Poe v. Fuller et al
Filing
90
MEMORANDUM RULING denying as moot 78 Motion for Summary Judgment and 82 Motion to Strike. Poe's negligence claim against Hearn for the care she provided at LPDC will be addressed in a separate ruling. His § 1983 claim against Hearn for her conduct at LPDC remains pending. Signed by Judge Elizabeth E Foote on 9/3/2019. (crt,Keifer, K)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
ARCHIE POE
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 17-913
VERSUS
JUDGE ELIZABETH ERNY FOOTE
BRUCE FULLER, ET AL.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY
MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment on the medical malpractice claim
urged by Plaintiff Archie Poe (“Poe”) against Drs. Bruce Fuller (“Fuller”) and Pamela Hearn
(“Hearn”) (collectively, “Defendants”) regarding the care that they provided him at David
Wade Correctional Center (“DWCC”). [Record Document 78]. Because it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, this Court is unable to rule on the motion’s merits. Poe’s medical malpractice
claim seeks a money judgment which, under the applicable statute, must be rendered against
the State of Louisiana rather than against Defendants. La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1237.1(A)(8); Detiller
v. Kenner Reg’l Med. Ctr., 2003-3259, p. 16 (La. 7/6/04); 877 So. 2d 100, 111. This requirement
makes the State of Louisiana a necessary party to this proceeding. Joinder of the State on a
claim for money damages would violate the Eleventh Amendment, and so this Court cannot
join the State. Because Poe has no remedy in the State’s absence, the claim against Defendants
for their role at DWCC is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment [Record Document 78] and Poe’s motion to strike [Record Document
82] are DENIED AS MOOT. Hearn’s motion for summary judgment on claims related to
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her work at the Lincoln Parish Detention Center (“LPDC”) [Record Document 75] will be
addressed in a separate ruling.
I.
Background
The Court has fully discussed the factual background of this case in its prior ruling,
[Record Document 57 at 1–5], so will recap only the most salient facts here. Poe needed a
total hip replacement revision. [Id. at 1]. He was incarcerated before he could have the surgery.
[Id. at 2]. He was initially housed at LPDC, where he was treated by Hearn. [Id.]. He was later
transferred to Elayn Hunt Correctional Center, to DWCC, and ultimately to the Louisiana
State Penitentiary (“LSP”). [Id. at 3, 5]. Hearn and Fuller both provided medical care to Poe
while he was at DWCC, but he did not have the surgery until after his transfer to LSP. [Id. at
3–5].
Dissatisfied with his care at DWCC, Poe filed an Administrative Remedy Procedure
(“ARP”) request. [Record Document 37-6 at 4, 7]. 1 Following completion of the ARP process,
Poe filed the instant suit, alleging that Defendants’ treatment of him constituted cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and negligence under Article 2315
of the Louisiana Civil Code. [Record Document 1 at 7–9]. After appropriate discovery, this
Court granted summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim arising from Defendants’
treatment of Poe at DWCC. [Record Document 57]. Because the factual record was
insufficient to support summary judgment as to the care Hearn provided at LPDC, the Court
denied the motion as to that claim. [Id. at 10–12]. The Court also declined to grant summary
Defendants confusingly describe this ARP as two separate ARPs. [Record Document
78-5 at 3]. Examining the two documents indicates that they are the State’s responses to the
first and second steps of the same ARP (DWCC-2016-1077). [Record Document 37-6 at 4, 7].
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judgment on Poe’s negligence claims because Defendants’ motion did not address them. [Id.
at 15].
Defendants have filed a second summary judgment motion in which they argue that
they were not negligent when treating Poe at DWCC. [Record Document 78]. They support
their motion by pointing to evidence that they did not deliberately refuse to provide Poe with
some treatment while he was at DWCC. [Record Document 78-1 at 8–9]. They also challenge
the admissibility of the testimony of Poe’s medical experts. [Id. at 9–11]. Poe’s opposition
emphasizes his belief that his claims sound in general negligence rather than medical
malpractice. [Record Document 83 at 12–15]. In support, he points to opinions from two
medical experts that Defendants’ treatment of him exacerbated his pain and worsened his
injuries. [Id. at 12–13]. He also relates the allegedly deficient medical care Defendants provided
to seven other DWCC inmates. [Id. at 16–18]. 2
II.
Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) directs a court to “grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 3 Summary judgment is appropriate when the
pleadings, answers to interrogatories, admissions, depositions, and affidavits on file indicate
This Court takes no position on the classification or legal analysis appropriate to
Defendants’ conduct toward these other inmates. Any claims these inmates may have are not
before this Court.
3 Rule 56 was amended effective December 1, 2010. Per the comments, the 2010
amendment was intended “to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding summary
judgment motions and to make the procedures more consistent with those already used in
many courts. The standard for granting summary judgment remains unchanged.” Therefore,
the case law applicable to Rule 56 prior to its amendment remains authoritative, and this Court
will rely on it accordingly.
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that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). When the burden at trial
will rest on the non-moving party, the moving party need not produce evidence to negate the
elements of the non-moving party’s case; rather, it need only point out the absence of
supporting evidence. See id. at 322–23.
If the movant satisfies its initial burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute of
material fact, the nonmovant must demonstrate that there is, in fact, a genuine issue for trial
by going “beyond the pleadings” and “designat[ing] specific facts” for support. Little v. Liquid
Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). “This burden is
not satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” by conclusory or
unsubstantiated allegations, or by a mere “scintilla of evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). However, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
255 (1985) (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)). While not
weighing the evidence or evaluating the credibility of witnesses, courts should grant summary
judgment where the critical evidence in support of the nonmovant is so “weak or tenuous”
that it could not support a judgment in the nonmovant’s favor. Armstrong v. City of Dall., 997
F.2d 62, 67 (5th Cir. 1993).
Additionally, Local Rule 56.1 requires the movant to file a statement of material facts
as to which it “contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” The opposing party must then
set forth a “short and concise statement of the material facts as to which there exists a genuine
issue to be tried.” W.D. La. R. 56.2. All material facts set forth in the movant’s statement “will
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be deemed admitted, for purposes of the motion, unless controverted as required by this rule.”
Id.
III.
Law and Analysis
Before evaluating the merits of Defendants’ motion, this Court must assure itself of its
jurisdiction over the claim at issue. See Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 542 (5th Cir.
1997) (citing Trizec Props., Inc. v. U.S. Mineral Prods. Co., 974 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1992); MCG, Inc.
v. Great W. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1990); Save the Bay, Inc. v. U.S. Army, 639 F.2d
1100 (5th Cir. 1981)) (“We repeatedly have instructed that before proceeding with a case,
federal trial and appellate courts have the duty to examine the basis for their subject matter
jurisdiction, doing so on their own motion if necessary.”).
A.
The Classification of Poe’s Negligence Claim
When a claim arises under state law, federal courts must apply that state’s substantive
law as interpreted by that state’s courts. Keen v. Miller Envt’l Grp., Inc., 702 F.3d 239, 243 (5th
Cir. 2012) (citing Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Swift Energy Co., 206 F.3d 487, 491 (5th Cir. 2000)).
In Louisiana, medical malpractice claims are controlled by two statutory schemes: the Medical
Malpractice Act (“MMA”) and the Malpractice Liability for State Services Act (“MLSSA”). La.
Stat. Ann. §§ 40:1231.1–.10, 40:1237.1–.4; see Spradlin v. Acadia-St. Landry Med. Found., 19981977, p. 6 n.5 (La. 2/29/00); 758 So. 2d 116, 120 n.5. The MLSSA controls malpractice claims
against “state health care providers,” while the MMA applies to all other health care providers, 4
Vanderhoff v. Beary, 2003-0912, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/20/03); 853 So. 2d 752, 754 (citing La.
To be covered by the MMA, health care providers must have “qualified” by obtaining
malpractice insurance (or self-insuring) and paying an annual surcharge to the Patient’s
Compensation Fund. La. Stat. Ann. §§ 40:1231.1(D), 1231.2(A), 1231.4(2)(a).
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Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.39(A) (recodified at La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1237.1(A)); La. Stat. Ann.
§ 40:1299.41(A) (recodified at La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1231.1(A)). Under the MLSSA, malpractice
claims against state health care providers must pass through an administrative review process
before suit can be brought (unless the State waives that procedure), and recovery is limited to
$500,000 exclusive of costs of future medical care. La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1237.1(E)–(F).
“[B]ecause the MLSSA limits the liability of certain health care providers in derogation of the
general rights of tort victims, any ambiguities in the Act should be strictly construed against
coverage.” Ruiz v. Oniate, 97-2412, p. 4 (La. 6/19/98); 713 So. 2d 442, 444 (citing Kelty v.
