Lawson v. LifePoint Hospitals Inc et al
Filing
82
MEMORANDUM RULING re 42 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by P H C Minden L P. Signed by Chief Judge S Maurice Hicks, Jr on 9/10/2018. (crt,McDonnell, D)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
THERESA LAWSON
CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-0414
VERSUS
JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.
PHC MINDEN, L.P. d/b/a MINDEN
MEDICAL CENTER
MAGISTRATE JUDGE HAYES
MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Record Document 42) filed
by Defendant PHC Minden, L.P. d/b/a Minden Medical Center (“MMC”). MMC seeks
dismissal of Plaintiff Theresa Lawson’s (“Lawson”) sole claim that she was not promoted
to a full-time Case Manager position because of her race. See id. MMC argues it had a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision and Lawson cannot prove pretext.
See id. Lawson opposes the motion and maintains that she has met her burden as to
pretext because she was clearly more qualified than the candidate that was selected and
she has evidence of racial discrimination. See Record Documents 53 & 61. For the
reasons set forth below, the MMC’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and
Lawson’s Title VII racial discrimination claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
MMC is a 161-bed acute care hospital located in Minden, Louisiana. See Record
Document 42-2 at ¶ A(1); Record Document 53-2 at ¶ A(1). It serves a population of more
than 70,000. See id. More than 1,800 people each month seek emergency care in its
emergency facility alone. See id. Other services include oncology, rehabilitation (both
inpatient and outpatient), diagnostic imaging, intensive care, home health, a Breast Care
Center, and the Heart Center of Minden. See id.
MMC hired Lawson, an African American, as a Registered Nurse (“RN”) in the
position of a staff floor nurse on July 20, 2003. See Record Document 42-2 at ¶ B(2);
Record Document 53-2 at ¶ B(2). Lawson’s job at MMC was her first “real job” after
graduating Grambling State University in 2002 with a Bachelor of Science degree in
Nursing. Id. at ¶ B(3); Record Document 53-3 at ¶ B(3). Lawson worked at MMC
continuously from July 2003 through November 2014, whether in a full-time, part-time or
contract capacity. More specifically, she worked at MMC from July 20, 2003 to July 9,
2004 on a full-time basis and then changed to PRN status (as needed). See id. Lawson
began working as a RN for Community Specialty Hospital (“CSH”) while continuing to work
PRN at MMC. See id. Lawson continued to work at CSH until it closed in 2007. See id.
at ¶ B(4); Record Document 42-2 at ¶ B(4).
In 2007, Lawson again began working exclusively for MMC. See id. She worked
under a Staffing Agreement until May 21, 2013. See id. at ¶ B(5); Record Document 53-2
at ¶ B(5). During this time, Lawson worked in the Med-Surgery Unit (“Med-Surg”) on the
night shift. See id. at ¶ B(6); Record Document 53-2 at ¶ B(6). Lawson enjoyed the
nursing responsibilities and taking care of patients, but admitted she felt overwhelmed at
times due to nursing staff turnover. See id. at ¶ B(7); Record Document 53-2 at ¶ B(7).
During the time period of 2008-2011, Lawson cross-trained as a relief Case
Manager on the night shift. See id. at ¶ B(8); Record Document 53-2 at ¶ B(8). The
number of relief shifts worked by Lawson is disputed. MMC contends Lawson worked a
total of 23 shifts as a Case Manager. See Record Document 42-2 at ¶ B(9). Lawson
maintains that she worked more than 23 shifts. See Record Document 53-3 at ¶ B(9).
Lawson admitted that she felt stressed and/or overwhelmed from time to time when she
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worked as a Case Manager. See Record Document 42-2 at ¶ B(10); Record Document
53-2 at ¶ B(10).
