Allen v. Royal Trucking Co et al

Filing 130

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 39 Daubert Motion. Signed by Chief Judge S Maurice Hicks, Jr on 3/31/2020. (crt,McDonnell, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
CORY ALLEN

CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-0420

VERSUS

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

ROYAL TRUCKING CO., ET AL.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Cory Allen’s (“Plaintiff”) Daubert motion to exclude the
testimony of Defendants Royal Trucking Co., Emmett Battle, and Cherokee Insurance
Co.’s (collectively “Defendants”) retained expert, William R. Scott. See Record Document
39. Defendants oppose the motion. See Record Document 49. For the reasons set forth
below, Plaintiff’s motion is hereby DENIED.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. Rule
702 states that “a witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise” if all of the
following elements are met:
(a)

the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue;

(b)

the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c)

the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d)

the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts
of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. This list of elements comes from the seminal case of Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and its progeny. 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). In
Daubert, the Supreme Court stated that courts are required to serve as gatekeepers for

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expert testimony, ensuring that such testimony is both reliable and relevant before it is
admitted into evidence. See id. at 589, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
Certain factors should be considered in determining whether a particular expert’s
opinions are reliable:
(1) whether the expert’s technique or theory can be or has been tested—
that is, whether the expert’s theory can be challenged in some objective
sense, or whether it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that
cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability; (2) whether the technique or
theory has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the known or
potential rate of error of the technique or theory when applied; (4) the
existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) whether the
technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific
community.
Fed. R. Evid. 702, advisory committee’s note (2000) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94,
113 S. Ct. at 2796–97). This list of factors is non-exclusive, as the factors to be considered
may vary depending upon the type of expert opinion at issue in a particular case. See
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149–50, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1175 (1999).
Relevance of expert testimony is a question of “fit,” i.e., whether the expert testimony in
question is well-suited to the issues of a particular case such that it will help the jury in
deciding these issues or in understanding evidence that is outside the average juror’s
ability to understand absent such help. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591–92, 113 S. Ct. at 2795–
96; see also In re Schooler, 725 F.3d 498, 514–15 (5th Cir. 2013).
Though the trial court must fulfill its role as gatekeeper in ensuring that all admitted
expert testimony is both reliable and relevant, “the trial court’s role as gatekeeper is not
intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system.” U.S. v. 14.38 Acres of
Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1996). Thus, “[t]he rejection of expert testimony is the
exception rather than the rule.” Fed. R. Evid. 702, advisory committee’s note (2000).

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“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction
on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but
admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S. Ct. at 2798. The proponent of an
expert’s testimony bears the burden of proving that it meets the requirements of Rule 702.
See Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F. 3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998). Whether these
elements are met is a preliminary question for the district court to decide under Federal
Rule of Evidence 104(a).
The instant matter arises from a train collision on January 2, 2018 in which Plaintiff,
who was operating the locomotive, allegedly suffered serious injury to the lumbar region
of his spine. See Record Document 119 at 5–6. Defendants retained and intend to offer
Dr. Scott as an expert witness in the field of biomechanics to provide testimony as to
whether the motion of Plaintiff’s body during the collision could have caused his alleged
injuries. See Record Document 49 at 5. In response, Plaintiff filed the instant Daubert
motion based on several grounds, including, inter alia, that Dr. Scott is not qualified to
render his opinions, his methodology and opinions are unreliable and based on
insufficient facts, and his opinions are irrelevant. See Record Document 119 at 2.
Upon consideration of the record, the Court is satisfied that Dr. Scott is qualified
as an expert by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” as required by Rule
702. Dr. Scott holds a Ph.D. in mechanical engineering and, further, has authored
numerous publications related to his field of study. See Record Document 49-2 at 1–2.
He has also worked as a principal consultant in the fields of biomechanics and accident
reconstruction since 1989 and has testified numerous times in the past several years.

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See id. at 25–26, 30. 1 Under these circumstances, Dr. Scott possesses sufficient training,
experience, and specialized knowledge to opine as to any aspect of the accident,
including the effect that the force of the impact from the accident had on Plaintiff’s lumbar
region. Plaintiff’s contention that Dr. Scott does not have sufficient experience in
analyzing train collisions specifically does not go to admissibility, but rather credibility, and
therefore is appropriate subject matter for cross-examination.
The Court also finds that Dr. Scott’s opinions appear to be sufficiently reliable and
based on sufficient facts and data. In reaching his opinions, he reviewed the accident
report, images of the locomotive and accident scene, in addition to various depositions
and relevant discovery. See Record Document 49-3 at 2–3. Furthermore, Dr. Scott relied
on his engineering background, knowledge, and experience in assessing the locomotive
event recorder data as part of his injury causation analysis. See Record Document 120
at 3–5. The Court finds that Dr. Scott’s analysis and opinions are “sufficiently grounded
in the methods and procedures of science,” and, moreover, will assist the jury in
determining the cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. Finley, 2019 WL 4087552, at *3. Again,
Plaintiff’s concerns regarding Dr. Scott’s failure to personally inspect the locomotive and
the extent to which he examined other evidence go to the weight, rather than the
admissibility, of Dr. Scott’s opinions. Thus, the Court is persuaded that Dr. Scott’s
methodology and principles are scientifically sound and based on facts sufficient to satisfy
Rule 702’s reliability requirement.

1

The Court notes that another court in this Circuit recently addressed proffered expert
testimony by Dr. Scott and found him qualified to render an opinion as to many of the
same issues present in this case. See Finley v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., No. 18-0192, 2019 WL
4087552, at *2–3 (W.D. Tex. July 10, 2019).
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Accordingly, based on the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of William
R. Scott (Record Document 39) is DENIED.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 31st day of March,
2020.

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