Brumfield, 93-1142, p. 9 (La. 2/25/94); 633 So. 2d 1210, 1216; Hutchinson v. Patel, 93-2156, p. 5
(La. 5/23/94); 637 So. 2d 415, 420), called into question on other grounds by Batson v. S. La. Med.
Ctr., 2002-2381 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/27/03); 858 So. 2d 653.
The MLSSA applies to medical malpractice only. La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1237.1(D)(1); see
Herrin v. East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, No. CV 15-00082-SDD-EWD, 2016 WL 4408999, at
*6 (M.D. La. July 6, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 4432698 (M.D. La. Aug.
17, 2016). The statute defines malpractice as “the failure to exercise the reasonable standard
of care . . . in the provision of health care, when such failure proximately causes injury to a
patient . . . .” La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1237.1(A)(4). In Coleman v. Deno, the Louisiana Supreme Court
adopted a six-factor test for determining whether a claim falls under the MMA:
[1] whether the particular wrong is ‘treatment related’ or caused by a dereliction
of professional skill,
[2] whether the wrong requires expert medical evidence to determine whether
the appropriate standard of care was breached, and
[3] whether the pertinent act or omission involved assessment of the patient's
condition.
....
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[4] whether an incident occurred in the context of a physician-patient
relationship, or was within the scope of activities which a hospital is licensed to
perform,
[5] whether the injury would have occurred if the patient had not sought
treatment, and
[6] whether the tort alleged was intentional.
Coleman v. Deno, 2001-1517, pp. 14–15 (La. 1/25/02); 813 So. 2d 303, 315–16 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Sewell v. Doctors Hosp., 600 So. 2d 577, 579 n.3 (La.
1992); then quoting Holly P. Rockwell, Annotation, What Patient Claims Against Doctor, Hospital,
or Similar Health Care Provider Are Not Subject to Statutes Specifically Governing Actions and Damages
for Medical Malpractice, 89 A.L.R.4th 887, 898 (1991)). Louisiana courts apply these factors by
analogy to MLSSA cases. See, e.g., Crum v. State, 41,059, p. 8 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/17/06); 931 So.
2d 400, 404.
Poe argues that his claim sounds in general negligence rather than medical malpractice.
[Record Document 83 at 12–15]. However, he fails to even address the factors identified by
the Louisiana Supreme Court. Instead he points to a set of mostly irrelevant caselaw. In
Bedingfield ex rel. Bedingfield v. Deen, 487 F. App’x 219 (5th Cir. 2012), Robinson v. Stalder, 98-0558
(La. App. 1 Cir. 4/1/99); 734 So. 2d 810, and the relevant portion of Authement v. Par. of
Terrebonne, No. CIV.A. 09-4618, 2010 WL 5093866, at *10–12 (E.D. La. Dec. 8, 2010), the
defendants were not health care providers but rather were prison officials. The negligence of
a prison official who is not a health care provider is not an issue in this case as Poe has only
sued his doctors. Admittedly, one of the defendants in Jackson v. Bailey was a nurse and in that
case the court did apply the duty-risk analysis appropriate for general negligence claims in
Louisiana. Jackson v. Bailey, No. CIVA 06-1083, 2008 WL 652136, at *3 (W.D. La. Mar. 11,
2008), aff'd, 305 F. App'x 246 (5th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, it is not clear that the nurse in
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Jackson asked the court to treat the claim as one for medical malpractice, and when dismissing
the negligence claim, the court only considered the duty owed by “prison authorities” and did
not separately analyze the nurse’s duty as a health care provider. Id. Poe has not sued any
prison authority; he has sued two physicians regarding their medical decisions. Moreover, the
MLSSA has specific provisions for the “medical malpractice claims of prisoners related to
health care rendered in a correctional facility,” La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1237.1(E)(1), thereby
indicating that Louisiana law recognizes claims against prison doctors as medical malpractice
claims. As Poe has failed to apply the correct factors and failed to point this Court towards
authority convincingly demonstrating that his claim regarding Defendants’ allegedly
inappropriate care does not sound in medical malpractice, this Court concludes that his claim
is a medical malpractice claim.
B.
