Seaton v. Goodwin

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM RULING re 15 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed by Richard A Seaton, Jr. Signed by Judge Elizabeth E Foote on 3/31/2020. (crt,Keifer, K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
RICHARD A. SEATON JR. #595392

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-1556 SEC P

VERSUS

JUDGE ELIZABETH E. FOOTE

JERRY GOODWIN

MAGISTRATE JUDGE PEREZ-MONTES

MEMORANDUM RULING
Now before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed
by Petitioner Richard A. Seaton, Jr. (“Petitioner”). [Record Document 1]. The only remaining issue
in this case is whether the State’s failure to produce a 911 audio recording (“the 911 recording”)
constituted a Brady 1 violation. [Record Document 20, p. 1]. For the reasons discussed below, the
instant petition [Record Document 1] is DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Additionally, Petitioner’s motion for a certificate of appealability [Record Document 19] is
GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner attacks his 2012 convictions for forcible rape, in violation of Louisiana Revised
Statute § 14:42.1(A)(1), and abuse of office, in violation of Louisiana Revised Statute § 14.134.3,
and subsequent 15-year sentence imposed thereon by the 1st Judicial District Court, Caddo Parish.
See State v. Seaton, 47, 741 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/13); 112 So. 3d 1011, 1013, writ denied, 20131056 (La. 11/15/13); 125 So. 3d 1102. Petitioner contests his convictions on two grounds. First, he
alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.

1

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution).
1

Record Document 1-1, p. 8. Second, he argues that the State failed to disclose Brady material. Id.
at 12. The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), recommending that
the petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. Record Document 15, p. 1. The Court adopted
the R&R as to its dismissal of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims and his claim
that the State’s failure to disclose the Background Event Chronology constituted a Brady violation.
Record Document 20, p. 1. But the Court also found that the R&R did not address whether the State
committed a Brady violation when it failed to disclose the 911 recording. Id. The Court ordered the
parties to submit supplemental briefing on this issue. Id.
The factual background of this case is fully set forth in the R&R, so the Court will not repeat
it here. See Record Document 15, pp. 2–8 (quoting Seaton,112 So. 3d at 1013–18). Relevant to this
ruling, on the night of the rape, Kim Barnes (“Barnes”), the victim’s mother, received text messages
from K.W., the victim, stating that she had been raped, which prompted Barnes to call 911. Record
Document 24, pp. 2–3. During this phone call, Barnes made two statements of interest to Petitioner:
(1) that she did not know if K.W. was “just pulling [her] chain or if it really happened” and (2) that
K.W. was “an eighteen-year-old drama queen.” Id. at 2 & 5. Based on these statements, Petitioner
claims that the State committed a Brady violation when it did not disclose the 911 recording before
Petitioner was convicted. Record Document 21, pp. 4 & 21.
LAW & ANALYSIS
I.

Applicable Law
In order to establish a Brady violation, the defendant must prove that “(1) the prosecution

suppressed evidence, (2) it was favorable to the defendant, and (3) it was material.” United States
v. Brown, 650 F.3d 581, 587–88 (5th Cir. 2011). In determining materiality, the Court must consider
whether “the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different

2

light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290 (1999)
(quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)). “[E]vidence is material only if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). A
reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. The
Brady rule does not require that the prosecutor disclose his entire file to defendant, but only the
evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive defendant of a fair trial. Id. at
675. This rule extends to impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence. United States v.
Bolton, 908 F.3d 75, 90 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Swenson, 894 F.3d 677, 683 (5th
Cir. 2018)).
II.

Arguments Regarding the Timeline
Petitioner argues that the State’s failure to produce the 911 recording until after trial

prevented him from impeaching K.W. and Barnes regarding the timeline of the case. Record
Document 21, p. 4. Petitioner’s main argument regarding the timeline appears to be that the 911
recording reveals that Barnes lied during her testimony about the times she received certain text
messages. Id. at 10–11. The Court rejects Petitioner’s argument on this point for the same reason it
rejected Petitioner’s argument that the State’s withholding of the Background Event Chronology
was a Brady violation. See Record Document 20, p. 1.
The R&R states that “[t]he lack of synchronicity as to time between various devices was
thoroughly discussed at trial” and therefore held that the Background Event Chronology did not
undermine confidence in the verdict and was therefore not Brady material. Record Document 15,
p. 19; see Record Documents 9-5, pp. 89–92; 9-6, pp. 78–83. The same is true of the 911 recording.
Furthermore, the phone records of K.W. and Barnes, which included text messages and phone calls,