In June 2013, MMC stopped using Staffing Agreements for its PRN nurses. See
id. at ¶ B(11); Record Document 53-2 at ¶ B(11). MMC offered Lawson a full-time position
as an RN in Med-Surg on the 2nd shift and she accepted the offer. See id. Just two
months later, Lawson resigned from working full-time as a RN in Med-Surg and requested
to go back to PRN status . See Record Document 42-2 at ¶ C(12); Record Document 53-2
at ¶ C(12). Lawson made this change primarily because it allowed her to work at night,
which paid a shift differential, and it was more convenient because it allowed her to take
care of her mother. See Record Document 42-2 at ¶ C(13); Record Document 53-2 at ¶
C(13). MMC granted her request. See Record Document 42-2 at ¶ C(14); Record
Document 53-2 at ¶ C(14).
Pursuant to MMC’s normal process for an employee who resigns a full-time position,
Mary Winget (“Winget”), Human Resources Director, conducted an exit interview with
Lawson on September 5, 2013. See Record Document 42-2 at ¶ D(15); Record Document
53-2 at ¶ D(15). During the exit interview, Lawson told Winget that she was transferring
to PRN status because had to care for her mother, felt stressed at home and at work, and
could not commit to a full-time day position. See Record Document 42-2 at ¶ D(16);
Record Document 53-2 at ¶ D(16).
On September 6, 2013, after her resignation from a full-time position back to PRN
status, Lawson learned of an opening for a full-time Case Manager position on the night
shift and applied for the position. See Record Document 42-2 at ¶ E(17); Record
Document 53-2 at ¶ E(17). Jamie Malone (“Malone”) also applied for the position. See
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Record Document 42-2 at ¶ E(18); Record Document 53-2 at ¶ E(18).
Malone, a
Caucasian, had worked as an RN in the Intensive Care Unit at MMC since October 2008
and had prior supervisory experience, including working as a Charge Nurse for two
different hospitals. See Record Document 42-2 at ¶ E(19); Record Document 53-2 at ¶
E(19). While Lawson disputes Malone’s prior experience in case management and
Malone’s qualifications, the summary judgment evidence establishes that both Lawson and
Malone met the minimum qualifications for the full-time Case Manager position. See
Record Document 42-2 at ¶¶ E(19-20); Record Document 53-2 at ¶¶ E(19-20).
MMC interviewed Lawson and Malone on September 11, 2013. See Record
Document 42-2 at ¶ E(21); Record Document 53-2 at ¶ E(21). The interview team
consisted of Cheryl Whatley (“Whatley”), the Case Management Manager, and three
employees who worked in Case Management, Charlotte Collins, Derek Milwee, and
Debbie Madhouse. See Record Document 42-2 at ¶ E(22); Record Document 53-2 at ¶
E(22). The interview team interviewed Lawson first, and then interviewed Malone. See
Record Document 42-2 at ¶ E(23); Record Document 53-2 at ¶ E(23). Lawson admitted
that she does not know how Malone performed in the interview. See Record Document
42-2 at ¶ E(34); Record Document 53-2 at ¶ E(34).
Whatley called Lawson later that day to inform her that the interview team had
made the decision to select Malone as the night shift Case Manager. See Record
Document 42-2 at ¶ E(35); Record Document 53-2 at ¶ E(35). Whatley told Lawson that
although she thought Lawson may have done a good job, she did not appear enthusiastic
or excited about getting the position during the interview. See Record Document 42-2 at
¶ E(36); Record Document 53-2 at ¶ E(36). Lawson did not speak to any of the other
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interviewers about why they made the decision to place Malone in the position instead of
her. See Record Document 42-2 at ¶ E(37); Record Document 53-2 at ¶ E(37). Lawson
does not know why the interview team decided to choose Malone over her and does not
know if Malone interviewed better than she did or not. See Record Document 42-2 at ¶
E(39); Record Document 53-2 at ¶ E(39). Lawson does not dispute that the interviewers
unanimously believed that Malone interviewed better, appeared to be very excited and
wanted the challenge of a new position, and that Lawson did not appear as excited about
the opportunity as Malone. See Record Document 42-2 at ¶ E(40); Record Document 53-2
at ¶ E(40).