Defendants’ Status as State Health Care Providers
Because Poe’s claim is one for medical malpractice, the next question is whether
Defendants are the sort of health care providers that the MLSSA protects. The MLSSA covers
physicians and other medical personnel who provide health care services on behalf of the State
of Louisiana. Batson, 2002-2381, p. 5; 858 So. 2d at 657 (citing La. Stat. Ann. §§ 40:1299.39–
.39.3 (recodified at La. Stat. Ann. §§ 40:1237.1–.4); Ruiz, 97-2412, pp. 4–5; 713 So. 2d at 444–
45). Under the version of the MLSSA in effect at the time that Poe was housed at DWCC, 5
“state health care providers” included:
Amendments to the definition of a “state health care provider” are substantive and
as such the statutory scheme that must be applied is the one in effect when the alleged
malpractice occurred. Ruiz, 97-2412, p. 2 n.1; 713 So. 2d at 443 n.1. Poe was housed at DWCC
from June 20, 2016 to March 27, 2017. [Record Document 57 at 3, 5].
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[1] [T]he state or any of its departments . . . which may provide any kind of
health care whatsoever, and the officers, officials, and employees thereof when
acting within the course and scope of their duties in providing health care in
connection with such state entity; [or]
[2] A person acting in a professional capacity in providing health care services,
by or on behalf of the state, including but not limited to a physician . . . who is
either:
(aa) Acting within the course and scope of his employment pursuant to
a contract with the state, which contract specially names that health care
provider and designates him to render such health care services, pursuant
to a staff appointment to a state hospital or other state health care
facility, or pursuant to an assignment to render such health care services
for or on behalf of the state, without regard to where the services are
performed, whether or not he is paid for such services.
(bb) Performing voluntary professional or telemedicine services in a
health care facility or institution for or on behalf of the state.
Act of July 3, 2008, No. 717, 2008 La. Acts (amending La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.39(A)(1)(a)(ii)
(recodified at La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1237.1(A)(9)(a)(ii)); Act of July 18, 1988, No. 786, 1988 La.
Acts (amending La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.39(A)(1)(a) (recodified at La. Stat. Ann.
§ 40:1237.1(A)(9)(a)(i)).
Interpreting a substantially equivalent version of this definition in Ruiz v. Oniate, the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that employees of a state hospital were covered by the MLSSA
even though there was no evidence that they had been named in a contract with the State. 972412, pp. 8–11; 713 So. 2d at 447–49 (interpreting La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.39(A)(1) (recodified
as amended at La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1237.1(A)(9))). In doing so, the court relied in part on
statutory language that has since been removed. Id. at pp. 10–11; 713 So. 2d at 448–49. In the
version of the statute under consideration in Ruiz, the contract with the State had to name
either the health care provider “or his employer.” Id. at p. 8; 713 So. 2d at 447 (quoting La.
Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.39(A)(1) (recodified as amended at La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1237.1(A)(9))). On
that basis, the court concluded that the Legislature intended to extend the MLSSA’s
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protections to “medical professionals who personally or through their private employers had
contracted with the state as independent contractors to provide medical services on behalf of
the state.” Id. at p. 10; 713 So. 2d at 448. At the same time, the court concluded that the
legislative decision to extend MLSSA protections to employees of state contractors did not
evince any intent to remove those protections from “noncontract employees,” who, the court
reasoned, were protected by virtue of that employment relationship. Id.
Subsequently, the Legislature amended the MLSSA to remove the “or his employer”
phrase. See Batson, 2002-2381, p. 10; 858 So. 2d at 660 (citing Act of July 18, 1988, No. 786,
1988 La. Acts). In light of that amendment, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal
concluded that Ruiz’s holding should now be limited to “direct employees” of the State and
to medical professionals who contract directly with the State. Id. at pp. 8–10; 858 So. 2d at
658–60. Applying its conclusion, the First Circuit found that the MLSSA did not protect
physical therapists working at a state facility under a chain of subcontracts. Id. at pp. 7, 12; 858
So. 2d at 658, 660. In light of this decision, it appears that the MLSSA no longer covers
contract physicians working for private employers who in turn contract with the State, but the
change in statutory language supporting this decision does not alter the relevant rule of law
for present purposes: direct employees of the State, regardless of whether they are named in
specific contracts, are covered by the MLSSA when they provide medical services as part of
their employment. See Ruiz, 97-2412, p. 9; 713 So. 2d at 447–48.
Here, the parties do not dispute that Defendants are employed by the Louisiana
Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“LDPSC”), which operates DWCC, in order to
provide medical treatment. [Record Documents 37-2 at 1 and 45-9 at 1]. They are direct
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employees and so are “state health care providers” as to the care they provided Poe at DWCC.
