Johnson v. Shreveport et al
Filing
37
MEMORANDUM RULING re 26 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by B M Sotak, City of Shreveport. Signed by Judge S Maurice Hicks on 8/15/2017. (crt,McDonnell, D)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
CALVIN W. JOHNSON, SR.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-0351
VERSUS
JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.
CITY OF SHREVEPORT, ET AL.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE HAYES
MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Record Document 26)
filed by Defendants, Corporal Brad Sotak (“Sotak”) and the City of Shreveport (“the City”).
Defendants seek a judgment dismissing Plaintiff Calvin W. Johnson, Sr.’s (“Johnson”) (1)
federal excessive force claim to the extent same stems from Sotak’s use of handcuffs
when taking Johnson into protective custody; (2) Monell claim against the City in its
entirety; (3) false arrest claim in its entirety; and (4) state law excessive force and
negligence claims to the extent same depend on Sotak’s use of handcuffs when taking
Johnson into protective custody. Defendants have not moved for summary judgment on
the component of the excessive force claim relating to Johnson’s allegation that Sotak
slung Johnson into his vehicle or intentionally caused Johnson to make contact with his
vehicle.
Johnson does not oppose the motion as to the dismissal of the Monell claims
against the City and all claims of false arrest under both federal and state law. See Record
Document 28 at 1. Johnson “opposes the dismissal of any claim arising out of handcuffing
as use of force only in regards to a dismissal’s form and wording.” Record Document 28
at 3. More specifically, Johnson submits:
Plaintiff makes no [claim for] typical handcuffing injuries such as nerve
damage in wrists. However, Plaintiff does claim that being handcuffed (1)
prevented him from avoiding injury, (2) assisted Sotak in his use of force[,]
(3) he should not have been handcuffed at all and (4) is a factor for the jury
to consider whether force was necessary or reasonable.
Record Document 28 at 8.
For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
is GRANTED. Johnson’s Monell claim against the City and his false arrest claims under
both federal and state law are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Johnson’s federal
excessive force claim to the extent same depends on the necessity or lack thereof in
utilizing handcuffs when executing the Order of Protective Custody is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. Likewise, Johnson’s state law battery/excessive force and negligence claims
to the extent same depends on the necessity or lack thereof in utilizing handcuffs when
executing the Order of Protective Custody are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Johnson’s
federal excessive force claim and state law excessive force and negligence claims relating
to the allegation that Sotak slung Johnson into his vehicle or intentionally caused Johnson
to make contact with his vehicle remain.
I.
BACKGROUND
On March 17, 2015, the Caddo Parish Deputy Coroner issued an Order of
Protective Custody. See Record Document 26-8. The order provided:
Description of threats which have led to the belief that the person
needing treatment is mentally ill or suffering from substance abuse and
is in need of immediate hospitalization to protect himself/herself from
physical harm:
Mr. Calvin W. Johnson Jr. (son) came to this Office today
seeking assistance for his father, Calvin W. Johnson Sr.
According to Mr. Johnson his father has a medical history of biPage 2 of 11
polar disorder and previous commitments. For the past week
Mr. Calvin W. Johnson Sr. (father) has been non-compliant
with his medications and refuses to sleep. Today he became
violent with family members and feels that they are plotting on
him. His condition is becoming worse each day. Mr. Calvin
Johnson Jr. (son) feels that Mr. Calvin W. Johnson Sr. (father)
is a danger to himself and others by his actions and condition;
it is ordered that he be picked up and transported to University
Health for psychiatric evaluation and/or treatment.
Id. Johnson does not dispute the validity of the Order of Protective Custody, which ordered
he be taken into custody in accordance with Louisiana Revised Statute 28:53.2. See
Record Document 26-1 at ¶ 1; Record Document 28-1 at ¶ 1.
On March 19, 2015, at approximately 8:58 a.m., Sotak was dispatched to take
Johnson into custody and transport him to University Health in accordance with the Order
of Protective Custody. See Record Document 26-1 at ¶ 3. Sotak proceeded to Johnson’s
location at the Bill Cockrell Recreation Center on Pines Road in Shreveport, Louisiana.