In a previous Memorandum Ruling, this Court dismissed Lawson’s claims against
Defendant Lifepoint Health, Inc. See Record Document 28. Lawson’s Title VII retaliation
claim and her state law claims for race discrimination and retaliation were likewise
dismissed. See Record Documents 28-29. Lawson’s sole remaining claim is her Title VII
failure-to-promote racial discrimination claim. See id. MMC has now moved for dismissal
of this remaining claim. See Record Document 42.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I.
Summary Judgment Standard.
Summary judgment is proper pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Quality Infusion Care, Inc. v. Health Care Serv.
Corp., 628 F.3d 725, 728 (5th Cir. 2010). “A genuine [dispute] of material fact exists when
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
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Id. at 728. During this stage, courts must look to the substantive law underlying the lawsuit
in order to identify “which facts are material.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986).
“Rule 56[(a)] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir. 2004).
If the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, “the
nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there
is a genuine [dispute] for trial.” Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 141 (5th
Cir. 2004). The court is to view “the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party.” Tubos de Acero de Mexico, S.A. v. Am. Int’l Inv.
Corp., Inc., 292 F.3d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Harris v. Serpas, 745 F.3d 767,
771 (5th Cir. 2014). Yet, a nonmovant cannot meet the burden of proving that a genuine
dispute of material fact exists by providing only “some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a
scintilla of evidence.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). Where
critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a
judgment in favor of the nonmovant, then summary judgment should be granted. See
Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005). The court should not,
in the absence of any proof, presume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the
necessary facts. See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
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II.
Failure to Promote Race Discrimination Standard.
To establish a prima facie case of Title VII racial discrimination involving a failure
to promote claim, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) she belongs to a protected group under
Title VII; (2) she applied for and was qualified for the position she sought; (3) she was not
promoted to the position sought; and (4) her employer promoted an employee to the
position sought by the plaintiff who was not a member of the protected class. See McFall
v. Gonzales, 143 Fed.Appx. 604, 607 (5th Cir. 2005), citing Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid
Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 316-17 (5th Cir. 2004). “[A] plaintiff must establish all four elements
of the case in order to prove that she was treated differently.” Id., citing Scales v. Slater,
181 F.3d 703, 709 (5th Cir.1999).
If the plaintiff establishes these requirements, then a presumption of discrimination
arises and the defendant must then rebut by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employment decision. See Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955,
957 (5th Cir. 1993). Once the defendant articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason,
“the presumption of . . . discrimination established by the employee’s prima facie case
dissolves.” Id. at 957. When the defendant employer has met its burden of production,
then “the plaintiff’s burden of persuasion then arises and [she] must prove that the
proffered reasons are not just pretexts but pretexts for . . . discrimination.” Id.
In the pretext stage of the burden-shifting framework, the plaintiff is given a “full and
fair opportunity to demonstrate” that the defendant’s proffered reason is not true, but
instead is a pretext for intentional discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 507-508, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2746 (1993). At the summary judgment stage, this means
“the plaintiff must substantiate [her] claim of pretext through evidence demonstrating that
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discrimination lay at the heart of the employer’s decision.” Price v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 283
F.3d 715, 720 (5th Cir. 2002). “If the plaintiff can show the employer’s asserted justification
is false, this showing, coupled with a prima facie case, may permit the trier of fact to
conclude that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff without additional evidence.”
Id., citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097,
2109 (2000). Notwithstanding, even this showing is not always sufficient to prevent
summary judgment, as there will be cases where a plaintiff has both established a prima
facie case and set forth ample evidence to reject the defendant’s explanation, yet “no
rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory.” Id., citing Reeves,
530 U.S. at 148, 120 S.Ct. at 2109. The decision of whether to grant summary judgment
turns on many factors, “including the strength of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, the
probative value of the proof that the employer’s explanation is false, and any other
evidence that supports the employer’s case and that properly may be considered.” Id.,
citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148-149, 120 S.Ct. at 2109.
III.
Analysis.
Here, MMC concedes that Lawson “can establish a prima facie case” of racial
discrimination.