Because Poe’s negligence claim sounds in medical malpractice and because Defendants are
“state health care providers,” the MLSSA governs Poe’s claim arising from his treatment at
DWCC.
C.
Effect of the Application of the MLSSA
Having determined that the MLSSA applies to Poe’s negligence claim against
Defendants arising from their treatment of him at DWCC, this Court must now examine the
effect of that determination. In Detillier v. Kenner Regional Medical Center, the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that “in a medical malpractice suit brought against the state and a qualified state
health care provider, if the court finds that the state health care provider committed medical
malpractice, judgment must be entered for the successful claimant against the state alone.”
2003-3259, p. 16; 877 So. 2d at 111. The court reached this conclusion by looking to MLSSA
language defining the “[r]ight to recover losses due to malpractice” as
the substantive right in favor of a patient or his representative to receive, subject
to the fiscal legislative discretion of appropriation, some measure of
compensation in money or services or both from the state as and to the extent
allowed by this Section, toward repairing any injury or losses proximately caused
to him by an act of malpractice committed by a state health care provider as
defined in this Section.
Id. at p. 13; 877 So. 2d at 109 (quoting La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.39 (recodified as amended at
La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1237.1(a)(8))). 6
With the exception of an added comma, which has no effect on the meaning of the
statute, this language remains unchanged in the current version of the statute. La. Stat. Ann.
§ 40:1237.1(a)(8).
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Although the precise holding of Detillier was that a plaintiff could join individual health
care providers as defendants to a claim against the State, 2003-3259, pp. 13–14; 877 So. 2d at
109, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit, applying Detillier, clarified that a state entity “must be
considered an indispensable party” to an MLSSA suit, Gettys v. Wong, 2013-1138, p. 7 (La. App.
4 Cir. 5/7/14); 145 So. 3d 460, 464. Here, Poe named Hearn and Fuller as defendants. [Record
Document 1 at 2]. The Fourth Circuit’s ruling suggests that the State of Louisiana must also
be named in Poe’s suit. The potential joinder of a state or a state agency raises the specter of
Eleventh Amendment immunity 7 and thus of this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. 8
D.
This Court’s Authority to Consider Joinder Issues Sua Sponte
Complicating the question of subject-matter jurisdiction is this matter’s procedural
posture. Failure to a join a required party under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Because the LDPSC is an arm of the State of Louisiana, it shares the State’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See Champagne v. Jefferson Par. Sheriff’s Office, 188 F.3d 312, 313–14 (5th
Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
8 The Fifth Circuit has not addressed federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction over
MLSSA claims, and federal district courts in Louisiana have typically dismissed such claims as
premature because a medical review panel was not convened. See, e.g., Hays v. Smith, No. CV
15-2134, 2016 WL 8679233, at *10 (W.D. La. Sept. 23, 2016); Herrin, 2016 WL 4408999, at *6;
Ford v. Cain, No. 15-136-SDD-EWD, 2016 WL 447617, at *2 (M.D. La. Feb. 4, 2016); Thurman
v. La. Dep’t of Health & Hosps., No. 2:12-CV-2426, 2013 WL 3146923, at *3 (W.D. La. June 14,
2013). One case found diversity jurisdiction lacking for an MLSSA claim against individual
physicians because, as the state could not be subjected to money damages in federal court, the
amount in controversy was zero. Tex. All. of Energy Producers Workers Comp. Self-Insured Grp. Tr.
v. La. State Univ. Health Scis. Ctr.-Shreveport, No. CIV.A. 10-1216, 2011 WL 4079228, at *3 (W.D.
La. Sept. 13, 2011). Another division of this Court noted that it had jurisdiction over MLSSA
claims but avoided detailed analysis by remanding the case to state court. Moore v. Louisiana,
No. CIV.A. 14-398, 2014 WL 6885929, at *3 (W.D. La. Dec. 4, 2014). Here, no party appears
to dispute that Poe exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his claims related to
Defendants’ care at DWCC.
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is properly raised in a pleading, in a motion to dismiss, in a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, or at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7), 12(h)(2). Although Defendants raised the defense
of Eleventh Amendment immunity in their answer, asserting that the amendment “also bars
this Court from hearing [P]laintiff’s State law claims,” [Record Document 11 at 2], they have
not raised the issue of failure to join a party under Rule 19.