See id. at ¶ 4.1 Upon arriving, Sotak parked his vehicle in the parking lot in front of the
recreation center. See id. at ¶ 5. Sotak then asked dispatch for details concerning the
Order of Protective Custody. See id. at ¶ 6. He was informed that Johnson was noncompliant with his medication, was refusing to sleep, was violent with his family, and that
the family considered Johnson to be a danger to himself and others. See id.
Sotak observed Johnson exiting the gym and entering his vehicle. See id. at ¶ 7.
Sotak then positioned his vehicle behind Johnson’s van. See id. While Sotak’s MVS
captured the initial interaction with Johnson, namely Sotak’s first attempts to handcuff
1
Sotak’s drive to the recreation center, parts of his interaction with Johnson, and his
transportation of Johnson to the hospital were recorded on Sotak’s police vehicle’s motor
vehicle system (“MVS”). See Record Document 26, Exhibit 6 (MVS DVD).
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Johnson, it did not capture “the impact of Johnson’s head to the van” or “all of the
handcuffing.” See id.; see also Record Document 28-1 at ¶ 7. The MVS shows Sotak
proceed to the driver’s side of Johnson’s vehicle. See Record Document 26-1 at ¶ 8;
Record Document 28-1 at ¶ 8. Johnson asks Sotak “what seems to be the problem.” Id.
Sotak asked Johnson to exit the vehicle to speak with him. See id. Johnson agreed and
exited the vehicle. See id. Sotak confirmed Johnson’s identity and asked him to “put your
hands behind your back for me real quick.” See id.; see also Record Document 26, Exhibit
6 (MVS DVD at 09:13:48).
The MVS shows Sotak’s initial interaction with Johnson. See Record Document 26,
Exhibit 6 (MVS DVD at 09:13:48). Johnson did not immediately comply with Sotak’s
command to put his hands behind his back. See id., Exhibit 6 (MVS DVD at 09:13:50).
The MVS shows that Sotak grabbed Johnson’s left wrist and placed a handcuff on it. See
id., Exhibit 6 (MVS DVD at 09:13:52). Johnson’s right hand remained free and he did not
voluntarily extend his right hand for cuffing. See id., Exhibit 6 (MVS DVD at 09:13:55-58).
While the MVS maintains sound, both Sotak and Johnson go outside of camera range at
approximately 09:14:00 and the facts surrounding the incident from this point forward are
contested.
According to Sotak, Johnson moved several times as if to try and face Sotak. See
Record Document 26-1 at ¶¶ 11-12. Each time, Sotak moved to maintain his place behind
Johnson. See id. Sotak eventually grabbed Johnson’s right wrist and tried to bring it
behind Johnson’s back to safely handcuff him. See id. at ¶ 12. Before Sotak could safely
fasten the right handcuff, Johnson spun around and pulled away from Sotak, at which point
Johnson began to fall and at some point made contact with a portion of his own vehicle.
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See id. at ¶ 14. Sotak maintains that he attempted to hold Johnson up when he felt him
begin to fall. See id. at ¶ 15. Sotak was able to handcuff Johnson’s right wrist after
Johnson came to a rest against the side of the driver’s seat of his vehicle. See id. at ¶ 16.
Conversely, Johnson alleges that there was never a command to extend his right
arm and that he tried to face Sotak in an attempt to speak with the officer. See Record
Document 28-1 at ¶¶ 11-12. He maintains that the only movement he made was to face
Sotak to speak. See id. at ¶ 13. Johnson maintains that Sotak deliberately swung him and
forced his head into the van door frame. See id. at ¶¶ 14-15. Johnson submits that he
was, in fact, fully handcuffed prior to being slammed into the van frame and that he did not
need to be handcuffed because he presented no risk or threat. See id. at ¶¶ 12-16.
