Shreveport Chapter #237 of the United Daughters of the Confederacy v. Caddo Parish Commission et al

Filing 82

MEMORANDUM RULING re 44 MOTION for Reconsideration, filed by Shreveport Chapter #237 of the United Daughters of the Confederacy. Signed by Judge Robert G James on 5/14/2018. (crt,Crawford, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
SHREVEPORT CHAPTER #237
OF UNITED DAUGHTERS OF THE
CONFEDERACY

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-1346

JUDGE ROBERT G. JAMES
VERSUS
CADDO PARISH COMMISSION, ET AL.

MAG. JUDGE MARK L. HORNSBY

RULING
Before the Court is a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Ruling denying a preliminary
injunction, filed by Plaintiff Shreveport Chapter #237 of the United Daughters of the Confederacy
(“UDC” or “Plaintiff”). [Doc. No. 44] By its motion, Plaintiff moves the Court to “reconsider[] its
previous Ruling and incorporate the findings contained in plaintiff’s Motion.”1 Id. at 13 (emphasis
in original). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
I.

Background
On October 19, 2017, Plaintiff filed this suit seeking, in part, a preliminary injunction

enjoining the Caddo Parish Commission (“Commission” or “Defendant”) from enforcing Resolution
69 by removing the Confederate Monument currently located at the Caddo Parish Courthouse
Square.2 In support of its motion for injunction, Plaintiff argued because it is the owner of the land

1

Although not specifically stated, it appears Plaintiff additionally seeks a judgment granting the
injunction previously requested.
2

Resolution 69 was adopted by the Commission on October 19, 2017. [Doc. No. 12-1 at 2]. The
Resolution “authorizes the Parish Administrator, assisted by the Parish Legal Staff, to pursue any and all
legal means to remove the monument from the Caddo Parish Courthouse Square.” [Doc. 12-4] Plaintiff

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upon which the monument sits, enforcement of Resolution 69 would violate its rights under the First,
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Doc. 10 at 4]. On December
11, 2017, the Court held a hearing on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction and then took the matter
under advisement. [Doc. No. 31]. On January 26, 2018, the Court issued its Ruling and denied the
motion. [Doc. No. 38]. As set forth in the Ruling, the Court found Plaintiff failed to meet its burden
of showing there is a substantial likelihood it will prevail on the merits, because Plaintiff did not
show a substantial likelihood of proving it owns the plot of land upon which the monument sits. Id.
at 6, 14. Because Plaintiff’s claims hinge upon its status as owner of the locus in quo, as a threshold
matter Plaintiff had to first establish a substantial likelihood it is the owner of the land before
showing its entitlement to injunctive relief. This Plaintiff failed to do.
By the present motion, Plaintiff lodges the following “objections” to the Court’s Ruling:
1.

“Plaintiff objects to the Court’s finding of facts which states, ‘Since the 1840's, Caddo Parish
has used Block 23, City of Shreveport, for public purposes. . . .’” [Doc. No. 44 at 1 (citing
Doc. No. 38 at 2)]

2.

“Plaintiff objects to the Court’s finding of facts which states, ‘. . .A courthouse, maintained
by Caddo Parish, has sat on the same property since 1860.’” Id. at 4 (citing Doc. No. 38 at
2).

3.

“Plaintiff objects to the Court’s finding of facts which states, ‘The Court will make its own
conclusions of law, but reports the findings of United Title as facts.’” Id. at 5 (citing Doc.
No. 38 at 3).

4.

“Based on the Court’s abuse of its discretion plaintiff objects to the Court’s finding of
conclusions of law whereby the plaintiff ‘has no substantial likelihood of success showing
that it obtained ownership interest in the plot based on the Caddo Parish Police Jury’s
gratuitous donation.’” Id. at 7 (citing Doc. No. 38 at 8).

originally named as Defendants the Caddo Parish Commission and the seven Caddo Parish Commissioners
who voted in favor of Resolution 69 in their official capacities only. [Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 6-13] On December
11, 2017, the Court dismissed the claims against the Commissioners, leaving the Caddo Parish Commission
as the sole Defendant to this suit. [Doc. No. 31]

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5.