“A court with proper jurisdiction may also consider sua sponte the absence of a required
person and dismiss for failure to join.” Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 861 (2008)
(citing Minnesota v. N. Secs. Co., 184 U.S. 199, 235 (1902)). Poe joined two claims in his
complaint: a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim and a state-law negligence claim. [Record Document 1 at
7–8]. This Court had original federal-question jurisdiction over the § 1983 claim against
Defendants for their work at DWCC. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. If a district court has original
jurisdiction over a claim, supplemental jurisdiction exists over “all other claims that are so
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same
case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Claims are part of the “same case or controversy” when they “derive from a common nucleus
of operative fact.” Mendoza v. Murphy, 532 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966), superseded by statute on other grounds by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3)). As the same medical care or lack thereof gives rise to Poe’s Eighth Amendment
claim and his medical malpractice claim, the Court had supplemental jurisdiction over Poe’s
MLSSA claim against Fuller and Hearn when Poe filed the case. Although the § 1983 claim
related to Defendants’ conduct at DWCC has been dismissed, [Record Document 57], a
district court has discretion to retain jurisdiction over supplemental state-law claims even if
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the claim providing for original jurisdiction has been dismissed, see Mendoza, 532 F.3d at 346
(citing Parker & Parsley Petrol. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992)). Therefore,
if Hearn and Fuller were the only necessary defendants, this Court would have subject-matter
jurisdiction over the MLSSA claim against them. Because this Court has jurisdiction, it may
examine sua sponte whether the State of Louisiana is a necessary and indispensable party on
Poe’s claims against Defendants related to the care they provided at DWCC. Cf. Jaffer v.
Standard Chartered Bank, 301 F.R.D. 256, 259–60 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (deciding a Rule 19 joinder
issue sua sponte in a diversity case).
E.
The State of Louisiana as a Necessary Party
Under Rule 19, a court must first determine whether an absent person is necessary to
the litigation. Pulitzer-Polster v. Pulitzer, 784 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir. 1986), superseded by statute
on other grounds by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). A person is necessary if, among other things, “in that
person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 19(a)(1)(A). As the Louisiana courts have made clear, only the State of Louisiana can be cast
in judgment on a medical malpractice claim controlled by the MLSSA. Detillier, 2003-3259, p.
16; 877 So. 2d at 111; Gettys, 2013-1138, p. 7; 145 So. 3d at 464. Without the State as a party,
“there is no entity against whom a judgment could be rendered.” Gettys, 2013-1138, p. 7; 145
So. 3d at 464. As this Court has already dismissed the § 1983 claim against Defendants arising
from their conduct at DWCC, [Record Document 57], Poe can recover damages for the
injuries he allegedly suffered at DWCC only if the State of Louisiana is joined as a party. As a
result, the State of Louisiana is required to be joined under Rule 19.
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F.
The Feasibility of Joining the State of Louisiana
Because the State of Louisiana is a necessary party to Poe’s MLSSA claims against
Defendants, this Court must now determine whether the State can feasibly be joined. In Stewart
v. Gusman, the Eastern District of Louisiana confronted this exact question. No. CV 07-4132,
2009 WL 10679822 (E.D. La. Jan. 5, 2009). An inmate filed a § 1983 claim against the Orleans
Parish Sheriff and a medical malpractice claim against a doctor at the state hospital to which
the inmate was taken for care. Id. at *1. The inmate did not join the State of Louisiana as a
defendant. Id. The court observed:
Under Detillier, it is clear that [the physician] is immune from judgment under
Louisiana law, and that the State of Louisiana is the only party that can be
answerable in damages based on the allegations in [the inmate]’s petition. Thus,
it is equally clear that [the inmate]’s claims against [the physician] qua the State
of Louisiana cannot proceed in this Court as a matter of Louisiana’s sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
Id. at *3.
This Court agrees with the Eastern District’s analysis. “[A] suit by private parties
seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (citing Great
N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 327 U.S.
573 (1946)). MLSSA claims provide for monetary damages, La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1237.1(C),
which, under Detillier, are available from the State of Louisiana only, 2003-3259, p. 16; 877 So.
