Ray v. Public Safety & Corrections

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM RULING re 1 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Jimmie Noel Ray. Signed by Judge S Maurice Hicks on 10/07/2016. (crt,McDonnell, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
JIMMIE N. RAY

CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-810

VERSUS

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is Jimmie N. Ray’s (“Ray”) request for a temporary restraining
order (TRO). See Record Document 1. Ray seeks a TRO “to prohibit Dept. of Public
Safety and Corrections, from requiring [him] to register as a Sex Offender at the Caddo
Parish Sheriff’s Office.” Id. at 1.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At the outset, it should be noted that Ray’s factual and legal contentions supporting
his argument for a TRO are somewhat unclear. It appears that Ray was originally
convicted of sexual battery in January, 1993, and was released from prison for that
offense in October, 1995. See Record Document 1-1 at 2. He then pleaded guilty to
another offense on August 23, 2004, and received a sentence of five years in prison. See
Record Document 1 at 2. After his release on April 9, 2008, Ray was re-arrested on April
17, 2008 for failure to abide by court order. See id. He was tried and convicted, and was
sentenced to serve one year in prison. See id. On April 16, 2009, Ray was released. See
id. Ray was then “arrested for a third time for the same offense” and was then tried,
convicted, and sentenced to two more years in prison. Id. It seems that he was then
released on June 21, 2011. See id. Ray filed this application for a TRO on June 9, 2016.
See id.
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LAW AND ANALYSIS
Ray argues that the requirement that he continue to register as a sex offender
violates numerous provisions of both the United States Constitution and the Louisiana
Constitution, including that the requirement constitutes an unconstitutional ex post facto
law and slavery or involuntary servitude. See Record Document 1 at 1, 4 ¶ 6. He seeks a
TRO on this basis. See id.
A TRO is a form of equitable injunctive relief that preserves the status quo of the
parties until there is an opportunity to hold a full hearing on an application for a preliminary
injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). “A court may issue a TRO without written or oral
notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a
verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will
result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition, and (B) the
movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why
it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).
To obtain a temporary restraining order, "the moving party must establish four
factors: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that
failure to grant the injunction will result in irreparable injury, (3) the threatened injury
outweighs any damage that the injunction may cause the opposing party, and (4) the
injunction will not disserve the public interest." Harris v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 115871 at *8-9 (W.D. La. 2012), citing Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103,
1107 (5th Cir. 1991). Injunctive relief "is an extraordinary remedy and should be granted
only if the movant has clearly carried the burden of persuasion with respect to all four

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factors." Allied Marketing Group, Inc. v. CDL Marketing, Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir.
1989).
As a threshold matter, the Court may not issue a TRO in this case because (a)
Ray has not sworn to specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint that clearly show
that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to him before the DOC
can be heard in opposition, and (b) Ray has not certified in writing any efforts made to
give notice of the filing of the request for a TRO to the DOC and the reasons why such
notice should not be required. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).
The Court will nonetheless address one of the factors Ray has the burden of
establishing to obtain a TRO. First, Ray must establish that he has a substantial likelihood
of success on the merits of her argument. The Court finds that he has virtually no
likelihood of success on the merits, as challenges to the Louisiana Sex Offender
Registration Statute, La. R.S. § 15:542, and others like it under both the Louisiana
Constitution and the United States Constitution have generally failed. See State ex rel.
Olivieri v. State, 779 So. 2d 735, 749-50 (La. 02/21/2001); see also Smith v. Doe, 538
U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003). Ray’s request for a TRO is therefore DENIED.
An order consistent with the terms of the instant Memorandum Ruling shall issue
herewith.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this the 7th day of October,
2016.

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