3

were admitted into evidence. Record Document 9-6, p. 187. Therefore, any testimony given by
Barnes or K.W. that was inconsistent with those phone records would have been apparent to all
parties and the court during Petitioner’s bench trial. As such, there is no reasonable probability that
the 911 recording would have influenced the court’s position regarding the timeline of events in
this case. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
III.

The 911 Recording as Impeachment Evidence
A.

Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner argues that the State’s failure to produce the 911 recording until after his

conviction prevented him from impeaching K.W. as to her reasons for not returning to her hotel the
night the rape took place, her communications with Barnes that night, and her reputation for
truthfulness, “particularly in relation to charges of rape.” Record Document 21, p. 12. Petitioner
also claims that he was denied the opportunity to impeach Barnes regarding the timeline of that
evening and K.W.’s reputation for truthfulness. Id. at 11. Petitioner asserts that his case rested on
whether the trial court believed his testimony or K.W.’s testimony regarding their sexual encounter.
Id. at 7–8. Thus, Petitioner claims that the trial court was entitled to hear “any and all evidence
concerning known inconsistencies, unusual features, internal contradictions, and irreconcilable
conflicts with physical evidence in K.W.’s story” and that “not even K.W.’s own mother found the
claims of a known drama queen to be credible.” Id. at 12.
In response, the State argues that the 911 recording fails to qualify as Brady evidence
because (1) it is not favorable to Petitioner; (2) it is not material to guilt or punishment or for
impeachment purposes; and (3) the recording is not sufficient to undermine confidence in the
judge’s verdict. Record Document 24, p. 2. The State claims that Barnes’ reference to K.W. as a
“drama queen” in the 911 recording is not favorable to Petitioner because “it does not carry a

4

connotation of untruthfulness, only excessive emotional displays or attention-seeking behavior.”
Id. at 6. The State also argues that Barnes could not have been questioned at trial about why she
called K.W. a drama queen because that comment does not relate to K.W.’s general reputation for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, which is the only type of reputation evidence allowed under the
Louisiana Code of Evidence. Id. at 7. Finally, the State argues that Petitioner’s request for relief
should be denied because “[t]here is no reasonable probability that the 911 call would have
produced a different verdict.” Id. at 10.
B.

Application
1.

The 911 recording was not favorable to Petitioner

In its brief, the State provides the Court with a text version of the 911 recording. 2 Record
Document 24, pp. 2–6. After reviewing the entirety of the call, the Court finds that Petitioner’s
attempt to paint Barnes’ comments as favorable to himself constitutes a misrepresentation of the
content of the phone call and takes Barnes’ comments completely out of context. During the call,
Barnes states that K.W. sent her a text that said “mom, the cop raped me.” Id. at 2. Barnes then
states:
I don’t know if she’s just pulling my chain or if it really happened. She’s still not
here back at the hotel, we couldn’t find her, we waited over an hour . . . I don’t
know what’s going on and I just want to report this because I don’t know what to
do.
Id. at 2–3. While explaining to the 911 operator the circumstances in which she last saw K.W.,
Barnes told the operator that K.W. was with her boyfriend, which prompted the following
interaction:
911: Surely, yeah, but it’s not adding up, though, surely the guy is not going to let
an officer rape her and they’re all hanging out together2

Petitioner provided the Court with a copy of the 911 recording. Record Document 21-1. Upon
the Court’s review, the State has accurately relayed the content of the recording in its brief.
5

