Poe v. Fuller et al

Filing 125

MEMORANDUM ORDER re 110 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Pamela Hearn. Signed by Judge Elizabeth E Foote on 10/20/2020. (crt,Keifer, K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
ARCHIE POE

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 17-913

VERSUS

JUDGE ELIZABETH ERNY FOOTE

BRUCE FULLER, ET AL.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY
MEMORANDUM ORDER

Now before the Court is Defendant Dr. Pamela Hearn’s (“Hearn”) motion for
summary judgment regarding the medical malpractice claim raised against her by Plaintiff
Archie Poe (“Poe”) for his treatment at the Lincoln Parish Detention Center (“LPDC”).
[Record Document 110]. The Court previously ruled that this claim is subject to a one-year
prescriptive period and that the claim was facially prescribed. Record Document 93. The Court
allowed for a limited period of discovery to address whether Poe had complied with the
grievance procedures in place at LPDC such that prescription was suspended. Record
Document 94. After the close of discovery, Hearn filed the instant motion arguing that Poe
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and therefore prescription was not suspended.
Record Document 110-1 at 4. Poe did not oppose the motion, despite receiving a lengthy
extension of time to do so, and Hearn’s motion is ripe for review. Record Document 116. For
the reasons stated herein, Hearn’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
I.

Background
This case stems from medical treatment Poe received from Hearn and Dr. Bruce Fuller

(“Fuller”) at LPDC and David Wade Correctional Center (“DWCC”). Poe filed suit alleging
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constitutional and state law claims against both doctors. The Court previously dismissed all
claims against Fuller. Record Documents 57 and 90. The Court also previously dismissed all
claims against Hearn connected to her work at DWCC. Id. That left pending only a
constitutional and state law claim against Hearn for her work at LPDC. Poe’s constitutional
claim against Hearn regarding her work at LPDC was dismissed after the parties settled.
Record Document 121. Thus, the only remaining claim in this matter is that at issue in Hearn’s
instant motion for summary judgment—a state law medical malpractice claim related to her
work at LPDC.
One of the Court’s prior rulings addressed this claim in detail. Record Document 93.
In that ruling, the Court concluded that Poe’s claim sounded in medical malpractice and was
subject to the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (“MMA”) Id. at 7, 12; La. R.S. § 40:1231, et
seq. Because of this, Poe’s medical malpractice claim against Hearn is subject to a one-year
prescriptive period. Record Document 93 at 16. The Court concluded that, at the latest, Poe’s
claim arose on May 31, 2016 when he was transferred from LPDC to another facility. Id. at
17. Poe filed suit on June 17, 2017, and so the claim is facially prescribed. Id. The Court next
considered whether Poe had carried his burden of showing that the prescriptive period was
suspended such that his lawsuit was timely filed. Id. Being an inmate, Poe was not required to
file a claim with the medical review panel to suspend prescription like other claims governed
by the MMA. Id. at 20. Instead, prescription of Poe’s claim would be suspended by adhering
to the procedures laid out for suspending prescription in the Corrections Administrative
Remedy Procedure Act (“CARP”), namely, initiating the administrative review process in place
at LPDC. Id. The Court concluded that there remained genuine issues of material fact
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regarding the procedures in place at LPDC and Poe’s compliance with those procedures. Id.
at 21. On this basis, the Court denied Hearn’s motion for summary judgment and ordered
additional discovery. Id. This discovery period has now closed. Record Document 94 at 3.
The Court’s previous ruling laid out the facts underlying Poe’s claims arising out of
LPDC, Record Document 93 at 1-2, and accordingly, the Court will not reproduce them here.
Relevant to the instant motion, though, are the facts surrounding Poe’s efforts at pursuing his
claim though LPDC’s grievance and administrative remedy procedures. Poe has asserted that
he made a request to the “ranking officer” at LPDC for an Administrative Remedy Procedure
(“ARP”), such as is used for grievances in the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and
Corrections (“DOC”) facilities, and was told “that they do not have ARPs at Lincoln Parish
and that I needed to get on the kiosk and write a medical complaint.” Record Document 802 at 1. LPDC records reveal that Poe filed a grievance through the kiosk on May 23, 2016,
May 24, 2016, May 26, 2016, and May 30, 2016. Record Document 110-3 at 6-8. In these
grievances, Poe complains that he was made to kneel despite this action causing him pain,
requests that Hearn connect him to an orthopedic surgeon, and complains of other symptoms
like a headache swollen face, and pain. Id.
II.

Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) directs a court to “grant summary judgment if

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings,
answers to interrogatories, admissions, depositions, and affidavits on file indicate that there is
no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
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of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). When the burden at trial will rest on
the non-moving party, the moving party need not produce evidence to negate the elements of
the non-moving party’s case; rather, it need only point out the absence of supporting evidence.
See id. at 322–23.
If the movant satisfies its initial burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute of
material fact, the nonmovant must demonstrate that there is, in fact, a genuine issue for trial
by going “beyond the pleadings” and “designat[ing] specific facts” for support. Little v. Liquid
Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). “This burden is
not satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” by conclusory or
unsubstantiated allegations, or by a mere “scintilla of evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). However, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
255 (1985) (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)). While not
weighing the evidence or evaluating the credibility of witnesses, courts should grant summary
judgment where the critical evidence in support of the nonmovant is so “weak or tenuous”
that it could not support a judgment in the nonmovant’s favor. Armstrong v. City of Dall., 997
F.2d 62, 67 (5th Cir. 1993).
Additionally, Local Rule 56.1 requires the movant to file a statement of material facts
as to which it “contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” The opposing party must then
set forth a “short and concise statement of the material facts as to which there exists a genuine
issue to be tried.” W.D. La. R. 56.2. All material facts set forth in the movant’s statement “will

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be deemed admitted, for purposes of the motion, unless controverted as required by this rule.”
Id.
III.

Law and Analysis
As the Court previously held, Poe’s medical malpractice claim is subject to a one-year

prescriptive period. Record Document 93 at 16-17. Because Poe did not file this suit until June
17, 2017, which was more than one year after his transfer, his claim is facially prescribed. Id.
The Court must therefore consider whether prescription was suspended. If a claim is facially
prescribed, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove either suspension, interruption, or some
exception to prescription, utilizing one of any number of legal constructs including but not
limited to the doctrine of contra non valentem and the theory of continuing tort.” Terrebonne Par.
Sch. Bd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 310 F.3d 870, 877 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing In re Med. Review Panel for
Claim of Moses, 2000-2643, p. 6 (La. 5/25/01); 788 So. 2d 1173, 1177–78; Stett v. Greve, 35,140,
p. 7 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/02); 810 So. 2d 1203, 1208; Strata v. Patin, 545 So. 2d 1180, 1189
(La. Ct. App. 1989)). Thus, it is Poe’s burden to prove that prescription was suspended prior
to May 31, 2017.
The Court also previously held that, as an inmate, Poe was not required to request
review before a medical review panel to suspend prescription. Record Document 93 at 20.
Instead, Poe’s claim is governed by the CARP requirements. Record Document 93 at 20.
CARP authorizes the DOC and sheriffs to adopt an administrative procedure that inmates
must pursue before they may file lawsuits related to their conditions of confinement. La. R.S.
§§ 15:1171–1179. The DOC has adopted an ARP procedure and requires local facilities that
house DOC inmates to provide a grievance procedure for those inmates. La. Admin. Code tit.
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22, pt. I, § 325(A), (M). Once a grievance procedure has been adopted, “[l]iberative
prescription for any delictual action for injury or damages arising out of the claims asserted by
a prisoner in any complaint or grievance in the administrative remedy procedure shall be
suspended upon the filing of such complaint or grievance and shall continue to be suspended
until the final agency decision is delivered.” La. R.S. § 15:1172(E).
It is undisputed that Poe filed grievances using the LPDC kiosk in May 2016. Hearn
now concedes that at LPDC, the administrative remedy process was initiated through
submitting a grievance using a kiosk in the facility. Record Document 110-1 at 3. Thus, the
undisputed evidence is that Poe properly initiated the grievance process at LPDC prior to May
31, 2016.
Nevertheless, the Court finds that Poe has failed to carry his burden of establishing
that the grievances he filed were sufficient to interrupt prescription for his medical malpractice
claim. The grievances report symptoms like a headache and pain, allege that someone other
than Hearn forced Poe to kneel despite that causing him pain, and request to see an orthopedic
surgeon. Even with ample opportunity to respond to Hearn’s motion for summary judgment,
Poe failed to oppose the motion and explain why these grievances are adequate to suspend
prescription regarding a medical malpractice claim. Reviewing the grievances, the Court
concludes that the grievances read more like requests for care than they do as allegations that
Hearn was failing to adequately treat him or that she was committing medical malpractice.
Therefore, Poe has failed to prove that prescription was suspended. Because his claim is
facially prescribed and because he has failed to prove suspension, Poe’s claim for medical

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malpractice against Hearn for her work at LPDC is prescribed, and the claim is DISMISSED
with prejudice.
IV.

Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment [Record Document 110] is GRANTED. Poe’s medical malpractice claim
against Hearn for her work at LPDC is DISMISSED with prejudice. A judgment stating the
same will be issued herewith.
20th
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana, on this ____ day of

October, 2020.
_______________________________
ELIZABETH E. FOOTE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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