Mark Doyle Construction L L C et al v. Tri H M Foundation L L C et al

Filing 109

MEMORANDUM RULING re 89 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by First Standard Asurety L L P. Signed by Chief Judge S Maurice Hicks, Jr on 8/8/2018. (crt,McDonnell, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
MARK DOYLE CONSTRUCTION ,
LLC, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-0674

VERSUS

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

TRIHM FOUNDATION, LLC, ET AL.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is Defendants, First Standard Asurety, LLP (“FSA”) and David
Harris’ (“Harris”) (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2). See Record Document 89. For the reasons that
follow, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Record Document 89) is DENIED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The present lawsuit was initially filed in a Texas federal district court then
subsequently transferred to this Court. Accordingly, it is necessary to discuss the factual
and procedural history of both the Texas court and this Court.
A.

Texas Lawsuit.

Plaintiffs, Mark Doyle Construction, LLC (“MDC”) and Woodrow Wilson 1 (“Wilson”)
(collectively “Plaintiffs” in the Texas lawsuit) filed this lawsuit on March 21, 2016 in the

1

On March 13, 2017, Wilson signed an affidavit that assigned his rights to MDC. Wilson’s
affidavit states:
For valuable consideration, I assign and transfer to Mark Doyle
Construction, LLC, any and all past, present, or future claims, whether
known or unknown, and whether based on tort, contract, or other theory of
recovery, that have accrued or that may accrue later, or otherwise be
acquired on account of, or in any way grow out of, or that are the subject of
the Lawsuit, and (b) any and all judgments and recoveries whatsoever
arising from or related to the lawsuit.
Page 1 of 21

United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division. See
Record Document 1. The President of MDC is Mark Doyle (“Doyle”). 2 MDC named as
Defendants TriHM Foundation, LLC (“TriHM”), Dr. Jackqueline Cooper (“Dr. Cooper”),
FSA, and Harris. See id. MDC voluntarily dismissed TriHM and Dr. Cooper from this
lawsuit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A) leaving only Defendants,
FSA and Harris. See Record Document 20.
Plaintiffs’ original Complaint is vague as to the parties involved and their roles in
the alleged fraud and conspiracy. However, MDC’s amended Complaint is more specific
and will be further discussed infra. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs’ original Complaint alleges that
Defendants contacted Plaintiffs, in Louisiana, to solicit investments for a company in
Texas. See Record Document 1 at pp. 1-4. Plaintiffs claim that they were fraudulently
induced into investing $88,000 in TriHM. See id. at pp. 2-3, ¶ 11. MDC allegedly paid
$30,000, $30,000, $3,000, and $3,000 for a total of $66,000. See id. at p. 3, ¶ 11. Wilson
allegedly paid $20,000 and $2,000 for a total of $22,000. See id. Defendants allegedly
refused to return MDC’s $88,000. See id. at ¶ 13. Consequently, Plaintiffs asserted claims
for fraud and conspiracy and sought to recover compensatory and punitive damages as
well as attorney fees. See id. at pp. 3-4.

See Record Document 45. After reviewing this affidavit and the relevant law, the Court
determines that this assignment of rights is valid. Therefore, Wilson is no longer a Plaintiff
in the present action.
Two other friends of Mark Doyle, President of MDC, Caldwell Dunn (“Dunn”) and
Johnny Smith (“Smith”) also invested in TriHM and like Wilson signed an affidavit that
assigned their rights to MDC. Accordingly, these assignments are likewise valid.
2

In the present action, Doyle, as the President of MDC, was the decision maker as it
relates to the alleged fraud and conspiracy. Therefore, the Court considers Doyle’s
actions as those of MDC.
Page 2 of 21