Sotak secured Johnson. See Record Document 26-1 at 17. Sotak then transported
Johnson to University Health. See id. at ¶ 18. Upon reaching the hospital, Johnson was
transferred to the care of the hospital staff and his interaction with Sotak ended. See id.
at ¶ 19.
Johnson filed suit alleging excessive force under federal law and negligence,
unlawful arrest and excessive force under state law.
See Record Document 1.
Defendants have now moved for summary judgment as to Johnson’s federal excessive
force claim to the extent same stems from Sotak’s use of handcuffs when taking Johnson
into protective custody; Monell claim against the City in its entirety; false arrest claim in its
entirety; and state law excessive force and negligence claims to the extent same depend
on Sotak’s use of handcuffs when taking Johnson into protective custody. See Record
Document 26.
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II.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A.
Partial Summary Judgment Standard.
Rule 56(a) provides, in pertinent part:
Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment. A party may
move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense–or the part
of each claim or defense–on which summary judgment is sought. The court
shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
F.R.C.P. 56(a) (emphasis added); see also Quality Infusion Care, Inc. v. Health Care Serv.
Corp., 628 F.3d 725, 728 (5th Cir.2010). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Quality Infusion Care, Inc., 628 F.3d at 728. “Rule 56[(a)] mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Patrick v. Ridge, 394
F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir.2004).
If the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, “the
nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 141 (5th
Cir.2004). Where critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could
not support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant, then summary judgment should be
granted. See Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir.2005).
“A partial summary judgment order is not a final judgment but is merely a pre-trial
adjudication that certain issues are established for trial of the case.” Streber v. Hunter, 221
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F.3d 701, 737 (5th Cir.2000). Partial summary judgment serves the purpose of rooting out,
narrowing, and focusing the issues for trial. See Calpetco 1981 v. Marshall Exploration,
Inc., 989 F.2d 1408, 1415 (5th Cir.1993).
B.
Qualified Immunity.
“Qualified immunity protects officers from suit unless their conduct violates a clearly
established constitutional right.” Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th
Cir.2003). Once the defendant raises the qualified immunity defense, “the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to rebut this defense by establishing that the official’s allegedly wrongful
conduct violated clearly established law.” Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th
Cir.2008). “Claims that law enforcement officers used excessive force are analyzed under
the Fourth Amendment.” Mace, 333 F.3d at 624, citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989).
The court applies a two-step analysis to determine whether a defendant is entitled
to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. See Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d
404, 410 (5th Cir.2007). First, the court must determine whether the defendant violated
the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See id. “If so, [the court] next consider[s] whether the
defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the
time of the conduct in question.” Id. at 410-411. Even on summary judgment, courts can
not ignore that qualified immunity “gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting
all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Poole v. City of
Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 2012).
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C.
Monell Claim Against the City & False Arrest Claims.
In his opposition, Johnson “agree[d] that there is insufficient evidence to support a
Section 1983 action against the City of Shreveport in its official capacity.” Record
Document 28 at 5.2 Likewise, Johnson agreed that “there is no viable claim for false arrest
under federal or state law.” Id. Thus, all Section 1983 Monell claims against the City and
all false arrest claims under both state and federal law are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
D.
Federal Excessive Force Claim Relating to the Use of Handcuffs.
Johnson conceded in his opposition that he “suffered his injuries after he was
handcuffed or otherwise restrained.” Record Document 28 at 2. He further acknowledged
that he has “no typical handcuffing injuries such as nerve damage in the wrists.” Id. at 3.
He admitted that he has no compensable injury from any immediate physical contact
between handcuffs and his wrists, hands or arms. See id. at 5. Yet, he maintains that the
jury should consider whether handcuffing at all was necessary or reasonable. See id. at
3. More specifically, he contends:
Plaintiff contends that such a ruling as suggested by Defendants has the
danger of convincing a jury that the other use of force of slamming Plaintiff’s
head unto the van door frame is not excessive if caused in part by handcuffs.
The handcuffs are a factor in the use of force complained of herein.
Id. at 5.
