Plaintiff without probable
cause resulting in charges that were only substantiated after Plaintiff was searched.”
Record Document 114 at 11. However, the facts of this case and Fifth Circuit
jurisprudence make it clear that Plaintiff’s false arrest claim was barred by Heck; and, as
such, was frivolous.
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that:
[i]n order to recover damages for ... other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983
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plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a
federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A
claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that
has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a
state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be
dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or
sentence has already been invalidated.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994). “The Heck
analysis ... does not make an inquiry to the validity of the plaintiff's claims, but, rather,
considers whether they are inconsistent with a prior criminal conviction.” Jenkins v. Town
of Vardaman, Miss., 899 F.Supp.2d 526, 532 (N.D. Miss. 2012).
In Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868 (5th Cir. 1996), the plaintiff, like Plaintiff herein,
contended that he was falsely arrested because the arresting officer lacked probable
cause to arrest and search him. The plaintiff in Hudson was arrested and found to be in
possession of a firearm. The Fifth Circuit determined that the plaintiff's false arrest claim
was barred by Heck because,
If proved Hudson's false arrest claim necessarily would call into question
his conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm. Specifically, if the
arresting officers lacked probable cause to arrest Hudson for burglary and
the arrest is invalid, the firearm discovered in Hudson's possession as a
result of the arrest would be subject to suppression under the Fourth
Amendment as the ‘fruit’ of an illegal arrest. See United States v. Wadley,
59 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1995). Moreover, it is improbable that doctrines
such as independent source, inevitable discovery and harmless error would
permit the introduction of the firearm as evidence in this case: the police
discovered the firearm in Hudson's possession when he was knocked from
his bike during the burglary arrest and we see no reason reflected in the
record before us to believe that the police would have discovered the
firearm had they not arrested Hudson for burglary. Thus, because a
successful section 1983 action for false arrest on burglary charges
necessarily would imply the invalidity of Hudson's conviction as a felon in
possession of a firearm, Heck precludes this claim.
Page 7 of 18

Hudson, 98 F.3d at 872.
The instant civil action presented a virtually identical claim. The marijuana seized
during the search of Plaintiff led to his conviction on the charge of possession of
marijuana. Therefore, his claim of false arrest, if successful, would necessarily call the
validity of the conviction into question. The record in this case is clear that if Defendants'
stop of Plaintiff, the occurrences surrounding his being taken into custody, and the
subsequent search incidental to arrest (which revealed the drugs that were essential to
the criminal charge) were determined unconstitutional by this Court in this Section 1983
action, such a holding would cast into doubt or potentially invalidate Plaintiff's drug
possession charge. 3 See Birgans v. Louisiana, 2010 WL 2428026, *2-4 (W.D. La. 2010),
adopted, 2010 WL 2485958 (W.D. La. 2010), appeal dismissed, 411 Fed. Appx. 717 (5th
Cir. 2011); Handshaw v. Hilliard, 2015 WL 5177623, *4 (S.D. Miss. 2015).
Here, Plaintiff pled guilty to possession of marijuana on December 16, 2014,
eleven months prior to filing the Complaint. See Record Document 21-9. Plaintiff never
alleged that his conviction had been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or called into
question by a federal court's issuance of writ of habeas corpus; therefore, Plaintiff's false
arrest claim was barred by Heck. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s false
arrest claim was frivolous.

3

Success in this action would call into question the validity of Plaintiff's conviction since if he could establish
that the Defendant Officers lacked probable cause to stop him and lacked probable cause to search his
person, then he would have been able to suppress the marijuana and the instant conviction would surely
not have ensued.

