Thomas v. Barclays Capital Inc et al

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM RULING re 29 MOTION to Strike 27 Response to Motion filed by Barclays Commercial Mortgage Securities L L C, Barclays Bank Delaware, Barclays Capital Securities Ltd, Barclays P L C, Barclays Bank P L C, Barcl ays Dryrock Funding L L C, Barclays Capital Inc, Barclays Dryrock Issuance Trust, 10 MOTION to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim Barclays PLC; Barclays Bank PLC; Barclays Capital Inc.; Barclays Commercial Mortgage Securities LLC; Barclays Capital Securities LTD; Barclays Dryrock Funding LLC; and Barclays Dryrock Issuance Trust filed by Barclays Commercial Mortgage Securities L L C, Barclays Bank Delaware, Barclays Capital Securities Ltd, Barclays P L C, Barclays Bank P L C, Barclays Dryrock Funding L L C, Barclays Capital Inc, Barclays Dryrock Issuance Trust, 11 MOTION to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim James Staley, David Henderson, James Gibson, Larry Kravetz, Curt Hess, John Thomas McFarlane, Tushar Morzaria, and Matthew Larson filed by Tushar Morzaria, Larry Kravetz, John Thomas McFarlane, James Gibson, Matthew Larson, David Henderson, Curt Hess, James Staley. Signed by Chief Judge S Maurice Hicks, Jr on 1/4/2019. (crt,McDonnell, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

DEUNTAE THOMAS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-0257

VERSUS

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

BARCLAYS CAPITAL INC ET AL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Record Document
10) filed by defendants Barclays Bank Delaware (“Barclays”), Barclays PLC, Barclays
Bank PLC, Barclays Capital Inc., Barclays Commercial Mortgage Securities LLC,
Barclays Capital Securities LTD, Barclays Dryrock Funding LLC, and Barclays Dryrock
Issuance Trust (collectively “Corporate Defendants”). Also before the Court is another
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Record Document 11) filed by defendants James
Staley, David Henderson, James Gibson, Larry Kravetz, Curt Hess, John Thomas
McFarlane, Tushar Morzaria, and Matthew Larson (collectively “Individual Defendants”).
Both motions seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims under F.R.C.P. Rules 12(b)(2) and
12(b)(6). For the following reasons, both motions are GRANTED.
Also pending before the Court is a Motion to Strike (Record Document 29) filed by
Defendants. For the reason stated in Section III of this Memorandum Ruling, the motion
is DENIED as moot.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s factual allegations are as follows:
I opened 4 accounts online with Barclays: 2 CD accounts ending in 6878
and 6880 valued at $1,000,000 each and two Savings Accounts ending in

6859 and 6861 valued at $250,000 each on July 11, 2014 using the account
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago ending in 5447 with the routing
number 0710-0030-1 and received immediate confirmation electronically.
On July 14, 2017 I received an email communication stating that the
transfers were reversed because the transfers were not accepted by the
Federal Reserve bank. In the exhibits that I provide I show that not only did
the transfers go through and stick but all payments the Federal Reserve
banks process are final and irrevocable. With this knowledge any competent
person with this information will reason that since according to the rules for
ACH payments that payments take up to two days to settle and once settled
the payments are final, irrevocable, and that FedWire will not accept the
money it has transferred out. All of this information can easily be found on
the Federal Reserve website or by diligent self-search. Going by this
information it stands to reason that if any reversals were to occur on day 3
or later of a FedWire transfer then no actual reversal has occurred but fraud
and theft by the recipient of the funds from the Federal Reserve. Since this
has occurred I have been calling into Barclays trying to speak with a highlevel manager to discuss the reasons for the theft [of] the funds from the
accounts and closure of these accounts without authorized permission from
me. When I do call I get the run around and if/when I speak to a manager I
am told that I have committed a scam and that the call will be disconnected
immediately. Barclays has put me on their list for scammers and made it to
where when I call in I can only speak with the Fraud Department, and now
they claim that they have spoken to me on the subject matter and will no
longer speak with me. The last time I contacted Barclays I had to call in
multiple times, got disconnected multiple times, disrespected by the
managers and employees, and told that I was a scammer when I tried to tell
the managers that not only do I have evidence that I am in honor but I can
show that Barclays took the money, allowed the payment to settle for the
maximum time period of two-days, and prove that FedWire states that all of
its transactions occur either instantaneously or same day and that these
transfers are final, irrevocable, and FedWire will not take these payments
back. They have dishonored me by claiming that I’m dealing with a
fraudulent transaction.
Record Document 1 at 5.
In addition to his factual allegations, Plaintiff attached a number of documents to
his complaint as exhibits. See Record Document 1-2. These documents include: screen
shots of various web pages, including the web pages of the Federal Reserve, the National
Automated Clearinghouse, Wikipedia, and PYMNTS.com; a UCC filing acknowledgment
from the California Secretary of State; and email correspondence between Plaintiff and
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Barclays. With these documents, Plaintiff attempts to show that, “not only did the transfers
go through and stick but all payments the Federal Reserve banks process are final and
irrevocable.” Record Document 1 at 5.
Thus, to summarize Plaintiff’s factual allegations, Plaintiff opened four bank
accounts with Barclays. He then instructed Barclays to request a wire transfer of $2.5
million from an account at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (“Federal Reserve”)
apportioned to his four Barclays accounts. Barclays proposed this transfer of funds
request, and the Federal Reserve subsequently transferred funds totaling $2.5 million to
Plaintiff’s Barclay’s accounts. After two days, these transfers became “final and
irrevocable.” Record Document 1 at 5. Plaintiff then received email correspondence from
Barclays stating that “the transfers were reversed because the transfers were not
accepted by the Federal Reserve Bank.” Id. However, Plaintiff argues, because the
transfer from the Federal Reserve was final and irrevocable at this time, the Federal
Reserve would not have accepted any “reversal” of the funds. Therefore, Plaintiff reasons,
the money was not actually transferred back to the Federal Reserve but was instead
“stolen” by Barclays.
Plaintiff further alleges that on his attempts to reach out to Barclays, he has been
accused of attempting to scam Barclays and has been placed on Barclays’ “list of
scammers.” Id. Additionally, he claims that his calls have been ignored and that he has
been disrespected by the employees and management at Barclays. Based on these facts,
Plaintiff filed the current lawsuit seeking relief in the amount of $17,500,000. Id.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I.