“Based on the Court’s abuse of discretion plaintiff objects to the Court’s finding of
conclusions of law whereby the plaintiff has no substantial likelihood of success showing
that it obtained ownership interest in the plot based on the Caddo Parish Police Jury’s
onerous donation.” Id. at 9 (citing Doc. No. 38 at pp. 8-9).

6.

“Based on the Court’s abuse of its discretion plaintiff objects to the Court’s finding of that
[sic] plaintiff could not ‘affirmatively use the defense of laches against the’ defendant
because ‘in effect, [it] result[s] in a finding that UDC had obtained title or ownership to the
plot where the Monument sits by acquisitive prescription.’” Id. at 11 (citing Doc. No. 38 at
14).

7.

“Based on the Court’s abuse of its discretion, plaintiff objects that the Court did not examine
its Fourteenth Amendment claims because the Court’s conclusion of law was based on an
error of a material issue of facts that plaintiff did not own the property underneath the
Monument.” Id. (citing Doc. No. 38 at 14).

8.

“Based on the Court’s abuse of its discretion plaintiff objects that the Court reached the legal
conclusion that the Court need not reach the remaining factors [for a preliminary injunction]
because it reasoning was based on an error of a material issue of fact that plaintiff did not
own the land underneath the Monument.” Id. at 12.
Following a thorough review of the pending motion, the Court finds nothing presented

therein warrants reversal of the Court’s original Ruling, as Plaintiff has not shown there is a
substantial likelihood it will succeed on the merits at trial.
II.

Standard of Review
In refusing an interlocutory injunction, a court must “state the findings and conclusions that

support its action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(2). On a party’s timely motion, “the court may amend its
findings—or make additional findings—and may amend the judgment accordingly. Fed. R. Civ. P.
52(b).3 The purpose of Rule 52(b) “is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or, in some limited
situations, to present newly discovered evidence.” Fontenot v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 791 F.2d 1207,

3

A motion filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b) “may accompany a motion for a new trial under
Rule 59.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b). Plaintiff in this matter does not move for a new trial under Rule 59.

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1219 (5th Cir. 1986). However, a motion to amend should not be employed “to introduce evidence
that was available at trial but was not proffered, to relitigate old issues, to advance new theories, or
to secure a rehearing on the merits.” Id. “Except for motions to amend based on newly discovered
evidence, the trial court is only required to amend its findings of fact based on evidence contained
in the record.” Id. “To do otherwise would defeat the compelling interest in the finality of litigation.”
Id.
III.

Analysis
Essentially, through its objections, Plaintiff argues the Court erred in finding Plaintiff failed

to meet its burden of showing it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, because
Plaintiff showed it owns the property upon which the monument sits. In its original motion, Plaintiff
argued it owns the locus in quo by virtue of a donation (either gratuitous or onerous) from the Caddo
Parish Police Jury to Plaintiff, as evidenced in the Minutes of the Police Jury’s meeting held on June
19, 1903.4 The Court found Plaintiff had failed to show a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the
merits with regard to this assertion, because (1) the referenced Minutes do not show any intent by
Defendant to transfer ownership of the land to Plaintiff by donation, and (2) there is no authentic act
accomplishing any alleged donation as required by Louisiana law. [Doc. No. 38 at 8-10]. In
accordance with the law in effect in 1903, a valid gratuitous donation required an authentic act. [Doc.
No. 38 at 7-8] An onerous donation did not require an authentic act, “except when the value of the
object given exceeds by one-half that of the charges or of the service to be performed.” Id. at 8; see
also La. Civ. Code art. 1526 (1870). Assuming arguendo Defendant intended to donate the plot of
land to Plaintiff, the Court found that without an authentic act, Plaintiff could not show a valid
4

The Caddo Parish Police Jury was Defendant’s predecessor in interest.