Page 8 of 18

B. Failure to Intervene Claim against Neville
Defendants argue Plaintiff’s failure to intervene claim against Neville was frivolous
since “it was undisputed throughout these proceedings that [ ] Neville could not see or
hear [ ] Coleman and [ ] Adams at the time of the alleged force.” Record Document 1121 at 8. Plaintiff contends he established a prima facie case against Neville, and it was
only after discovery commenced that it was discovered Neville did not see or hear the
altercation. See Record Document 114 at 10.
Generally, to prevail on a failure to intervene/bystander liability claim against an
officer, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant officer (1) knows that a fellow officer is
violating an individual’s constitutional rights; (2) is present at the scene of the
constitutional violation; (3) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (4)
chooses not to act. See Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013). The Court
found there was no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Neville (1) knew that
Officer Coleman was violating Adams’ constitutional rights or (2) had a reasonable
opportunity to prevent the harm that Adams suffered, and dismissed Plaintiff’s claim on
summary judgment. See Record Document 64 at 20.
Although Plaintiff may have had a reasonable foundation to bring this claim against
Neville prior to discovery, the Court notes that Plaintiff continued to litigate the claim after
it clearly became frivolous. See Nance, 2006 WL 2338193 at *8. The evidence made it
clear that once Plaintiff and Coleman turned off the main street, Neville could not see
them or hear them. See Record Document 64 at 21. Additionally, the Court found that
“undisputed summary judgment evidence show[ed] that [ ] Neville was preoccupied with
detaining King, looking up his name for outstanding warrants, and speaking to the local

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resident who offered him water while Officer Coleman was chasing Adams and arresting
him.” Id. at 22. There was simply no evidence pertaining to two elements required for
Plaintiff’s failure to intervene claim, and yet Plaintiff continued to press this claim until
December 7, 2016, after the Defendants filed for summary judgment on November 11,
2016. See DeRamus v. City of Alexandria, 675 F.Appx. 408, 416 (5th Cir. 2017) (affirming
district court’s finding of frivolity where plaintiffs provided no evidence to support their
claims, but still asserted their claims after defendant filed for summary judgment).
Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff’s failure to intervene claim against Neville was
frivolous.
C. Failure to Intervene Claim against Coleman
The undisputed evidence confirmed that it was Coleman who actually used force
against Adams; however, Plaintiff still asserted his failure to intervene claim against
Coleman. See Record Document 2 at 8-11; Record Document 64 at 20. Defendants
argue such a claim was frivolous and notes the Court’s memorandum ruling language, “a
claim against [ ] Coleman–the officer who actually used force–for failure to intervene is
simply illogical and cannot proceed.” Record Document 112-1 at 8. Plaintiff argues his
claim was not frivolous because he only learned the identity of which officer used forced
against him after his case was in suit and discovery had commenced. 4 See Record
Document 114 at 10.
Plaintiff’s argument, however, is not supported by the record or the evidence.
Plaintiff’s counsel obtained the case summary report prior to filing the Complaint, and the
report clearly identified Coleman as the officer who chased and tackled Plaintiff. See

4

“Before discovery commenced, Plaintiff had knowledge that he was stopped by two officers and chased
by at least one.” Record Document 114 at 10.

Page 10 of 18

Record Document 112-2; 117-1. Additionally, Plaintiff in his Complaint identified Coleman
as the officer who used force against Adams:
18. Near or on Prentiss Avenue, OFFICER COLEMAN then approached
LEGEE ADAMS, by forcefully and violently grabbing LEGEE ADAMS’
shoulder and then throwing LEGEE ADAMS to the ground.
***
22. Despite hearing and acknowledging LEGEE ADAMS’ statements, and
aware that LEGEE ADAMS was not resisting arrest or attempting to flee,
OFFICER COLEMAN violently grabbed LEGEE ADAMS’ arm, which was
then position below LEGEE ADAMS’ body in an injured and protective
position, and forcefully pulled it behind LEGEE ADAMS’ back.
Record Document 2.
Plaintiff knew Coleman was the officer who chased and tackled him before filing
suit. Further, Plaintiff specifically alleged it was Coleman who used excessive force
against him in his Complaint. And yet, Plaintiff still asserted his failure to intervene claim
against Coleman – the officer who actually used force. For these reasons, the Court finds
Plaintiff’s claim was frivolous.
D. Excessive Force Claim against Neville
Defendants argue Plaintiff’s inclusion of an excessive force claim against Neville,
which was wholly without evidentiary support, was frivolous. See Record Document 1121. Plaintiff believes this claim was grounded in merit at the time the Complaint was filed,
as he only learned the identity of which officer used force against after discovery
commenced. See Record Document 114 at 10. However, as previously discussed,
Plaintiff retained the case summary report prior to filing the Complaint. This report clearly
identified Coleman as the officer who chased and tackled Plaintiff. Additionally, Plaintiff’s
Complaint fails to even allege that Neville used any force against him. See Record