Legal Standards

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a. F.R.C.P. 12(b)(2)
Under F.R.C.P 12(b)(2) a defendant may seek to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims
against him because personal jurisdiction over that defendant is absent. There is personal
jurisdiction if the state's long-arm statute extends to the defendant and the exercise of
such jurisdiction is consistent with due process. See Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int'l Corp.,
523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2008). The Louisiana long arm statute extends as far as is
permitted by due process. See Patin v. Thoroughbred Power Boats Inc., 294 F.3d 640
(5th Cir. 2002). The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant comports with due
process only if (1) the defendant has purposefully availed himself of the benefits and
protection of Louisiana by establishing “minimum contacts” with Louisiana and (2) the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice. Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 285 (5th Cir.
1997).
Personal jurisdiction may be general or specific. General jurisdiction “requires
‘continuous and systematic’ forum contacts and allows for jurisdiction over all claims
against the defendant, no matter their connection to the forum.” In re DePuy
Orthopaedics, Incorporated, Pinnacle Hip Implant Product Liability Litigation, 888 F.3d
753, 778 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted). Specific jurisdiction “obtains only
where a defendant ‘purposefully directs’ his activities toward the state, and the plaintiff’s
claim ‘arises out of or is related to’ the defendant’s forum contacts.” Id. (internal citations
omitted).
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. See Patterson v. Aker
Sols. Inc., 826 F.3d 231, 233 (5th Cir. 2016). If, as here, the court rules on personal

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jurisdiction without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing only a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. See Quick Techs., Inc. v.
Sage Grp. PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2002). In determining whether plaintiff has
met its burden, the Court “must accept the plaintiff’s uncontroverted allegations, and
resolve in [his] favor all conflicts between the facts contained in the parties' affidavits and
other documentation.” Patterson, F.3d at 233.
b. Rule 12(b)(6)
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the requirements for
pleadings that state a claim for relief, requiring that a pleading contain "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The standard for the
adequacy of complaints under Rule 8(a)(2) is now a "plausibility" standard found in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and its progeny. Under this standard, “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). A claim for relief is
plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A
claim for relief is implausible on its face when the “well pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id.
Rule 9(b) governs the requirements for pleadings that allege fraud. According to
this rule, "a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 9(b). A plaintiff bringing a fraud claim must "specify the statements contended
to be fraudulent, identify the speaker, state when and where the statements were made,
and explain why the statements were fraudulent." ABC Arbitrage v. Tchuruk, 291 F.3d