Barnes: That’s what I don’t – I know – that’s what I – believe me
911: That doesn’t make any sense at all. There’s just no possible, that would be
strange, I mean, that meansBarnes: Let me tell you, he’s got a knife on him, he put it in his shoe911: I know, but you’re saying, and then, and then, you’re saying an officer raped
herBarnes: No, I’m sure, I’m not sure that, I mean – this is an eighteen-year-old drama
queen, yeah probablyId. at 4–5.
Barnes’s reaction to K.W.’s text message must be read in context of the entire 911 recording.
To begin, the degree to which these comments reflect any disbelief of K.W.’s request for help is
severely undercut by the fact that Barnes took the request seriously enough to call 911. Furthermore,
Barnes referred to K.W. as a drama queen only after the 911 operator questioned the validity of
Barnes’ report three times. Id. During the call, Barnes makes several efforts to obtain help for K.W.,
such as making sure the call was being recorded, asking for a police officer to take her to where
K.W. was, and trying to call K.W. Id. at 4. Moreover, Barnes states repeatedly that she does not
know what to do, highlighting the fact that Barnes was distressed and confused during the call. Id.
at 2–6. In context, Barnes’ comments appear to reflect that she was overwhelmed rather than
suspicious of K.W.’s request for help. Because Barnes’ comments do not reflect doubts as to K.W.’s
credibility, the 911 recording was not favorable to Petitioner.
2.

The 911 recording was not material

Even if the 911 recording constituted evidence clearly favorable to Petitioner, he has failed
to demonstrate that it meets the Bagley standard of materiality. First, Petitioner would not have
been able to use Barnes’ statements in the 911 recording to impeach K.W. as to her own credibility

6

during cross-examination. The 911 recording constitutes inadmissible hearsay under the Louisiana
Code of Evidence. La. C.E. arts. 801 & 802. Furthermore, although article 607(D)(2) allows a
witness’s credibility to be impeached using a prior inconsistent statement, there is no evidentiary
rule that allows a witness to be impeached by another party’s prior inconsistent statement. Id. at art.
607(D).
Second, any benefit Petitioner might have gained by impeaching Barnes as to K.W.’s
credibility would have been minimal at best. Louisiana Code of Evidence article 608(A) provides
that the credibility of a witness may be attacked by evidence in the form of general reputation only
in reference to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Id. at art. 608(A)(1). In isolation, Barnes’
statements that K.W. was “an eighteen-year-old drama queen” and wasn’t sure whether K.W. was
“just pulling [her] chain or if it really happened” could indicate that K.W. tended to exaggerate the
truth. However, as noted above, when the statements are placed in context along with the rest of the
911 recording, their benefit to Petitioner is greatly reduced. Additionally, it is difficult to image that
Petitioner would have been able to gain a favorable answer from Barnes by questioning her about
her own daughter’s character for truthfulness.
Finally, although Petitioner cites cases in support of his argument that the 911 recording is
material, it does not rise to the same level of materiality as the evidence withheld in Petitioner’s
cited cases. In State v. Kemp, the Louisiana Supreme Court overturned the petitioner’s conviction
and sentence for second degree murder because of a Brady violation. 2000-2228 (La. 10/15/02);
828 So. 2d 540, 546. In that case, the State failed to timely disclose witness statements that would
have supported the petitioner’s claim that he shot the victim in self-defense. Id. In State v. Lindsey,
the defendant relied on intoxication as his sole defense to the charge of second-degree murder.
2002-2363 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/2/03); 844 So. 2d 961, 969. After his conviction, defendant discovered

7

the previously-undisclosed statements of two witnesses that contained exculpatory evidence
essential to his intoxication defense and contradicted their trial testimony regarding his intoxication
at the time of the murder. Id. at 963. The court found that the witnesses’ statements were “clearly
material in light of Kemp” and granted defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief. Id. at 969.
Unlike the evidence at issue in Kemp and Lindsey, Barnes’ comments in the 911 recording
do not directly support a defense offered by Petitioner. Kemp and Lindsey both involved witness
statements wherein the witnesses’ direct accounts supported the defendants’ version of events. In
this case, Petitioner attempts to use Barnes’ statements out of context in order to support a
conclusion that she did not make herself, that K.W. was known to be untruthful and was not
credible. Record Document 21, pp. 12–13. The Court finds that Barnes’ off-hand comments, made
in a high-stress situation, do not constitute material evidence that would have changed the result of
Petitioner’s trial if the 911 recording had been disclosed. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
3.