Record Document 42-1 at 9. Thus, for purposes of the instant
Memorandum Ruling, the Court will assume that Lawson has met her prima facie case and
MMC must rebut Lawson’s prima facie case by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for not promoting Lawson. MMC has offered competent summary judgment
evidence that its decision to promote Malone over Lawson was based on the interview
performances of Lawson and Malone, namely the interview team unanimously agreeing
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that Malone would do a better job in the position.” Record Document 42-3 at 58.
Whatley’s declaration provides the following information regarding the decision to promote
Malone over Lawson:
•
Malone was looking forward to the challenge of a new position;
•
Malone had prior supervisory experience, was detail oriented and
organized, and had a critical care background;
•
The interview team agreed that Malone was genuinely excited about
the opportunity, whereas Lawson seemed to be entirely motivated by
her desire for a lower stress position at night that would be more
convenient for her; and
•
The interview team was impressed with Malone’s enthusiasm and
interest in the position and believed that she was genuinely interested
in joining the Case Management Department.
Id. Based on the foregoing, this Court holds that MMC has satisfied its burden of
presenting a legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason for promoting Malone in lieu
of Lawson. See Mayes v. Office Depot, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 878, 890 (W.D. La. 2003).
Because MMC has offered a nondiscriminatory reason for its promotion decision,
the burden shifts back to Lawson to show that MMC’s reason is merely a pretext for
discrimination. Lawson may demonstrate pretext by “showing that the employer's proffered
explanation is false or unworthy of credence.” Churchill v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice,
539 Fed.Appx. 315, 319 (5th Cir. 2013), citing Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th
Cir. 2003). “An explanation is false or unworthy of credence if it is not the real reason for
the adverse employment action.” Id. “Alternatively, a fact finder can infer pretext if it finds
that the employee was ‘clearly better qualified’ (as opposed to merely better or as qualified)
than the employees who are selected.” Churchill, 539 Fed.Appx. at 319, citing EEOC v.
La. Office of Cmty. Servs., 47 F.3d 1438, 1444 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted).
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Lawson argues that MMC’s nondiscriminatory reason was merely pretext for racial
discrimination based on the following: (1) Lawson was clearly more qualified than Malone
for the Case Manager position; (2) “evidence of racial discrimination”; (3) MMC record
keeping - destruction of evidence; (4) failure to produce documents; and (5) the selection
committee acted in a completely arbitrary and discriminatory manner. Record Document
53-1 at 14-22; see also Record Document 61.
The Court will take each of these
arguments in turn.
A.
Clearly More Qualified.
Lawson maintains that she was clearly more qualified than Malone because of her
professional education, training, experience and job performance. See Record Document
53-1 at 14. She points to “her formal evaluations, recommendations and other statements
and assessments documenting her many years of successful service to MMC.” Id. at 15.
Lawson notes that she had extensive cross-training, while Malone “had worked in only one
unit of the hospital (ICU) since her employment at MMC.” Id. Finally, Lawson highlights
her “successful work[]” as a relief Case Manager on the night shift. Id.
The Fifth Circuit has held that it is hard to find untruthfulness on the part of the
employer when “its judgments on qualifications are somewhere within the realm of reason”
Deines v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 282 (5th Cir. 1999).
The fact that one candidate has “better education, work experience, and longer tenure with
the company do[es] not establish that [she] is clearly better qualified.” Price, 283 F.3d at
723. The “clearly better qualified” standard requires “that disparities in qualifications must
be of such weight and significance that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial
judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in
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question.” Bright v. GB Bioscience Inc., 305 Fed.Appx. 197, 205 n. 8 (5th Cir. 2008). “In
order to establish pretext by showing the losing candidate has superior qualifications, the
losing candidate’s qualifications must ‘leap from the record and cry out to all who would
listen that [she] was vastly-or even clearly-more qualified for the subject job.’” Price, 283
F.3d at 723.
In Autry v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 704 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), the plaintiff,
an African American male, argued that he was better qualified than the Caucasian female
selected for the open position because he had experience working with the employer for
two years, a Bachelor’s degree, and several years of experience for the open position,
unlike the individual that was selected for the position. See id. at 345-346. Baker, the
Caucasian female hired for the position, had no formal education beyond high school, no
apparent connection to the employer, and had no work experience for the open position.