Defendants answered Plaintiffs’ original Complaint on July 28, 2016. See Record
Document 13. In their Answer, Defendants claim that the court lacked personal
jurisdiction over them because Plaintiffs’ original Complaint did not allege that Defendants
committed any acts within the forum state of Texas. See id. at p. 1.
On February 28, 2017, Defendants moved to dismiss MDC’s lawsuit for lack of
personal jurisdiction. See Record Document 35. In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants
claim that there were no allegations in Plaintiffs’ original Complaint that Defendants ever
did business in Texas to establish personal jurisdiction. See id. at p. 5. Plaintiffs
responded to Defendants’ Motion requesting that as an alternative to dismissal, the Court
grant it leave to file a motion to transfer venue to the Western District of Louisiana. See
Record Document 43 at p. 8. In reply, Defendants stated that, “[w]hile it is up to the Court
as to whether or not to transfer this matter to another jurisdiction, it is evident that much
of the same arguments against jurisdiction in Texas would be relevant to an argument
against jurisdiction in Louisiana.” Record Document 48 at p. 9.
On April 26, 2017, Magistrate Judge Bemporad issued a Report and
Recommendation. See Record Document 49. Judge Bemporad recommended that
instead of granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction that
MDC’s alternative request be granted transferring this lawsuit to this Court. See id. District
Judge Biery adopted Judge Bemporad’s Report and Recommendation on May 22, 2017.
See Record Document 51. The case was transferred and assigned to this Court that same
day.

Page 3 of 21

B.

Louisiana Lawsuit.

On May 25, 2017, Magistrate Judge Hornsby issued a Memorandum Order
requesting MDC 3 file an amended Complaint setting forth each party’s domicile and
explain in a separate memorandum how the amount in controversy element has been
met pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1332. See Record Document 55. Defendants have raised the
issue of this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit so this will be further
discussed by the Court infra.
On August 10, 2017, MDC filed its amended Complaint that is currently before the
Court. See Record Document 65. Again, MDC has asserted claims for fraud and
conspiracy and seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages as well as attorney
fees. See id. at pp. 3-4.
MDC in its amended Complaint alleges that in or around November 2013,
Defendants accepted the terms of a $400,000 payment from Dr. Cooper in return for
helping her obtain investors. See id. at p. 3, ¶ 9. MDC alleges that Harris met with Dr.
Cooper in Texas so that they could discuss procuring a T-Listed surety and combine their
contacts to obtain assets for investment in TriHM. See id.; Record Document 47-2 at p.
12, Email Exchange.
MDC alleges that on February 6, 2014, at approximately 9:12 p.m., Doyle received
a telephone call from Harris. See Record Document 65 at ¶ 10. Harris inquired into
whether Doyle would be interested in investing in a mega-million dollar project that one
of his clients, Dr. Cooper, was steering. See id. Doyle had no prior relationship with Dr.

3

As noted supra, at this point in the litigation, Wilson, an original Plaintiff in this lawsuit
assigned his rights to MDC. See Record Document 45. Accordingly, MDC is the only
remaining Plaintiff.
Page 4 of 21

Cooper, but was a longtime client of Harris and FSA. See id. During the conversation,
Harris explained further that the investment would be in a Texas foundation, which he
described as a $5 billion business that would operate throughout the United States and
some third world countries. See id. Harris allegedly requested Doyle to consider the
investment since it was an investment that potentially provided an extremely high and
quick return. See id. Initially, Doyle was skeptical of the opportunity. See id. However,
after several minutes, Doyle alleges that Harris convinced him by promising that any
money invested in TriHM, Harris would insure with a bond issued by FSA. See id.
Following the phone call, MDC alleges that Harris emailed Dr. Cooper to inform
her that he procured a final investor for her project. See id. at ¶ 11. As a quid pro quo for
obtaining MDC’s investment, MDC alleges that Harris requested that Dr. Cooper pay him
a fee of $1 million in addition to the $400,000 Dr. Cooper promised him for extending the
bond issued by FSA. See id.
Approximately ten minutes after emailing Dr. Cooper, MDC alleges that Harris
once again called Doyle, but this time it was a conference call with Dr. Cooper. See id.
MDC alleges that Harris again ensured that FSA would bond the $30,000 that MDC had
agreed to invest. See id. Moreover, MDC alleges during that call Harris instructed him to
send the funds directly to Dr. Cooper in Texas so that she could put the money in a trust
account. See id.
MDC alleges that numerous phone calls took place throughout the following weeks
with both Harris and Dr. Cooper working to establish and confirm payment. See id.