Page 11 of 18

Document 2. The Court believes Plaintiff’s argument is without merit and Plaintiff’s
inclusion of an excessive force claim against Neville was frivolous.
Even if Plaintiff’s claim against Neville was not frivolous at the time the Complaint
was filed, it most certainly became frivolous after discovery commenced. Plaintiff’s own
deposition testimony stated that only one officer, Coleman, chased him when he ran. See
Record Document 21-1 at 7. Additionally, Neville stated when Plaintiff ran, he detained
Aaron King until Coleman returned with Plaintiff after chasing and handcuffing him. See
Record Document 21-6 at 16. However, after it became clear that Plaintiff’s excessive
force claim against Neville was frivolous, Plaintiff continued to litigate the issue. See
Nance, 2006 WL 2338193 at *8. After Defendants asserted there was no genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether Neville used excessive force, Plaintiff opposed Defendants’
argument, writing more than three pages in support of a claim that was clearly frivolous.
As the Court acknowledged in its Memorandum Ruling,
[T]his section of Adams’ Opposition only mentions Officer Neville in making
the conclusory assertion that summary judgment is inappropriate on
Adams’ excessive force claim against Officer Neville. See Record
Document 27-1 at 8-12. Otherwise, this section only recites the facts of the
incident in question, emphasizes Officer Coleman’s actions and Adams’
injuries, and recites the standards for overcoming a qualified immunity
defense on an excessive force claim. See id. In fact, Adams’ Opposition
confirms that it was Officer Coleman and not Officer Neville who ran after
Adams and allegedly tackled and beat him. See id. at 10 (“Plaintiff ran for a
short distance before being tackled and beaten by Defendant Coleman”).
Finally, in another section of Adams’ Opposition, Adams concedes that
“Officer Neville, himself, did not tackle and batter Plaintiff.” See id. at 13.
Record Document 64 at 18.
The Court believes Plaintiff’s claim was frivolous from the outset as Plaintiff’s
counsel retained the case summary report prior to filing Complaint. However, assuming
arguendo Plaintiff’s claim was not frivolous when the Complaint was filed, it certainly
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became so; and yet, Plaintiff continued to litigate, even after Defendants filed their motion
for summary judgment. See DeRamus, 675 F.Appx. at 416. For these reasons, the Court
believes Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Neville was clearly frivolous.
E. Excessive Force Claim against Coleman
Defendants’ main argument pertaining to the frivolity of Plaintiff’s excessive force
claim against Coleman is that “Plaintiff had presented at least three different versions of
what occurred.” Record Document 112-1 at 6. In this case, the Court finds that
Defendants' argument is not persuasive enough to award costs and attorneys' fees under
Section 1988 with regard to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Coleman. Plaintiff
was able to establish a prima facie case, and his claim was arguably meritorious. 5
Moreover, the Court notes this claim survived summary judgment, proceeded to a full trial
on the merits, survived Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, and went to
the jury. All of these factors weigh heavily in the Court’s decision. 6
There was evidence that Coleman used excessive force against Plaintiff. The
Court allowed a complete trial on this claim and sent it to the jury. Consequently, the Court
cannot find Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Coleman was frivolous.
F. Monell Claims against the City
Defendants assert Plaintiff presented no evidence in support of his claims and
there was no legal authority to support a Monell claim based on a single incident where
there was no notice, and the facts were insufficient to establish a causal connection. See

5

Plaintiff presented evidence at trial that Coleman used excessive force against him during his arrest.
Whether the jury disbelieved Plaintiff’s testimony and credited Coleman’s denial does not influence the
Court’s analysis. See Myers, 211 F.3d at 293.
6 The Court notes Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Coleman meets the majority of the factors
considered in the Fifth Circuit’s determination of frivolity. See Myers, 211 F.3d at 292.