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onerous donation because it showed neither the value of the object given, nor the value of the service
performed. [Doc. No. 38 at 8-12].
By the pending motion, Plaintiff argues reconsideration is warranted because the “Court’s
Ruling implies that for purposes [sic] LA CIV. CODE ART. 1536 (1870) that the defendant is a
‘person.’” [Doc. No. 44 at 7 (emphasis in original)]. According to Plaintiff, “[t]his conclusion is
clearly erroneous for the defendant is a sub-political entity; but not a ‘person’ under this said ART.
1536 (1870).” Id. Plaintiff additionally argues reconsideration is appropriate, because “defendant
produced no evidence that a COMPLETE conveyance record exists in Caddo Parish, thus there is
no absolute certainty that the parties failed to execute a written legal instrument conveying
ownership to the plaintiff.” Id. at 7 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff further contends the Court erred
in finding Plaintiff had failed to show the value of the services it provided in purchasing and
installing the monument. [Doc. 44 at 9].
The Court finds these arguments are without merit. First, Plaintiff cites no authority for its
position that Defendant is not a “person.” In accordance with the Louisiana Civil Code, Defendant
is a person - a “juridical person.” See La. Civ. Code art. 24 (2018); id. at comments (a), (c); see also
Stonecipher v. Caddo Parish, 219 So.3d 1187, 1192-94 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2017). As to Plaintiff’s
second argument – i.e., Defendant did not show a complete conveyance record exists – the Court
would again note it is Plaintiff, and not Defendant, who bore the burden of showing a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits. Finally, the Court finds Plaintiff’s argument regarding the value
of the services provided does not warrant an amendment of the Court’s findings. As discussed in the
Court’s original Ruling, even if the Court were to accept Plaintiff’s contention that the value of the
services performed at the time of the purported donation was $10,000.00, Plaintiff still has not
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provided any evidence as to the value of the plot of land. As such, Plaintiff failed to show the value
of the object given did not exceed by one-half the value of the services performed, and therefore any
alleged onerous donation was null for defect of form. See e.g. Potts v. Potts, 77 So. 786, 788 (La.
1918).
In its original Ruling, the Court sua sponte considered whether Plaintiff obtained title to the
plot of land by acquisitive prescription. Ultimately the Court concluded this legal theory fails
because “[p]rivate citizens cannot acquire title to property from the government by acquisitive
prescription.” [Doc. No. 44 at 12]. In its Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff argues it “acquired
ownership of the said front plat thru [sic] acquisitive prescription because Block 23 was not public
property prior to 1907 or later.” [Doc. No. 44 at 8]. According to this argument, following the June
18, 1903 meeting of the Caddo Parish Police Jury, “plaintiff gained adverse possession of its ‘front
plat or portion of court house square’ of land underneath the Caddo Parish monument. . . .”5 [Doc.
No. 44 at 5]. Appearing to recognize that “public things” are not subject to private ownership and
therefore cannot be acquired by prescription6, Plaintiff attempts to overcome this obstacle by arguing
at the time Plaintiff took possession of the plot, it belonged to someone other than the Parish and/or
the public. While a bit difficult to follow, Plaintiff makes the following arguments in its effort to

5

The Court notes the 1903 Minutes of the Caddo Parish Police Jury would appear to indicate Plaintiff
is likely a precarious possessor of the plot of land upon which the monument sits, rather than an adverse
possessor. The exercise of possession over a thing with the permission of the owner constitutes “precarious
possession.” See La. Civ. Code art. 3437 (2018); Id. at comment (a). Precarious possessors cannot acquire
property by acquisitive prescription. La. Civ. Code art. 3510 (1870).
6

See La. Civ. Code art. 450, 452 (2018); La. Civ. Code arts. 453, 454 (1870); Akin v. Caddo Parish
Police Jury, 234 So.2d 203, 208 (“The [Caddo Parish] courthouse square, known as Block 23, constitutes
public property”; “The title of the property having been dedicated to the public . . . continues in the public
. . .”); City of New Orleans v. Carrollton Land Co., 60 So. 695, 696 (1913); City of Shreveport v. Walpole,
22 La.Ann. 526, 529 (1870).