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Furthermore, MDC alleges that documents were issued to the investors 4that they
believed to be valid indemnity bonds listing the investors as beneficiaries and TriHM as
FSA’s client. See id. Between February and March of 2014, MDC along with Wilson,
Dunn, Smith, and Thomas allegedly paid Dr. Cooper a total of $161,130, of which $13,300
was intended for the premiums for the Financial Guarantee Indemnity Bonds issued by
FSA. See Record Document 68 at p. 4, ¶ 12; Record Document 47. Doyle alleges that
through MDC he invested $80,830. See Record Document 68 at p. 4, ¶ 12.
However, MDC along with the other investors allegedly never received
membership certificates, investment certificates, bonds, etc., in, to or by TriHM or any
other entity/person. See Record Document 65 at p. 4, ¶ 13. MDC alleges that the
documents given to the investors purporting to be Financial Guarantee Indemnity Bonds
issued by FSA at or before the time the investors gave Dr. Cooper their investment were
fake. See id. at ¶ 13.
The parties’ relationship soured when MDC demanded payment on the bonds. See
id. MDC alleges that Defendants claimed that since Dr. Cooper never paid for the bonds,
they never were in effect. See id. Nonetheless, MDC alleges that Defendants received
some portion of funds from Dr. Cooper and TriHM, not only for the bonds, but as
consideration of the $1.4 million promised to him as compensation for brining in the
investors. See id.

4

The investors include Doyle’s friends, Wilson, Dunn, Smith, and a man by the name of
Vernon Thomas (“Thomas“), who appears to have no relationship with Doyle or MDC.
Page 6 of 21

LAW AND ANALYSIS
I.

Jurisdiction
MDC’s amended Complaint does not invoke federal question jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1331. The sole basis for jurisdiction is an assertion of diversity jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which places the burden on MDC, the party invoking federal
jurisdiction, to plead particular facts that establish the requisite amount in controversy and
complete diversity of citizenship between itself and Defendants. See St. Paul
Reinsurance Co. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1998).
Although Defendants’ Motion is titled “Defendants First Standard Asurety and
David Harris’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of In Personam Jurisdiction and Brief to Support
Motion”, Defendants contend that MDC fails to meet the jurisdictional amount in
controversy of Section 1332. See Record Document 89. Therefore, it is clear to the Court
that Defendants are actually challenging this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(1).
II.

Standard of Review
A.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

“A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is non-waivable and may be challenged
at any time.” Martin ex rel. Martin v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., Civil Action No. 14-508, 2014
WL 5465838, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 28, 2014). Courts may dismiss a lawsuit for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on any one of three different bases: “(1) the complaint alone;
(2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts in the record; or (3) the complaint
supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Ramming

Page 7 of 21

v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Barrera–Montenegro v.
United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir.1996)).
Rule 12(b)(1) challenges to subject matter jurisdiction come in two forms: “facial”
attacks and “factual” attacks. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir.
1981). A “facial” attack consists of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion unaccompanied by supporting
evidence that challenges the court's jurisdiction based solely on the pleadings. See id. at
523. A “factual” attack challenges the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact,
irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings—such as testimony and
affidavits—may be considered. Id. Because the parties have each submitted evidence
outside the pleadings, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is a “factual” attack, and the Court
will consider the evidence in the record, resolving any disputed facts.
B.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) lack of personal jurisdiction

A motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) allows a party to move to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). “Where a defendant challenges
personal jurisdiction, the party seeking to invoke the power of the court bears the burden
of proving that jurisdiction exists.” Luv N'Care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 469
(5th Cir. 2006) (citing Wyatt v. Laplan, 686 F.2d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1982)). When a court
rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary
hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. See
Rd. Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669, U.A., AFL-CIO v. CCR Fire Prot., LLC, Civil
Action No. 16-448-JWD-EWD, 2018 WL 3076743, at *4 (M.D. La. June 21, 2018).
“Moreover, on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, uncontroverted
allegations in the plaintiff's complaint must be taken as true, and conflicts between the

Page 8 of 21

facts contained in the parties' affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor for
purposes of determining whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction exists.”
Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting D.J. Investments, Inc. v.
Metzeler Motorcycle Tire Agent Gregg, Inc., 754 F.2d 542, 546 (5th Cir.1985)). Courts
may consider “affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony, or any combination
of the recognized methods of discovery.” Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir.
2002) (quoting Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985)).
III.

Applicable Law
A.

Subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332

A person’s domicile rather than residency is what courts must determine for
diversity of citizenship purposes. See Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
& Co., 313 F.3d 305, 310 (5th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, “[c]itizenship of a LLC is
determined by the citizenship of all of its members.” Harvey v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 542
F.3d 1077, 1080 (5th Cir. 2008). “The citizenship of a limited partnership is based upon
the citizenship of each of its partners.” Id. at 1079.
To meet the jurisdictional amount, the plaintiff’s damages must be greater than
$75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In other words, to meet the jurisdictional amount the
plaintiff’s damages must be at least $75,000.01. If the sum claimed by the plaintiff is
apparently made in good faith, that sum controls. See St. Paul Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v.
Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir.1998). Moreover, “[e]vents occurring
subsequent to the institution of suit which reduce the amount recoverable below the
statutory limit do not oust jurisdiction.” Carter v. Westlex Corp., 643 F. App'x 371, 376
(5th Cir. 2016) (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 290,

Page 9 of 21

58 S. Ct. 586, 591 (1938). Consequently, in order for courts to grant a party’s motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for failure to meet the jurisdictional amount in
controversy requirement, “it must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for
less than the jurisdictional amount.” St. Paul Reinsurance Co., 134 F.3d at 1253 (quoting
St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289, 58 S. Ct. 586, 590
(1938)). Furthermore, “discretion is vested in the trial court to determine whether the claim
meets the jurisdictional amount and the standard–whether expressed in terms of good
faith or legal certainty–clearly favors those parties seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the
federal court.” Lee v. Kisen, 475 F.2d 1251, 1253 (5th Cir.1973) (internal citation omitted).
B.

Personal jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment

“A federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if
(1) the forum state's long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over that defendant;
and (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” McFadin v. Gerber, 587 F.3d 753, 759 (5th Cir. 2009). The
Louisiana long-arm statute is intended to effectuate “specific jurisdiction over an out-ofstate defendant who has not consented to suit in the state of Louisiana.” Charles v. First
Fin. Ins. Co., 97-1185 (La. Ct. App. 3rd Cir. 3/6/98), 709 So.2d 999, 1001, writ denied,
98-0933 (La. 5/15/98), 719 So.2d 466. “The Louisiana long-arm statute 5 authorizes the

5

La. Rev. Stat. § 13:3201 provides:
A. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, who acts
directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from any one of the
following activities performed by the nonresident:
(1) Transacting any business in this state.
(2) Contracting to supply services or things in this state.
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exercise of personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process.” Choice Healthcare, Inc. v.
Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Colo., 615 F.3d 364, 367 (5th Cir. 2010); see La. Rev. Stat.
§ 13:3201(b). Therefore, the Court need only consider the second step of the inquiry of
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendants comports with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Due process is satisfied for personal jurisdiction purposes when: (1) the defendant
has purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the forum state by
establishing “minimum contacts” with that state; and (2) the exercise of personal

(3) Causing injury or damage by an offense or quasi offense
committed through an act or omission in this state.
(4) Causing injury or damage in this state by an offense or quasi
offense committed through an act or omission outside of this state if
he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives revenue from goods used or
consumed or services rendered in this state.
(5) Having an interest in, using or possessing a real right on
immovable property in this state.
(6) Non-support of a child, parent, or spouse or a former spouse
domiciled in this state to whom an obligation of support is owed and
with whom the nonresident formerly resided in this state.
(7) Parentage and support of a child who was conceived by the
nonresident while he resided in or was in this state.
(8) Manufacturing of a product or component thereof which caused
damage or injury in this state, if at the time of placing the product into
the stream of commerce, the manufacturer could have foreseen,
realized, expected, or anticipated that the product may eventually be
found in this state by reason of its nature and the manufacturer's
marketing practices.
B. In addition to the provisions of Subsection A, a court of this state may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident on any basis consistent
with the constitution of this state and of the Constitution of the United States.
Page 11 of 21

jurisdiction does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at
367 (quoting Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999)).
The “minimum contacts” prong of the two-part test may be further subdivided into
contacts that give rise to general personal jurisdiction and specific personal jurisdiction.
Choice Healthcare, Inc., 615 F.3d at 368. General jurisdiction is proper when the
defendant’s contacts within the forum state are not only “substantial”, but “continuous and
systematic” and unrelated to the pending litigation. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.
117, 127, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014). Therefore, general jurisdiction is typically
unavailable unless it can be fairly said that the defendant is “at home in the forum state.”
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 131 S. Ct. 2846,
285 (2011).
“When the contacts are less extensive, the court may still exercise specific
personal jurisdiction where a ‘nonresident defendant has purposefully directed its
activities at the forum state and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of
or relate to those activities.’” Choice Healthcare, Inc. v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of
Colo., 615 F.3d 364, 368 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Walk Haydel & Assocs., Inc. v. Coastal
Power Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 235, 243 (5th Cir. 2008)). “A single act by the defendant
directed at the forum state, therefore, can be enough to confer personal jurisdiction if that
act gives rise to the claim being asserted.” Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co.,
9 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Courts construe a non-resident
defendant’s actions as “purposefully avail[ing] themselves of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Id.
at 419 (citations omitted). Therefore, “[t]he non-resident[] [defendant’s] purposeful