See id. at 346. The employer acknowledged Autry’s work experience and educational
background, but selected the other candidate based on her qualifications and interview
performance. See id. at 347. The Fifth Circuit reasoned:
Here, though Autry’s qualifications are sterling, Autry failed to introduce any
evidence shedding light on Baker’s credentials or work experience. Indeed,
in his deposition, Autry conceded that he had never met Baker, did not know
how Baker had performed in her interview, had no idea what Baker’s former
job as an escrow officer entailed, and had never seen Baker’s résumé. . . .
Ultimately, the record gives a trier of fact no reasonable basis upon which to
compare Autry and Baker’s respective qualifications for the support manager
position, and Autry’s first theory of pretext must therefore fail at the summary
judgment stage.
Id. at 347-348.
Here, Lawson admitted that she did not know what Malone’s interview entailed, if
Malone interviewed better, or what questions the interview committee asked Malone. See
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Record Document 42-3 at 99. It is undisputed that Lawson had experience working as a
relief Case Manager and Malone did not. Likewise, Lawson held a Bachelor’s degree, as
compared to Malone’s associate degree. Yet, neither Lawson’s tenure, educational
background, nor her experience establish that she was “clearly more qualified” than
Malone, and the Court will not sit as a super-personnel department to review MMC’s
decision. See Nichols v. Lewis Grocer, 138 F.3d 563, 568-569 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that
losing applicant’s longer tenure and more varied work experience with the company did not
make her “clearly better qualified” than the winning applicant); Price, 283 F.3d at 723 (“[The
plaintiff]’s education, work experience, and longer tenure with the company do not establish
that he is clearly better qualified … Although [his] qualifications are sufficient, they do not
“leap from the record” when contrasted with [the selected candidate].”); McLendon v.
Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 31785, *11 (5th Cir. May 31, 2001) (noting
that employment discrimination laws have not “vested in the federal courts the authority to
sit as super-personnel departments reviewing the wisdom and fairness of the business
judgments made by employers” and dismissing the plaintiff’s claim because the evidence
established only that the employer made a “judgment call” as to who was the better
qualified candidate for the position at issue). The summary judgment record does not
present a situation where Lawson’s qualifications “leap from the record and cry out to all
who would listen that [she] was vastly-or even clearly-more qualified for the subject job.”
Price, 283 F.3d at 723. Lawson’s reliance on her subjective belief that she was better
qualified than Malone and that discrimination occurred is insufficient to demonstrate
pretext. See Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 337 (5th Cir. 1997).
Page 12 of 18
B.
Evidence of Racial Discrimination.
Lawson argues there is evidence of race discrimination in her not being selected for
the position, including no other black person in a full-time Case Management Supervisor
position; the interview committee was comprised of all whites; no black person(s) in the
Case Management department; and the MMC transfer/promotion procedures were not
followed in this case. See Record Document 53-1 at 15-16.
The Court holds Lawson’s arguments are not sufficient to raise a genuine dispute
of material fact as to pretext. Lawson has offered no competent summary judgment
evidence to link these pieces of evidence to racial discrimination. Lawson’s mere opinion
or belief with no supporting evidence is insufficient to support pretext. See Rowe v. Jewell,
88 F.Supp.3d 647, 671 (E.D. La. 2015). As to the lack of African Americans in the Case
Management department, the Court finds guidance in Runnels v. Tex. Children’s Hosp.
Select Plan, 167 Fed.Appx. 377 (5th 2006).
In Runnels, eight African-American
technicians filed a racial discrimination suit against their employer alleging that they were
not promoted for various positions due to their race. See id. at 379-380. In affirming
summary judgment in favor of the employer, the Fifth Circuit noted that “the lack of
African-American management does not appear to be relevant as to whether management
engaged in purposeful discrimination against [the plaintiffs].” Id. at 383. Simply put, the
lack of African Americans in the Case Management department at the time Lawson
interviewed for the position – without more – is not determinative on the issue of whether
MMC’s proffered reason for its business decision was pretext.