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336, 350 (5th Cir. 2002); see also United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc.,
625 F.3d 262, 266 (5th Cir. 2010) (plaintiffs alleging fraud must allege the “who, what,
when, where, and how” of the alleged fraud). The standard for pleading fraud is, therefore,
a higher standard than the standard for pleading other claims that must only comply with
the Rule 8(a)(2) standard.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows parties to seek dismissal of a
party's pleading for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In deciding
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court generally "may not go outside the pleadings."
Colle v. Brazos Cty., Tex., 981 F.2d 237, 243 (5th Cir. 1993). However, a court may also
rely upon "documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which
a court may take judicial notice" in deciding a motion to dismiss. Dorsey v. Portfolio
Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008). A judicially noticed fact “must be one not
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(b).
When analyzing a complaint for purposes of 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all
allegations in a complaint as true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. However, courts do not
have to accept legal conclusions as facts. See id. Courts considering a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6) are only obligated to allow those complaints that are facially plausible
under the Iqbal and Twombly standard to survive such a motion. See id. at 678-679. If
the complaint does not meet this standard, it can be dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. See id. The same is true for fraud claims that fail to
meet the requirements of Rule 9(b). See United States ex rel. Gage v. Davis S.R. Aviation,

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L.L.C., 623 Fed. Appx. 622, 625-26 (5th Cir. 2015) (unpublished). Such a dismissal ends
the case "at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the
court." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558.
“We hold pro se plaintiffs to a more lenient standard than lawyers when analyzing
complaints, but pro se plaintiffs must still plead factual allegations that raise the right to
relief above the speculative level.” Chhim v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469
(5th Cir. 2016). While dismissals of pro se pleaders under 12(b)(6) are ordinarily
accompanied by leave to amend, it is not necessary to grant such leave where it is
“obvious from the record that the plaintiff has pled his best case.” Hale v. King, 642 F.3d
492, 503 (5th Cir. 2011).

II.

Analysis
a. Personal Jurisdiction
i. Barclays Bank Delaware

The Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of the Corporate Defendants (Record
Document 10) argues that “Plaintiff has not alleged a basis for personal jurisdiction over
any [Corporate] Defendant, except for [Barclays].” Record Document 10-1 at 20. The
Court takes this to mean that Barclays is not asserting a 12(b)(2) challenge. Therefore,
personal jurisdiction as to Barclays will not be addressed. The remaining Corporate
Defendants and all Individual Defendants seek dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction
under Rule 12(b)(2).
ii. All Other Defendants
As to the remaining Corporate Defendants, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed
to meet his burden in establishing personal jurisdiction. As stated above, the burden is on
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Plaintiff to establish jurisdiction. See Patterson v. Aker Sols. Inc., 826 F.3d 231, 233 (5th
Cir. 2016). To meet his burden, Plaintiff must allege that the defendants have had
sufficient “minimum contacts” with the state of Louisiana to support personal jurisdiction,
either specific or general. Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the remaining Corporate
Defendants are domiciled in Louisiana. Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to allege any
contacts by the remaining Corporate Defendants with the forum state of Louisiana. In fact,
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts in his complaint connecting any of the remaining
Corporate Defendants to the events at issue in this case. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to
meet his burden to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction regarding these
defendants. See Quick Techs., Inc. F.3d at 343. Therefore, all claims against the
remaining Corporate Defendants should be DISMISSED for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The same is true regarding all Individual Defendants. Plaintiff does not allege that
any Individual Defendant is domiciled or resides in Louisiana. Additionally, Plaintiff has
failed to allege that any Individual Defendant had any connection to the events
surrounding this case or has had any contacts with the State of Louisiana. Therefore,
Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to make a prima facie showing of personal
jurisdiction for the Individual Defendants. For these reasons, all claims against the
Individual Defendants should be DISMISSED for lack of personal jurisdiction. 1