Page 12 of 21

availment must be such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court in the forum state.” Id. (internal quotation omitted) (citations omitted).
However, “[e]ven if “minimum contacts” exist, the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant will fail to satisfy due process requirements if the assertion
of jurisdiction offends ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id. at 421
(citations omitted). In determining this fundamental fairness issue, courts examine a
number of factors such as: “(1) the defendant's burden; (2) the forum state's interests;
(3) the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief; (4) the judicial system's interest
in efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the state's shared interest in furthering
fundamental social policies.” Id.
IV.

Analysis
The Court will first determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the

present lawsuit before determining whether it has personal jurisdiction over Defendants.
A.

Whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit.

As noted supra, in order for the Court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the
present lawsuit there must be complete diversity of citizenship and the amount in
controversy must be greater than $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
1.

Complete diversity of citizenship

MDC is a limited liability company with two members, Mark and Sharon Doyle, who
are both domiciled in Louisiana. See Record Document 65. Therefore, MDC is a citizen
of Louisiana for jurisdiction purposes. See Harvey v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 542 F.3d
1077, 1080 (5th Cir. 2008). FSA is a limited liability partnership, and Harris, the sole
limited partner of FSA, is domiciled in Georgia. See Record Document 93. Therefore,

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FSA and Harris are citizens of Georgia for jurisdiction purposes. See Harvey, 542 F.3d at
1079. Accordingly, complete diversity of citizenship exists between MDC and Defendants.
2.

Amount in controversy

Defendants first argue that the amounts MDC claims to have paid have varied
depending on MDC’s filings and is not supported with evidence. See Record Document
89 at p. 11. Next, Defendants argue that MDC cannot aggregate the alleged loss by the
various individuals in order to meet the jurisdictional amount. See id. Lastly, Defendants
argue that the losses MDC has alleged to have suffered is less than the required amount
in controversy. See id.
MDC’s amended Complaint alleges that it along with Wilson, Dunn, Smith, and
Thomas paid Defendants a total of $161,130 of which $13,300 was intended for the
premiums for the Financial Guarantee Indemnity Bonds issued by FSA. See Record
Document 65 at p. 4, ¶ 12. MDC’s Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction alleges that it
paid $80,830 from its own funds. See Record Document 68 at p. 4, ¶ 12. The Court has
no reason to believe that the sum claimed by MDC was made in bad faith. Moreover,
Defendants have failed to attach to their Motion to Dismiss evidence that would show bad
faith by MDC or showing that to a legal certainty the amount in controversy is not greater
than $75,000. See St. Paul Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253
(5th Cir.1998).
Therefore, based on these allegations, the Court finds that MDC has met the
jurisdictional amount required. See Lee v. Kisen, 475 F.2d 1251, 1253 (5th Cir.1973)
(“[D]iscretion is vested in the trial court to determine whether the claim meets the
jurisdictional amount and the standard–whether expressed in terms of good faith or legal

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certainty–clearly favors those parties seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal
court.”). In other words, the Court finds that it does not appear to a legal certainty that
MDC’s claim is less than the required jurisdictional amount.
Even MDC’s original Complaint meets the jurisdictional amount. MDC’s original
Complaint alleges it paid Defendants $66,000. $66,000 coupled with a punitive damages
award for fraud would likely exceed the required jurisdictional amount. See St. Paul
Reinsurance Co., 134 F.3d at 1253 n. 7 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hilbun, 692 F. Supp.
698, 701 (S.D. Miss. 1988)) (“Punitive damages can be included to reach the amount in
controversy requirement if, under the governing law of the suit, they are recoverable.”).
Defendants’ argument that the amounts MDC claims to have paid have varied
depending on MDC’s filings and is not supported with evidence holds no merit. As noted
supra, “[e]vents occurring subsequent to the institution of suit which reduce the amount
recoverable below the statutory limit do not oust jurisdiction.” Carter v. Westlex Corp., 643
F. App'x 371, 376 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.,
303 U.S. 283, 290, 58 S. Ct. 586, 591 (1938). For these same reasons, Defendants’
argument that because previous Defendants, Dr. Cooper and TriHM, were dismissed
from the lawsuit and the amount recoverable against the present Defendants is allegedly
only $13,300 holds no merit. Moreover, Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of its
Motion to Dismiss also lacks any evidence or case law to support its arguments.
Consequently, at this stage in the litigation, the Court rejects Defendants’ claim
that MDC has failed to meet the amount in controversy element of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) Motion is DENIED.