In the qualified immunity context, a plaintiff must show the following to succeed on
an excessive force claim: “(1) an injury (2) which resulted directly and only from the use of
2
Johnson does note that his state law vicarious liability claims against the City
remain. See Record Document 28 at 5.
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force that was clearly excessive to the need and (3) the force used was objectively
unreasonable.” Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703 (5th Cir.1999). The Fifth Circuit
has also held that “handcuffing too tightly, without more, does not amount to excessive
force.” Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 314 (5th Cir. 2001). Here, Johnson has
admitted that he has no compensable injury from any immediate physical contact between
handcuffs and his wrists, hands or arms. He has failed to allege more than a de minimis
injury and simply cannot make out a prima facie case for an excessive force claim relating
to Sotak’s use of handcuffs. See Williams, 180 F.3d at 703-704; see also Carlton v.
Fearneyhough, No. 07-10676, 2008 WL 686595, at *2 (5th Cir. Mar. 12, 2008). Therefore,
Johnson has failed to make out a prima facie case of a federal excessive force claim.
Moreover, Johnson’s position that the jury should consider whether handcuffing at
all was necessary or reasonable is misplaced. The summary judgment record contains the
Order of Protective Custody. See Record Document 26-8. The undisputed MVS evidence
further establishes that Sotak asked dispatch for details concerning the Order of Protective
Custody and was informed that Johnson was non-compliant with his medication, was
refusing to sleep, was violent with his family, and that the family considered Johnson to be
a danger to himself and others. See Record Document 26, Exhibit 6. In light of this
information, Sotak’s actions in handcuffing Johnson were objectively reasonable in light of
clearly established law at the time of the incident. See Freeman, 483 F.3d at 410.
Johnson has also pointed to no case law to suggest otherwise. See Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718
F.3d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 2013) (“When there is no controlling authority specifically prohibiting
a defendant’s conduct, the law is not clearly established for the purposes of defeating
qualified immunity.”). At trial, the jury will hear and see evidence that Johnson was
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handcuffed. It will then be for the jury to consider whether any other force used by Sotak
was excessive in light of the fact that Johnson was handcuffed, not whether the initial use
of handcuffs was excessive. See Record Document 29 at 4.
E.
State Law Excessive Force and Negligence Claims Relating to the Use
of Handcuffs.
Johnson has alleged a state law excessive force/battery claim against Sotak in
relation to the use of handcuffs. See Record Document 28 at 1. “Louisiana’s excessive
force tort mirrors its federal constitutional counterpart.” Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156,
172 (5th Cir. 2009). Thus, Johnson’s state law excessive force/battery claim fails for the
same reasons as his federal excessive force claim.
Johnson’s state law negligence claim relating to the use of handcuffs also fails
because this Court has found Sotak’s use of handcuffs to be reasonable under the
qualified immunity analysis. Thus, his negligence claims are undermined. See Roten v.
City of Minden, No. 16-CV-0381, 2017 WL 1398655, at *8 (W.D. La. Apr. 18, 2017) (“The
focus of the qualified immunity inquiry is reasonableness. By finding the actions of Engi
and Young to be reasonable under the qualified immunity analysis, Roten’s state law
negligence claims are undermined.”).
III.
CONCLUSION
This Court holds that partial summary judgment in favor of Defendants is
appropriate as to Johnson’s Monell claim against the City; false arrest claims under both
federal and state law; federal excessive force claim to the extent same depends on the
necessity or lack thereof in utilizing handcuffs when executing the Order of Protective
Custody; and state law battery/excessive force and negligence claims to the extent same
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depends on the necessity or lack thereof in utilizing handcuffs when executing the Order
of Protective Custody. All such claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Johnson’s
federal excessive force claim and state law excessive force and negligence claims relating
to the allegation that Sotak slung Johnson into his vehicle or intentionally caused Johnson
to make contact with his vehicle remain.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Record
Document 26) be and is hereby GRANTED.
An Order consistent with the terms of the instant Memorandum Ruling shall issue
herewith.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 15th day of August,
2017.
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