1

It is worth noting here that even if this Court had personal jurisdiction over the
Corporate Defendants, it would not automatically have personal jurisdiction over any
Individual Defendant by virtue of his or her association with a Corporate Defendant. See
Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1985) (“While the general rule is that
jurisdiction over an individual cannot be predicated upon jurisdiction over a corporation,
courts have recognized an exception to this rule when the corporation is the alter ego of
the individual.”). Plaintiff has alleged no facts suggesting that any of the Corporate
Defendants are “alter egos” of any of the Individual Defendants.
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b. Failure to State a Claim
It is only necessary to address Barclays’ 12(b)(6) challenge, as all other
defendants have been dismissed under 12(b)(2). However, the Court notes that the
following analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) would apply with equal force to all other defendants
if they were subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction.
Plaintiff fails to identify any particular provision of law providing a cause of action.
However, he does make vague references to “theft,” “fraud,” and “defamation.” See
Record Document 1. Additionally, in Section II(A) of Plaintiff’s complaint, he lists the
following provisions of law as bases for federal question jurisdiction: the entire Uniform
Commercial Code, The National Bank Act, The Federal Tax Lien Act, 42 U.S.C. Chapter
7, U.S. Code Title 18, U.S. Code Title 28, and the Dodd Frank Act. Id. at 3. Plaintiff does
not cite to specific sections of these statutes and does not mention any of these provisions
of law in the body of his complaint. However, because we hold pro se plaintiffs to a “more
lenient standard than lawyers when analyzing complaints,” the Court will address the
causes of action that may be related to these vague references. See Chhim, 836 F.3d at
469.
i. Theft or Conversion
As stated in the factual background section above, Plaintiff alleges that Barclays
did not “reverse” the transfer of the $2.5 million, but committed “theft” of the funds. See
Record Document 1 at 5. Taking all of Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, Plaintiff fails
to state a claim for the alleged “theft” of $2.5 million.
For any cause of action related to the theft of property, Plaintiff would be required
to show that he has a right to the property. For example, under Louisiana law, the relevant

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claim would be one of conversion. In order to prevail on a claim of conversion under
Louisiana law, “the plaintiff must prove that: (1) he owned or had the right to possess
funds that were misused by the defendant; (2) the misuse was inconsistent with the
plaintiff's rights of ownership; and, (3) the misuse constituted a wrongful taking of the
funds.” Watson v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 2015 WL 5714635, at *8
(E.D. La. 2015) (quoting Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Perry Chrysler Plymouth, 783 F.2d 480,
484 (5th Cir. 1986).
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege that he has any right to the funds in the Federal
Reserve account at issue. Additionally, and most importantly, the Court takes judicial
notice of the fact that “individuals cannot, by law, have accounts at the Federal Reserve,”
as the Federal Reserve “provides financial services to banks and governmental entities
only.” Does the Federal Reserve maintain accounts for Individuals? Can individuals use
such accounts to pay bills and get money?, (Dec. 27, 2018, 1:20 PM),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/does-the-federal-reserve-maintain-accounts-forindividuals-can-individuals-use-such-accounts-to-pay-bills-and-get-money.htm; See also
12 C.F.R. Subchapter A. 2 Thus, not only does Plaintiff fail to allege that he had a right to
the funds in the Federal Reserve Account, he is legally precluded from having any such
right or account. Even if Plaintiff had alleged such a right, his claim would be implausible
at best. Therefore, any claim for conversion or theft should be DISMISSED for failure to
state a claim.

2

A review of these provisions, which govern the Federal Reserve system, makes clear
that membership in that system is reserved for financial institutions and governmental
entities. Nowhere do the regulations authorize the Federal Reserve banks to maintain
accounts for individuals.
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i. National Bank Act Claim
Plaintiff has also failed to state a claim under the “National Bank Act.” Plaintiff has
alleged that, “under the National Bank Act . . . financial institutions may be charged double
for any damages caused for loss of property.” See Record Document 1 at 4. Because it
has already been determined that Plaintiff has failed to allege, and could not plausibly
allege, that he has any right to the $2.5 million at issue in this case, it is not plausible that
Plaintiff has suffered any “loss of property.” Additionally, in its research, the Court has
found that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under any other provision of the “National
Bank Act.” Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim for “double damages” under the National Bank Act
is DISMISSED.
ii. Defamation Claim
Under Louisiana law, “[f]our elements are necessary to establish a defamation
cause of action: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an
unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the
publisher; and (4) resulting injury.” Trentecosta v. Beck, 703 So.2d 552, 559
(La.10/21/97). The “publication element” of this cause of action requires “publication or
communication of defamatory words to someone other than the person defamed.” Perez
v. City of New Orleans, 173 F. Supp. 3d 337 (E.D. La. 2016). While Plaintiff does allege
that he has been called a “scammer” and has been personally “disrespected by managers
and employees” of Barclays Bank, he does not allege that any defamatory statements
have been communicated to a third party. See Record Document 1. Therefore, Plaintiff
has failed to adequately plead a cause of action for defamation and thus the defamation
claim should be DISMISSED