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Record Document 112-1 at 9. Again, the Court does not find the Defendants’ argument
persuasive.
Plaintiff alleged facts in his Complaint and sought discovery to determine if the
alleged violations of his constitutional rights were caused by a lack of training by the City.
See Record Document 2 at 11-14. In City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-90
(1989), the Supreme Court left open the possibility that a pattern of similar violations might
not be necessary to show deliberate indifference “in a narrow range of circumstances,”
one of which is where minimal training has been offered and the duties assigned carry an
obvious need for an additional or different training. Plaintiff produced the deposition
testimony of Neville, Coleman, Lieutenant Jeffrey Peters, and Sergeant Johnson (the
testimony indicated that Shreveport Police Department officers use a subjective standard
for determining the appropriate amount of force, rather than an objective standard, thus
showing officers were generally unfamiliar with the constitutional standards for the use of
force) in an attempt to show there was an obvious need for additional or different training,
and that the Shreveport Police Department’s failure to do so amounted to deliberate
indifference. See Record Document 27-1 at 16-20. The Court eventually dismissed
Plaintiff’s Monell claim, finding Plaintiff’s evidence insufficient to prove deliberate
indifference. See Record Document 64 at 25-28. The Court’s dismissal does not
categorize Plaintiff’s claim as frivolous, however.
The district court’s analysis in Crump-Richmond v. Arambula, 2007 WL 1112685
(D. Nev. 2007), is instructive. There, the court granted a motion for summary judgment
against plaintiff’s Monell claims in an excessive force case against an officer due to
insufficient evidence of policy or inadequate training; however, this insufficiency did “not

Page 14 of 18

mean the claims were groundless, vexatious, frivolous, or brought merely to harass or
embarrass” the defendant. Id. at *2. The court reasoned as follows:
The action against the officer is based upon actions taken within the scope
of the officer's duties. It is not unreasonable to assume that the officer was
acting in accordance with the policies and procedures he had been taught
to follow. Thus, assuming there may likely be violations based upon Monell
is not unreasonable, groundless or without foundation. The fact that Plaintiff
was unable to discover any policies or training (or inadequate training)
which resulted in any excessive force by the officer does not make the
original assumption frivolous. It was merely mistaken, and not sufficient
grounds to grant an award of fees pursuant to Section 1988.
Id.
Here, the Court granted summary judgment against Plaintiff’s Monell claims based
on Plaintiff’s inability to meet the stringent standard of deliberate indifference. Plaintiff
provided evidence for his Monell claim. The Court’s ruling that Plaintiff’s evidence was
insufficient does not make his claim unreasonable or frivolous and is not sufficient to grant
an award of fees pursuant to Section 1988.
G. Sanctions Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927
Defendants do not specifically analyze their claim for sanctions under Section 1927
in either memorandum, instead they conclude Plaintiff “unreasonably and vexatiously
multiplied these proceedings” throughout their argument. See Record Document 112-1.
After reviewing the case record in its entirety, the Court does not believe sanctions under
Section 1927 are appropriate in this instance.
28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in
any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to
satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees
reasonably incurred because of such conduct.