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Because the Court determined that MDC itself meets the jurisdictional amount in
controversy, it is unnecessary for the Court to determine whether the parties, who
assigned their rights to MDC, claims can be aggregated to meet the jurisdictional amount
in controversy.
B.

Whether the Court has general personal jurisdiction over Defendants.

In the present action, MDC argues that this Court has general personal jurisdiction
over Defendants. To support this position, MDC argues that since March 28, 2012, FSA
has been registered with the Louisiana Secretary of State as a non-Louisiana (Georgia)
partnership doing business in Louisiana. See Record Document 101-1, Secretary of State
Website, Exhibit A. However, without more, the appointment of an agent for service of
process and the registration to do business within the state, does not satisfy the criteria
to exercise general jurisdiction. See Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966
F.2d 179, 182 (5th Cir.1992) (There is no case law within the Fifth Circuit that supports
the proposition that the appointment of an agent for process and the registration to do
business within the state, without more, suffices to satisfy the criteria for the exercise of
general jurisdiction.). MDC also argues that FSA has been previously sued in Louisiana
state court to support general personal jurisdiction. See Record Document 101 at p. 2.
Finally, evidence in the record reveals that since June 3, 2014, FSA was an individual
surety to MDC, a Louisiana citizen. See Record Document 47-12, Letter, Exhibit 11.
Nonetheless, the Court is not persuaded by MDC’s arguments in support of
general personal jurisdiction. The evidence offered by MDC does not amount to
Defendants’ contacts within the forum state that are not only “substantial”, but “continuous
and systematic” and unrelated to the pending litigation. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571

Page 16 of 21

U.S. 117, 127, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014). Therefore, the Court is not persuaded that
Defendants are “at home” in Louisiana based on the evidence offered by MDC. See
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 131 S. Ct. 2846,
285 (2011). Accordingly, the Court rejects MDC’s claim that this Court has general
personal jurisdiction over Defendants.
C.

Whether the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over FSA.

The Court will first determine whether MDC has established that Defendants had
“minimum contacts” with Louisiana to meet the first prong of a specific personal
jurisdiction analysis. If the Court determines that Defendants had sufficient “minimum
contacts,” the Court will analyze whether exercising specific personal jurisdiction over
Defendants would offend the “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
1.

Minimum Contacts

Defendants argue that there was not sufficient contact with Louisiana for the Court
to exercise specific personal jurisdiction. See Record Document 89. However, MDC’s
amended Complaint and Doyle’s affidavit rebut this contention. See Record Document
65; Record Document 101-2, Affidavit of Mark Doyle, Exhibit B. Furthermore, Defendants
have failed to offer evidence or case law to support its position that this Court lacks
specific personal jurisdiction.
On February 6, 2014, Harris telephoned Doyle in Louisiana to pitch a mega-milliondollar project in which investors were being sought to fund a Texas foundation that would
operate throughout the United States and some third world countries. See Record
Document 101-2 at p. 2, ¶¶ 4-5, Exhibit B. Harris assured Doyle that any investments
would be insured with a bond issued by FSA. See id. at ¶ 6. Other telephone calls and e-