The 911 recording was not material in the context of the entire record

The materiality of an omitted piece of evidence must be evaluated in the context of the entire
record. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976). This is necessary because “[i]f there is no
reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evi[dence] is considered, there is no
justification for a new trial,” whereas “additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be
sufficient to create a reasonable doubt” if a verdict is already of questionable validity. Id. at 112–
13. In this case, the record contains both testimonial and physical evidence corroborating K.W.’s
version of events, aside from her own testimony and that of Barnes.
As to physical evidence, Melanie Hubbard (“Hubbard”), an expert in the field of sexual
assault forensic examination, performed a sexual assault evaluation on K.W. that revealed four slits
or lacerations at the bottom of K.W.’s vaginal opening. Record Document 9-5, p. 39. Hubbard

8

testified that these lacerations were outside of the norm and indicated rough intercourse, which
could have occurred with or without consent. Id. at 40. The trial court also heard testimony from
Jonathan Long (“Long”), a bail bondsman that encountered K.W. before the rape while she was
attempting to bail her boyfriend out of jail following his arrest. Record Document 15, p. 3. Long
testified that K.W. told him that Petitioner had driven her to the jail and was making unwanted
sexual advances towards her. Record Document 9-4, pp. 171. Long stated that K.W. asked him for
a ride and was “pretty upset and crying pretty deeply.” Id. at 172. After Long refused to give K.W.
a ride, Petitioner told K.W. that they were going to his office to use the phone and a nearby ATM.
Record Document 15, p. 3.
Furthermore, Gerald Posey (“Posey”), a deputy and the Technical Resources Manager of
the Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Office, testified that the cameras at Government Plaza were operated by
the Sheriff’s office and that Petitioner was the only person with the City, other than the IT personnel,
who was a “power user,” that is, someone who could delete videos from the video index. Record
Document 9-4, p. 235; see Seaton, 112 So. 3d at 1016. Posey also testified that five security videos
from the evening of the crime had been deleted from the video index. Record Document 9-4, p.
239. These videos, later recovered, included footage of Petitioner and K.W. walking into and exiting
Government Plaza through the parking garage. Record Document 9-5, p. 64. As the State points
out, Petitioner would not need to delete video evidence if the sexual encounter between himself and
K.W. was consensual. See Record Document 24, p. 7.
Based on the above, the Court agrees with the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeals
that that Petitioner’s “attempts to portray the victim as a sinister person plotting his downfall” are
not supported by the record. Seaton, 112 So. 3d at 1019–20. Because of the significant evidence in
the record supporting K.W.’s version of events, the Court finds that the verdict in this case was not

9

of “questionable validity” and that there is no reasonable doubt about Petitioner’s guilt, whether or
not the 911 recording is considered. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112–113. Therefore, the 911 recording, and
any ability it may have given Petitioner to impeach the credibility of K.W. and Barnes, is not
material in the context of the entire record. Id. at 112.
IV.

Officer Holloway’s Report
Petitioner claims that the State’s failure to timely disclose the 911 audio recording was

compounded by another Brady violation: its failure to disclose the police report of Officer Matthew
Holloway (“Officer Holloway”). Record Document 21, pp. 8–9. In this report, Officer Holloway
states that when he arrived at Barnes’ location in response to her 911 call, Barnes told him that
K.W. had texted her to let her know that K.W.’s boyfriend had been arrested. Record Document 98, p. 151. Petitioner claims that this report contradicts K.W.’s testimony that she went with
Petitioner initially because she did not want her family to learn that her boyfriend had been arrested.
Record Document 21, p. 9. Petitioner does not provide the Court with a citation to K.W.’s testimony
on this matter. Nevertheless, for the same reasons discussed above, the Court finds that this report
is not sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial court’s ruling in the context of
the entire record.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the 911 recording was not material to
Petitioner’s guilt or punishment and would not have changed the outcome of the trial if it had been
timely disclosed. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. Therefore, the 911 recording is not Brady material, and
the instant petition [Record Document 1] is DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings for the U.S. District Courts
requires the district court to issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order

10

adverse to the applicant. A court may issue a certificate of appealability only if the applicant has
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The Court
has considered the record in this case and the standard set forth in § 2253. Although the Court
denies the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s motion for a
certificate of appealability [Record Document 19] because the Petitioner has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
A judgment consistent with this ruling will issue herewith.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana on this 31st day of
2020. March,

ELIZABETH E. FOOTE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

11