Allen v. Royal Trucking Co et al

Filing 194

MEMORANDUM RULING re 132 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Royal Trucking Co. Signed by Chief Judge S Maurice Hicks, Jr on 10/8/2020. (crt,McDonnell, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
COREY ALLEN

CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-420

VERSUS

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

ROYAL TRUCKING COMPANY,
MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY
EMMETT BATTLE, KANSAS
CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY,
AND THE CHEROKEE INSURANCE COMPANY
MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Record Document
132) filed by Defendant Royal Trucking Company (“Royal”). Royal’s motion seeks
dismissal of Plaintiff Cory Allen’s (“Plaintiff” or “Allen”) and Cross-Claimant Kansas City
Southern Railway Company’s (“KCS”) claims of “negligent hiring, training, instruction,
supervision, following and enforcing proper procedures, rules, and industry standards,
entrustment, and retention and unknown alleged violations of federal law, regulation and
rules.” Record Document 132. Royal contends the claims of direct negligence against it
must be dismissed because Royal has stipulated that its employee, Emmett Battle
(“Battle”), was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the
incident. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion is hereby GRANTED.
Plaintiff and KCS’s claims for negligent hiring, training, and supervision against Royal are
DISMISSED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On or about January 22, 2018, Plaintiff was working as an engineer on a KCS train.
Plaintiff became injured when Royal’s tractor-trailer, driven by Battle, collided with the
train. See Record Document 1. Plaintiff filed claims against Royal and Battle for Battle’s
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negligent operation of the tractor trailer, Royal’s negligent entrustment, and Royal’s
negligent hiring of Battle. See id. at 3. Pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act,
45 U.S.C. § 51, Plaintiff also filed a claim against his employer, KCS, for failing to provide
a safe workplace. See id. KCS, in its answer to Allen’s Complaint, filed a cross claim
against Royal asserting Royal’s negligent hiring, training, and supervision in addition to
Battle’s negligent operating caused Allen’s injuries. See Record Document 5.1
On April 8, 2020, pursuant to an order by Magistrate Judge Hornsby, Royal
stipulated that Battle was acting within the course and scope of his employment with
Royal when the incident occurred. See Record Document 131. Royal then filed the instant
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on April 9, 2020. See Record Document 132.
Plaintiff and KCS filed responses opposing the motion. See Record Documents 136 &
137. Plaintiff and KCS urge this Court to refrain from deciding the present motion until
Royal has fully complied with Magistrate Judge Hornsby’s order to contact all counsel
regarding whether liability or course and scope will be an issue going forward. To date,
Royal has stipulated to course and scope but has failed to explicitly state a position on
liability.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I.

Summary Judgment Standard
“A partial summary judgment order is not a final judgment but is merely a pre-trial
adjudication that certain issues are established for trial of the case.” Streber v. Hunter,
221 F.3d 701, 737 (5th Cir.2000). Partial summary judgment serves the purpose of

1

Plaintiff subsequently filed an Amended Complaint (Record Document 20) realleging the previous claims while
adding defendant Cherokee Insurance Company.

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rooting out, narrowing, and focusing the issues for trial. See Calpetco 1981 v. Marshall
Exploration, Inc., 989 F.2d 1408, 1415 (5th Cir.1993).
Rule 56 of the F.R.C.P. provides that the court “shall grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” F.R.C.P. 56(a). In a summary judgment motion,
“a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings . .
. [and] affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (U.S.
1986) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “If a party fails to properly support an
assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required
by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . grant summary judgment.” F.R.C.P. 56(e)(3).
If the movant meets this initial burden, then the non-movant has the burden of
going beyond the pleadings and designating specific facts that prove that a genuine issue
of material fact exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2554 (U.S. 1986);
see Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). A non-movant, however,
cannot meet the burden of proving that a genuine issue of material fact exists by providing
only “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by
unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.” Little, 37 F.3d 1069, 1075
(5th Cir. 1994).
II.

Analysis
Louisiana Civil Code article 2320 states in relevant part that “masters and

employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by their servants and overseers,

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in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed.” La. C.C. art. 2320. Essential
to establishing this theory of vicarious liability is determining whether the employee’s
negligence occurred within the course and scope of his employment. See Olmeda v.
Cameron Intern. Corp., 139 F.Supp.3d. 816, 834 (E.D. La. 2015). Because of its
stipulation to course and scope, Royal has confirmed that it is vicariously liable for Battle’s
potential negligent conduct. However, Royal argues that because it has accepted
responsibility for Battle, it cannot be held liable for negligent hiring, training, and
supervision as claimed by Plaintiff and KCS. See Record Document 132.
Royal relies on this Court’s previous holding in Dennis v. Collins to support its theory
that all direct negligence claims must be dismissed. In Dennis, Collins, an employee of
Greyhound, was driving a bus when he collided with Dennis’s vehicle. See Dennis v.
Collins, 2016 WL 6637973 (W.D. La. 11/9/16). Dennis filed a claim against Collins for
negligent driving and against Greyhound for negligent supervision, teaching, and training
of Collins. See id. at *1. Greyhound moved for partial summary judgment arguing that
negligent training and supervision causes of action against an employer are “subsumed
within a negligence cause of action against the employee” if it is clear the employee acted
negligently in the course and scope of employment. Id. at *4. This Court, agreeing with
Greyhound’s argument, held that a plaintiff may not simultaneously maintain independent
causes of action in tort against both an employee and an employer for the same incident
when the employer stipulates that the employee acted within the course and scope of
employment. See id. at *7.
In further explanation of its holding in Dennis, this Court also relied on Libersat v.
J & K Trucking, Inc., from the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal. See Libersat v. J &

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K Trucking, Inc., 00-00192 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/11/00); 772 So.2d 173. Libersat involved a
trailer driver who collided with Mr. Libersat when the trailer driver attempted to make a Uturn. See id. at 174. In the appellate court, Mr. Libersat’s surviving spouse argued that
the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the employer’s potential liability for
improper hiring and training. See id. at 178. The Libersat court reasoned, however, that
if the driver-employee was not found negligent “then no degree of negligence on the part
of [the employer] in hiring [the driver] would make [the employer] liable to the Appellants.”
Id. This Court interpreted the Third Circuit’s decision to mean that a complete lack of
training or supervision could not be the but-for or legal cause of Dennis’s injuries absent
some level of negligence on the part of the employee. See Dennis, 2016 WL 6637973 at
*7.
As in Dennis, the present motion for partial summary judgment requires the Court
to answer whether there is a genuine issue of material fact on each element of Plaintiff
and KCS’s negligent hiring, training, and supervision claims against Royal. This Court
finds there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the elements of cause-in-fact or legal
cause regarding the negligent hiring, training, and supervision claims. Royal’s liability to
Allen for the injuries he suffered hinges on whether Battle acted negligently. In other
words, if the trier of fact finds Battle’s negligence to be the cause-in-fact and legal cause
of the harm suffered by Allen, then Royal is negligent. If Battle is not negligent, then no
amount of negligence on the part of Royal in hiring, training, and supervising Battle could
have been the cause-in-fact or legal cause of Allen’s injuries. Royal’s Motion for Partial
summary Judgment is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION

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Based on the foregoing reasons, Royal’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Record
Document 132) is hereby GRANTED.
An order consistent with the terms of the instant Memorandum Ruling shall issue
herewith.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this the 8th day of October,
2020.

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