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iii. Fraud Claim
Under Louisiana law, the elements of Fraud are “1) a misrepresentation of a
material fact, 2) an intent to deceive (fraudulent intent), and 3) justifiable reliance and
resulting damages.” Tureau v. Hess Corp., 2015 WL 1542508 (W.D. La. 2015) (Opinion
by Chief Judge Drell). F.R.C.P. Rule 9 states that, “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party
must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Here, there
are no allegations that Plaintiff reasonably or justifiably relied on any representation made
by Barclays or that any such reliance resulted in damages to Plaintiff. While he does seem
to allege that Barclays falsely represented that the Federal Reserve rejected Barclays’
transfer request, Plaintiff does not allege that he acted in reliance on this representation
to his detriment. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead fraud and thus the
fraud claim should be DISMISSED.
iv. Uniform Commercial Code Claims
Plaintiff cites the entire Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) and specifically UCC
Article 4 in his complaint as bases for federal question jurisdiction. UCC Article 4 governs
bank deposits and collections. After review, the Court finds that UCC Article 4 does not
provide a cause of action or claim relevant to this particular matter. Therefore, Plaintiff
has failed to state a claim under UCC 4 and any such claim should be DISMISSED.
Article 4A of the UCC governs the rights and obligations of parties to funds
transfers. It has been adopted by every state in the United States, except South Carolina.
Additionally, Article 4A has been incorporated into Regulation J, which governs the rights
and obligations of parties to funds transfers through Fedwire, the funds transfer system
established by the Federal Reserve. For our purposes, Regulation J has no relevant
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differences from UCC 4A. Based on the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint and the
documents attached to that Complaint, the Court finds that UCC 4A is inapplicable to the
current case.
UCC 4A governs “funds transfer[s].” A “funds transfer” is defined as “the series of
transactions, beginning with the originator’s payment order, made for the purpose of
making payment to the beneficiary of the order.” La. Stat. Ann. § 10:4A-104. A “payment
order” is defined as “an instruction of a sender to a receiving bank . . . to pay, or to cause
another bank to pay . . . money to a beneficiary if: (ii) the receiving bank is to be
reimbursed by debiting an account of, or otherwise receiving payment from, the sender .
. . .” La. Stat. Ann. § 10:4A-103. In this case, the “receiving bank” is the Federal Reserve
and the “sender” is Plaintiff. Under the facts alleged in the Complaint, the Federal Reserve
was not to be reimbursed by “debiting an account of, or otherwise receiv[ing] payment
from,” the Plaintiff. Id. In fact, as discussed above, Plaintiff did not, and cannot, plausibly
allege that he maintains an account at the Federal Reserve that could be debited.
Additionally, Plaintiff fails to allege that the Federal Reserve would be reimbursed in any
way after the transfer took place. Therefore, because the instruction from Plaintiff at issue
in this case cannot be considered a “payment order” for purposes of UCC 4A, Plaintiff
has failed to state a claim under the Article 4A. Thus, any such claim should be
DISMISSED.
v. Other Provisions of Law Mentioned
Title 28 of the United States Code governs the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.
It does not create a cause of action for Plaintiff under the facts of this case. Therefore,
any claim under this Title should be DISMISSED. Likewise, Title 18 of the United States

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Code defines crimes and offenses against the United States. Plaintiff has alleged only
claims for civil relief. Title 18 is unavailable to Plaintiff. Therefore, any claim under this
Title should be DISMISSED. Additionally, Title 42 of the United States Code, Chapter 7
governs the United States social security program. Plaintiff has made no factual
allegations related to social security. Therefore, any claim under this chapter should also
be DISMISSED. Furthermore, Plaintiff mentions the Federal Tax Lien Act but makes no
mention of taxes in his factual allegations. Therefore, any claim under this Act should be
DISMISSED. Finally, the Dodd Frank Act is a series of statutory provisions enacted after
the Financial Crisis of 2008 to reform Wall Street practices. After review, the Court finds
that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under any provision of the Dodd Frank Act and any
such claim should be DISMISSED.
III.

Defendants’ Pending Motion to Strike

Pending before the Court is a Motion to Strike (Record Document 29) filed by
Defendants. This motion seeks to have Plaintiff’s Reply to Court’s Second Notice (Record
Document 27) stricken from the record. Plaintiff’s Reply to Court’s Second Notice,
Defendants argue, contains statements that “are scandalous and have no place in this
Court.” Record Document 29-1 at 4. Given that the Court is granting Defendants’ motions
to dismiss, Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED as moot.
CONCLUSION
Because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over all Defendants, except
Barclays, and because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Barclays, Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Record Documents 10 and 11) are hereby
GRANTED. A judgment consistent with the terms of the instant Memorandum Ruling will

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issue herewith. Additionally, Defendants’ Motion to Strike (Record Document 29) is
DENIED as moot.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED at Shreveport, Louisiana, this 4th day of January,
2019.

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