The same is true as to Lawson’s point that the interview committee was comprised
of all whites. “It is beyond dispute that the fact that the interviewers were white and
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[Lawson] is black does not amount to proof of pretext but is merely [Lawson]’s subjective
belief.” Calvin v. Mississippi Dep’t of Rehab. Servs., No. 3:12CV258TSL, 2013 WL
372332, *2 (S.D. Miss. 2013), citing Auguster v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 400,
402-03 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that a plaintiff must offer substantial evidence of pretext
amounting to more than her subjective belief of discrimination). Likewise, Lawson’s
argument that MMC’s failure to follow transfer/promotion procedures is insufficient to
create a genuine dispute of material fact as to pretext.
The Fifth Circuit has held
repeatedly that “an employer’s ‘disregard of its own hiring system does not of itself
conclusively establish that improper discrimination occurred or that a nondiscriminatory
explanation for an action is pretextual.’” Churchill, 539 Fed.Appx. at 320, quoting EEOC
v. Tex. Instruments Inc., 100 F.3d 1173, 1182 (5th Cir.1996). Any disregard by MMC of
its own promotion or transfer procedures does not prove racial discrimination absent a
showing by Lawson that discrimination was a motive in the employment action taken. See
id. at 320 n. 4, quoting Sanchez v. Tex. Commission Alcoholism, 660 F.2d 658, 662 (5th
Cir.1981). Lawson has merely speculated and has presented no evidence that any alleged
failure to follow transfer/promotion procedures was motivated by race discrimination. See
Deines v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 281 (5th Cir.1999)
(Courts must remain cognizant that the ultimate issue is ‘whether the employer’s selection
of a particular applicant over the plaintiff was motivated by discrimination.”). Lawson has
merely speculated and has presented no evidence that MMC’s alleged failure to follow
procedures was motivated by race discrimination.
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C.
MMC Record Keeping - Destruction of Evidence and Failure to Produce
Documents.
Lawson notes that “all written evidence of the interview and selection process was
knowingly and intentionally destroyed by the MMC Director of Case Management
immediately following the interview of the personal selected.” Record Document 53-1 at
16. Lawson argues that the spoliation of records has prejudiced her case and is evidence
of pretext. See id. at 16-17. She asks that any documents “created” after the interview
and selection process by Human Resources Director Winget be excluded from evidence
and an adverse inference under Rule 37 be applied. Id. at 17. Lawson further contends
that MMC failed to produce documents at Whatley’s deposition, namely documents from
Lawson’s personnel file relating to the selection and interview process. See id. at 18-19.
Whatley stated in her declaration that “if any notes were made by the interview
team, they were not kept because we made a decision to select Ms. Malone immediately
after the interviews concluded.” Record Document 42-3 at 59. Lawson appears to allege
that the destruction of any such notes was intentional spoliation and creates an inference
of pretext. While the destruction of any such notes may have been in violation of EEOC
regulations (see Record Document 53-1 at 16 n. 2), MMC has extensively explained the
interview and selection process through the deposition testimony and declaration of
Whatley and consideration of any “recreated” document by Winget is simply unnecessary.
Additionally, competent summary judgment evidence indicates that the notes were
allegedly destroyed immediately after the interviews were completed, not after the filing of
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Lawson’s employment discrimination claims.1 Furthermore, in Assariathu v. Lone Star
Health Mgmt. Assocs., L.P., 516 F. App’x 315, 320-321 (5th Cir. 2013), the interviewer’s
notes were lost and the Fifth Circuit reasoned:
That [defendants’] choices were arguably wrong or poorly executed does not
change our analysis “so long as those decisions are not the result of
discrimination.” Jackson v. Watkins, 619 F.3d 463, 468 n. 5 (5th Cir.2010)
(per curiam). Moreover, [defendants’] alleged “disregard of its own hiring
system does not of itself conclusively establish that improper discrimination
occurred or that a nondiscriminatory explanation for an action is pretextual.”