2d at 111. Hence, this Court cannot assert jurisdiction over an MLSSA claim for money
damages unless the State of Louisiana has waived its sovereign immunity. 9
Although a state can also be sued if Congress has validly abrogated the state’s
sovereign immunity, see Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (citing
9
15
“A state does not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit only
in its own courts.” Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 306 (1990) (citing
Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981)
(per curiam)). To find a waiver, “a clear declaration of the state’s intention to submit its fiscal
problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found.” Edelman, 415 U.S. at
673 (quoting Great N. Life Ins. Co., 322 U.S. at 54). This intention is present “only in the most
exacting circumstances.” Magnolia Venture Capital Corp. v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 151 F.3d 439, 443
(5th Cir. 1998). Nothing in the text of MLSSA suggests that the State of Louisiana intends to
allow itself to be sued in federal court for the malpractice of state-employed physicians. The
MLSSA expressly defines the right to bring an MLSSA action “as a special substantive sui
generis statutory grant in the domain of public law.” La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1237.1(C). In case the
legislative intent were not clear, the statute reinforces the point: “Otherwise than as provided
by [the MLSSA], a patient shall not have a right to recover losses due to malpractice from the
state or from a state health care provider . . . .” Id. § 40:1237.1(D)(1). Given this language, a
finding of waiver would be proper only if the MLSSA specifically provides for suit in federal
court. No language in the statute even hints at such an intention. Hence, this Court finds that
the State of Louisiana has not waived its sovereign immunity from suit in this Court for claims
arising under the MLSSA. In the absence of waiver, sovereign immunity prevents this Court
from joining the State as a defendant on the MLSSA claim against Defendants related to their
conduct at DWCC.
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000)), Poe’s MLSSA claim arises under state, not
federal, law.
16
G.
The Indispensability of the State of Louisiana
Because the State of Louisiana is a necessary party to this proceeding but cannot be
joined, this Court must now consider the second step of the Rule 19 analysis, “determin[ing]
whether the party is ‘merely necessary’ to the litigation, or in fact ‘indispensable.’” Moss v.
Princip, 913 F.3d 508, 515 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v.
Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 117–19 (1968)). That determination turns on four factors:
(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might
prejudice that person or the existing parties;
(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by:
(A) protective provisions in the judgment;
(B) shaping the relief; or
(C) other measures;
(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence would be adequate;
and
(4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were
dismissed for nonjoinder.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). The analysis of these factors is case-specific. Moss, 913 F.3d at 515 (citing
Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 118 n.14) (“[T]here is no prescribed formula for determining
in every case whether a person is an indispensable party.”). If the person who cannot feasibly
be joined is indispensable, the action must be dismissed. Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 118.
The State of Louisiana suffers no prejudice by not being joined; after all, it cannot be
cast in judgment if it is not a party. However, Poe would be prejudiced if the State were not
joined as there would be no defendant from whom he could recover. Hearn and Fuller would
also suffer prejudice if the State were not joined. Subjecting them to the burden of
participation in this suit is only justifiable if the end result of the suit could provide Poe with
some relief. Such relief is available only if the State of Louisiana is joined, and so this first
factor favors a finding that the State of Louisiana is an indispensable party.
17
As the MLSSA prohibits casting Hearn and Fuller in judgment, see Detillier, 2003-3259,
p. 16; 877 So. 2d at 111, there is no way at present to craft a judgment that would provide Poe
with the monetary relief that he seeks. Without that monetary relief, judgment would be utterly
inadequate. Poe has been transferred from DWCC and has now had the hip surgery he sought,
[Record Documents 45-2 at 33–35 and 45-3 at 26, 35], so money damages are the only way
his injuries could be redressed. Thus, the second and third factors also support a conclusion
that the State of Louisiana is indispensable to this action.
Finally, Louisiana courts provide an “adequate forum” in which Poe can prosecute his
malpractice claim against Defendants for their conduct at DWCC. See Stewart, 2009 WL
10679822, at *5. When a federal court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of statelaw claims, such claims may be refiled in state court. See Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct.
594, 598 (2018) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d)). Although requiring Poe to pursue his
DWCC claim in state court while his claims regarding Hearn’s care at LPDC remain pending
in this Court may perhaps be less convenient for Poe, that result does not render the state
court inadequate. 10 The final factor thus also counsels against maintaining this action in the
State’s absence. In light of the four Rule 19(b) factors, this Court concludes that the State of
Louisiana is an indispensable party without which the claims against Defendants regarding the
care they provided Poe at DWCC cannot proceed. Therefore, this Court will dismiss Poe’s
negligence claim related to that care.