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show title to the plot of land was capable of prescribing to Plaintiff: “[D]efendant presented no
admissible evidence that Caddo Parish had used Block 23 . . . for public purposes thru [sic] adverse
possession since the 1840s” [Doc. No. 44 at 2]; Defendant provided no evidence that it had
ownership of Block 23 from 1903 - 1906, Id.; no written conveyance exists to prove that Caddo
Parish had ownership of Block 23, Id.; “defendant presented no historical evidence that the Caddo
Parish Police Jury (post-Civil War) had adverse possession of Block 23 until after 1877.” Id.
The Court finds these arguments to be without merit. First, Defendant did present evidence
that it has used Block 23 for public purposes since at least the 1850s.7 [See Doc. No. 51 at 56, 58-59]
Second, regarding the lack of a “written conveyance,” the Court would again note Plaintiff, and not
Defendant, bore the burden of showing it owns the land at issue. Further, title to property
constituting a public thing “may be shown by any species of legitimate evidence,” and is “not
required to be proved by deed.” City of Shreveport v. Walpole, 22 La.Ann. 526, 527 (1870).
Plaintiff’s contention that the Parish “had no adverse possession of Block 23 until after 1877" is a
bit more difficult to decipher. This argument appears to be based on Plaintiff’s contention that the
Parish’s possession of the locus in quo was interrupted during the period of time that Louisiana left
the Union. Louisiana seceded from the Union in 1861, rejoined in 1870, and local rule was not reestablished until 1877. According to Plaintiff, prescription was interrupted when Louisiana left the
Union, and did not begin to run anew until 1877. Therefore, according to Plaintiff, the Parish could
not acquire the property by acquisitive prescription of thirty years until 1907, i.e., four years after the
purported donation of the plot to Plaintiff.

7

Other courts have found Block 23 has been used for public purposes since at least 1846, when a jail
was erected at that location. See also Akin, 234 So.2d at 205.

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The Court must begin by stating the obvious. If the Parish did not own the plot of land on
June 18, 1903, then any attempted donation to Plaintiff would be null, as one cannot donate property
one does not own. Regardless, the Court finds Plaintiff’s contention that the Parish’s possession was
interrupted during secession is incorrect. Once acquired, possession is retained by the intent to
possess as owner, even if the possessor ceases to possess corporeally. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3429
and 3442 (1870). Further, no evidence has been presented to the Court that possession was lost
during secession. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3448, 3449 (1870). Indeed, Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Joiner,
testified the Parish continued to maintain the property during secession, which further supports a
finding that the Parish continued to possess the property during that period of time. [Doc. No. 51
at 59]. Moreover, possession for acquisitive prescription purposes does not have to by the same
person (natural or juridical). As long as possession continues uninterrupted, “[t]he possessor is
allowed to make the sum of possession necessary to prescribe, by adding to his own possession that
of his author. . . .” La. Civ. Code art. 3493 (1870); see also La. Civ. Code art. 3433 (1870) (“[O]ne
may possess a thing not only by one’s self, but also by other persons.”); La. Civ. Code art. 3492
(1870) (“The actual possessor, when he proves that he has formerly been in possession, shall be
presumed also to have been in possession in the intermediate time.”)
Finally, the Court notes Plaintiff takes issue with various evidence it argues was either
erroneously admitted or excluded under the Rules of Evidence governing hearsay. [Doc. 44 at 2, 3,
4, 5, 9, 12-13] The ordinary rules of admissibility are relaxed in a preliminary injunction hearing,
and hearsay may be admitted in such proceedings. See e.g. Fed. Savings & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Dixon,
835 F.2d 554, 558 (5th Cir. (1987); Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. F.D.I.C., 992 F.2d 545, 551
(5th Cir. 1993); Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
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2949 (3d 2015).8
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to show an amendment
of the Court’s original findings is warranted under Rule 52(b). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED.
Signed at Monroe, Louisiana, this 14th day of May, 2018.

8

The remainder of Plaintiff’s objections set forth in its motion have previously been addressed, either
in the Court’s original Ruling or herein. Accordingly, the Court declines to address those matters again, and
disposes of them by footnote.

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