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Section 1927 does “not distinguish between winners and losers or between plaintiffs and
defendants. The statute is designed to curb litigation abuses by counsel, irrespective of
the merits of the client's claims or defenses.” Manton v. Strain, 2011 WL 1000964, *6
(E.D. La. 2011), citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 762 (1980). “An
award of attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is considered ‘punitive in nature’ and
should only be awarded if a party ‘multiplies the proceedings ... unreasonably and
vexatiously.’” Manton, 2011 WL 1000964 at *6, quoting Bryant v. Military Dept. of Miss.,
597 F.3d 678, 694 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Travelers Ins. Co. v. St. Jude Hosp. of Kenner,
La., Inc., 38 F.3d 1414, 1416 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that Section 1927 must be strictly
construed so as “not to dampen the legitimate zeal of an attorney in representing his
client”). This standard, which “focuses on the conduct of the litigation and not on the
merits, requires clear and convincing evidence that every facet of the litigation was
patently meritless and evidence of bad faith, improper motive, or reckless disregard of the
duty owed to the court.” Manton, 2011 WL 1000964 at *6 (internal quotations omitted).
“Punishment under this section, however, is ‘sparingly applied, and except when the
entire course of proceedings were unwarranted and should neither have been
commenced nor persisted in ….’” Butler v. Rapides Foundation, 365 F.Supp.2d 787, 796
(W.D. La. 2005), quoting Meadowbriar Home for Children, Inc. v. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521, 535
(5th Cir.1996). “Accordingly, the emphasis in Section 1927 is that personal liability of
counsel is only for the excess costs, expenses, and fees where counsel both
“unreasonably and vexatiously” multiplies the litigation.” Butler, 365 F.Supp.2d at 797.
The course of Plaintiff’s litigation, filings and conduct with this Court, considered in
their entirety, were not unwarranted, unreasonable or vexatious. On November 5, 2015,

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Plaintiff filed their Complaint. See Record Document 2. On January 4, 2016, Plaintiff filed
a joint 26(f) Report with defense counsel. See Record Document 7. Plaintiff has
maintained each deadline set by this Court in conjunction with their 26(f) Report and
motion to extend granted by this Court. This Court only required three status conferences
and one pre-trial conference to address merit based issues presented by counsel. Prior
to those filed documents relating to trial only twenty documents were filed by both parties
with this Court. See Butler v. Rapides Foundation, 365 F.Supp.2d 787, 797 (W.D. La.
2005) (Where Plaintiff’s counsel filed only twenty-three documents total, only five of which
were generated by Plaintiff, the court found “sanctions under § 1927 for personal liability
inappropriate.”). Upon the Court’s grant of motion for summary judgment on some claims,
Plaintiff respected the Court’s decision and made no further pursuit to litigate those
claims. At trial, Plaintiff presented a concise case in chief that lasted one and one-half
days. See Record Documents 102 and 103. Plaintiff has pursued this case with full
respect and compliance with those duties owed to the court, and without improper motive
or bad faith. Accordingly, the Court finds sanctions against Plaintiff’s counsel under
Section 1927 inappropriate in this matter.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that given established case law, the facts of the case known by
Plaintiff and his counsel at the time Plaintiff filed his action and those learned during
discovery, Plaintiff’s claims of false arrest, failure to intervene, and his excessive force
claim against Neville were frivolous. However, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claim of excessive
force against Coleman and his Monell claim were not frivolous and were reasonable when
filed and litigated. Therefore, the Court will exercise its discretion and decline an award

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of Defendants’ fees for the frivolous claims Plaintiff filed in this case. Instead, the Court
will award Defendants’ costs. The Court believes this award to be appropriate especially
in light of the frivolity of Plaintiff’s false arrest claim, failure to intervene claim against
Coleman, and his excessive force claim against Neville. Accordingly, the Defendants’
motion for attorneys' fees and costs is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. With
respect to costs, the motion is GRANTED. With respect to attorneys’ fees, the motion is
DENIED.
Pursuant to Local Rule 54.3, Defendants are ordered serve on Plaintiff's counsel
and file with the clerk a motion to tax costs on the forms prescribed by the court, together
with a certification that the items are correct and that the costs have been necessarily
incurred.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 12th day of June, 2018.

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