The Court notes that there is a remote possibility that separating the two different
claims against Hearn could result in a double recovery. If the DWCC claim proceeds to trial
in state court or the LPDC claims proceed to trial in this Court, procedures or instructions
can be crafted to avoid that possibility.
10
18
IV.
Poe’s Standing
Because Defendants are immune from judgment on Poe’s MLSSA claim, see Detillier,
2003-3259, p. 16; 877 So. 2d at 111, Poe, even if victorious, would recover nothing, see Texas
All. of Energy Producers Workers Comp. Self-Insured Grp. Tr. v. La. State Univ. Health Scis. Ctr.Shreveport, No. CIV.A. 10-1216, 2011 WL 4079228, at *3 (W.D. La. Sept. 13, 2011). This fact
raises the possibility that Poe might lack standing to pursue his MLSSA claim in this Court.
Federal courts may only hear “cases” and “controversies” that are “amenable to, and
resolved by, the judicial process.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998)
(citing Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356–57 (1911)). For a case to be justiciable, the
plaintiff must have standing. Id. (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). As
Article III standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction, this Court must address it
sua sponte. See Ford v. NYLCare Health Plans of Gulf Coast, Inc., 301 F.3d 329, 331–32 (5th Cir.
2002) (citing SEC v. Forex Asset Mgmt., LLC, 242 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2001)). Article III
standing requires that the plaintiff have: “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable
to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envt’l Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–
81 (2000)). At issue in this case is the third prong. An injury is redressable if a “‘favorable
decision will relieve a discrete injury,’” though the decision need not “‘relieve [the plaintiff’s]
every injury.’” Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Tex., Dep’t of Ins., Div. of Workers’ Comp., 851 F.3d 507, 514
(5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 243 n.15 (1982)). Money damages,
such as those sought by Poe, are a valid form of redress. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d
19
790, 802 (5th Cir. 2014). The relevant question is “whether ‘the prospect of obtaining relief
from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling is too speculative.’” Hanson v. Veterans Admin.,
800 F.2d 1381, 1385 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984), abrogated
on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014)).
Poe has had his hip replacement and is no longer incarcerated at a facility where either
Hearn or Fuller is employed. [Record Documents 45-2 at 33–35 and 45-3 at 26, 35]. As a
result, money damages are the only possible remedy this Court could order if a jury were to
find that Defendants had committed malpractice at DWCC. Under the MLSSA, money
damages cannot be awarded against individual state health care providers. Detillier, 2003-3259,
p. 16; 877 So. 2d at 111. Because Defendants are immune from damages, this Court cannot
redress Poe’s alleged injury and, in consequence, Poe lacks standing to proceed in this Court. 11
Hence, even if this Court were wrong to conduct the Rule 19 analysis sua sponte, this Court
would still be obligated to dismiss Poe’s MLSSA claim against Defendants for their conduct
at DWCC.
V.
Conclusion
Poe can only recover on his claim for Defendants’ alleged malpractice at DWCC if the
State of Louisiana is joined as a party. Sovereign immunity prevents this Court from joining
the State as a party to Poe’s MLSSA claims. Hence, this Court has two options: allow the
MLSSA claim to proceed against Hearn and Fuller only or dismiss the action. See Fed. R. Civ.
While the State of Louisiana can be cast in judgment for money damages due to its
physicians’ malpractice, Detillier, 2003-3259, p. 16; 877 So. 2d at 111, this Court, as discussed
above, lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to enter such a judgment as a result of the State’s
sovereign immunity. Hence, this Court will not grant Poe an opportunity to amend his
complaint to add the party that could be cast in judgment.
11
20
P. 19(b). Because this Court cannot cast Fuller and Hearn in judgment on Poe’s malpractice
claim arising from the care they provided him at DWCC, see Detillier, 2003-3259, p. 16; 877 So.
2d at 111, the State is indispensable to this litigation. Without the State present as a defendant,
Poe’s potential recovery is zero dollars, and so his injury is not redressable.
Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that the claims against Hearn and Fuller arising from
the care they provided to Poe at DWCC are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Record
Document 78] and Poe’s motion to strike [Record Document 82] are DENIED AS MOOT.
Poe’s negligence claim against Hearn for the care she provided at LPDC will be
addressed in a separate ruling. His § 1983 claim against Hearn for her conduct at LPDC
remains pending.
3rd
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana, on this ____ day of
September
__________________, 2019.
_______________________________
ELIZABETH E. FOOTE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
21
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