Page 17 of 21

mails by Harris and FSA to Doyle in Louisiana followed. See id. at p. 3, ¶ 9. However,
Harris in his affidavit contends that no follow up calls or emails ever took place. See
Record Document 89-1 at p. 2, ¶¶ 9-10, Affidavit of David Harris. Nonetheless, “conflicts
between the facts contained in the parties' affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff's
favor for purposes of determining whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction
exists.” Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting D.J. Investments,
Inc. v. Metzeler Motorcycle Tire Agent Gregg, Inc., 754 F.2d 542, 546 (5th Cir.1985)).
Therefore, the Court credits this part of Doyle’s affidavit rather than Harris’.
MDC bears the initial burden of proving that this Court has specific personal
jurisdiction over Defendants. See Luv N'Care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 469
(5th Cir. 2006). In the present action, the allegations of multiple phone calls and emails
to MDC, a Louisiana citizen, soliciting MDC’s investment by Harris and FSA is sufficient
for the Court to find that the “minimum contacts” prong is met. See Ruston Gas Turbines,
Inc. v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 1993) (“A single act by the defendant
directed at the forum state, therefore, can be enough to confer personal jurisdiction if that
act gives rise to the claim being asserted.”). Furthermore, the allegation that as a quid pro
quo for obtaining MDC’s investment, Harris requested that Dr. Cooper pay him a fee of
$1 million in addition to the $400,000.00 Dr. Cooper promised him for extending the bond
issued by FSA only strengthens the Court’s finding. See id. This allegation, taken as true,
shows that Defendants were intrinsically involved in the funding of TriHM by soliciting
Louisiana investors.
Moreover, Defendants should have been aware and likely were aware that delivery
of a bond to a Louisiana resident could result in litigation over that bond in a Louisiana

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court, even if that bond was never delivered. Thus, Defendants should have reasonably
anticipated being haled into court in Louisiana. See Ruston Gas, 9 F.3d at 419 (“The nonresident[] [defendant’s] purposeful availment must be such that the defendant should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum state.”). Accordingly, based on
the factual allegations in MDC’s amended Complaint and Doyle’s affidavit, the Court holds
that MDC has met the “minimal contacts” prong of a specific personal jurisdiction analysis.
2.

Traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice

As noted supra, in determining this fundamental fairness issue, courts examine a
number of factors such as: “(1) the defendant's burden; (2) the forum state's interests;
(3) the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief; (4) the judicial system's interest
in efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the state's shared interest in furthering
fundamental social policies.” Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415,
421 (5th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, the Court will examine the relevant factors.
i.

Defendants’ burden

“[O]nce minimum contacts are established, the interests of the forum and the
plaintiff justify even large burdens on the defendant.” Wright v. Davis, Civil Action No.
308CV97 DPJ-JCS, 2008 WL 4999165, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 19, 2008) (quoting Wien
Air Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt, 195 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir.1999)). Georgia and Louisiana are
not neighboring states and the distance between them is significant. However, the Court
rejects any contention by Defendants that it would be unduly burdensome for Defendants
to appear before this Court. It should also be noted that Defendants have failed to show
how defending this lawsuit in Louisiana would be unduly burdensome. Accordingly, the
Court finds that the burden on Defendants to be minimal.

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ii.

Louisiana’s interest

MDC, a Louisiana citizen, as well as other Louisiana citizens have been allegedly
wronged by the actions of Defendants. Accordingly, this Court has an interest in
adjudicating the matter and providing a forum for the redress of injuries to its citizens.
iii.

MDC’s interest in convenient and effective relief

MDC’s office is in Bossier City, Louisiana and Doyle resides in Bossier City. This
Court encompasses Bossier City. Moreover, a significant number of likely witnesses to
the present action reside in Louisiana though Dr. Cooper resides in Texas and Harris
resides in Georgia. Therefore, substantially all the witnesses reside in Louisiana.
Accordingly, MDC’s interest in convenient and effective relief is high.
iv.

Judicial system's interest in efficient resolution of
controversies

This case was transferred from a Texas federal district court to the present one.
Accordingly, the interstate judicial system's interest in promoting the most efficient
resolution of the controversy is best served by adjudication of MDC’s claims in the current
forum where it has been pending since August 10, 2017.
v.

Louisiana’s shared interest in furthering fundamental
social policies

There is nothing before the Court which suggests that the fifth factor, the shared
interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies, has
any application in the present case.

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Based on the Court’s analysis of the aforementioned factors, the Court’s exercise
of specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants will not offend the “traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.”
Therefore, MDC has met its burden of establishing a prima facie case of specific
personal jurisdiction, i.e., MDC has establish sufficient “minimum contacts” of Defendants
with Louisiana and exercising jurisdiction over Defendants will not offend the “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2) is DENIED. The Court finds that MDC has met the jurisdictional
amount required in 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Furthermore, it is appropriate for the Court to
exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants.
An order consistent with the terms of the instant Memorandum Ruling shall issue
herewith.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, on this the 8th day of
August, 2018.

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