EEOC v. Tex. Instruments Inc., 100 F.3d 1173, 1182 (5th Cir.1996) (internal
quotation omitted).
Assariathu, 516 Fed.Appx. at 320-321.
Lawson further contends that MMC failed to produce documents in discovery from
her personnel file that were relevant to the selection and interview process. Again, it
appears Lawson believes this creates an inference of pretext and seeks sanctions under
Rule 37. This Court’s scheduling order provides the following:
March 16, 2018
6.
DISCOVERY COMPLETION and DISCOVERY
1
Lawson asks for an adverse inference under Rule 37 to be applied. See Record
Document 53-1 at 17. The doctrine of spoliation allows a jury to draw an adverse inference
“that a party who intentionally destroys important evidence in bad faith did so because the
contents of those documents were unfavorable to that party.” Whitt v. Stephens County,
529 F.3d 278, 284-285 (5th Cir.2008). Such inference is predicated on bad conduct of the
defendant and the circumstances of the bad act must manifest bad faith. See Vick v.
Texas Employment Commission, 514 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1975).
“Because the alleged spoliation here occurred before any litigation was filed, [Rule]
37, which is a procedural rule that governs conduct during the pendency of a lawsuit, does
not apply.” Lopez v. Kempthorne, 684 F.Supp.2d 827, 890 (S.D. Tex. 2010), citing Beil v.
Lakewood Engineering and Mfg. Co., 15 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir.1994). Notwithstanding,
the Court may rely on its inherent power to impose sanctions. See id., citing Duque v.
Werner Enterprises, Inc., Civil Action No. L–05–183, 2007 WL 998156, *2 (S.D.Tex. Mar.
30, 2007) and Toon v. Wackenhut Corrections Corp., 250 F.3d 950, 952 (5th Cir.2001).
However, the Court denies Lawson’s request for a Rule 37 adverse inference in this matter
because the record simply is devoid of any evidence to support a culpable state of mind
in the alleged destruction of the notes.
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MOTIONS.
To allow time for responses, written discovery must be
served more than thirty (30) days before the deadline.
Motions to compel must be filed by this date.
Record Document 41 at 3. Lawson has to date not filed a motion to compel production of
the personnel documents. Moreover, the February 15, 2018 Notice of Deposition issued
as to Whatley, which purportedly seeks the production of the documents from MMC, did
not allow MMC the required 30 days to respond prior to the closure of discovery on March
16, 2018. See Record Document 65-1 at 5-8. Lawson’s arguments as to MMC’s
destruction of notes and failure to produce documents appear to be her attempt to cast
doubt on MMC’s articulated reason and are insufficient to meet her burden as to pretext.
See Bienkowski v. Am. Airlines, 851 F.2d 1503, 1508 n. 6 (5th Cir.1988) (“But, merely
casting doubt on the employer’s articulated reason does not suffice to meet the plaintiff's
burden of demonstrating discriminatory intent.”).
D.
The Selection Committee Acted in a Completely Arbitrary and
Discriminatory Manner.
Finally, Lawson argues that the interview committee acted in a completely arbitrary
and discriminatory manner because they considered her emotional response and
excitement, which she characterizes as entirely subjective, in making the employment
decision. See Record Document 53-1 at 19-20. This argument fails to create a genuine
dispute of material fact as to pretext. In Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., LLC, 332 F.3d
874 (5th Cir. 2003), the Fifth Circuit held that “the mere fact that an employer uses
subjective criteria is not . . . sufficient evidence of pretext.” Id. at 882. Again, Lawson’s
subjective beliefs and mere opinions with no supporting evidence are insufficient to support
pretext. See Rowe, 88 F.Supp.3d at 671.
Page 17 of 18
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, this Court finds that Lawson is unable to meet her
burden of persuasion and prove that MMC’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its decision to promote Malone over Lawson was a pretext for racial discrimination.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Record Document 42)
filed by MMC is GRANTED and Lawson’s Title VII racial discrimination claim is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
A Judgment consistent with the terms of the instant Memorandum Ruling shall issue
herewith.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 10th day of September,
2018.
Page 18 of 18
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